{ "id": 5435619, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK POWELL, Defendant-Appellee.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 1998 DODGE DURANGO SLT, Defendant (Mark Powell, Claimant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Powell", "decision_date": "2004-06-28", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-03-0751, 2-03-0752 cons.", "first_page": "906", "last_page": "910", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 906" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171768 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832339 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578232 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224804 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131046 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4023582 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" }, { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 1108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3449042 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/1108-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 3d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3398349 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/54/0603-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 441, "char_count": 9167, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.09654635216686e-08, "percentile": 0.32050343475623483 }, "sha256": "c8ea68c506d5e50b692febc86c502ee2052f79435a051fbd23944569457f0e3c", "simhash": "1:1321984376f10e54", "word_count": 1533 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:18:36.100393+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK POWELL, Defendant-Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 1998 DODGE DURANGO SLT, Defendant (Mark Powell, Claimant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn case No. 01 \u2014 CF\u20143050, defendant, Mark Powell, was charged with two counts of indecent solicitation of a child (720 ILCS 5/11\u2014 6(a) (West 2000)). In case No. 02 \u2014 MR\u201441, the State filed a complaint for the forfeiture of defendant\u2019s 1998 Dodge Durango SLT, alleging that defendant used it in committing the solicitation offenses (720 ILCS 5/36 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)). In each case, defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that a suppression order in a related Cook County case had collateral estoppel effect. The Kane County circuit court granted defendant\u2019s motions. The State appeals in each Kane County case, arguing that collateral estoppel did not apply because the Cook County suppression order was not final. Because the State cannot appeal the suppression order in the forfeiture case, we dismiss appeal No. 2 \u2014 03\u20140752. However, in the criminal case, we agree with the State\u2019s argument. Thus, in appeal No. 2 \u2014 03\u20140751, we vacate and remand with directions.\nI. FACTS\nOn November 1, 2001, defendant was arrested in Kane County for indecent solicitation of a child. Subsequently, after a search of his Chicago hotel room, defendant was charged in Cook County case No. 01 \u2014 CR\u201430066 with multiple counts of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 20.1(a) (West 2000)). In the Cook County case, defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence, arguing that his arrest was unlawful. On October 29, 2002, the Cook County circuit court granted that motion, and the State appealed to the Appellate Court, First District.\nWhile that appeal was pending, defendant moved to suppress the evidence in the Kane County cases, arguing that the Cook County circuit court\u2019s determination of the unlawfulness of his arrest had collateral estoppel effect. On June 25, 2003, the Kane County circuit court agreed, suppressing the evidence in both cases and continuing them to July 18, 2003. On July 1, 2003, the State appealed in each case. We consolidated the appeals.\nOn March 25, 2004, while these appeals were being briefed, the First District resolved the State\u2019s appeal in the Cook County case. The First District determined that defendant\u2019s arrest was lawful, reversing the Cook County suppression order and remanding the case. People v. Powell, No. 1 \u2014 02\u20143774 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On May 18, 2004, defendant petitioned for leave to appeal to the supreme court. That petition remains pending.\nII. No. 2 \u2014 03\u20140752\nWe first address the State\u2019s appeal of the suppression order in the forfeiture case. Defendant asserts that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we agree.\nThe State first contends that we have jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). That rule provides that the State may appeal an order suppressing evidence, but only in a criminal case. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The State points out that forfeiture proceedings frequently have been described as \u201ccriminal in nature.\u201d See, e.g., People v. Mudd, 54 Ill. App. 3d 603, 606 (1977). Nevertheless, \u201ca forfeiture action is clearly a civil proceeding.\u201d People v. Glenn, 142 Ill. App. 3d 1108, Ill. (1986). It is not a criminal, in personam proceeding against an offender; rather, it is \u201ca civil, in rem proceeding against property that was used in the commission of an offense.\u201d People v. 1995 Ford Van, 348 Ill. App. 3d 303, 306 (2004). The distinction is best reflected in the standard of proof; in a forfeiture action, \u201cthe State needs to prove its right to the property by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d 1995 Ford Van, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 306; see 720 ILCS 5/36 \u2014 2 (West 2000). Thus, a forfeiture action clearly is not a criminal case, and the State cannot appeal a suppression order under Rule 604(a)(1).\nAlternatively, the State contends that we have jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301), which permits any party to appeal a final judgment in a civil case. The problem on this point is that a \u201cpretrial ruling on a motion to suppress is not final and may be changed or reversed at any time prior to final judgment.\u201d People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 127 (1999). Indeed, as the circuit court continued the case after suppressing the evidence, the suppression order obviously did not terminate the proceedings. Thus, although the State complains that \u201c[wjithout the ability to present any evidence ***, the State could not pursue the forfeiture action,\u201d the State cannot appeal the suppression order until a final judgment is entered.\nIn sum, we lack jurisdiction over appeal No. 2 \u2014 03\u20140752, and we dismiss that appeal.\nIII. No. 2 \u2014 03\u20140751\nWe now address the State\u2019s appeal of the suppression order in the criminal case. Initially, defendant asserts that we lack jurisdiction here as well. He acknowledges that Rule 604(a)(1) allows the State to appeal a suppression order in a criminal case. He contends, however, that the Kane County circuit court did not actually suppress the evidence; rather, the court \u201cmerely gave effect to a previous suppression\u201d that was entered by the Cook County circuit court. Defendant concludes that the Kane County circuit court\u2019s order was not a suppression but instead an \u201capplication of collateral estoppel,\u201d which the State cannot appeal under Rule 604(a)(1). This argument, at best, is disingenuous.\nDefendant did not move the Kane County circuit court to \u201capply collateral estoppel\u201d; he moved the court to \u201csuppress the evidence,\u201d and the court did exactly that, on the basis of collateral estoppel. In a criminal case, Rule 604(a)(1) permits the State to appeal any order \u201csuppressing evidence\u201d (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)); there is no exclusion based upon collateral estoppel. Thus, we reject defendant\u2019s claim that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.\nNext, defendant asserts that the State waived or forfeited its argument that collateral estoppel did not apply because the Cook County suppression order was not final. The State disputes defendant\u2019s assertion, but we deem it irrelevant. It is well settled that we are not bound by the parties\u2019 procedural defaults and need not place them above the goals of obtaining just results and maintaining a sound body of precedent. People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 243 (2000). Because the First District has reversed the Cook County suppression order, the evidence against defendant is presently suppressed in Kane County but not in Cook County. To remedy such an anomalous situation, we will address the State\u2019s argument, regardless of whether the State defaulted it.\nCollateral estoppel bars the litigation of an issue that was decided in a prior case. People v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381, 396 (2002). However, it applies only if, in the prior case, the issue was litigated to a final judgment. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 396. Defendant contends that the prerequisite of a final judgment should not apply in a criminal case, but we summarily reject that contention; there is no doubt that the prerequisite exists. See, e.g., Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d at 396. The applicability of collateral estoppel is a question of law, and thus our review is de novo. In re J!America B., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1041 (2004).\nIt is well established that \u201ca judgment is not final for collateral estoppel purposes until the potential for appellate review has been exhausted.\u201d People v. One 1984 Pontiac Parisienne Sedan, 323 Ill. App. 3d 717, 722 (2001). When the Kane County circuit court entered its suppression order, the State\u2019s appeal of the Cook County suppression order was pending and not final. Thus, the Kane County circuit court erred in giving it effect. Indeed, now that the First District has reversed it, the Cook County suppression order still has no effect because it is presently pending before the supreme court upon defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the Kane County suppression order.\nThe parties now agree that the proper course is to remand the criminal cause to the Kane County circuit court with directions to stay further proceedings until the potential for appellate review has been exhausted in the Cook County case. That is precisely what we will do.\nIV CONCLUSION\nAppeal No. 2 \u2014 03\u20140752 is dismissed. In appeal No. 2 \u2014 03\u20140751, the order of the circuit court of Kane County is vacated, and the cause is remanded with directions.\nNo. 2 \u2014 03\u20140751, Vacated and remanded with directions.\nNo. 2 \u2014 03\u20140752, Appeal dismissed.\nGROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Meg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Mary Katherine Moran, Special State\u2019s Attorney, and Martin R Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Catherine A. Voigt, of Glen Ellyn, for the People.", "Jason R. Epstein, of Law Offices of Jason R. Epstein, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK POWELL, Defendant-Appellee.\u2014THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 1998 DODGE DURANGO SLT, Defendant (Mark Powell, Claimant-Appellee).\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201403\u20140751, 2\u201403\u20140752 cons.\nOpinion filed June 28, 2004.\nMeg G\u00f3recki, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Mary Katherine Moran, Special State\u2019s Attorney, and Martin R Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Catherine A. Voigt, of Glen Ellyn, for the People.\nJason R. Epstein, of Law Offices of Jason R. Epstein, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0906-01", "first_page_order": 924, "last_page_order": 928 }