{ "id": 5306802, "name": "EMANUEL S. LOZOFF, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHORE HEIGHTS, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd.", "decision_date": "1976-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 74-18", "first_page": "697", "last_page": "703", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 697" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "355 F.2d 488", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 842256 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/355/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5128163, 5130132 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/3/0281-02", "/ill-app-2d/3/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 N.E.2d 329", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.Y.S.2d 953", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.Y.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 2274155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/16/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 A.L.R. 3d 907", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 859886 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/37/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 867295 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/17/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "406 Ill. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2635780 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/406/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "404 Ill. 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307956 ], "year": 1950, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/404/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5005720 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/338/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5322195 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/99/0391-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 644, "char_count": 13722, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.679056366791974e-07, "percentile": 0.6972053196923836 }, "sha256": "15c95084d8dc208382e4e70544243f8dc8f234e5bdd1f2d0a4fc6548dc4753b3", "simhash": "1:11584bea124543db", "word_count": 2297 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:45.042916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EMANUEL S. LOZOFF, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHORE HEIGHTS, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GUILD\ndelivered' the opinion of the court:\nIn 1971 the defendant corporation, Shore Heights, Ltd., (Shore Heights), was the beneficiary of a land trust holding title to 209 lots in Kendall County. Flintlock Investments of Aurora, Illinois (Flintlock) was negotiating with Shore Heights for the purchase of these lots and was also negotiating with Aldridge Construction Company (Aldridge) for the sale of the same lots. Plaintiff, Emanuel S. Lozoff, was employed by Flintlock at this time. Plaintiff was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin but was not licensed to practice law in Illinois until March 2, 1972, almost three months after the complaint herein was filed.\n\u2022 . A contract was entered into between Shore Heights and Flintlock but the sale was not consummated. Thereafter, plaintiff discussed with Aldridge\u2019s attorneys the possibility of their negotiating directly with Shore Heights. Plaintiff also proposed to Shore Heights\u2019 attorney, Norman Lawrence, that plaintiff be employed by Shore Heights to put together a sale of the lots to Aldridge.\nOn July 20, 1971, a meeting was held between Shore Heights\u2019 attorney, plaintiff and the defendant Charles Greene, who was general manager of Shore Heights. At this meeting a letter agreement was dictated by plaintiff and later signed by the defendant, Delores Greene, presi-r dent of Shore Heights, for Shore Heights. In pertinent part, this agreement provided as follows:\n\u201cDear Mr. Lozoff:\nThis is to serve as a memorandum of our agreement in which you will be paid the sum of $65,000 as attorneys fees for the legal services rendered by you in the Aldridge Construction Company \u2014 Shore Heights land agreement for properties located \u2018in Kendall County, Illinois.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nOn August 6, 1971, a contract was entered into between Shore Heights and Aldridge but later Aldridge served notice on Shore Heights that they were not going to proceed with the contract.\nOn December 9, 1971, plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed the instant complaint alleging that he was due $65,000 from defendants for having rendered legal services to them as described in the July 20, 1971, letter agreement. The complaint also alleged that plaintiff dealt with the defendants Charles and Delores Greene individually as well as on behalf of the defendant Shore Heights and that the Shore Heights-Aldridge contract was not consummated due to defendants\u2019 \u201crefusal, failure or inability\u201d to comply therewith. The jury returned a verdict in favor of. the plaintiff and against the individual and corporate defendants in the amount of $65,000, and answered in the affirmative the special interrogatory, \u201cDid the Plaintiff perform all of the services, which were required by him by the contract?\u201d Following entry of judgment based upon the jury\u2019s verdict and the denial of relief prayed for in their post-trial motion, defendants appeal.\nThe sole question presented in this case is whether an attorney who is licensed to practice law in Wisconsin but not in Illinois may recover attorney\u2019s fees for legal services rendered in Illinois.\nAlthough defendants raise several allegations of error, we find that we need only consider the question of whether an attorney who is not licensed to practice law in Illinois can recover on a contract to perform legal services in Illinois. Prior to a discussion of that issue, we note plaintiff\u2019s argument that defendants have not properly preserved this issue for review due to their failure to raise it in their post-trial motion. We. find, however, that in their post-trial motion defendants specifically asserted that the court erred in denying their motion for judgment on tire pleadings and motion in limine, both of which were based exclusively upon plaintiff\u2019s lack of an Illinois license to practice law. Such a specification of error satisfies the specificity requirement of section 68.1 (2) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 68.1(2)) by indicating the grounds upon which the defendants rely \u201c* * * with sufficient particularity to afford the trial court identity of the error relied upon.\u201d Osborne v. Leonard (1968), 99 Ill. App. 2d 391, 396, 240 N.E.2d 769, 771.\nWe turn, then, to a consideration of the effect of plaintiff\u2019s not being licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois. Section 1 of the Attorneys and Counselors Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 13, par. 1) in part states:\n\u201cNo person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor at law within this State without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from the Supreme Court of this State.\nNo person shall receive any compensation directly or indirectly for any legal services other than a regularly licensed attorney.\u201d\nPlaintiff argues that the plain meaning of this statute has no application to the instant case because: (1) he acted merely as a \u201cfinder\u201d and not as a lawyer, or (2) Supreme Court Rule 707 (Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, ch. 110A, par. 707) controls the instant case.\nAs to plaintiff\u2019s first argument, we find that the fact that the Lozoff-Shore Heights contract, which was drafted by plaintiff, provided that plaintiff was to be paid $65,000 \u201cas attorney\u2019s fees for * * * legal services\u201d and the fact that the complaint sought recovery for legal services precludes plaintiff from now contending that he merely acted as a broker or \u201cfinder.\u201d As to plaintiff\u2019s second contention, we find Supreme Court Rule 707 inapplicable to the case at bar. That Rule provides:\n\u201cAnything in these rules to the contrary notwithstanding, an attorney and counselor-at-law from any other jurisdiction in the United States, or foreign country, may in the discretion of any court of this State be permitted to participate before the court in the trial or argument of any particular cause in which, for the time being, he is employed.\u201d\nThis Rule, in the discretion of the court, allows a foreign attorney \u201cto participate before the court in tire trial or argument of any particular cause in which, for the time being, he is employed.\u201d Plaintiff herein is attempting to recover for legal services performed outside of the courts of this State. Rule 707, therefore, has no application to the instant case.\nThe courts of the State of Illinois have the sole and exclusive power to determine who may practice law in the State. (Chicago Bar Association v. Kellogg (1949), 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.Bd 519.) The practice of law is not limited to court appearances, (People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. Schafer (1949), 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773), but includes the giving of advice or the rendition of any service requiring the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch (1950), 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E.2d 148.\nIn City of East St. Louis v. Freels (1885), 17 Ill. App. 339, 343, in considering the claim of a nonlawyer for legal services the court stated the following with reference to a predecessor of the statute involved in the instant case:\n\u201cFrom this statute it would seem that the policy of the law is, that no person without being duly licensed as an attorney at law can recover for services performed as such in a court of record.\u201d\nIn Sellers v. Phillips (1890), 37 Ill. App. 74, an attorney who was licensed to practice law in Michigan but not in Illinois sued to recover on a contract for attorney\u2019s fees for prosecuting an appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court. The appellate court noted first that the contract,\n\u201c* * * is in conflict with Sec. 1, Chap. 13, R.S., which prohibits any person from practicing as an attorney or counselor at law, or conducting any action or suit in which he is not a party concerned in any court of record in this State without having previously obtained a license for that purpose * * *.\u201d (37 Ill. App. 74, 75.)\nThe court then went on to hold,\n\u201cWe think the terms of the statute warrant us in going further, [than did the court in Freels, supra] and in saying, positively, that the contract was unlawful and compensation therefore can not be recovered.\u201d (37 Ill. App. 74, 75.)\nWe also note the following statement found in Annot., 11 A.L.R. 3d 907, 908, (1967), relying in part upon Freels and Sellers:\n\u201cMost courts take the view that in the absence of some extenuating circumstance, an out-of-state attorney who renders services locally falls within the prohibition against illegally practicing law and cannot recover compensation from his client for the local services.\u201d\nSee also 4 Ill. L.&Pr. Attorneys and Counselors \u00a7\u00a712 and 125 (1971) and Spivak v. Sachs (1965), 16 N.Y.2d 163, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953, 211 N.E.2d 329.\nIn arriving at the above decision we are not unmindful of the decisions of Mock v. Higgins (1954), 3 Ill. App. 2d 281, 121 N.E.2d 865, and Dorf v. Relies (7th Cir. 1966), 355 F.2d 488.\nIn Mock v. Higgins, the appellate court in substance held that under section 12 of the Attorneys and Counselors Act, a Missouri lawyer could, in fact, practice in Illinois. Section 12 reads as follows:\n\u201cWhen any counselor or attorney at law, residing in any other state or territory, may desire to practice law in this state, such counselor or attorney shall be allowed to practice in the several courts of law and equity in this state upon the same terms and in the same manner that counselors and attorneys at law residing in this state now are or hereafter may be admitted to practice law in such other state or territory.\u201d\nIt is to be noted that this provision provides that an attorney residing outside of the State shall be allowed to practice in the several courts of law and equity in this State upon the same terms and in the same manner an Illinois lawyer is admitted to practice law in such other State or territory. It is conceded that this section of the statute is somewhat difficult to analyze. It would appear the provision, using the words \u201cadmitted to practice law\u201d doubtless means \u201callowed to practice law.\u201d However, if section 12 is read in conjunction with Supreme Court Rule 707, there appears at first blush to be a conflict. This may not necessarily be so. Rule 707 specifically provides that an attorney from outside the State of Illinois, from another jurisdiction of the United States or foreign country, may be permitted to participate before the court in a trial of a particular case for the time being he is expressly employed. It would appear that section 12 must be read in conjunction with Supreme Court Rule 707. In other words, a foreign attorney, in the discretion of the court, may be allowed to appear in the courts of this State on specific cases for which he is then presently employed. The difficulty arises, however, in such case as the one before us where appearance in court is not an issue but the rendition of legal services by a foreign attorney in the State of Illinois is tire problem.\nIn Mock v. Higgins, the plaintiff, Mock, had entered into a contract with attorney Leahy who was an attorney licensed to practice law in Missouri but not in Illinois. The contract entered into was signed by Leahy, the St. Louis attorney, together with the plaintiff Constance Mock and George F. Higgins, the public administrator of Du Page County, Illinois. Under the provisions of the contract both Leahy, the St. Louis attorney, Higgins, the public administrator, Farthing, \u25a0 an Illinois attorney and Joseph Sam Perry, an Illinois attorney, were to receive for their services the sum of 10% of the amount collected by Constance Mock in a certain probate claim or the sum of $250,000, whichever was the larger. They were successful in their efforts and Constance Mock was decreed to be entitled to one-third of the estate, which was in the neighborhood of $3,500,000. After Constance Mock had received the money, she became dissatisfied with the contract and sued Higgins, the administrator, Leahy, the St. Louis attorney, Farthing, the Illinois attorney and Joseph Sam Perry, the Illinois attorney, alleging that Leahy was not admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois and that the entire contract was therefore void. In passing upon this issue, as indicated above, the court specifically held that it was common knowledge that Missouri lawyers practice in the State of Illinois and, although Leahy was not admitted to practice law in the State of Illinois, the contract involving Mr. Leahy, the St. Louis attorney, was not void. The court in Mock at no time considered the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 707 or its predecessor, if any.\nIn Dorf v. Relies, the Federal court cited with approval the above finding in Mock. We do not adhere to Mock insofar as it relates to the case at bar, nor do we adhere to Dorf insofar as it follows Mock. We find that section 12, relative to nonresident lawyers practicing law in Illinois, must be read in conjunction with Supreme Court Rule 707. In other words, the Missouri lawyer, or as here a Wisconsin lawyer, may, in certain instances, in the discretion of the trial court, be allowed or admitted to practice law before the courts of this State. Insofar as Mock holds to the contrary, we disagree.\nWe therefore find that plaintiff is precluded from recovering for legal services rendered in Illinois when he was not licensed to practice law in Illinois.\nThe judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and judgment is entered in favor of the defendants.\nReversed.\nSEIDENFELD, P. J., and HALLETT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GUILD" } ], "attorneys": [ "David P. Peskind and Gail L. Erschen, both of Tyler, Peskind & Solomon, of Aurora, for appellants.", "Albert Brooks Friedman, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EMANUEL S. LOZOFF, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHORE HEIGHTS, LTD., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District (1st Division)\nNo. 74-18\nOpinion filed February 6, 1976.\nDavid P. Peskind and Gail L. Erschen, both of Tyler, Peskind & Solomon, of Aurora, for appellants.\nAlbert Brooks Friedman, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0697-01", "first_page_order": 723, "last_page_order": 729 }