{ "id": 5435476, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD A. JUNIOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Junior", "decision_date": "2004-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-0334", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "293", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "360 U.S. 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9052 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "1221" }, { "page": "1177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/360/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198911 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544876 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0326-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 735, "char_count": 15312, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.02847802651471e-08, "percentile": 0.37364726669392695 }, "sha256": "408d8d77783bd1c478c528ef8e84354dc29bdda7f85d3391d3d65d6deded84e3", "simhash": "1:db7a60982895cf73", "word_count": 2514 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:36.100393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TURNER and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD A. JUNIOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn March 10, 2001, the State charged defendant, Chad A. Junior, and codefendant, Aaron Settle, by information with two counts of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 2000)) and one count of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 2000)). Settle pleaded guilty to all charges. Defendant pleaded not guilty, and a jury trial was held in December 2001. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of burglary. The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the residential burglary count, and the trial court declared a mistrial. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the court rejected. On February 21, 2002, Judge Lisa Holder White sentenced defendant as a Class X offender to concurrent 10-year prison sentences on the burglary convictions. On the State\u2019s motion, the court also dismissed the residential burglary charge. Defendant petitioned the court to reconsider his sentence. The court denied the motion and held his sentence was appropriate.\nDefendant appeals, arguing (1) his due-process rights were violated when the State used and failed to correct Settle\u2019s perjured testimony, (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because Public Defender Jon Baxter represented both him and Settle at their joint preliminary hearing, and (3) his trial counsel, Assistant Public Defender David Massey, labored under a conflict of interest because his law partner, Baxter, represented both Junior and Settle at their joint preliminary hearing. We reverse and remand for a new trial.\nAt approximately 1 a.m. on March 5, 2001, Skyler Kaufman, Sebastian Santos, and Daniel French were sitting on Kaufman\u2019s front porch waiting to catch some of their friends who were supposed to \u201cprank\u201d French\u2019s house down the street. The boys noticed a white vehicle they initially thought belonged to their friends driving slowly in the neighborhood. They hid but continued to watch as the vehicle drove around the neighborhood and parked.\nThe boys saw two men get out of the vehicle. At trial, they testified one man was wearing a red-hooded sweatshirt and the other had a long ponytail. At trial, none of the boys could identify defendant as one of the men who got out of the vehicle.\nThe boys watched the men break into a black Jeep that belonged to a neighbor and try to break into garages in the neighborhood. The boys awakened Kaufman\u2019s father, Tom Kaufman, who called the police and then went outside to wait with the boys. Before the police arrived, Tom saw the two men walking down the street. One man was carrying what looked like a bag, and the other was pushing an object. When the two men noticed Tom, they dropped what they were carrying and ran in between some houses.\nTom and the boys remained outside until the police arrived. The boys told Officer Steve Young what they had witnessed and took him to the white car. As they were talking, Settle approached the white car. Kaufman and Santos identified Settle as one of the men they saw break into the Jeep. Officer Young approached Settle, who initially said his wife had car trouble and he was looking for her car. Settle then admitted he and defendant had been burglarizing vehicles and garages in the area.\nOfficers recovered and returned a coat, compact discs, and a camera taken from Christian Sassano\u2019s Jeep, a power washer and chain saw taken from William Shorter\u2019s detached garage, and a plastic gas can taken from Kathy Powell\u2019s attached garage.\nBoth defendant and Settle were charged with the counts outlined above. At their arraignment, Settle told the trial court, \u201c[t]his man was with me earlier this day. At the time of the offense, it was a different person that was with me.\u201d At their joint preliminary hearing, defendant and Settle were represented by Baxter. After the State had presented its evidence, the following exchange took place between Settle and the court:\n\u201cSETTLE: I want to make a statement. This my co[ jdefendant. He wasn\u2019t even there.\nCOURT: Sir, you have asked to have a lawyer appointed and we have done that. You must speak through your lawyer. If you want to represent yourself, we will take away your lawyer. Can\u2019t have it both ways. Do you want a lawyer in the case?\nSETTLE: Yes.\u201d\nThe trial court found probable cause to believe defendant and Settle committed the burglaries. Both men pleaded not guilty. The court appointed Massey to represent defendant and Assistant Public Defender Thomas Wheeler to represent Settle.\nOn July 25, 2001, Settle and the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office entered into a plea agreement. In exchange for Settle\u2019s guilty pleas on all three counts and his testimony against defendant, the State promised to seek concurrent, not consecutive, sentences.\nOn December 10, 2001, defendant\u2019s trial began. Settle testified defendant was with him on the morning of March 5, 2001, and together they burglarized the Jeep and two garages. He testified defendant owed him money and they went out that night to get that money. Settle recanted earlier statements, including a written statement, where he indicated defendant was not involved in the burglaries. He testified he made the statements because he had been threatened by his brother and defendant.\nWhen questioned on direct, Settle testified he had not been promised anything in consideration for his testimony. During cross-examination, when defense counsel challenged this assertion, Settle claimed he was testifying only because he was subpoenaed. During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued if Settle and the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office had made a deal, the deal was not a very good one for Settle as he anticipated being sentenced to the penitentiary.\nTina Hutchinson testified for the defense. She testified defendant lived with her at the time of the burglary. On March 4, 2001, Settle was at her home until 10 p.m., but he left alone. Defendant went to bed shortly after Settle left. Hutchinson went to sleep in the same bed as defendant at about midnight.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of two counts of burglary but could not reach a unanimous verdict on the residential burglary charge. The State later moved to dismiss the residential burglary charge. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 10-year prison sentences. This appeal followed.\nThe State\u2019s knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a criminal conviction violates a defendant\u2019s due-process rights. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 345, 680 N.E.2d 321, 331 (1997). Where a reasonable likelihood exists that the perjured testimony could have affected the jury\u2019s verdict, the conviction must be set aside. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, 680 N.E.2d at 331. The same principles apply where the State does not solicit the testimony but allows it to go uncorrected, even if the testimony concerns only the credibility of the witness. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, 680 N.E.2d at 331.\nFundamental fairness requires that a jury be truthfully informed about all matters going to the credibility of a witness and his motives for testifying known by the prosecutor or an agent of the prosecutor. See People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223, 652 N.E.2d 278, 284 (1995). The \u201c \u2018jury\u2019s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant\u2019s life or liberty may depend.\u2019 \u201d Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, 680 N.E.2d at 331, quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 1221, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1959).\nIn this case, defendant claims the State elicited testimony from Settle that he received no promises from the State in return for his testimony when the State actually promised to seek concurrent, not consecutive, sentences. On July 25, 2001, before Settle pleaded guilty to the three charges arising out of this incident, the prosecutor, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Richard Current, explained the plea agreement to the trial court judge, Theodore Paine, as follows:\n\u201cBasically, the defendant is going to plead to the charges. The matter will be set for [sentencing [h] earing. He is also willing to agree to cooperate being a [witness] in the case against the co[ ]defendant[,] which I believe is set for tomorrow. The People have agreed that any sentencing would be served concurrently and there would be no consecutive sentences.\u201d\nDefendant asserts, despite this knowledge, the State here, allowed Settle\u2019s false testimony to go uncorrected and actually misled the jury during closing argument, violating his due-process rights.\nDefendant\u2019s claims are supported by the record. At trial, Settle testified he was promised nothing in return for his testimony:\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR DAVID SPENCE]: [Settle], you have pled guilty to the burglary of the Jeep, to the burglary of the garage, and to residential burglary; haven\u2019t you?\nSETTLE: Yes.\nPROSECUTOR: You are currently awaiting sentencing in those matters, is that correct?\nSETTLE: Yes.\nPROSECUTOR: At the time of your plea, was there aiiy promises made to you regarding an exchange for your testimony here?\nSETTLE: No.\u201d\nDuring cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:\n\u201cDEFENSE COUNSEL: And you think that by coming in here and telling these stories, it\u2019s going to help you somehow?\nSETTLE: No.\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: You don\u2019t think it\u2019s going to help you?\nSETTLE: No. I just had a subpoena. If I didn\u2019t come today, I had to go to jail for not obeying the subpoena.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s redirect included the following:\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR SPENCE]: Yes. Thank you. Sir, I think you indicated that you think you know what to expect with regard to the criminal cases that you\u2019re involved in. Do you recall making that statement earlier?\nSETTLE: Yes.\nPROSECUTOR: What is it that you expect?\nSETTLE: Well for the residential, it\u2019s mandatory 4 to 7 years [in the Department of Corrections].\nPROSECUTOR: So, you\u2019re expecting to go to the Department of Corrections?\nSETTLE: Yes.\u201d\nThroughout his testimony, Settle\u2019s testimony suggested he was testifying because he was subpoenaed, not because it was a condition of his plea agreement. Further, he stated he was promised nothing for his testimony when in fact the State made a sentencing concession promising it would not seek consecutive sentences. During closing arguments, the prosecutor implied Settle received no consideration for his testimony:\n\u201cIs there anything here that suggests to you that Mr. Settle had a reason to tell the police that it was [defendant] when it was not[?] This is his long[-]time friend. The guy that he spent nearly the entire day with by all of the evidence in this case. He also told you that he plead [sic] guilty to all of these offenses, and he also told you that he has an expectation of what the outcome is going to be for him as a result of these burglaries; and his expectation was that he\u2019s going to prison.\nNow if he is identifying someone in exchange for helping the prosecution, he didn\u2019t get a very good deal; did he[?] There\u2019s no commitment as to the sentence that he\u2019s going to receive. His expectation is he\u2019s going to the penitentiary. So[,] did he tell you that [defendant] did this, [sic] because he\u2019s not going to have to go the penitentiary[?] Of course not. Nobody had told him anything.\u201d\nKnowledge on the part of any representative or agent of the prosecution that a witness\u2019s testimony is not truthful is sufficient to create an obligation to correct false testimony. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 348, 680 N.E.2d at 332. Here, Settle made an agreement with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office in July 2001, months before he testified in defendant\u2019s December 2001 trial. When explaining to Judge Paine the conditions of Settle\u2019s plea, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Current stated, \u201c[h]e is also willing to cooperate being a [witness] in the case against the co[ ]defendant[,] which I believe is set for tomorrow. The People have agreed that any sentencing would be served concurrently and there would be no consecutive sentences.\u201d Settle\u2019s original sentencing hearing was set for September 14, 2001, but was continued five times, by both the State and Settle, until after defendant was tried and sentenced. Defendant\u2019s prosecutor herein, David Spence, represented the State at one of Settle\u2019s continuance hearings, the one held December 10, 2001.\nThe State disagrees with defendant\u2019s contention that the prosecution misled the jury about the inducement for Settle\u2019s testimony. It further maintains any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not contribute to the jury\u2019s verdict. According to the State, even though Settle denied receiving any promises from the prosecution, the jury was still aware of Settle\u2019s self-serving motive to cooperate while awaiting sentencing in his case in the expectation of leniency\nIn considering the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude that evidence of Settle\u2019s deal with the prosecution could have affected the jury\u2019s verdict. The State\u2019s case against defendant depended almost entirely on Settle\u2019s testimony as it was the only evidence linking defendant to the burglaries. None of the other eyewitnesses could identify defendant as the man they saw burglarizing the black Jeep. Maintaining Settle\u2019s credibility was therefore crucial to the State\u2019s case against defendant. Truthful evidence about the conditions of his plea agreement could show Settle had a motive to testify falsely Had the jury been informed of such information, it could reasonably have concluded that Settle\u2019s testimony was not credible.\nThe fact that the jury was aware Settle was awaiting sentencing for his involvement in the crimes does not alter our conclusion. Throughout its case, the State characterized Settle as a witness who had \u201cno reason to he\u201d because he was already going to prison. Settle told the jury he was testifying because he was subpoenaed and he had received \u201cno promises\u201d from the State in exchange for his testimony. Settle and the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office made an agreement, the conditions of which were known to Judge Paine. After Settle testified to the jury about the conditions of his plea, the State was required to correct the false information. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 347, 680 N.E.2d at 332. The State did not do this. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the merits; although not binding on retrial, we find the evidence here sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, so double jeopardy does not bar retrial.\nBecause we have remanded this case for a new trial, we need not address defendant\u2019s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nTURNER and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Andrew J. Harger (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Scott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHAD A. JUNIOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20140334\nArgued May 12, 2004.\nOpinion filed June 25, 2004.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Andrew J. Harger (argued), both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nScott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 304, "last_page_order": 311 }