{ "id": 5434644, "name": "ROSE M. TRENT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE OFFICE OF THE CORONER OF PEORIA COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Trent v. Office of the Coroner", "decision_date": "2004-06-03", "docket_number": "No. 3-03-0206", "first_page": "276", "last_page": "283", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 276" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "352 F.3d 1122", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9299300 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/352/1122-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 552", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 961", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307266 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243860 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260487 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "941" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603320 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980658 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 157", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5929642 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding under the federal FOIA that no privacy right survives decedent; rather, postdeath privacy rests with the surviving family" }, { "parenthetical": "holding under the federal FOIA that no privacy right survives decedent; rather, postdeath privacy rests with the surviving family" }, { "parenthetical": "holding under the federal FOIA that no privacy right survives decedent; rather, postdeath privacy rests with the surviving family" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0157-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 713, "char_count": 14671, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.8172472706271035e-08, "percentile": 0.30296476744397066 }, "sha256": "c0d6c604fbc5404bb4d1a2e18c4ce35ab6bbd13b970721e73fc9943279dc2679", "simhash": "1:b502d19407af6df0", "word_count": 2407 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:36.100393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROSE M. TRENT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE OFFICE OF THE CORONER OF PEORIA COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, Rose M. Trent, James C. Trent and James Clark, filed a pro se complaint under our state\u2019s Freedom of Information Act (the Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2002)) against the defendants, the office of the coroner of Peoria County and Daniel Heinz, in his official capacity as Peoria County coroner. The plaintiffs are attempting to obtain medical records of C.N., a deceased minor. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs are not entitled to receive C.N.\u2019s medical records. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in ruling that the records they seek are exempt from disclosure under the Act (5 ILCS 140/7(l)(b) (West 2002)) even though the plaintiffs have acquired a signed authorization from the deceased child\u2019s mother, Katrina Harden. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nPlaintiff James Trent and Katrina Harden are currently incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). They were both convicted of murdering C.N., who was four years old at the time of her death on July 20, 1996. Harden pled guilty and agreed to testify against Trent in exchange for the State\u2019s agreement not to seek the death penalty. James Trent appealed to this court in People v. Trent, 315 Ill. App. 3d 437, 734 N.E.2d 1 (2000). The facts stated in that appeal set forth the brutal murder of this four-year-old child. While James Trent and Harden were living together, they repeatedly struck C.N. with a belt, a metal spatula and a metal pole. Trauma from this severe beating caused C.N.\u2019s death.\nThe remaining plaintiffs, Rose Trent and James Clark, filed various requests under the Act in an attempt to obtain C.N.\u2019s medical records. On April 15, 1999, Rose went to the Peoria County coroner\u2019s office and orally requested to inspect and copy various documents related to C.N.\u2019s death. Rose asserted that her request for the documents was pursuant to the Act. Initially, the coroner\u2019s office denied Rose\u2019s request.\nOn May 4, 2000, Rose submitted a written request for the documents under the Act. Accompanying this written request was a signed authorization from Harden directing the coroner\u2019s office to release C.N.\u2019s medical records to Rose. On May 8, 2000, the Peoria County coroner denied Rose\u2019s request in writing.\nOn November 15, 2000, James Trent sent a similar request for documents to the coroner\u2019s office. On November 28, 2000, that request was denied.\nOn January 26, 2002, James Clark submitted a written request for the documents under the Act. This request also was accompanied by a signed authorization from Katrina Harden. On February 4, 2002, Clark\u2019s request was denied.\nThe plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies regarding their requests. Then, on January 2, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Act. Among other documents, the plaintiffs sought C.N.\u2019s medical records from (1) Saint Francis Medical Center; and (2) Methodist Hospital.\nThe defendants filed their answer on January 17, 2003. They contend that C.N.\u2019s medical records are not subject to disclosure under the Act.\nEventually, the coroner\u2019s office supplied the plaintiffs with some of the documents they had requested, but not the decedent\u2019s medical records. At the hearing on the complaint, the trial court stated that the medical records were exempt from disclosure under the Act. The court commented that the authorization signed by Katrina Harden \u201cmight apply, if at all, to a request for these records directly from the hospitals.\u201d Plaintiffs appeal.\nANALYSIS\nThe plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by ruling they were not entitled to disclosure of the medical records under the Act.\nWe are called upon to interpret portions of the Act and other Illinois statutes. It is axiomatic that when interpreting a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature when it enacted the statute. Heck v. Central Illinois Light Co., 152 Ill. 2d 401, 405, 604 N.E.2d 939, 941 (1992). The language of the statute itself provides the best indication of the drafters\u2019 intent. Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 165, 549 N.E.2d 348, 349 (1989). Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court of review must give it effect as written, without reading exceptions, limitations or conditions into the statute. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85, 710 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1999). Because interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995).\nUnder the Act, \u201cEach public body shall make available to any person for inspection or copying all public records, except as otherwise provided in Section 7 of [the] Act.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2002).\n\u201c \u2018Public records\u2019 means all records, reports, forms, writings, letters, memoranda, books, papers, *** and all other documentary materials, *** having been prepared, or having been or being used, received, possessed or'under the control of any public body.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2002).\n\u201c(1) The following shall be exempt from inspection and copying:\n(b) Information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(b) (West 2002).\nIn this case, the parties do not dispute that the coroner\u2019s office is a \u201cpublic body\u201d under the Act. C.N.\u2019s medical records are \u201cpublic records,\u201d as defined by the Act, because the records were used, received, possessed and under the control of the defendants.\nThere is also no dispute that an individual\u2019s medical records constitute \u201c [information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2002). An individual\u2019s medical records fall squarely within this exemption for documents, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Therefore, the issue is whether the authorization signed by the decedent\u2019s murderer, who also happened to be the decedent\u2019s mother, is sufficient to require disclosure under the Act. For the reasons set forth below, we hold it is not.\nDocuments otherwise exempt from disclosure under section 7(l)(b) may be released only if \u201cthe disclosure is consented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2002).\nThe \u201cindividual subject of the information\u201d sought under the Act was C.N. The Act makes no provision for a written consent to be submitted by a third party in the event the subject of the information is deceased. The plain language of the Act only permits disclosure of privileged information with the written consent of \u201cthe individual subjects of the information.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2002). Here, the plaintiffs do not possess written consent from C.N., which is necessary to release medical records under the Act. We will not read an exception into the Act by grafting into it language from the Code of Civil Procedure regarding physician-patient privilege release provisions.\nPlaintiffs cite section 8\u2014802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/8\u2014802 (West 2002)) and suggest this allows them to obtain C.N.\u2019s medical records in light of the signed authorization they have acquired from C.N.\u2019s mother. We disagree.\nSection 8\u2014802 of the Code governs the physician-patient privilege. It states:\n\u201cNo physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient *** except only *** with the expressed consent of the patient, or in case of his or her death[,] *** [a] person authorized to sue for personal injury ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8\u2014802 (West 2002).\nWe are aware of no authority that allows a mother convicted of murdering her child to sue for that child\u2019s personal injuries.\nOnly the personal representative of a decedent may bring an action under the Wrongful Death Act. 740 ILCS 180/2 (West 2002). A person who has been convicted of a felony may neither be appointed guardian of a child\u2019s estate (755 ILCS 5/11 \u20143(a) (West 2002)) nor named administrator of an estate of a decedent who dies intestate (755 ILCS 5/9 \u20141 (West 2002)).\nWe also find relevance in section 2\u20146 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 2002)), commonly known as the slayer statute. It provides, in relevant part:\n\u201c\u00a7 2 \u2014 6. Person causing death. A person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes the death of another shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of the death, whether as heir, legatee, beneficiary, joint tenant, survivor, appointee or in any other capacity and whether the property, benefit, or other interest passes pursuant to any form of title registration, testamentary or nontestamentary instrument, intestacy, renunciation, or any other circumstance. The property, benefit, or other interest shall pass as if the person causing the death died before the decedent ***. *** A person convicted of first degree murder or second degree murder of the decedent is conclusively presumed to have caused the death intentionally and unjustifiably for purposes of this Section.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 2002).\nWe find the authorization signed by C.N.\u2019s mother is invalid and provides no legal basis for. disclosure of C.N.\u2019s medical records.\nAs a matter of law, once Katrina Harden was convicted of first degree murder of the decedent, she was conclusively presumed to have caused the death of C.N. and, therefore, forever barred from receiving \u201cany property, benefit, or other interest\u201d from C.N.\u2019s estate. 755 ILCS 5/2\u20146 (West 1996). Legally, Katrina Harden is viewed as predeceasing her daughter.\nBecause Katrina Harden has no legal right to receive any property or benefit from C.N.\u2019s estate and she cannot be appointed guardian of C.N.\u2019s estate, the releases she signed are not valid under the Code as she is not, as a matter of law, a \u201cperson authorized to sue for personal injury\u201d on C.N.\u2019s behalf.\nIt is clear that, even under the broader authorization provisions of the Code, a physician or hospital would not be authorized to release C.N.\u2019s medical records on the authorization of Katrina Harden. Therefore, even if we were to graft the Code language onto the Act, as plaintiffs suggest, this would be of no help to their case. Any authorization signed by Katrina Harden is of no effect as it relates to C.N.\u2019s medical records. The plaintiffs, with the help of Harden, seek to have C.N.\u2019s medical records sent to one of her convicted murderers at State-ville Penitentiary. The indignities visited upon this four-year-old little girl in life will not be perpetuated against her after her death.\nWe believe that the comments recently made by the Seventh Circuit in discussing the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 552 (West 1996)) (FOIA) are equally applicable to our Freedom of Information Act. The Seventh Circuit noted:\n\u201cThe FOIA has a noble goal: it contemplates a policy of broad disclosure of government documents to serve the \u2018basic purpose of ensuring an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society.\u2019 [Citation.] Stated another way, the FOIA\u2019s central purpose is to guarantee \u2018that the Government\u2019s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Lakin Law Firm v. Federal Trade Comm\u2019n, 352 F.3d 1122, 1123 (7th Cir. 2003).\nCONCLUSION\nThe circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSLATER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the holding that the office of the coroner was not obligated to disclose the medical records it obtained from the attending physicians who rendered medical treatment at St. Francis Medical Center and Methodist Hospital in Peoria. However, I do not agree with the majority\u2019s reliance upon section 7(1)(b) of the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2002)) to establish a privacy right of an individual extending beyond death. I am convinced that the majority\u2019s reliance upon such a privacy interest of the deceased is misplaced as there is no common law or statutory right of privacy surviving beyond death. See National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 158 L. Ed. 2d 319, 124 S. Ct. 1570 (2004) (holding under the federal FOIA that no privacy right survives decedent; rather, postdeath privacy rests with the surviving family). Here, under privacy interest analysis, the facts would warrant disclosure, since the survivors assert no privacy interest in their own vein.\nRather, I believe that disclosure of the medical records sought from the coroner in the instant matter is prohibited under section 7(1)(a) of the FOIA, which provides:\n\u201c(1) The following shall be exempt from inspection and copying: (a) Information specifically prohibited from disclosure by federal or State law or rules and regulations adopted under federal or State law.\u201d 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(a) (West 2002).\nHere, the medical records sought from the coroner\u2019s office were provided to it under the privacy of medical records provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2002). I would find that the restrictions upon disclosure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure followed those medical records when they were provided to the coroner\u2019s office pursuant to its investigation into the cause of death of C.N. Thus, like the physicians who first generated the medical records in question, the coroner, as custodian of copies of those records, must follow the same statutory limitations on any further disclosure.\nHere, under the unique facts of this case, application of the Code provisions would prevent disclosure, since there would be no one available to authorize disclosure in accordance with the Code. The subject of the medical records was deceased, and the mother was excluded by application of statute as aptly discussed by the majority.\nFor the foregoing reasons, I concur in the judgment to affirm the circuit court.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rose M. Trent and James Clark, both of Flint, Michigan, for appellants.", "Kevin W Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Donald J. Toohill, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROSE M. TRENT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE OFFICE OF THE CORONER OF PEORIA COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201403\u20140206\nOpinion filed June 3, 2004.\nRehearing denied July 23, 2004.\nRose M. Trent and James Clark, both of Flint, Michigan, for appellants.\nKevin W Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Donald J. Toohill, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0276-01", "first_page_order": 294, "last_page_order": 301 }