{ "id": 5434426, "name": "TYREAN OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD SNYDER et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Owens v. Snyder", "decision_date": "2004-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-3765", "first_page": "35", "last_page": "45", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 35" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4972575 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/322/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\" 'The Appellate Court will not reverse the judgment of a lower court when it can determine from the record that the judgment is the only one which could properly be rendered' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5007347 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "\" 'The Appellate Court will not reverse the judgment of a lower court when it can determine from the record that the judgment is the only one which could properly be rendered' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/339/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 977", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5872890 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58949 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill. App. 3d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2726412 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/43/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950581 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456128 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937-38" }, { "page": "938" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3413123 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3596980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1028" }, { "page": "1028" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1580095 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" }, { "page": "330-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/123/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 N.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "summary dismissal of a section 2 - 1401 petition was improper because lack of notice and opportunity to respond undermined the proceedings to the extent the court could not conclude petitioner was not prejudiced" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3739001 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196-97", "parenthetical": "summary dismissal of a section 2 - 1401 petition was improper because lack of notice and opportunity to respond undermined the proceedings to the extent the court could not conclude petitioner was not prejudiced" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 987", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3949814 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sua sponte dismissal of habeas corpus petition improper, regardless of the petition's lack of merit, without notice to petitioner or affording the petitioner an opportunity to respond" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0987-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448551 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 N.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132357 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "applying Pennsylvania law, the court said, \"[a] party may object to personal jurisdiction or improper service of process only on behalf of himself or herself, since the objection may be waived\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221433 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "applying Pennsylvania law, the court said, \"[a] party may object to personal jurisdiction or improper service of process only on behalf of himself or herself, since the objection may be waived\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 1188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a party over whom a court fails to acquire jurisdiction may, at any time, directly or collaterally attack a judgment that the court enters against that party" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910268 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "a party over whom a court fails to acquire jurisdiction may, at any time, directly or collaterally attack a judgment that the court enters against that party" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544451 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577569 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208021 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521896 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "770 N.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 N.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "interpreting section 2 - 201(a) of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 - 201(a) (West 1994)), which says, \"Every action, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint. The clerk shall issue summons upon request of the plaintiff'" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182698 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10-11", "parenthetical": "interpreting section 2 - 201(a) of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 - 201(a) (West 1994)" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "800 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974991 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 N.E.2d 1248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609703 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833020 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "27" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "804 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463105 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 1228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5873203 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "802 N.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3738830 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "774 N.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034113 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" }, { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0834-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1074, "char_count": 24127, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.07699840737259e-07, "percentile": 0.7585440309454335 }, "sha256": "e671f6b4bdbe9410e2aafb98979c29cd74f4e609dccfd2cf2a2d6416e1a6e8c6", "simhash": "1:8b7d75e6aee76454", "word_count": 3964 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:36.100393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CAHILL and BURKE, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "TYREAN OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD SNYDER et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDoes a circuit court judge have the authority to sua sponte dismiss a complaint for mandamus before summons is issued to the defendant?\nThis question has been answered differently by two districts of this court, but is a matter of first impression in the First District. The Fourth District answered affirmatively, finding trial courts have the \u201cinherent authority\u201d to protect their dockets from the numerous, frivolous mandamus requests filed by inmates. Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App. 3d 834, 840, 774 N.E.2d 457 (2002). The Second District disagreed, holding trial courts must follow the mandamus procedure, including service on the defendant, outlined by the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d 175, 802 N.E.2d 381 (2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill. 2d 538 (2004). We agree with the Fourth District\u2019s conclusion, but for different reasons.\nFACTS\nPlaintiff Tyrean Owens pleaded guilty to charges of delivery of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, and criminal damage to property on August 9, 2000. The circuit court sentenced him to three consecutive prison terms: five years for delivery of a controlled substance, two years for possession of a controlled substance, and three years for criminal damage to property. The circuit court also admonished plaintiff that he would be placed on mandatory supervised release for three years. Plaintiff never filed a motion to withdraw his plea and did not pursue a direct appeal.\nPlaintiff did file a postconviction petition contending that his sentence violated the holding of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The trial court summarily dismissed his petition and this court affirmed on appeal. People v. Owens, No. 1 \u2014 01\u20140772 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn October 9, 2002, plaintiff filed his pro se complaint for mandamus against defendant Donald Snyder, the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). In his complaint, plaintiff alleged IDOC would improperly begin his mandatory supervised release after his discharge from prison. He contended his term of mandatory supervised release should run concurrently with his prison terms; otherwise, he could possibly serve more time than he agreed to in the plea agreement, because an inmate may be reincarcerated if he violates the terms of the supervised release (see 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20149 (West 2002)).\nOn October 18, 2002, the circuit court \u201csummarily\u201d denied plaintiffs complaint, a sua sponte dismissal, without prior notice to him. No reason for the dismissal appears in the record.\nOn October 30, 2002, the circuit court clerk of Cook County sent plaintiff a letter advising him that \u201cthe Honorable Judge Stuart E. Palmer denied [his] motion for petition for Mandamus, off call.\u201d The record does not show summons to Director Snyder was issued or that he was served a summons or the complaint. Snyder never responded to the complaint. We assume there was no summons or service.\nPlaintiff now appeals, contending the circuit court lacked the authority to summarily dismiss his complaint for mandamus under the relevant provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)).\nDECISION\nBy challenging the circuit court\u2019s power to sua sponte dismiss his complaint for mandamus under the Code, plaintiff presents an issue of statutory construction. Questions of statutory construction are questions of law, reviewed de novo. Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Machine Corp., 345 Ill. App. 3d 645, 648, 302 N.E.2d 1228 (2003).\nMandamus is an extreme remedy used to compel a public official to perform a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill. 2d 457, 464, 804 N.E.2d 546 (2004). To prove a legal right to relief by mandamus, the complainant must demonstrate a clear right to the requested relief, the respondent\u2019s clear duty to act, and the respondent\u2019s clear authority to comply with the terms of the order. People ex rel. Madigan, 208 Ill. 2d at 465.\nArticle XIV (the mandamus statute) of the Code provides the procedural framework for mandamus actions. 735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002). In section 14 \u2014 102, the Code provides:\n\u201cUpon the filing of a complaint for mandamus the clerk of the court shall issue a summons, in like form, as near as may be as summons in other civil cases. The summons shall be made returnable within a time designated by the plaintiff not less than 5 nor more than 30 days after the service of the summons.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 102 (West 2002).\nSection 14 \u2014 103 requires served defendants to answer or otherwise plead in response to the complaint within a set period of time. 735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 103 (West 2002). Other sections under the mandamus statute provide for the plaintiff\u2019s reply and amendments to an inadequate complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 104, 14 \u2014 108, 14 \u2014 109 (West 2002).\nPlaintiff contends the summary dismissal is a void order because the trial court did not follow the proper procedure set forth in the Code. Plaintiff contends the Code requires the court to follow specific procedures, such as issuing defendant a summons (735 ILCS 5/14\u2014 102 (West 2002)), prior to dismissing a complaint seeking mandamus.\nWhen interpreting the statute, this court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, which usually is determined by applying the plain meaning of the statute\u2019s language. Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 346 Ill. App. 3d 18, 27, 803 N.E.2d 914 (2003), citing Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320, 789 N.E.2d 1248 (2003). We also adhere to the \u201cdeeply rooted\u201d principle that statutes should not be construed in a way that produces absurd results. Emerald Casino, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 34, citing People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 800 N.E.2d 1201 (2003).\nA statutory notice provision, like the summons requirement in section 14 \u2014 102 (735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 102 (West 2002)), serves three purposes: (1) the defendant is notified of pending litigation; (2) it enables the defendant to appear and defend; and (3) it vests jurisdiction in the trial court over the defendant. Nelson v. Keene Corp., 283 Ill. App. 3d 7, 10-11, 669 N.E.2d 665 (1996) (interpreting section 2 \u2014 201(a) of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 201(a) (West 1994)), which says, \u201cEvery action, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute, shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint. The clerk shall issue summons upon request of the plaintiff\u2019). A judgment rendered against a defendant without proper service of a summons is void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. Nelson, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 11.\nAlthough plaintiff contends the trial court\u2019s dismissal is void, he does not claim the trial court lacked jurisdiction. When issues implicating the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction arise, a reviewing court has a duty to consider them. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334, 770 N.E.2d 177 (2002). We consider the jurisdictional issue before addressing plaintiffs contention that the dismissal is void because the court lacked statutory authority to sua sponte dismiss the complaint.\nIf a court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction, any subsequent order is void ab initio and can be attacked at any time. Schak v. Blom, 334 Ill. App. 3d 129, 134, 777 N.E.2d 635 (2002). Subject matter jurisdiction is derived entirely from the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 9), except in cases involving administrative review. Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 334. The state constitution grants jurisdiction over all \u201cjusticiable matters.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a7 9. \u201c[A] \u2018justiciable matter\u2019 is a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.\u201d Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 335.\nIn Belleville Toyota, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court held that statutory provisions are not \u201cconditions precedent\u201d to subject matter jurisdiction, except in the area of administrative review. In other words, in cases that do not rely on special statutory jurisdiction, the failure to follow statutory requirements did not preclude the court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction. Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 336. Mandamus actions, such as this one, do not rely on special statutory jurisdiction; therefore, the failure to follow the summons and response requirements in the mandamus statute did not deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Forest Preserve District v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 305 Ill. App. 3d 657, 664, 712 N.E.2d 856 (1999).\n\u201cPersonal jurisdiction is conferred by service of summons or by a general appearance and is derived from the actions of the person sought to be bound.\u201d Meldoc Properties v. Prezell, 158 Ill. App. 3d 212, 216, 511 N.E.2d 861 (1987). Once the circuit court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it has the power to impose a personal obligation on that defendant. Meldoc Properties, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 216. Although subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent of the parties (Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286 Ill. App. 3d 499, 505, 676 N.E.2d 679 (1997)), personal jurisdiction can vest in the trial court if a party, by his actions, consents to or waives personal jurisdiction. See Meldoc, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 216. A plaintiff invokes personal jurisdiction by filing a complaint, thereby seeking to be bound to the court\u2019s resolution of the complaint.\nIn this case, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking mandamus. By submitting his request to the court, plaintiff was consenting to the trial court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the mandamus action. We find no legal authority that would allow a plaintiff to avoid a court\u2019s dismissal because of a lack of personal jurisdiction over his opposition. See Christensen v. Saylor, 297 Ill. App. 3d 719, 723, 697 N.E.2d 1188 (1998) (a party over whom a court fails to acquire jurisdiction may, at any time, directly or collaterally attack a judgment that the court enters against that party); see also Fanslow v. Northern Trust Co., 299 Ill. App. 3d 21, 29, 700 N.E.2d 692 (1998) (applying Pennsylvania law, the court said, \u201c[a] party may object to personal jurisdiction or improper service of process only on behalf of himself or herself, since the objection may be waived\u201d). The Second District cases relied on by plaintiff do not turn on a lack of jurisdiction.\nFor these reasons, we believe the court had both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff, enabling it to dismiss his complaint. See also In re Detention of Hayes, 321 Ill. App. 3d 178, 189-90, 747 N.E.2d 444 (2001) (failure to serve process did not deprive the trial court of personal jurisdiction over the Department of Human Services because, although the Department had a statutory duty to arrange for the care, control and treatment of sexually violent persons, the civil commitment order directly affected only the rights of the respondent).\nThe mandamus statute states the clerk of court \u201cshall\u201d issue summons to the defendant, and the defendant \u201cshall\u201d respond within a specified time frame. See 735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 102, 14 \u2014 103 (West 2002). \u201cShall\u201d usually indicates a mandatory intent; however, the courts have interpreted it as directory at times. Emerald Casino, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 27. \u201c[W]hen a statute prescribes the performance of an act by a public official or a public body, \u2018the question of whether it is mandatory or directory depends on its purpose.\u2019 \u201d Emerald Casino, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 27, quoting Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. 2d 13, 21, 373 N.E.2d 1332 (1978).\nIn Shellstrom, as in this case, an inmate of IDOC brought a complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Director of IDOC, challenging the three-year term of mandatory supervised release included in his sentence. The inmate alleged he never was advised of the term of mandatory supervised release and that the term did not appear on the judgment order. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 176. When interpreting the Code\u2019s mandamus sections, the Second District held that the mandamus procedure outlined by the Code, regarding notice to the defendant, reply pleadings, and possible amendments, must be followed even if the complaint has no merit. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 179. The court concluded the omission of a specific summary dismissal section precluded trial courts from dismissing mandamus complaints sua sponte. Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 177. The court expressly disagreed with Mason, an earlier Fourth District case affirming a trial court\u2019s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for mandamus.\nThe Second District also has reversed summary dismissals of habeas corpus petitions and petitions for relief from judgment filed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2002)). People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill. App. 3d 987 (2004) (sua sponte dismissal of habeas corpus petition improper, regardless of the petition\u2019s lack of merit, without notice to petitioner or affording the petitioner an opportunity to respond); People v. Pearson, 345 Ill. App. 3d 191, 196-97, 802 N.E.2d 386 (2003) (summary dismissal of a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition was improper because lack of notice and opportunity to respond undermined the proceedings to the extent the court could not conclude petitioner was not prejudiced).\nIn Mason, the Fourth District based its decision on the trial court\u2019s \u201cinherent\u201d authority to control its docket. The court said:\n\u201c[T]rial courts may evaluate such petitions to determine their sufficiency, particularly when filed by [IDOC] inmates. In so concluding, we take judicial notice of our own records, which show an ever-increasing number of appeals brought by inmates in such cases, as well as the fact that [IDOC] currently houses over 46,000 inmates. The potential to overwhelm the courts and the civil justice system by the filing of groundless [IDOC] inmate mandamus petitions is clear and real, and one first step to deal with this situation is to recognize the trial court\u2019s authority to evaluate such petitions for their sufficiency.\u201d Mason, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 840.\nThe Fourth District cited three cases in support of sua sponte dismissals, although none of the cases involves failure to issue summons.\nIn Barrett v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 123 Ill. App. 2d 326, 260 N.E.2d 94 (1970), the plaintiff appealed the summary dismissal of his complaint after the trial court entered the order without an appearance, answer, or motion by the defendant. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, but gave no further explanation of its ruling. On appeal, this court reviewed the trial court\u2019s dismissal procedure and determined a trial court could consider \u201cthe sufficiency of a pleading on its own initiative *** if for no other reason than to determine the sufficiency \u00f3f the evidence.\u201d Barrett, 123 Ill. App. 2d at 330. The court said:\n\u201cIt is also true that a trial court need give no reasons for its rulings and although in cases such as this where the issues are not clearly formed by the pleadings, the better practice might well be to advise counsel of such reasons, the failure to do so does not result in error. ***\nEven though we believe the procedure could have been more effective, nevertheless we believe that the issue relating to the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action is properly before us. To hold otherwise would require us to reverse the judgment of the trial court without considering or being able to consider the very issue decided by the trial court.\u201d Barrett, 123 Ill. App. 2d at 330-31.\nIn Rhodes v. Mill Race Inn, Inc., 126 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1028, 467 N.E.2d 915 (1984), the trial court, on its own motion, dismissed a count against the defendant, who had not filed an appearance or motion to dismiss. The Second District affirmed the dismissal, finding the complaint failed to state a cause of action against the defendant. The cotut said, \u201c[t]he failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a fundamental defect which may be raised at any time by any means and cannot be waived.\u201d Rhodes, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 1028, citing People ex rel. Defanis v. Futia, 56 Ill. App. 3d 920, 925, 373 N.E.2d 530 (1978).\nIn Mitchell v. Norman James Construction Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 927, 937-38, 684 N.E.2d 872 (1997), this court again recognized a trial court\u2019s authority to sua sponte strike a substantively insufficient claim or dismiss a complaint that fails to state a cause of action. However, in Mitchell, this court vacated the dismissal, even though it found the dismissed counts were conclusory and substantively insufficient, because the trial court should have struck the counts and ordered the plaintiff to replead instead. Mitchell, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 938.\nFollowing Mason, the Fourth District later affirmed the summary dismissal of a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition for relief from judgment (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2002)), brought by a committed, sexually dangerous person. People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill. App. 3d 468 (2004).\nAlthough the Second District in Shellstrom acknowledged that the increasing volume of inmate mandamus requests \u201cis a real concern for trial courts\u201d (Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 178), the court rejected the reasoning in Mason:\n\u201c[W]e should not attempt to remedy this concern by reading into the mandamus statute a summary dismissal procedure that is not there. The procedural framework of mandamus actions is not a policy issue for the courts to decide but, rather, a legislative decision to be made by the General Assembly. Accordingly, it is the province of the legislature, not the judiciary, to amend the statute to allow for summary dismissals.\u201d Shellstrom, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 178.\nWe disagree with the Second District\u2019s conclusions in Shellstrom, Pearson, and Winfrey. The purpose of the relevant sections in the mandamus statute is to protect a defendant from adverse judgment absent notice or the opportunity to defend. We do not see how the failure to follow these procedures prior to dismissal prejudiced plaintiff. Typically, it is the unserved party that challenges the subsequent court action if it adversely affects that party\u2019s interests. See, e.g., Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 770 N.E.2d 177. We have found no case outside the Second District in which the plaintiff was allowed to challenge a trial court order because of lack of service on the defendant.\nWhen a court fails to follow these notice requirements, the Director of IDOC, not the inmate, is denied the protection of notice and the opportunity to defend the complaint against him. Here, the Director of IDOC needed no such protection; he emerged victorious. On appeal, the Director has accepted the court\u2019s dismissal and, in fact, contends we should affirm it.\nPlaintiff does not explain how the court\u2019s deviation from procedure prejudiced him, other than asking, \u201cHow can a petitioner present his substantive claim to a reviewing court from an order and a record like the one in this case?\u201d There is no need to further develop the record, because plaintiffs complaint does not raise any questions of fact or issues of law. Plaintiffs mandamus request requires only the application of the mandatory supervised release section of the Uniform Code of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(d) (West 2002).\nIf the court had issued a summons, defendant would have been required to file a responsive pleading on or before the date specified by the summons. 735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 103 (West 2002). Even if defendant had failed to respond in accordance with the Code, the plaintiff would not have automatically won mandamus relief. Section 14 \u2014 103 of the mandamus statute provides in part, \u201cIf the defendant defaults, judgment by default may be entered by the court.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 103 (West 2002). We take \u201cmay\u201d to be a permissive term. We hold the trial court has discretion to deny a complaint for mandamus even if the defendant fails to challenge it.\nIn this case, we find no prejudice to plaintiff resulted from the trial court\u2019s failure to follow the Code strictly. Perhaps under different circumstances, a defendant might file pleadings acknowledging his duty to fulfill the plaintiffs mandamus request; a sua sponte dismissal would prevent that from occurring. Even under those circumstances, an order granting mandamus would be improper, because mandamus will not issue when the record shows the person whose compulsion is sought is willing to perform the act freely. People ex rel. Courshon v. Hirschfield, 43 Ill. App. 3d 432, 437, 357 N.E.2d 673 (1976). Regardless, we know that possibility does not exist in this case.\nPlaintiff has not raised any legal argument or cited legal authority to support the substantive merit of his complaint, in which he alleged his term of mandatory supervised release must run concurrently with his other prison terms. That is because there is none. His claim is frivolous. Failure to raise arguments or cite supporting legal authority is a violation of Supreme Court Rule 341 (188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)) and we may consider those issues waived. Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 493, 771 N.E.2d 357 (2002).\nWaiver aside, we have reviewed plaintiffs contentions and find his complaint is without merit. Terms of mandatory supervised release are imposed by statute \u201cin addition\u201d to imprisonment and cannot be stricken by the courts. See People v. Russell, 345 Ill. App. 3d 16, 22, 801 N.E.2d 977 (2003), citing 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(d)(2) (West 1998).\nIf the trial court had followed the Code and defendant had been served, plaintiff would be in the same position he now is in. Dismissal of his complaint was inevitable. Plaintiff requests this court to reverse and remand for further proceedings. Such action would have little remedial effect, only delaying dismissal. Cf. Board of Education of School District 851/2 v. Idle Motors, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 359, 364, 90 N.E.2d 121 (1950) (\u201c \u2018The Appellate Court will not reverse the judgment of a lower court when it can determine from the record that the judgment is the only one which could properly be rendered\u2019 \u201d), quoting People v. City of Olney, 322 Ill. App. 43, 48 (1944).\nWe agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff did not demonstrate anything close to a clear, affirmative right to relief, the sine qua non for mandamus. There was nothing plaintiff could do to make it any better. He simply was off the track and could not get back on. We do not believe the legislature intended to require judges and clerks to jump through useless hoops aimed toward impossible goals. This judge did not improperly characterize plaintiffs action as a post-conviction petition, as the trial judge did in Shellstrom. This judge apparently saw the plaintiff\u2019s complaint for what it was \u2014 a totally deficient claim for mandamus relief.\nWe hold a trial judge has the inherent authority to dismiss a patently frivolous mandamus complaint before service on the defendant is issued. But we urge trial judges to use this power with caution, especially in cases related to criminal proceedings. We also suggest trial judges give reasons for early dismissals, for the benefit of the losing litigant and for those called on to review trial court orders.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL and BURKE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "James Geis, of James Geis Law Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TYREAN OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD SNYDER et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201402\u20143765\nOpinion filed June 1, 2004.\nJames Geis, of James Geis Law Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0035-01", "first_page_order": 53, "last_page_order": 63 }