{ "id": 5306851, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDERICK J. LECHNER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lechner", "decision_date": "1976-02-03", "docket_number": "No. 61157", "first_page": "1033", "last_page": "1047", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 1033" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "87 S. Ct. 752", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 L. Ed. 2d 557", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 1019", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11421921, 11422373, 11422058, 11422187, 11421968, 11422128, 11422292, 11422011, 11422332, 11422239 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/1019-01", "/us/385/1019-10", "/us/385/1019-04", "/us/385/1019-06", "/us/385/1019-02", "/us/385/1019-05", "/us/385/1019-08", "/us/385/1019-03", "/us/385/1019-09", "/us/385/1019-07" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5379867 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2856294 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 N.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. App. 3d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2932986 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/11/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2957947 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2937684 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2470545 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/133/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 Ill. App. 3d 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2509277 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/17/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314247 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Neb. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 4528087 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/108/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Utah 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8871106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/utah/78/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.W.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "292 Ky. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ky.", "case_ids": [ 2758407 ], "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ky/292/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 P. 2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 8740692 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/okla-crim/59/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.W.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10203090 ], "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/184/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "216 Ga. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 275996 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ga/216/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 N.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "375 Ill. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2535257 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 N.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2708741 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0064-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1288, "char_count": 36572, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0373303287405411e-07, "percentile": 0.5498453770856911 }, "sha256": "faf6e90b5c2b612092425c21ba2e5d609f922f2b6e981dc94a37469a0925762c", "simhash": "1:8898f42c3110f697", "word_count": 5902 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:45:45.042916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDERICK J. LECHNER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Frederick J. Lechner, was charged with the murder of his wife, Betty Lechner, and one Richard Taylor. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(2).) Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of murder for both homicides and was sentenced to serve in the penitentiary a term of not less than 14 nor more than 30 years.\nDefendant appeals from these judgments and presents the following c\u00f3ntentions: (1) the trial court erred by denying a lay witness the opportunity to express an opinion regarding defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the homicides; and (2) both convictions must be reversed because defendant presented sufficient evidence to shift the burden to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was legally sane at the time the homicides were committed, and the prosecution failed to sustain this burden.\nOn November 30, 1971, defendant called his office at Talman\u2019s Savings and Loan and advised that he would not be coming to work. At approximately 4 or 5 p.m., that afternoon, defendant was in Ron\u2019s Tap, a tavern located in Chicago. As he departed from, the tavern, defendant told one Stanley Lakas that he was going to visit his wife, Betty Lechner. The Lechners had been living apart since October 15, 1971, and Betty had been residing with her sister, Gertrude Samborski, since about the first week in November.\nOn the evening of November 30, 1971, defendant twice telephoned the Samborski home to speak with Betty, but was informed that she had not returned from work. Gertrude testified that defendant sounded \u201cquite angry\u201d during the second telephone call. At 7:50 p.m. that evening, Gertrude observed defendant drive by her home and look into the driveway.\nAt approximately 8:25 p.m., Betty Lechner, accompanied by Richard Taylor, drove into the driveway adjacent to the Samborski residence. As Gertrude approached the back door to meet Betty, she heard two or three sounds which she thought were \u201cbackfires of a car.\u201d When she opened the door and turned on the light, she heard voices and observed Betty get \u201cout of the car as if Fred pulled her out.\u201d Defendant was holding a \u201csilver\u201d gun. After Betty told defendant that \u201cshe still loved him and didn\u2019t care what anybody else said,\u201d defendant replied he \u201cwas tired of her lying, her bullshit.\u201d Defendant then shot Betty, firing approximately three shots. Although Gertrude did not observe defendant shoot Taylor, it was stipulated that defendant caused both deaths.\nDefendant returned to Ron\u2019s Tap at approximately 9 p.m. and informed Stanley Lakas that \u201cI have just killed those people.\u201d Defendant was taken into custody later that evening and was described by the arresting officers as \u201cloud,\u201d \u201cprofane,\u201d and \u201cobviously drunk.\u201d The weapon which was used to slay the victims was recovered from Ron\u2019s Tap.\nWhile Betty was living with Gertrude, defendant came to visit his daughter two or three times. On each occasion, defendant came alone, stayed for about four hours, and never created a disturbance. During this period, defendant telephoned the Samborski residence almost nightly, usually talking to Gertrude. Gertrude testified that although defendant sometimes sounded intoxicated, he never cried during their conversations. In a few of these telephone conversations, defendant expressed his belief that Betty was pregnant by Richard Taylor. The witness further testified that defendant repeatedly threatened to kill Betty, his daughter, Taylor; and Taylor\u2019s children. He also warned that \u201che would get all of us.\u201d Defendant reasoned that \u201cif he couldn\u2019t have her, nobody else was going to have her * s\nTwo days before the homicides occurred, Gertrude overheard defendant arrange to call Betty on Tuesday (the day of the shootings), and Betty was to inform him at that time of her intentions with respect to their marriage.\nThe \u201caffirmative defense of insanity\u201d was adduced by defendant as follows:\nThe secretary for defendant\u2019s supervisor testified that on one morning in early November, 1971, defendant came to work \u201ccrying in an uncontrollable way, and shaking quite badly.\u201d Defendant stated that his wife had left him. Defendant\u2019s supervisor also observed defendant\u2019s condition. Defendant was taken to a hospital where he was treated with tranquilizing medication. The attending physician, Dr. Roche, considered defendant\u2019s condition to be normal, but \u201cnervous, and sort of mixed up, that\u2019s all.\u201d Defendant spent the evening at home and returned to work the next morning.\nPrior to this occasion defendant\u2019s job performance at Talman\u2019s since he commenced employment there in January of 1971 was described as \u201cvery good,\u201d \u201cvery stable,\u201d and \u201cdid not miss a day of work.\u201d Thereafter, defendant continued his perfect attendance, but he experienced three or four crying spells each day, interspersed with periods of recovery. The secretary had never seen a man cry like defendant, and defendant\u2019s supervisor had never observed such a depressive condition: Defendant continued to work at his appointed tasks, but he was not assigned additional duties because of his condition.\nDr. Roche saw defendant on a professional basis on a few occasions subsequent to defendant\u2019s initial hospital visit. After a suicide threat by defendant, Dr. Roche examined defendant and advised him to consult a psychiatrist. It was the witness\u2019 belief, as is common in instances of threatened suicide, that defendant was dangerous to himself and required professional counselling. Although Dr. Roche did not employ his training in psychiatry when examining defendant, it was his opinion that there was \u201csomething wrong\u201d with defendant and that defendant was \u201cmentally disturbed.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s aunt testified that defendant moved to Chicago from a small town in Wisconsin at the age of 17, subsequently entered into his first marriage which ended in divorce, and then married Betty. His second marriage lasted nearly 10 years. She further related that during 1970, defendant reacted severely to the deaths of his parents and an aunt. In November of 1971, defendant came to the witness\u2019 house and was very upset and emotional, claiming that his wife had left him. During this visit, defendant gave his aunt two shotguns and a revolver because \u201che didn\u2019t trust himself.\u201d He then collapsed, but was \u201ccoming out of it a little\u201d by the time the fire department arrived. During Thanksgiving dinner at the witness\u2019 home, defendant brooded and cried and stated that his wife was \u201crunning around with\u201d another man with whom she worked,\nDr. Marvin Ziporyn, a psychiatrist, examined defendant in the county jail for 45 minutes in July of 1972. He testified that as a result of that examination, it was his opinion that defendant was competent to stand trial. However, during the examination, he found defendant to be extremely agitated, unable to address himself to questions, and responding in a \u201cvery circumstantial fashion.\u201d In addition, defendant manifested marked respiratory signs, teared when discussing emotionally charged material, appeared restless and hyperactive, and had marked tremors throughout tire examination.\nBased upon this examination, Dr. Ziporyn opined that defendant suffered from \u201cagitated depression,\u201d a psychoneurotic condition in which there is no departure from reality in terms of thinking processes, but in which \u201cswings in mood and feeling\u201d are exhibited. This form of \u201cmental illness\u201d is characterized by depression, sleeping and working difficulties, frequent weeping, and suicidal tendencies. When this depressive condition becomes agitated, the above symptoms are accompanied by tension, hyperactivity, and often panic states, in which the individual \u201closes his control of himself, and acts beyond the ability or capacity of his brain to control his actions.\u201d In response to a hypothetical question predicated upon the facts of this case, it was Dr. Ziporyns opinion that the hypothetical man appreciated the criminality of his conduct, but as a result of a mental disease, he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The witness further explained that the personality displayed by the hypothetical man was such that the basic family structure was of paramount importance to him and that his need for dependence gratification was continually unsatisfied due to the loss of loved ones, either by death or divorce.\nIn rebuttal to the evidence presented by defendant to establish the defense of insanity, the prosecution adduced the following evidence:\nDefendant\u2019s mother-in-law testified that she had about four conversations with defendant between the date her daughter left defendant, October 15, and the date on which the shootings occurred, November 30. During this period, defendant did not appear depressed to this witness, and she did not observe defendant crying or undergoing any personality changes.\nBetty\u2019s brother and sister-in-law both testified that they had seen defendant twice and once respectively during November of 1971 and had not noticed anything unusual about defendant\u2019s behavior during the month preceding the shootings. On all the several occasions, however, Betty had been with defendant. The brother also testified that defendant had related his marital difficulties to him.\nGertrude, Betty\u2019s sister, testified that during many of the telephone conversations she had with defendant, he told her that he had been following Betty and her employer, Richard Taylor; that he had observed them embracing and kissing; that a female coworker of Betty and Taylor had told defendant that Betty was pregnant by Taylor; and that he had hired a private detective to follow them. The witness had never seen Betty and- Taylor embrace, nor did she have knowledge of a romantic involvement between them. Although she had observed defendant \u201cangry and shoving Betty around\u201d at a party on November 14, 1971, she had never seen defendant cry or black out, or otherwise behave in an unusual manner.\nLinda Taylor, widow of Richard Taylor, testified initially as a defense witness and related that she knew Betty Lechner who was her husband\u2019s secretary and they would give each other rides to work. They were not romantically involved. Linda Taylor as a State rebuttal witness related that defendant told her that her husband and Betty Lechner were having an affair. Defendant told her that he had hired a detective to follow her husband and Betty Lechner and that he was going to get some photographs from the detective; The witness did not believe that a detective had been hired, but she testified that defendant was able to tell her the date and the flight when she made a trip to Washington and the date she returned.\nDr. Edward Kelleher testified as the prosecution\u2019s expert medical witness. He examined defendant on July 28, 1972 pursuant to court order. In response to a hypothetical question formulated from the facts in this case, Dr. Kelleher was of the opinion that \u201cbased upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty,\u201d the hypothetical man was not suffering from a mental disease on November 30, 1971, and had the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. One factor which the witness found particularly influential was that \u201cneurosis is rather persistent and requires treatment once it comes on,\u201d whereas in tire hypothetical question, \u201cthere is evidence that he [the hypothetical man] recovered rapidly and assumed normal behavior.\u201d Dr. Kelleher thus characterized the condition depicted by the hypothetical question as \u201can emotional reaction rather than a neurotic depression.\u201d He stated that the hypothetical man exhibited an \u201cexplosive-passive-aggressive\u201d personality disorder, but not a mental disease.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Kelleher replied that the hypothetical, man \u2022 might be delusional if his beliefs that his wife was romantically involved with and pregnant by her employer and that he had hired a private detective to follow them were not based upon facts other than his own declarations as to what he had done or had observed or had been told. The witness testified that if the hypothetical man was delusional, then he would be suffering from a mental disease which would render him unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. However, in addition to the possibility that the hypothetical man was delusional, it could also be theorized that either he did not have enough facts at his disposal when he reached these conclusions, or that he was making an emotional attempt to become reunited with his wife. Based upon all of the facts contained in the hypothetical question, it was this expert\u2019s opinion that the hypothetical man was not delusional.\nThe defense called Dr. Robert Reifman to testify as an expert medical witness in surrebuttal to the prosecution\u2019s evidence on the issue of defendant\u2019s sanity on November 30. Dr. Reifman, in addition to Dr. Kelle-her, was approved by the trial court to perform a psychiatric examination of defendant. In his report filed with the court following his examination of defendant on July 28, 1972, Dr. Reifman concluded that \u201c[a]s a result of the examination, it is not possible to substantiate a finding of legal insanity.\u201d When a hypothetical question was posed describing the history and behavior in evidence concerning defendant, the witness responded that there was insufficient information in the question to enable him to arrive at an opinion on the hypothetical man\u2019s sanity. He further stated that additional information was needed in order for him to make a determination of whether the hypothetical man was delusional. On cross-examination, Dr. Reifman explained that \u201cit\u2019s possible for a man to appreciate the difference between right and wrong, and the criminality of his act, and to be laboring under a delusion,\u201d although it is slightly more probable that such a person would be legally insane.\nUpon this evidence, defendant was found guilty of the murder of both his wife and Taylor. Defendant urges reversal of these convictions by first arguing that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing a qualified lay witness, defendant\u2019s supervisor, to express his opinion as to defendant\u2019s mental condition at the time of the homicides. Defendant contends that this ruling had the effect of depriving him of a fair opportunity to fully and completely present his defense of insanity.\nDefendant\u2019s supervisor testified with respect to defendant\u2019s behavior and job performance both before and during the time in which defendant and his wife were living apart. The witness observed defendant on numerous occasions throughout this period. Defense counsel then asked the witness - if, based upon his observations of defendant, he had an opinion on whether defendant was \u201csuffering from some sort of a disability or impairment or illness or abnormal condition\u201d during tire 30-day period prior to the shootings. The prosecution\u2019s objection to this question was sustained, with the trial court ruling: \u201cI don\u2019t think he can answer that, he hasn\u2019t sufficient medical knowledge to render such a decision. He can merely testify to. defendant\u2019s conduct.\u201d Thereupon, defense counsel concluded his direct examination of this witness.\nDefendant argues that the testimony of this witness culminating in the question to which objection was made clearly demonstrates that this witness, as a nonexpert, was qualified to express his opinion regarding defendant\u2019s mental condition. Defendant places principal reliance upon People v. Pruszewski, 414 Ill. 409, 111 N.E.2d 313, and concludes that this ruling constituted error, that the error was so highly prejudicial that he was not granted a fair opportunity to fully present evidence in support of his defense of insanity, and that therefore, a new trial is required. Our conclusions with respect to this issue are contrary to those reached by defendant.\nIn Pruszewski, our Supreme Court reiterated a well-established principi\u00e9 of law that \u201ca nonexpert witness who has had an opportunity to observe the subject under inquiry may give his opinion as to his mental condition \u2014 at the same time stating the facts and circumstances as the basis for the opinion.\u201d 414 Ill. 409, 413, 111 N.E.2d 313, 315.\nThe factual situation in Pruszewski which prompted a reversal and remandment is clearly distinguishable from that presented in the instant case. In Pruszewski, several lay witnesses were permitted to express their opinions, over objection, that defendant was sane. But the entire testimony of defendant\u2019s brother was stricken with the trial court ruling that \u201che is. not qualified as a witness to give an opinion * # Prior to expressing his belief that defendant was insane on the date the homicide was committed, this witness testified that defendant had related that he \u201cheard voices,\u201d that defendant was known to walk around the block for long periods of time and that \"about a day before this happened he lost his way and forgot where he lived,\u201d and that the witness awoke one morning to find defendant sleeping on a pillow which was \u201call cut up with a knife.\u201d This latter incident occurred just two days before defendant repeatedly stabbed his wife, causing her death. In the instant case, the lay witness was permitted to testify with respect to defendant\u2019s behavior during an 11-month period before the incident and was only prohibited from responding to one question.\nThis action by the trial court did not constitute error. First, the question posed by defense counsel is objectionable since it exceeded the ambit of merely seeking a lay witness\u2019 opinion concerning the accused\u2019s sanity. Not only was this a leading question, but in order for a witness to give an accurate response, a certain level of medical knowledge and familiarity with psychiatric terminology would be required. Dr. Ziporyn referred to an \u201cimpairment of the cognitive ability\u201d as being one area which must be considered in order to determine the existence of mental disease. In addition, \u201cabnormal\u201d was the key word in Dr. Kelleher\u2019s definition of \u201cmental disease.\u201d After this definition was elicited, a line of questioning followed which attempted to distinguish between \u201cnormal\u201d and \u201cabnormal\u201d conduct. And Dr. Reifman testified that \u201c[a] delusion indicates mental illness and impaired judgment.\u201d Thus, the question asked of this nonexpert witness was couched in terms subsequently used by expert witnesses in their testimony to describe various types and characteristics of mental illness. By selecting one of the four alternatives offered in the question, the lay witness could be attributing a mental illness to defendant without so intending. Consequently, the trial court properly ruled that this witness did not possess \u201csufficient medical knowledge to render such a decision.\u201d\nSecond, whether or not sufficient facts and circumstances have been testified to by a lay witness to serve as a foundation for that witness\u2019 opinion of the accused\u2019s sanity is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and a reviewing court will not reverse this determination unless there has been an abuse of discretion. (People v. Banks, 17 Ill. App. 3d 746, 308 N.E.2d 261; People v. Lassiter, 133 Ill. App. 2d 353, 273 N.E.2d 166.) We do not consider the ruling at issue in the instant case to be the product of an abuse of discretion. This particular witness testified that defendant became very depressed after his wife left him, and that defendant\u2019s working effectiveness decreased accordingly. Although defendant related to this witness that \u2018lie couldn\u2019t go on much longer,\u201d the trial court could properly conclude that this witness had not observed conduct which was particularly unusual under the circumstances. Moreover, notwithstanding this ruling, defendant was not deprived of a fair opportunity to fully present his defense of insanity. The failure of this witness to express an opinion regarding defendant\u2019s sanity is not decisive of whether defendant\u2019s sanity was brought into issue since \u201cif there are sufficient facts shown by the testimony, the absence of such opinion testimony is immaterial.\u201d People v. Smothers, 55 Ill. 2d 172, 175, 302 N.E.2d 324, 326.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that the prosecution failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was legally sane at the time the homicides were committed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 2.) When evidence is introduced by an accused in order to relieve culpability for the charged offense, such an attempt raises an affirmative defense which is defined as follows:\n\u201c(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, lie lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-requirements of law.\n(b) The terms \u2018mental disease or mental defect\u2019 do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social- conduct.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 6 \u2014 2. '\nIn a criminal proceeding, the accused is presumed to have been sane at the time he allegedly committed the charged offense. (People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328, 320 N.E.2d 321; People v. Lono, 11 Ill. App. 3d 443, 297 N.E.2d 349.) The purpose of this presumption is to require the production of evidence which is sufficient to bring the accused\u2019s sanity into issue. Once this evidence is introduced, the presumption vanishes and the burden shifts to the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was legally sane at the time of the occurrence. People v. Redmond; People v. Lassiter.\nWe agree with defendant that sufficient evidence was adduced to bring defendant\u2019s sanity into issue. However, we hold that the prosecution sustained the burden which devolved upon it to establish defendant\u2019s sanity on November 30, 1971, beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAlthough the evidence adduced on this issue was conflicting, our review of the record reveals ample competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding. Defendant argues that he was so emotionally overcome upon seeing his wife with Taylor at the time of the incident that he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, notwithstanding the possibility that he may have appreciated the criminality of his action. However, this theory ignores Gertrude\u2019s testimony that defendant repeatedy threatened to kill several persons, including his wife. Moreover, there was evidence that defendant threatened to kill his wife \u201cevery time they had trouble.\u201d Significantly, this latter testimony was based upon conversations with defendant occurring more than 3 years prior to the period in which- defendant\u2019s sanity is now being questioned.\nDefendant further maintains that an examination of the expert testimony, including that elicited from the prosecution\u2019s expert witness, uncovers a strong possibility that d\u00e9fendant was delusional at the time the homicides occurred. Again, we are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s argument. Dr. Kelleher stated that it was possible that defendant was delusional at the time of the shooting, but it was his expert opinion that defendant was not. And although there was insufficient information to enable Dr. Reifman to render an opinion on this matter, he testified that it was possible for a person who was laboring under a delusion to appre-date the criminality of his actions and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Furthermore, both of these witnesses offered theories that could explain defendant\u2019s behavior preceding the incident which was equally as conceivable, if not more so, as the possibility that defendant was delusional during this period.\nOur Supreme Court has reached a similar holding when confronted with conflicting testimony on the sanity issue. In People v. Ford, 39 Ill. 2d 318, 235 N.E.2d 576, four police officers who talked with defendant after she was arrested testified that she was coherent, logical, in touch with reality, and in their opinion, able to appreciate the criminality of her conduct and to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law. Two doctors described defendant\u2019s confinement in a mental institution and considered her to be psychotic with a schizoid personality. Another expert witness diagnosed her condition as ambulatory schizophrenia, and it was this witness\u2019 opinion that at times defendant was legally insane. Three lay witnesses were of the opinion that defendant was insane bn the date of the occurrence. The Supreme Court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was sane at the time of the .homicide. Similarly, in People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019, 17 L. Ed. 2d 557, 87 S. Ct. 752, a finding of sanity was supported by the evidence, even though the testimony of five expert witnesses on this issue was conflicting.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the \u201cfindings of the trial court constitute a paradigm of confused reasoning which, in and of itself, mandates a reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\u201d Although the findings of the trial court were to a degree confusingly stated, our examination of the testimony of the witnesses referred to in the findings, and in particular the examination of the expert witnesses convinces us that the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was legally sane at the time of the homicides.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nLEIGHTON, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STAMOS" }, { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE HAYES,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur with tire opinion of the court. I wish, however, to develop the matter of an insane delusion as the specific mental disease or mental defect on the basis of which a defendant in a criminal prosecution interposes the affirmative defense of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense for which he is being prosecuted. I wish to do so because we have been cited to no Illinois case in which the insanity defense has been predicated upon an insane delusion as the specific mental defect or mental disease, nor have I been able to find any such Illinois case.\nWhen, in a criminal prosecution, the defendant interposes the affirmative defense of insanity at the time of the commission of the criminal offense, the opinion of the court notes that the defendant must initially make a showing of his alleged insanity sufficient to rebut the presumption of sanity; if he does so, the State then has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was legally sane at the time he committed the criminal offense. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 3 \u2014 2.\nIn the instant case, Dr. Ziporyn, a psychiatrist, testified for defendant as an expert witness in defendant\u2019s initial showing of insanity. Dr. Ziporyn had no occasion to deal with the matter of an insane delusion because, in response to defense counsel\u2019s hypothetical question, the doctor stated that it was his opinion that the hypothetical person was suffering from tire mental disease of agitated depression which, while it did not impair his cognitive ability mentally to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, yet rendered him unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law because it rendered him unable to control his emotional impulses. In the doctor\u2019s opinion, the truth or falsity of defendant\u2019s suspicions as to the existence of a romantic relationship between his wife and Mr. Taylor and as to her pregnancy by him was irrelevant; granted that he entertained such suspicions or beliefs, the only relevant factor was his ability to control the emotional impulses resulting from the intensity of his suspicions or beliefs.\nDr. Kelleher, a psychiatrist, then testified for the State as its expert witness. In response to the prosecutor\u2019s hypothetical question, Dr. Kel-leher was of the opinion that, under the totality of the circumstances, the hypothetical person was not suffering from any mental defect or mental disease, but merely from a personality disorder; he was suffering from an emotional reaction, not from a neurotic depression. On cross-examination, defense counsel first asked for Dr. Kelleher\u2019s opinion as to whether the hypothetical person could have been laboring under an insane delusion which constituted the mental disease or mental defect of paranoia. In Dr. Kelleher\u2019s opinion the totality of the circumstances did not warrant that finding. Dr. Kelleher defined an insane delusion as a persistent false belief having no basis in reality, which belief will nevertheless not yield to evidence of its falsity and to logical reason.\nDr. Reifman, a psychiatrist, was then called by defendant to testify in \u201csurrebuttal.\u201d In response to defense counsel\u2019s hypothetical question, the doctor stated that the facts upon which the hypothetical question was based were insufficient to enable him to form any opinion as to whether die hypothetical person was suffering from any mental disease or mental defect. On cross-examination and then on redirect examination, Dr. Reifman had occasion to discuss the matter of insane delusions. While an insane delusion indicates mental illness and an impairment of judgment, the doctor was unable to form an opinion as to whether the hypothetical person was laboring under an insane delusion because of insufficient facts in the hypothetical question. A person laboring under an insane delusion might or might not be able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. A delusion is defined as a belief which would not be deemed factual by one\u2019s peers. The deluded person is suffering from a mental disease called paranoid schizophrenia. Paranoia is a break away from reality to such a degree as to indicate a mental illness.\nThe trial court itself questioned both Dr. Kelleher and Dr. Reifman as to whether the hypothetical person could have been laboring under an insane delusion at the time of the shootings. The trend of the court\u2019s questioning clearly indicates that the court, working from the definitions of Dr. Kelleher and Dr. Reifman, could not understand how, in view of what the hypothetical person was proved to have personally observed on the night of the shootings and before the shootings occurred, the hypothetical person\u2019s belief as to the existence of a romantic relationship between his wife and Mr. Taylor and as to her pregnancy by him could possibly constitute an insane delusion. Later, in finding that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not insane at the time he committed the charged murder, the trial court, for the reason just stated, expressed its opinion that the said belief could not have constituted an insane delusion.\nWith the above preamble, I wish to make the following observations.\n(1) The definition of an insane delusion, for tire purpose of constituting a specific mental disease or mental defect as the basis for an affirmative defense of insanity in a criminal prosecution, should be the same definition as that used by Illinois courts in actions to contest a will on the specific ground of insane delusion, as distinguished from the ground of general mental testamentary incapacity. In a will contest on the specific ground of insane delusion, general mental testimentary capacity is conceded; the attack is focused solely on the existence of a belief on the part of the testator which has caused the testator to include or to omit a testamentary donative provision which he would otherwise have respectively omitted or included. In these will contests, an insane delusion is defined as a false belief entertained by the testator which is not supported by any shred of evidence and which no rational person, in the absence of evidence, would believe to be true. (Sterling v. Dubin (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 64, 77, 126 N.E.2d 718; Ryan v. Deneen (1940), 375 Ill. 452, 457, 31 N.E.2d 582.) The egregious falsity of the belief is not the crucial factor; rather, the crucial factor is that the belief is not supported by any shred of evidence whatsoever.\nUnder that definition, the State in the instant case might contend that defendant\u2019s belief as to a romantic relationship between his wife and Mr. Taylor and as to her pregnancy by him was not an insane delusion because it was supported by a shred of evidence, namely, defendant knew that his wife had separated from him and was considering filing for a divorce. From this evidence, defendant suspected and believed that his wife was romantically involved with another man who was Mr. Taylor, for which reason defendant, a few hours before the shootings, announced his intent to kill both his wife and Mr. Taylor. Since, however, at the time defendant first expressed his belief, there was no shred of verified evidence that another man was involved or that Mr. Taylor was that other man, defendant might contend that his specific belief, as initially formulated and expressed, was an insane delusion.\n(2) Whether or not defendant\u2019s belief, as initially formulated and expressed was an insane delusion, the trial court clearly was of the opinion that the belief was not an insane delusion at the time of the shootings because it had then been confirmed by at least a shred of evidence, namely, the verified personal observations of defendant on the night of, but prior to, the shootings. Whether a belief which, wheii initially .formulated and expressed, is an insane delusion can then lose its character as an insane delusion by reason of a subsequent shred of evidence which logically confirms that belief is a theory which, in my opinion, need not be, and is not, decided by the opinion of the court in this case.\n(3) While I can find no Illinois criminal case which has dealt with the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by reason of the specific mental disease or mental defect of insane delusion, decisions in a few other States have done so. Mullins v. State (I960), 216 Ga. 183, 115 S.E.2d 547; Coffee v. State (1944), 148 Tex. Crim. R. 71, 184 S.W.2d 278; Kennamer v. State (1936), 59 Okl. Crim. 146, 57 P. 2d 646; Horn v. Commonwealth (1942), 292 Ky. 587, 167 S.W.2d 58; State v. Green (1931), 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177; Kraus v. State (1922), 108 Neb. 331, 187 KW. 895. See also 40 C.J.S. Homicide \u00a7267, at 1217 (1944).\nAll of these States require that the defendant must make a showing that (a) he was actually laboring under an insane delusion at the time he committed the offense for which he is being prosecuted, and that (b) the said offense was the result of that insane delusion. Precisely how the defendant is to make the showing that he was laboring under an insane delusion at the time he committed the offense is not clear.\nIn five of these six States, there is a third essential element of the defense: the delusion must relate to a fact which, if true, would constitute legal justification for the criminal offense committed. The Nebraska case does not require this third essential element if the insane delusion was such that it prevented the defendant from mentally appreciating the criminality of his conduct. In the instant case, none of the expert witnesses was of the opinion that, even assuming that the hypothetical person shot tire victims as the result of his insane delusion, the said insane delusion impaired his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Hence, under the test established in these other States for a successful defense of insanity based on insane delusion, tire defendant must establish that his insane delusion would, if true, have constituted legal justification for the homicides. Under our Illinois statutory provisions in respect of legal justification (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 7 \u2014 1 through 7 \u2014 14), it is clear that defendant\u2019s belief in the instant case, even if assumed to be an insane delusion, would not, if true, have constituted legal justification for the homicides.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE HAYES," } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Richard D. Khar as, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Linda Ann Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FREDERICK J. LECHNER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 61157\nOpinion filed February 3, 1976.\nHAYES, J., specially concurring.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Richard D. Khar as, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Linda Ann Miller, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1033-01", "first_page_order": 1059, "last_page_order": 1073 }