{ "id": 5306717, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Hoover, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hoover", "decision_date": "1976-01-28", "docket_number": "No. 60811", "first_page": "799", "last_page": "806", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 799" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill.App. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2742554 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/129/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.E.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2854055 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Ill.App.3d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2611300 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/18/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill.App.3d 858", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2836090, 2836452 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0858-01", "/ill-app-3d/3/0858-02" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill.2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856405 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12131628 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 N.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill.App.3d 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5313474 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 N.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill.App.3d 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511777 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/17/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853046 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill.App.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2537844 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/95/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5334974 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/17/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill.App.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5321989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/92/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill.App.3d 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2960775 ], "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2853113 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill.App.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2477410 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/97/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2884013 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/33/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill.App. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1588317 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/115/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 N.E. 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5156087 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/319/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 N.E.2d 608", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2851346 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0445-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 693, "char_count": 14575, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.406749928542077e-07, "percentile": 0.6461668228533787 }, "sha256": "a8f4eff650e24c2508f58982e5aa7b22b4b8f89e5094fdaf2d7c0dc00411a4ca", "simhash": "1:1fe298570b5f9c30", "word_count": 2364 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:45.042916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Hoover, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE ADESKO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial defendant was convicted along with codefen-dant Andrew Howard of murdering one William \u201cPooky\u201d Young and was sentenced to a term of 150 to 200 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal defendant contends that the trial court erred when it:\n(1) Denied his motion for a severance based on admission of a post-arrest statement of the codefendant;\n(2) Admitted evidence concerning tire death of one of the witnesses and that witness\u2019 testimony;\n(3) Restricted cross-examination of a witness;\n(4) Gave instructions regarding a conspiracy;\n(5) Admitted evidence of other crimes;\n(6) Allowed the State to make improper remarks during opening and closing arguments.\nIn addition, defendant asserts that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nOn February 26, 1973, at approximately 8 p.m., a witness heard a car stop in the alley behind his apartment. The car pulled away after three or four shots were fired. This witness then saw a body lying in the aUey and called the police. The victim, William Young, had been shot six times in the head and once in the arm.\nThe \u25a0 State\u2019s witness, Larry Leverston, testified that the killing of William Young had been ordered by defendant who with Leverston, defendant Hoover, and codefendant Andrew Howard had all been members of an organization known as \u201cthe Family,\u201d which sold narcotics in the Englewood area of Chicago. Defendant, known as \u201cKing Hoover,\u201d was the leader of \u201cthe Family.\u201d On or about February 21, 1973, the three were all present at a meeting of ten or eleven members of \u201cthe Family.\u201d During the meeting defendant ordered the execution of William Young, Joel Ford, Joshua Shaw, and Tony Tucker for sticking up one of his dope houses. At another meeting Leverston attended on February 26, 1973, defendant stated that \u201che had gotten one of the guys that they was [sic] after and he wanted the other two, Josh Shaw, Tony Tucker killed also before the week was out.\u201d Defendant further stated \u201cthey had gotten Pookey and threw him in the alley around. 68th and Lowe and shot him in the head.\u201d On cross-examination Leverston admitted that he was currently charged with murder. The trial court, however, sustained the State\u2019s objections to defense questions on whether Lever-ston had been indicted, whether he was incarcerated on other charges, and whether he was promised favorable treatment for testifying for the State.\nCertain evidence was introduced at trial which applied particularly to codefendant Howard. At Howard\u2019s preliminary hearing, before defendant had been arrested, Shaw\u2019s testimony placed Howard with Young on February 16, 1973. Howard had told a companion to shoot if Young tried to run. Further testimony revealed that Shaw had been shot to death on September 27, 1973. The transcript of Shaw\u2019s testimony at the preliminary hearing was thus read to the jury at the trial with certain references to defendant stricken. The court also instructed the juiy not to consider Shaw\u2019s testimony against defendant.\nHoward admitted after his arrest that at defendant\u2019s request he brought Young to the Roberts Motel on February 26, 1973, and then released him when Young said he did not want to see defendant. The court instructed the jury that \u201can admission may not be considered by you against any defendant other than the one who made it.\u201d\nAfter the jury had been impanelled, defense counsel moved for a severance based on certain police reports he claimed he had received just before trial. The court denied the motion as untimely.\nDuring the opening argument, the State referred to defendant as the leader of a Chicago gang known as the \"supreme gangsters.\u201d In his closing argument, he alluded to narcotic drug traffic, to defendant as the \u201cKing\u201d of \u201cthe Family,\u201d and to orders by the defendant that certain persons including the victim must die.\nDefendant was arrested on September 21, 1973, for a traffic violation. He attempted to escape, but was apprehended a short time later.\nDefendant urges, as grounds for reversal, that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to sever. He claims that the conflict between his statement and Howard\u2019s statement as to whether Howard ever called him to inform him of Young\u2019s whereabouts denied him a fair hearing.\nWhile jointly indicted defendants are ordinarily tried together, the granting of a severance is left largely to the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Ross (1968), 41 Ill.2d 445, 244 N.E.2d 608.) A motion for a severance must be made before the jury is sworn. (People v. Fox (1925), 319 Ill. 606, 150 N.E. 347; People v. Ramey (1969), 115 Ill.App. 2d 431, 253 N.E.2d 688.) The primary inquiry is whether or not the defenses of the several defendants were so antagonistic that being tried together denied one of them a fair trial (People v. Connolly (1965), 33 Ill.2d 128, 210 N.E.2d 523; People v. Trigg (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 261, 240 N.E.2d 130.) Defendant must show how he would have been prejudiced by a joint trial. People v. Rhodes (1969), 41 Ill.2d 494, 244 N.E.2d 145; People v. Howard, 34 Ill.App.3d 145, 340 N.E.2d 53.\nThe motion for severance in the instant case was based on the alleged contradiction between the post-arrest statements of defendant and codefendant Andrew Howard. The same counsel represented both defendant and Howard. Moreover, the supplemental police reports giving these statements were furnished to defendant before he answered ready for trial and a jury was chosen. Defendant, nonetheless, answered ready for trial and the court proceeded to impanel the jury. The foHowing day, as the court prepared for opening statements, defendant oraUy moved for a severance based on police reports showing a contradiction between statements of defendant and Howard. We are of the opinion the trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion for a severance as untimely.\nDefendant urges that it was error to aHow the oral statement of Andrew Howard made to the pohce after his arrest to be considered as evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Statements made to a police officer at the time of arrest do not faU within the exception to the hearsay rule which aHows statements in furtherance of a conspiracy into evidence. (People v. Daniels (1968), 92 Ill.App.2d 207, 235 N.E.2d 305; People v. Tunstall (1959), 17 Ill.2d 160, 161 N.E.2d 300.) Where defendants are tried jointly, however, evidence competent against one or more of them is admissible when the trial judge limits the evidence to the particular party implicated by it. People v. Sessions (1968), 95 Ill.App.2d 17, 238 N.E.2d 94.\nIn the case before us, Howard told the police that on February 26, 1973, he called defendant who told him' to bring in the victim, William Young. According to Howard, Young objected and Howard permitted him to leave. Defendant in his post-arrest statement denied having seen Young or having talked to Howard that day. While Howard\u2019s statement may have exculpated Howard, it also may have implicated defendant. The trial court, therefore, instructed the jury not to consider the statement against any defendant other than the one who made it. The State, moreover, did not need Howard\u2019s statement to bring defendant\u2019s intentions into evidence. Larry Leverston testified as to his pres-, ence at two meetings. At the first defendant announced his intent to execute William Young. At the second defendant announced they shot the victim and threw him in an alley. The jury could find sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without reference to Howard\u2019s statement. Howard\u2019s statement may or may not have implicated defendant. Leverston\u2019s testimony certainly implicated defendant. We find the trial court to have, at most, committed harmless error in admitting the statement of Andrew Howard into evidence.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred when it admitted the testimony of Joshua Shaw and evidence regarding the death of Joshua Shaw. In People v. Howard, 34 Ill.App.3d 145, 340 N.E.2d 53, we held the transcript to have properly been admitted against codefendant Howard. When a witness testifies under oath in a prior proceeding and is cross-examined, that testimony may later be introduced against two parties to the prior proceeding if the witness becomes unavailable. (People v. Jackson (1968), 41 Ill.2d 102, 242 N.E.2d 160.) Defendant in the case at bar had not yet been arrested at Howard\u2019s preliminary hearing. Both defendant and Howard, however, were represented by the same counsel who represented Howard at the preliminary hearing. Shaw\u2019s testimony placed Howard\" with the victim on February 16, 1973. Howard had told a companion to shoot if Young tried to run. Further testimony revealed that Shaw had been shot to death on September\n27, 1973. The transcript of Shaw\u2019s testimony at the preliminary hearing was thus read to the jury at trial with certain references to. defendant stricken. The court also instructed the jury not to consider Shaw\u2019s testimony against defendant. Defendant, furthermore, had. notice of the transcript of Joshua Shaw\u2019s testimony and yet made no motion for severance based on that transcript. In light of the juiy instruction and the fact that defendant did not move for severance based on the transcript, we believe the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting Shaw\u2019s statement. Defendant was in jail at the time of Shaw\u2019s death. Counsel, nonetheless, can prove a man\u2019s death without describing and detailing the method of his demise. We hold it was harmless error to detail the death of Joshua Shaw.\nDefendant further contends that the trial court improperly restricted defendant\u2019s cross-examination of Leverston. The court refused to allow defense counsel to inquire whether Leverston had been indicted on a murder charge or how many times the murder charge had been up before the court. The general principle concerning impeachment of witnesses by evidence of past crimes applies only to convictions. (People v. Hanks (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 633, 307 N.E.2d 638.) We rely on our opinion in People v. Howard (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 145, 340 N.E.2d 53, in holding that aH matters affecting Leverston\u2019s credibffity were properly before the jury.\nDefendant argues that instructions regarding a conspiracy should not have been given where the evidence did not estabhsh conspiracy. Although the trial court gave no conspiracy instruction to the jury, the court determined that a conspiracy existed in its rulings on the admissibHity of certain evidence. The elements of the crime of conspiracy are \u201can agreement to commit an offense with the intent that the offense be committed, followed by commission of an act in furtherance of Hie agreement by either conspirator.\u201d (People v. Graham (1971), 1 Ill.App.3d 749, 752, 274 N.E.2d 370, 372.) When the evidence at trial, taken as a whole, shows a conspiracy, statements of one conspirator accompanying or explaining the common design are admissible against all coconspirators. People v. Daniels (1968), 92 Ill.App.2d 207, 235 N.E.2d 305; People v. Grilec (1954), 2 Ill.2d 538, 119 N.E.2d 232.\nThe evidence in the instant case revealed that defendant led an organization known as \u201cthe Family.\u201d Leverston testified that he and Howard were present at a meeting when defendant ordered the kfiling of WilHam Young. At a meeting approximately an hour and a half after Wilfiam Young had been tilled, defendant described how he and Howard had accomphshed the killing. Howard then took Leverston into a bathroom and told how he had taken Young to defendant. They held Young for a few hours, took him to an alley, and shot him. We hold that the statements of Howard, a coconspirator, were properly admitted against defendant.\nDefendant maintains that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of other crimes by the defendant. He contends the testimony concerning narcotics sales was brought forth to prejudice and inflame the passions of the jury. Our supreme court, however, has aHowed evidence of a defendant\u2019s narcotics sales to show motive. (People v. Durso (1968), 40 Ill.2d 242, 239 N.E.2d 842.) Defendant in the case before us was the head of an organization involved in narcotics sales. The victim was a seller for defendant and was believed by defendant to have stolen from defendant\u2019s supply. We conclude that the testimony concerning defendant\u2019s involvement in narcotics sales was properly admitted to show defendant\u2019s motive for killing William Young.\nDefendant asserts that he was prejudiced by improper remarks made by the prosecution during opening and closing arguments. The State\u2019s closing argument referred to sales of narcotics by defendant and his associates. We rely on People v. Howard, 34 Ill.App.3d 145, 340 N.E. 2d 53, and conclude that defendant\u2019s assertion cannot be upheld.\nDefendant claims not to have been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We held in People v. Howard, 34 Ill.App.3d 145, 340 N.E.2d 53, that it was the function of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses, weigh their testimony, and determine factual matters. (People v. Robinson (1972), 3 Ill.App.3d 858, 279 N.E.2d 515.). Further more, the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to convict even if contradicted by the accused. (People v. Arroyo (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 187, 309 N.E.2d 804; People v. Daily (1968), 41 Ill.2d 116, 242 N.E.2d 170.) The State in the case at bar rehed heav\u00fcy on the testimony of Larry Leverston. The court instructed the jury regarding evidence admissible only against codefendant Howard. This court holds that the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nDefendant finaUy contends that the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. The granting of a mistrial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. (People v. Oliver (1970), 129 Ill.App. 2d 83, 262 N.E.2d 597.) Our previous analysis treated defendant\u2019s contentions in support of a motion for a mistrial. We do not find the trial judge to have abused his discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, this court concludes that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County must be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nDIERINGER and BURMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE ADESKO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Walter LaVon Pride, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Kevin Sweeney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Hoover, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 60811\nOpinion filed January 28, 1976.\nWalter LaVon Pride, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Kevin Sweeney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0799-01", "first_page_order": 825, "last_page_order": 832 }