{ "id": 5436248, "name": "WEST BELMONT, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "West Belmont, L.L.C. v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "2004-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-1199", "first_page": "46", "last_page": "56", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 46" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 935", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "800 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974991 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 N.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29956 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "715 N.E.2d 1209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in construing section 19.2 of the Revenue Act of 1939, whether property is used with a view toward profit depends on the intent of the owner in using the property" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 1114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336105 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1117", "parenthetical": "in construing section 19.2 of the Revenue Act of 1939, whether property is used with a view toward profit depends on the intent of the owner in using the property" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/1114-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5394465 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609702 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 522017 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "457-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 961", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307266 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 N.E.2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186496 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "474-75" }, { "page": "475" }, { "page": "472-73" }, { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0469-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 952, "char_count": 25555, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0448397721900272e-07, "percentile": 0.5517827487239604 }, "sha256": "638f0a1a1d60d142cc9fa3b1b4758d2182b85c66d7ae8edb6f7c541e659f0865", "simhash": "1:3230cb6c3924bb31", "word_count": 4079 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:36.100393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "WEST BELMONT, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn an attempt to stimulate economic growth and neighborhood revitalization, the Chicago city council enacted a transfer tax exemption for real property \u201cused primarily for commercial or industrial purposes.\u201d\nThe plaintiff, West Belmont, L.L.C. (West Belmont), purchased property at 1711-1717 West Belmont Avenue in order to develop and build residential townhomes. West Belmont was denied a real property transfer tax exemption by the City of Chicago (the City) because the property was not \u201cused primarily for commercial or industrial purposes\u201d under the Chicago Municipal Code. The circuit court affirmed the administrative hearing officer\u2019s decision upholding assessment of tax, penalties, and interest against West Belmont. We affirm.\nFACTS\nOn January 26, 1998, West Belmont bought the property commonly known as 1711-1717 West Belmont Avenue in Chicago (the property) from American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago. The property previously had been occupied by Roosevelt Chair & Supply Company (Roosevelt), a furniture retailer, wholesaler, and rental company. Following the purchase, West Belmont demolished the furniture store and began selling and constructing residential townhomes on the land.\nWest Belmont filed a declaration claiming the transfer was exempt under section 3 \u2014 33\u2014060(L) of the Chicago Municipal Code because it purchased real property used primarily for commercial purposes located in an enterprise zone. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 33\u2014060(L) (1999). After an investigation, the department of revenue (Department) disallowed the exemption because the property was being developed to build townhomes \u2014 not a commercial or industrial purpose.\nChapter 3 \u2014 33 of the Municipal Code imposes the Chicago real property transfer tax on \u201cthe privilege of transferring title to, or beneficial interest in, real property located in the city.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 33\u2014030 (1999). The tax is imposed on the transferee at the rate of $3.75 per $500 of the transfer price, or fraction thereof, of the real property or the beneficial interest in real property. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 33\u2014030 (1999). Section 3 \u2014 33\u2014060 lists transfers that are exempt from the tax. The exemption at issue in this case exempts:\n\u201cL. Transfers of title to, or beneficial interest in, real property used primarily for commercial or industrial purposes located in an enterprise zone, as defined in Chapter 16 \u2014 12 of this code[.]\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 33\u2014060(L) (1999).\nAn enterprise zone is a depressed area of the City that has been designated a \u201cproposed enterprise zone\u201d by the city council and approved and certified by the proper state or federal authorities as an enterprise zone. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 16 \u2014 12\u2014020 (1999). Both parties agree the property is located in an enterprise zone.\nThe Department sent West Belmont a notice of tax determination and assessment requesting unpaid real property transfer tax and interest in the amount of $11,264.06. The Department sent a second notice for $14,934.37, including penalties for negligent and late payments.\nOn November 19, 1998, West Belmont filed a protest and petition for hearing with the City. On December 23, 1999, West Belmont filed an amended protest. West Belmont contended the transfer was exempt because: (1) up to and including the transfer date, Roosevelt had used the property for commercial purposes; (2) after the transfer, West Belmont used the property for the commercial purpose of selling residential townhomes; and (3) West Belmont\u2019s activities fit the definition of industrial property because it used raw construction materials to make physical goods that were sold to the public.\nAt the hearing, the Department relied on its Chicago Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2, promulgated December 23, 1998, and effective January 4, 1999, limiting the exemption to property used primarily for commercial or industrial use after the transfer.\nOn May 31, 2001, the administrative hearing officer (AHO) affirmed the assessment of tax against West Belmont. In her decision and order, the AHO found the property was not \u201cused primarily for commercial or industrial purposes\u201d up to and at the time of transfer as required by the exemption. Based on the evidence, the AHO concluded the property either was vacant up to and at the time of transfer, or the property was the site of sales activity related to a planned residential real estate development up to and at the time of transfer. In either case, West Belmont was not entitled to the exemption because real estate sales activity did not constitute a \u201ccommercial or industrial purpose\u201d under the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms.\nThe AHO did not discuss the Chicago Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2 in her decision. She noted: \u201cwhether the enterprise-zone exemption also imposes a requirement of commercial or industrial use after transfer, it imposes such a requirement at the time of transfer. Consequently, because, as will be seen, West Belmont fails the threshold requirement, its claim to the enterprise-zone exemption cannot prevail.\u201d\nOn July 29, 2001, West Belmont filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. On November 20, 2002, the court affirmed the AHO\u2019s decision, finding: (1) the AHO did not err by relying on the sales contract as evidence; (2) the AHO followed the appropriate rules of statutory construction by limiting the exemption to property used for commercial purposes up to and at the time of transfer; (3) a conclusion that the property was not \u201cused primarily for commercial purposes\u201d was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (4) West Belmont\u2019s use of the property did not meet the plain definition of commercial purpose.\nWest Belmont filed a motion for reconsideration or clarification. The court denied the motion, holding it was not within the scope of the court\u2019s review to determine the AHO\u2019s meaning of \u201ctime of transfer.\u201d\nDECISION\nI. Standard of Review\nIn reviewing a final decision under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)), we review the administrative decision and not the circuit court\u2019s judgment. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. Department of Revenue, 313 Ill. App. 3d 469, 474, 729 N.E.2d 924 (2000). Our review extends to all questions of fact and law presented in the record. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2002). An administrative agency\u2019s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are deemed to be prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2002).\nHere, the issue concerns the Department\u2019s interpretation of a municipal ordinance, a question of law we review de novo. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961 (1995). An agency\u2019s construction of a statute it is charged with administering is considered relevant, but not binding on the court. Branson, 168 Ill. 2d at 254. Nevertheless, we accord substantial weight and deference to an agency\u2019s interpretation because agencies are an informed source for ascertaining the legislature\u2019s intent. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 474-75.\nA taxpayer bears the burden of proving he is entitled to an exemption from a particular tax. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. v. Topinka, 334 Ill. App. 3d 454, 457, 778 N.E.2d 239 (2002). Statutes exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed in favor of taxation. Balmoral, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 457-58.\nWest Belmont challenges two aspects of the AHO\u2019s interpretation of the exemption: (1) holding the property must be in commercial or industrial use at the time of the transfer; and (2) excluding the sale of real property from the definition of \u201ccommercial purpose\u201d.\nII. Time of Commercial Use\nWest Belmont contends the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. The word \u201cused\u201d in the phrase \u201cused primarily for commercial or industrial purposes\u201d can refer only to the historical use of the subject property as determined at the time of transfer. In this case, West Belmont says it met the exemption\u2019s requirement because the property had been used by Roosevelt for commercial purposes before the transfer to West Belmont. It contends the AHO\u2019s determination that the property must be in commercial or industrial use \u201cat the time of transfer\u201d would lead to absurd results, because any property that is vacant on the closing date would fail to qualify for the exemption.\nWest Belmont also contends the Department\u2019s Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2 improperly amends and limits the exemption by ignoring past use of the property and focusing solely on future use. There is no language in the ordinance prescribing how long the property must remain in commercial or industrial use; thus, the tax ruling\u2019s construction of the ordinance is arbitrary and unenforceable.\nIn response, the Department contends the word \u201cused\u201d in the ordinance is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 172, 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003). Courts can consult interpretive aids when construing an ambiguous statute. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 172.\nThe word \u201cused\u201d could refer either to past use of the property, use of property at the time of transfer, the \u201cuse\u201d the transferee intends to make of the property, or a combination of some or all of the possible uses. The Department contends the transferee intent to use definition more logically reflects the city council\u2019s intent. Under section 3 \u2014 33\u2014 140 of the Municipal Code, the Department has the authority to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations pertaining to the transfer tax. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 33\u2014140 (1999). The Department relies on its interpretation in Chicago Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2, which provides:\n\u201c4. The limiting language \u2018used primarily for commercial or industrial purposes\u2019 was added to chapters 3 \u2014 33 and 16 \u2014 12 on December 15, 1992, and became effective on March 1, 1993. The purpose of this limiting language was to insure that exemptions of the transfer tax were allowed to only the following types of properties:\na. Property that was being used primarily for commercial or industrial purposes before the transfer, and continued to be used primarily for commercial or industrial purposes after the transfer.\nb. Property that was not being used primarily for commercial or industrial purposes before the transfer, and was converted to use primarily for commercial or industrial purposes after the transfer.\u201d Chicago Department of Revenue Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2, \u00a7 4 (January 4, 1999).\nThe Department says its interpretation of the word \u201cused\u201d is consistent with other judicial interpretations of revenue provisions with similar language. In Metropolitan, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 475, the court denied an exemption under section 15 \u2014 75 of the Illinois Property Tax Code, which provided: \u201c[a]ll market houses, public squares and other public grounds owned by a municipal corporation and used exclusively for public purposes are exempt.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/ 15 \u2014 75 (West 1994). The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District leased property to a private company, which used the land for an employee parking lot. Metropolitan, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 472-73. The court found the land lost its tax-exempt status because the private entity used the property post-lease for commercial and not public purposes. Metropolitan, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 476-77.\nIn Childrens Development Center Inc. v. Olson, 52 Ill. 2d 332, 334, 288 N.E.2d 388 (1972), the court construed section 19.2 of the Revenue Act of 1939, which exempted from taxation \u201c[a]ll property used exclusively for religious purposes, or used exclusively for school and religious purposes, or for orphanages and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 120, par. 500.2. The court held it was \u201cthe primary use to which the property is devoted after the leasing which determines whether the tax-exempt status continues.\u201d Children\u2019s Development Center, 52 Ill. 2d at 336. See also First Presbyterian Church of Dixon v. Zehnder, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1114, 1117, 715 N.E.2d 1209 (1999) (in construing section 19.2 of the Revenue Act of 1939, whether property is used with a view toward profit depends on the intent of the owner in using the property).\nWe agree the language of the ordinance is ambiguous and find the Department\u2019s interpretation is reasonable. We give substantial weight and deference to an agency\u2019s interpretation of an ambiguous ordinance based on the agency\u2019s experience and expertise. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 394, 763 N.E.2d 272 (2001).\nThe tax exemption clearly was not intended to reward past use of the property, because the buyer of the property, not the seller, pays the tax and receives the exemption. The purpose of the exemption is to encourage commercial or industrial use of property located in an enterprise zone. It looks to the posttransfer future, not to the past.\nWest Belmont\u2019s proposed construction of the ordinance \u2014 that a property qualifies for the exemption if at one time it had been used for commercial or industrial purposes \u2014 would award a tax exemption to a buyer regardless of the use it intended to make of the property. The buyer could avoid the tax even if the property remained vacant. We do not believe the city council intended such an absurd result. It is a court\u2019s duty to construe statutes in a manner that avoids absurd or unjust results. People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 498, 800 N.E.2d 1201 (2003).\nThe AHO found the property was not \u201c \u2018used primarily for commercial or industrial purposes\u2019 up to and at the time of the transfer.\u201d We do not believe the statute is best served by focusing exclusively on the exact moment of transfer. A buyer could intend to build and operate a commercial business on land that is still vacant or being used for noncommercial purposes on the day of the transfer. We take the AHO\u2019s holding to be directed at the buyer\u2019s stated purpose of future use made at the time of transfer, as well as the use of the property at the moment of transfer. If the AHO intended to read intended use out of the exemption, she was in error.\nIn order to obtain an exemption, a buyer must file with the Department a real property transfer declaration describing the facts supporting the exemption and containing such supporting documentation as the Department shall reasonably require. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 33\u2014070 (1999). We believe the exemption turns on the use the buyer intends to make of the property, as stated in its declaration. This interpretation best serves the purposes of the exemption and the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act \u2014 to encourage economic growth and neighborhood revitalization. 20 ILCS 655/2 (West 2002).\nThe Department\u2019s interpretation is not unworkable or unenforceable, as West Belmont contends. The Department is capable of determining, based on a purchaser\u2019s declaration setting forth facts supporting the exemption, whether the purchaser intends to use the property primarily for commercial or industrial use. The Department is also authorized to examine and investigate claimed exemptions to ensure compliance with the tax code. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 4\u2014 150(B)(1) (1999). The question then becomes: Was West Belmont\u2019s construction and sale of townhomes a \u201ccommercial purpose\u201d under the ordinance? If so, West Belmont should get its exemption.\nIII. \u201cCommercial\u201d or \u201cIndustrial\u201d Use of Property\nThe AHO rejected West Belmont\u2019s argument that its activities constituted \u201ccommercial\u201d use of the property, because the \u201cplain and ordinary meaning of \u2018commercial purpose\u2019 does not encompass the sale or construction of townhouses, regardless of when those activities began.\u201d The AHO relied on several dictionary definitions, all of which defined \u201ccommerce\u201d as the exchange of goods, commodities, or personal property. Two common threads in the definitions excluded West Belmont\u2019s activities: (1) the property involved in commerce is personal property, not real property; and (2) those involved in commerce are the producers, transporters, and traders of personal property, not the users of such property.\nWest Belmont attacks the AHO\u2019s definition of \u201ccommercial purpose\u201d as too restrictive, because it would exclude service-oriented or other businesses that are not primarily retail or wholesale-oriented. It cites instead the following definitions from Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, which, according to West Belmont, encompass the sale of real property:\nCommercial: \u201cRelates to or is connected with trade and traffic or commerce in general; is occupied with business and commerce. [Citation.] Generic term for most all aspects of buying and selling.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 270 (6th ed. 1990).\nCommerce: \u201cThe exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the buying, selling, and exchanging of articles.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 269 (6th ed. 1990).\nCommercial activity: \u201cany type of business or activity which is carried on for a profit.\u201d'Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 270 (6th ed. 1990).\nWest Belmont says the construction and sale of residential town-homes fit the definition of commercial use because it employed architects, construction personnel, and on-site sales personnel on the property from June 1998 until completion.\nRather than confining our analysis to dictionary definitions, we believe it is more appropriate to determine the intent of the city council in light of the circumstances surrounding the enactment, as well as the need for it and the purpose it serves. See People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 444, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997).\nThe Department says West Belmont did not use the land for a commercial purpose, according to the definition in the Chicago Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2, which provides:\n\u201c5. Property which is used primarily for commercial purposes is property used primarily for buying or selling of goods and services, or for otherwise providing goods and services, including any real estate used for hotel or motel purposes. See Cook County Real Estate Classification Ordinance; with Amendments Approved December 6, 1994, section 1(B)(9).\u201d Chicago Department of Revenue Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2, \u00a7 5 (January 4, 1999).\nWe find West Belmont\u2019s use of the property was not primarily \u201ccommercial\u201d within the meaning of the exemption. While the sale of real estate might be included in a general definition of commerce as the \u201cexchange of property of any kind,\u201d we do not believe West Belmont\u2019s intended use of the land furthered the pin-pose of the exemption. West Belmont did not intend to set up a real estate sales office from which it would continue to sell townhomes indefinitely. It purchased the property to convert it into residential use. Whatever \u201ccommerce\u201d that might have been involved would come to an end when the homes were built and sold. West Belmont would pack up and leave the property.\nWest Belmont contends it sold \u201cgoods and services\u201d within the meaning of the tax ruling because home buyers bought personal property such as appliances and the service of customizing their homes. We disagree. Any sale of goods or services was subsidiary to West Belmont\u2019s primary purpose of building and selling townhomes and was not included in the tax ruling\u2019s definition.\nWest Belmont contends its use of the property fulfills the stated goals of the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act (Act):\n\u201cThe General Assembly finds and declares that the health, safety and welfare of the people of this State are dependent \u00fapon a healthy economy and vibrant communities; that the continual encouragement, development, growth and expansion of the private sector within the State requires a cooperative and continuous partnership between government and the private sector; and that there are certain depressed areas in this State that need the particular attention of government, business, labor and the citizens of Illinois to help attract private sector investment into these areas and directly aid the local community and its residents. Therefore, it is declared to be the purpose of this Act to explore ways and means of stimulating business and industrial growth and retention in depressed areas and stimulating neighborhood revitalization of depressed areas of the State by means of relaxed government controls and tax incentives in those areas.\u201d 20 ILCS 655/2 (West 2002).\nWest Belmont says the Act is intended to stimulate residential development as well as economic development by providing incentives for the private sector to redevelop depressed areas. That is, says West Belmont, replacing a vacant commercial building with a residential development serves the Act\u2019s purpose of \u201cstimulating neighborhood revitalization.\u201d West Belmont contends the trial court erred in finding the purpose of the Act is limited to economic development.\nIn response, the City contends the exemption is intended to subsidize only commercial and industrial projects, rather than all forms of revitalization. Using scarce enterprise zone property for residential purposes limits the availability of land for commercial and industrial use. We agree with the City.\nThe Act is concerned with \u201cbusiness and industrial growth,\u201d and a residential real estate development would not serve that purpose. We are not persuaded that West Belmont\u2019s residence construction activities furthered the goals of the exemption.\nWest Belmont contends the City tacitly approved of its use of the land by giving it a sales tax exemption on all construction materials that were to be permanently affixed to the property located in the enterprise zone, pursuant to section 16 \u2014 12\u2014070(a)(3)(A) of the Municipal Code. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 16 \u2014 12\u2014070(a)(3)(A) (1999). This section of the enterprise zone ordinance does not exclude residential property.\nBut unlike the transfer tax exemption, the building materials exemption is not confined to primarily commercial or industrial use of the property. The building materials exemption is available for any type of property located in an enterprise zone. The City\u2019s grant of the sales tax exemption to West Belmont does not mean the transfer tax exemption is available for property used for residential real estate development.\nAlternatively, West Belmont contends its use of the property was industrial because it used raw construction materials to make finished physical goods that were sold to the public.\nThe Chicago Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2 defines property used primarily for industrial purposes as:\n\u201c6. *** property used primarily in manufacturing, or in the extraction or processing of raw material unserviceable in their natural state to create new physical products or materials, or in the transportation or storage of raw materials or finished physical goods in the wholesale distribution of such materials or goods. *** Manufacturing means the material staging and production of goods used in procedures commonly regarded as manufacturing, processing, fabrication, or assembling which changes existing material into new shapes, new qualities, or new combinations.\u201d Chicago Department of Revenue Real Property Transfer Tax Ruling No. 2, \u00a7 6 (January 4, 1999).\nWest Belmont was not engaged in manufacturing of goods, extraction, or processing of raw materials, or the wholesale distribution of raw materials or goods. Definitions of the term \u201cgoods\u201d include: \u201cevery species of personal property\u201d; \u201c[i]terns of merchandise, supplies, raw materials, or finished goods\u201d; and \u201c[a]ll things (including specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 694 (6th ed. 1990). Residential townhouses are not considered \u201cgoods\u201d within the ordinary meaning of the term.\nIV Manifest Weight of the Evidence\nWest Belmont contends the AHO\u2019s reliance on the sales contract to determine the property was not being used commercially at the time of transfer was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Whether Roosevelt was using the property for a commercial purpose at the time of transfer does not matter. What matters is West Belmont\u2019s use, then and, especially, later.\nWest Belmont does not seriously contend it was using the property for construction and sale of townhomes on the day of transfer. Since we hold as a matter of law that Roosevelt\u2019s use of the property on the day of transfer is irrelevant, the dispositive issue is whether, at the time of purchase, West Belmont intended to use the property for a commercial purpose. There are no fact issues to review. Everyone agrees West Belmont was going to build and sell townhomes on the property. Our agreement with the City that building and selling town-homes is not a \u201ccommercial purpose\u201d as that term is used in the ordinance decides the case. West Belmont is not entitled to the exemption.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm the decision and order of the AHO.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Sreenan, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Michael D. Bess, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WEST BELMONT, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20141199\nOpinion filed June 1, 2004.\nMichael J. Sreenan, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Michael D. Bess, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0046-01", "first_page_order": 64, "last_page_order": 74 }