{ "id": 5307139, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Knoxell DeBoise, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. DeBoise", "decision_date": "1976-01-19", "docket_number": "No. 74-270", "first_page": "298", "last_page": "305", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 298" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill.App.3d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2784357 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill.App.3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2783819 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill.2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5362185 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.Ct. 252", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 L.Ed.2d 169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 908", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6376834, 6377634, 6378407, 6377837, 6377074, 6377430, 6377270 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0908-01", "/us/409/0908-05", "/us/409/0908-07", "/us/409/0908-06", "/us/409/0908-02", "/us/409/0908-04", "/us/409/0908-03" ] }, { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5392065 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill.App.3d 1049", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2612102 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/1049-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 Ill.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2844436 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill.App.3d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2759316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill.App.3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2613920 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1519562 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446-447" }, { "page": "2360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/417/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 U.S. 206", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165005 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "1444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/364/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9639 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599-600" }, { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 U.S. 643", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1785580 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/367/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 U.S. 618", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6172443 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/381/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 338", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715874 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2729369 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill.App.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2473075 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.Ct. 262", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 L.Ed. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 928", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11394572, 11394607, 11394514, 11394485, 11394552 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0928-04", "/us/396/0928-05", "/us/396/0928-02", "/us/396/0928-01", "/us/396/0928-03" ] }, { "cite": "251 N.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848389 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 N.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill.App.3d 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344083 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2933485 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.Ct. 1658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L.Ed.2d 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 972", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11767201, 11766531, 11766566, 11766759, 11767023, 11767089, 11766834, 11766972, 11767158, 11766684, 11766623 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0972-11", "/us/402/0972-01", "/us/402/0972-02", "/us/402/0972-05", "/us/402/0972-08", "/us/402/0972-09", "/us/402/0972-06", "/us/402/0972-07", "/us/402/0972-10", "/us/402/0972-04", "/us/402/0972-03" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2899528 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 827, "char_count": 16443, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.088635910429115e-08, "percentile": 0.46724461541966344 }, "sha256": "5ca1c778ac7ff71ded0015673d48449828efcd59010c62285565da9996e9c111", "simhash": "1:806af04a974005f5", "word_count": 2760 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:45.042916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Knoxell DeBoise, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the defendant, Knoxell DeBoise, from a judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court of St. Clair County on a jury verdict of guilty to the charge of murder and the sentence of 40 to 90 years imposed thereunder.\nOn appeal the defendant raises the following contentions: (1) that \u201cthe trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motions to suppress evidence\u201d; (2) that the trial court erred in permitting the State to reopen its case; and (3) that the defendant\u2019s sentence of 40 to 90 years in the penitentiary was excessive. We find that the defendant has waived his first contention.\nPrior to defendant\u2019s first trial, he filed three motions to suppress. The first motion, encaptioned \u201cMotion to Suppress Identification,\u201d alleged that the identification procedures employed by the police were \u201csuggestive and unfair.\u201d The second motion, encaptioned \u201cMotion to Suppress Confession,\u201d alleged that the defendant\u2019s confession was not voluntary and that the defendant was denied his fifth amendment rights as required by the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The third motion, encaptioned \u201cMotion to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized,\u201d alleged that the defendant was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause and that as a result of this illegal arrest the \u201cdefendant was prevailed upon to give statements\u201d in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment. A hearing was conducted on the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress confession. There was only one witness called to testify at this hearing, Detective Robert Henry. He testified that the defendant was advised of the Miranda warnings, that the defendant stated that he understood these warnings, and that no threats or promises were made to the defendant. At the conclusion of this hearing the trial court pronounced that,\n\u201c[The] Motion of the defendant, Knoxell DeBoise, to Suppress the Confession is denied. The Motion to Suppress the Identification will be continued.\u201d\nAn order to the same effect was entered the same day. Neither the pronouncement nor the order made any reference to the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence illegally seized. While the record reflects that \u201cMotions [were] heard\u201d prior to the selection of jurors for defendant\u2019s first trial, it does not indicate either the nature or the disposition of such motions.\nAfter the defendant\u2019s first trial ended in a mistrial, a second trial was held which ended in a jury verdict of guilty. No new motions to suppress were filed by the defendant; nor were any of the defendant\u2019s previous motions renewed. Prior to the second trial the trial court made the following inquiry: \u201cGentlemen, are there any Motions to be made before we proceed?\u201d In response to this inquiry the defense counsel stated that there was a motion for a change of venue. After this motion was argued and denied, tire defense counsel stated, \u201cI believe that is the only Motion, your Honor.\u201d During the trial the State offered into evidence a statement the police had taken from the defendant. At this time the defense counsel made the following statement,\n\u201cYour Honor, there has been a pre-trial Motion heard already and objections to it. I don\u2019t want to cross examine the man at this time. I won\u2019t object to it based on the prior rulings of the Court as long as it is understood that we don\u2019t waive any objections presented at the pre-trial Motion.\u201d\nAfter the trial court stated, \u201cLet the record so show,\u201d it stated,\n\u201cI will show formally that People\u2019s Exhibit Number 6 is offered and accepted into evidence. Show that the record indicates that the defendant has not waived any statements or arguments previously presented as to the offering of this particular exhibit.\u201d\nPeople\u2019s Exhibit 6 was the inculpatory statement made by defendant in which he stated that he was walking the street armed looking for someone to rob and that the decedent was shot accidentally by defendant\u2019s father\u2019s gun, which after the incident defendant returned to a file cabinet in which it was kept. Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and the defendant filed a post-trial motion requesting a new trial, or in the alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This post-trial motion was devoid of any reference to any of the defendant\u2019s motions to suppress. The only substantive issue raised therein, other than the State\u2019s failure to sustain its burden of proof, was that the trial court erred \u201cin allowing the State to re-open its case.\u201d\nAs a general rule,\n\u201cWhere the grounds for a new trial are stated in writing, the accused is limited on review to the errors alleged therein and all other errors are deemed to have been waived.\u201d (People v. Hairston, 46 Ill.2d 348, 367, 263 N.E.2d 840, 851, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972, 29 L.Ed.2d 136, 91 S.Ct. 1658.)\n(See also People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856; People v. Hut son, 13 Ill.App.3d 775, 300 N.E.2d 305; People v. Norris, 8 Ill.3d 931, 291 N.E.2d 184. Furthermore, where, as in the instant case, the defendant urges a basis for suppression on appeal which was not urged in the trial court, such basis will not be entertained by a court of review. (People v. Sawyer, 42 Ill.2d 294, 251 N.E.2d 230, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928, 24 L.Ed. 2d 225, 90 S.Ct. 262; People v. Fentress, 133 Ill.App.2d 38, 272 N.E.2d 801.) While the defendant filed a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence before his first trial, which could have formed the basis for the contention now raised on appeal, he allowed this motion to remain unheal'd by the trial court. This motion was not renewed before the defendant\u2019s second trial. Consequently, the trial court did not consider the contention the defendant now raises on appeal. Under such circumstances the- defendant has the burden to request a hearing on his motion and his failure to take any affirmative action on this motion places him in no position to assign error on appeal. See People v. Kostos, 21 Ill.2d 496, 173 N.E.2d 469.\nUnder the facts of this case, we do not find that fundamental fairness (Supreme Court Rule 615(a), Ill. Rev. Sta't. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 615(a)) requires that we relax the waiver rule in the instant case. Although we befieve that the defendant may be able to demonstrate a technical violation of his constitutional rights, we do not befieve that the alleged police misconduct enabled the police to obtain any evidence that would not have been obtained in the absence of the alleged violation. In other words, the evidence the defendant seeks to suppress was not obtained by exploitation of the alleged illegality of his arrest. The exclusionary rules are designed to deter the lawless action of police. (United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 94 S.Ct. 613; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 81 S.Ct. 1684. As stated by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 425, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2260:\n\u201c \u2018The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter \u2014 to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available way \u2014 by removing the incentive to disregard it.\u2019 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). But \u2018[d] espite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.\u2019 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 620. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2360, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974).\u201d\nNext, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in permitting the State to, reopen its case with testimony of defendant\u2019s parole officer that the defendant made.a, second statement to a parole officer similar to that which the defendant allegedly gave the police. The following sequence of events forms the basis for this argument. During the trial defendant testified on his own behalf. The defendant testified that he attended a dance the night in question. He further testified that he did not leave the dance,from the time he entered the dance hall at 7:30 p.m. until he left to go home sometime after twelve. Two weeks after this incident the defendant\u2019s sister told him that the police were looking for him on an unrelated murder charge. The defendant\u2019s father told him to go down to the police station and \u201csee what it was all about.\u201d After flagging down a police car the defendant was taken to the police station. The defendant then testified that he was threatened by the police. He also testified that he did not relate to the police any of the statements attributed to him in the \u201cStatement,\u201d i.e., confession, introduced into evidence by the State. The defendant testified that one of the detectives said he. would make the murder look like an accident if the defendant would confess. The defendant recalled that he did not sign the statement until after he had been hit by the police. On cross-examination the defendant claimed that the police made up the statement, including the portion that stated that he had no intention of hurting the victim and that it was purely accidental. The defendant also testified that he was on parole at the time of the alleged murder. He further testified that his parole officer was (Henry) Morriseau. The defendant stated that he had requested to see his parole officer, but he was denied an, opportunity to talk to him. After rebuttal testimony the State rested, and instructional conference was held. On the day following the instructional conference, the State\u2019s Attorney advised the trial court that the defendant\u2019s parole officer had come to his office the preceding afternoon. The State\u2019s Attorney told the trial court that he had never seen Morriseau before, and that,\n\u201cHe [Morriseau] advised me that he had learned of the defendant\u2019s testimony through deputy sheriffs at the St. Clair County Jail when he was there visiting other inmates on unrelated matters. He advised me that statements attributed to him by the defendant were not true, specifically with respect to him being deprive[d] of tire right to see .his parolee, the defendant, at the East St. Louis Police Station, and with respect to defendant\u2019s testimony that he, Morriseau, had told the defendant at the County Jail that he had not been permitted to see Iirm and that the police had advised Morriseau there was nothing-lie could do for the defendant.\u201d\nThe State\u2019s-Attorney then related to the trial court the version of the incident the defendant had allegedly told his parole officer. After stating that the State had never heard about this statement and advising the trial court that Morriseau submitted a report of his \u201cinvestigation\u201d solely to the Parole and Pardon Board, the State\u2019s Attorney moved to be aUowed to reopen its case \u201cfor presentation of rebuttal evidence.\u201d Thereafter arguments were heard on the State\u2019s motion. The motion was granted and the defendant was granted a 30-minute recess to interview Morriseau. On direct examination Morriseau substantiated the statements the State\u2019s Attorney had made to the trial court. The witness also related that the defendant \u201c[had] told me that he had taken the weapon from his father\u2019s home, and he had approached a truck that a driver was getting out of. He had the weapon in his hand, and his intent was to rob the man of his money; and he told me that he didn\u2019t even have his finger on the trigger, but rather had the hammer of the weapon back a little bit. He got nervous when the door opened or something of that nature, and the hammer caused the weapon to discharge; and he got scared to death and he ran at that time.\u201d No objection was raised to the introduction of the above quoted testimony. We do note, however, that immediately preceding this testimony the defense requested that the trial court renew the objections he had voiced in camera. These objections were limited to: (1) the fact that the evidence was cumulative; (2) an alleged confidential relationship between parole officer and parolee; (3) the inability to challenge statements by pretrial motion; and (4) tire failure of the State to exercise due diligence in finding out that the defendant had made statements to his parole officer. The trial court granted the defendants\u2019 request to continue the above stated objections. While the defense counsel subsequently made several other objections, the record contains no objection to any testimony on the basis that such testimony was beyond the scope of rebuttal. After a brief cross-examination tire witness was excused and the State rested. While no instruction was given limiting Morriseau\u2019s testimony to impeachment purposes, we note that prior to the reception of this testimony the trial court stated,\n\u201cGentlemen, after we conclude the testimony, I will hold an instruction conference so that you folks will have an opportunity to tender any further instruction if you feel that they are appropriate.\u201d\nThe record contains no indication that any further instructions were proffered by the defendant.\nSection 114 \u2014 10(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 10(c)), provides that,\n\u201cNo such confession shall be received in evidence which has not been furnished in compliance with subsection (a) of this Sec tion unless the court is satisfied that the prosecutor was unaware of the existence of such confession prior to trial and that he could not have become aware of such in the exercise of due diligence.\u201d\nUnlike People v. Thompson, 18 Ill.App.3d 613, 616, 310 N.E.2d 504, 507, wherein we found \u201cno indication in the record \u201d * * that the State\u2019s Attorney was unaware of the statement or could not have become aware of it in the exercise of due diligence,\u201d the instant case does contain a plausible explanation by the State\u2019s Attorney which the trial court found satisfied the requirement imposed by section 114 \u2014 10(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 10(c)). On the record before us we can find no error in the trial court\u2019s action. Similarly, we find no abuse in the trial court\u2019s discretion in allowing the State to reopen its case for admission of rebuttal testimony (see People v. Price, 8 Ill.App.3d 158, 289 N.E.2d 280), since the rebuttal testimony had probative value for refuting the defendant\u2019s testimony (People u. Daugherty, 43 Ill.2d 251, 254, 253 N.E.2d 389; People v. Brown, 18 Ill.App.3d 1049, 310 N.E.2d 498, 502).\nAlbeit we believe that it was error not to give the jury an instruction limiting the reception of Morriseau\u2019s testimony to impeachment and rebuttal purposes, the failure of the defendant to proffer such an instruction constituted a waiver of this error. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 451(c); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 67. See also People v. Springs, 51 Ill.2d 418, 425, 283 N.E.2d 225, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 908, 34 L.Ed.2d 169, 93 S.Ct. 252; People v. Damen, 28 Ill.2d 464, 469, 193 N.E.2d 25; People v. Doss, 26 Ill.App.3d 1, 324 N.E.2d 210.\nThe sole remaining issue raised by the defendant is that his sentence of 40 to 90 years in the penitentiary was excessive. In the instant case the defendant was on parole from a sentence imposed on a burglary charge when he committed the offense of murder. He committed the murder during an attempted aimed robbery. He had been walking the street armed with a handgun looking for an appropriate victim to rob. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in the sentence it imposed. See People v. Van Gilder, 26 Ill.App.3d 152, 324 N.E.2d 715.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County and the sentence imposed thereunder is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nJONES, J., concurs.\nG. J. MORAN, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul Bradley and Gordon Berry, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Robert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Bruce D. Irish and Myra J. Brown, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Knoxell DeBoise, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 74-270\nOpinion filed January 19, 1976.\nG. J. MORAN, J., dissenting.\nPaul Bradley and Gordon Berry, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRobert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Bruce D. Irish and Myra J. Brown, both of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0298-01", "first_page_order": 324, "last_page_order": 331 }