{ "id": 5435351, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCO A. CAMPOS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Campos", "decision_date": "2004-06-01", "docket_number": "No. 2-03-0032", "first_page": "172", "last_page": "178", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 172" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780294 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5260903 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6189962 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "2089" }, { "page": "673-75" }, { "page": "423-24" }, { "page": "2088-89" }, { "page": "676" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "2089" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963666 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220-21" }, { "page": "221" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261338 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349544 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461618 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-60" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to judge the motives and intentions of the prosecutors\"" }, { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1025912 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0475-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 651, "char_count": 13893, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7866810409790057e-07, "percentile": 0.7142985942423671 }, "sha256": "bb8f387e1191c5f9e5cbc3bdcfd0229180b72134f251c65f288ed9c943ce044f", "simhash": "1:fbabc424d3df5de1", "word_count": 2290 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:36.100393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McLaren and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCO A. CAMPOS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a mistrial on charges of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(1) (West 1996)), criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 15(a)(1) (West 1996)), and battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3(a)(2) (West 1996)), defendant, Marco A. Campos, filed a \u201cMotion to Discharge and Acquit Defendant on Plea of Double Jeopardy.\u201d The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion, and defendant filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)). On appeal, defendant argues that the State should be barred from retrying him because the prosecutor intentionally provoked a mistrial. We affirm.\nDefendant was charged with committing five assaults against four different women. Four of the five assaults allegedly occurred at defendant\u2019s place of employment, the Chateau Village Center, which is a nursing home in Willowbrook. The fifth incident was alleged to have taken place in an apartment in Darien. Defendant\u2019s trial commenced on August 26, 2002. We dispense with a summary of the testimony at trial, as it is not necessary for resolution of the issue before us. We will refer to relevant evidence as our analysis warrants.\nDefendant\u2019s claim of error is based on the prosecutor\u2019s examination of Willowbrook police commander Mark Shelton. Shelton testified that, on May 11, 1998, he went to the Chateau Village Center to speak with facility administrator Nancy Hartmann as part of his investigation of several complaints against defendant. Shelton testified that he also spoke to defendant on that date. Defense counsel then requested a sidebar and informed the court that defendant had asked to speak to a lawyer during his conversation -with Shelton. Defense counsel stated, \u201cIf that comes out, it will vitiate the jury and cause a mistrial.\u201d The following colloquy then occurred:\n\u201cMR. KNIGHT [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney]: I\u2019m certainly not going to ask him that.\nMR. CONNIFF [Defense counsel]: Then where are we going with this?\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t think you want to try the case again. So make sure, you know\u2014\nMR. KNIGHT: I know, I understand the law, judge.\u201d\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight then asked Shelton what he asked defendant regarding the incidents under investigation and what, if anything, defendant said in response. Defendant objected and the court overruled the objection. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight then asked Shelton to relate what he told defendant and what defendant said to him about the incidents. Shelton testified as follows:\n\u201cA. I told him that some ladies had come forward to the police department about some incidents involving improper contact involving him.\nQ. What did he say?\nA. He said he had done nothing to anyone. And at that time, he said he needed to speak with an attorney.\u201d\nDefense counsel then objected and moved for a mistrial. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight advised the court that, when he went over Shelton\u2019s testimony with him, Shelton indicated that he was going to testify that defendant said he did not do anything to anybody. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight further said that he told Shelton, \u201c[Tjhat\u2019s all we\u2019re going to talk about.\u201d The court then declared a mistrial.\nSubsequently, defendant moved for an acquittal or a discharge of the complaints against him on double jeopardy grounds. The State responded with affidavits that mirrored Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight\u2019s earlier statement to the court that he had intended to limit Shelton to testifying that defendant said he did not do anything to anyone. However, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight admitted that he did not specifically instruct Shelton not to mention defendant\u2019s request for an attorney The court denied defendant\u2019s motion, finding that there was no reason why the State would have wanted a mistrial and that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith in failing to tell Shelton not to mention defendant\u2019s request for an attorney. Defendant\u2019s appeal ensued.\nThe parties disagree regarding which standard of review should apply to our review of the merits of the court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion. Defendant argues for a de novo standard of review because of the need for uniformity and because neither the credibility of the witnesses nor the facts are at issue. The State contends that we should reverse the trial court\u2019s decision only if an abuse of discretion occurred because the ruling was based on a factual determination, namely, whether the prosecutor goaded defendant into moving for a mistrial. We agree with the State.\nThere is case law that states, generally, that review is de novo when a constitutional right is at stake. People v. Leeper, 317 Ill. App. 3d 475, 480 (2000). However, this is not always the case. Recently, when reviewing a trial court\u2019s decision to disqualify a defendant\u2019s chosen counsel on conflict of interest grounds, our supreme court declined to review de novo the trial court\u2019s ultimate \u201cassessment\u201d of the facts. People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354 (2004). Instead, because trial courts need to have discretion when deciding whether to allow a defendant to waive counsel\u2019s actual or potential conflict of interest, the court held that it was required to give deference not only to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, but also to the weight the trial court gave to the facts. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 358-60. Consequently, the court considered whether the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying defendant\u2019s counsel. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 359.\nSimilarly, when a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the prosecutor goaded him into moving for a mistrial, reviewing courts have declined to reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion absent an abuse of discretion. This court has held that the proper standard of review in a case such as the one before us is \u201cwhether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss based upon its finding that the State did not intend to provoke a mistrial.\u201d People v. Wilson, 309 Ill. App. 3d 235, 242 (1999).\nCiting People v. Walker, 308 Ill. App. 3d 435 (1999), defendant contends that the authority from this court is inconsistent as to which standard of review is proper. We disagree. In Walker, the issue was whether statements made by a police detective should be imputed to the State in order to establish prosecutorial overreaching. We held that this was a question of law, subject to de novo review. Walker, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 438. Unlike in Walker, the issue in this case is the intent of the prosecutor himself, which is a factual question that the trial court is in the best position to determine. See Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 363 (\u201c[T]he trial court is in a better position than a reviewing court to judge the motives and intentions of the prosecutors\u201d). Consequently, Walker is distinguishable.\nDefendant also contends that de novo review is appropriate because neither the credibility of witnesses nor specific facts are at issue. This argument is not persuasive, because the question of prosecutorial intent involves assessing the credibility of the prosecutor\u2019s representations to the trial court, an assessment that the trial court is in the best position to make. The outcome of defendant\u2019s motion to discharge rested solely on the trial court\u2019s finding with respect to intent. Accordingly, we will not overturn the court\u2019s factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we will not reverse the trial court\u2019s decision on the merits of the motion to discharge absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court\u2019s decision is \u201cfanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.\u201d Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 359.\nDefendant further contends that we should not defer to the trial court\u2019s discretion because the court applied an incorrect standard when deciding his motion and did not address the prosecutor\u2019s intent. Whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review. Walker, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 438. Accordingly, we review de novo whether the trial court properly applied the law. However, we give deference to the court\u2019s factual findings and to its ultimate decision based on those findings. For the following reasons, we conclude that the court did use the wrong standard, but the denial of defendant\u2019s motion was appropriate nonetheless.\nThe double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 10) protect a criminal defendant from repeated prosecutions for the same offense. When the defendant, rather than the State, moves for a mistrial, the defendant is deemed to have deliberately chosen \u201cto forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.\u201d People v. Nelson, 193 Ill. 2d 216, 220-21 (2000). In such a case, the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial, unless \u201cthe governmental conduct in question is intended to \u2018goad\u2019 the defendant into moving for a mistrial.\u201d Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416, 425, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 2089 (1982). This is a \u201cnarrow exception\u201d that the Supreme Court adopted after rejecting a more general standard based on a prosecutor\u2019s bad-faith conduct or harassment of the defendant. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673-75, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 423-24, 102 S. Ct. at 2088-89; see also Nelson, 193 Ill. 2d at 221.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court determined whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith rather than whether he intended to provoke defendant into moving for a mistrial. It appears that the court was relying on one of this court\u2019s opinions, which held that prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor acts to cause or provoke a mistrial in order to obtain another opportunity to convict the defendant, or when the prosecutor\u2019s conduct is \u201c \u2018motivated by bad faith to harass or prejudice the accused.\u2019 \u201d Walker, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 439, quoting People v. Brown, 222 Ill. App. 3d 703, 711 (1991). However, as the parties point out, both the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have rejected the general \u201cbad faith\u201d and \u201charassment\u201d standards. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 425, 102 S. Ct. at 2089; Nelson, 193 Ill. 2d at 221. Thus, the trial court erred when it considered whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith when questioning Commander Shelton. We hold, however, that the denial of defendant\u2019s motion was proper, even though the court applied an incorrect legal standard.\nThe propriety of the trial court\u2019s judgment, not its reasoning, is before us on appeal. We may affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment on any ground warranted, regardless of whether the trial court relied on it and regardless of whether the trial court\u2019s reasoning was correct. People ex rel. Waller v. 1990 Ford Bronco, 158 Ill. 2d 460, 463 (1994). It is evident from the trial court\u2019s factual findings that there was no prosecutorial intent to provoke a mistrial. Accordingly, we will not reverse the trial court\u2019s decision.\nIn rendering its decision, the trial court made factual findings relevant to whether the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial. These findings will not be disturbed, as they are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, the decision to deny the motion to discharge was not an abuse of discretion. See Wilson, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 242. First, the trial court found that there was no reason why the State would have wanted a mistrial and that the evidence was \u201cgoing in a way that was not unfavorable to the State.\u201d Although defendant claims that he had been \u201cpoking holes\u201d in the State\u2019s theory of the case during his cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses, he has not persuaded us that the court\u2019s assessment of the trial\u2019s progress was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, there is no evidence to support defendant\u2019s contention that the State wanted a mistrial.\nThe court found that the errors committed by Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight were \u201cdumb mistakes\u201d that did not amount to bad faith, implying that he did not act intentionally to provoke a mistrial. Defendant argues that the repeated inquiries about what defendant said to Shelton demonstrate an intent to subvert the protections of the double jeopardy clause. We disagree. Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight stated to the court, both orally and in an affidavit, that he did not intend to elicit testimony from Shelton that defendant asked to speak to an attorney. We find nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court\u2019s assessment of the nature of the prosecution\u2019s errors was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and, thus, there is insufficient evidence to support a determination that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to discharge. While Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Knight should have advised Shelton not to mention defendant\u2019s request for an attorney, and while his questioning of Shelton perhaps should have been tailored to elicit a legally inoffensive response, these mistakes do not amount to prosecutorial intent to provoke a mistrial.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nAffirmed.\nMcLaren and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, and Anthony J. Conniff, of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Stephen E. Norris and Patrick D. Daly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCO A. CAMPOS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201403\u20140032\nOpinion filed June 1, 2004.\nRehearing denied July 20, 2004.\nRobert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, and Anthony J. Conniff, of Glen Ellyn, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Stephen E. Norris and Patrick D. Daly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0172-01", "first_page_order": 190, "last_page_order": 196 }