{ "id": 1083937, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Roberts", "decision_date": "2004-07-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201403\u20140892", "first_page": "684", "last_page": "693", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 684" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1147" }, { "page": "1148" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "748 N.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2528196 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 1123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1128" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096645 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0849-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 932, "char_count": 22279, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.598468043819651e-08, "percentile": 0.5263855151400719 }, "sha256": "bae6dd887d6d73d9044390e49a9747de481b8507e0c4efd94bd343ee62687369", "simhash": "1:387a99a448491fd5", "word_count": 3659 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:22:07.473803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "STEIGMANN, J, concurs." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Michael L. Roberts, was charged and convicted by a jury of one count of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West 2002)). On appeal, he argues that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury and did not provide the jury with the proper verdict forms. We reverse.\nOn February 26, 2003, the State filed a one-count information, charging defendant with domestic battery of his 16-year-old daughter, T.S.R. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West 2002). The information stated:\n\u201c[Defendant] on or about the 25th day of February, 2003, *** committed the offense of domestic battery, in that said defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to [T.S.R.], a household member of the defendant, in that the said defendant pulled on [T.S.R.\u2019s] hair and struck [T.S.R.] in the face with his hand ***.\u201d\nOn August 14 and 15, 2003, the trial court conducted a jury trial. At trial, defendant testified that he entered his home on the evening of February 25, 2003, and found his wife Sharon and daughter T.S.R. screaming at each other. T.S.R. testified that the argument had been going on for 15 or 20 minutes before defendant entered and became aware of it. T.S.R. testified that the argument began when she tried to speak with Sharon and had to raise her voice to get Sharon\u2019s attention because Sharon was watching television and was not responding. Sharon testified that the argument resulted from T.S.R.\u2019s refusal to end her telephone conversation with her boyfriend despite Sharon\u2019s repeated requests to do so.\nDefendant testified that he walked in, saw Sharon and T.S.R. screaming at each other, and asked T.S.R. to quit fighting and to go to her room. Defendant stated that T.S.R. did not go to her room but instead continued to yell at Sharon. Sharon testified that T.S.R. became physically aggressive toward her and hit her a couple of times in the head. Defendant testified that after about five more minutes of continued shouting, he grabbed T.S.R. by the hair and tried to make her go to her room. Defendant testified that, with T.S.R.\u2019s hair in both of his hands, he \u201cpush[ed] her forward,\u201d in the direction of her bedroom. Defendant stated that he let go of T.S.R.\u2019s hair because he thought she was walking toward her room, but she ran into the kitchen instead. He stated that as T.S.R. ran into the kitchen, she hit the light switch really hard and the power went out in the home. Defendant went downstairs and flipped the circuit breaker back on. Defendant testified that when he came back upstairs, T.S.R. was once again screaming at Sharon. However, when T.S.R. saw defendant, she ran upstairs toward her room. Defendant and Sharon testified that when T.S.R. came back downstairs sometime later, she had a bruised eye and accused defendant. Both defendant and Sharon denied that defendant ever struck T.S.R., even accidentally.\nT.S.R. testified that when defendant pulled her by the hair he also hit her in the face. T.S.R. stated that defendant hit her about five or six times with his palm on the right side of her head and on the left side of her face around her eye as he dragged her across the room. As evidenced by the photograph submitted as People\u2019s exhibit No. 1, there was significant swelling around T.S.R.\u2019s left eye when the police came to the house that night. However, Terry Walters, an investigator for the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), testified that he examined T.S.R. the day after the incident and saw very little if any swelling around her eye. He stated that in the vast majority of situations where somebody had been hit in the eye with the hand, the swelling was pronounced for several days afterward. Walters testified that it was his opinion that T.S.R\u2019s eye injury was not consistent with how she testified it was caused.\nAt the jury instruction conference after testimony had concluded, the State tendered and the court approved 14 jury instructions. One instruction approved by the court explained to the jurors that \u201ca person is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend another against the imminent use of unlawful force.\u201d The court approved this instruction as a possible justification for defendant\u2019s actions, although defendant specifically testified that he did not see or know that T.S.R hit Sharon.\nInstead, defendant wanted to show that he was justified in pulling T.S.R.\u2019s hair and dragging her to the stairway to discipline her. Defendant offered two nonpattern jury instructions on the subject for the court\u2019s approval. The first, identified as \u201cdefendant\u2019s No. 5,\u201d stated: \u201cA parent is legally justified in using reasonable force when necessary as part of reasonable discipline of a child.\u201d The second, identified as \u201cdefendant\u2019s No. 6,\u201d stated: \u201cA parent is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary for the proper and necessary discipline of his child.\u201d Defense counsel explained that these instructions reflect a common-law defense to domestic battery that allows a parent to use reasonable physical force in disciplining his child.\nThe court rejected both of defendant\u2019s nonpattern instructions, stating:\n\u201cWhen we *** start giving instructions that are non-IPI, those instructions must be those which accurately state the law. I am not convinced that those instructions that are tendered are appropriate to be given to the jury on this issue. I do not believe that the non-IPI instructions should be given. They are simple admittedly. They are brief admittedly. But I don\u2019t feel that they meet the remaining criteria, and so consequently, those instructions \u2014 that being defendant\u2019s exhibit [No.] 5 and defendant\u2019s [No.] 6 \u2014 will be refused.\u201d\nAlso during the conference, defendant requested the court provide the jury with two sets of jury forms because there were two distinct physical acts alleged in the information: (1) pulling T.S.R.\u2019s hair and (2) striking T.S.R. in the face. Defendant\u2019s forms would have allowed the jury to either convict or acquit defendant of domestic battery for each individual act. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the court gave only one set of verdict forms to the jury, explaining that although there were two allegations, there was only one charge, which combined both acts.\nThe 14 instructions tendered by the State and 2 verdict forms were delivered to the jury. The jury found defendant guilty of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West 2002)). On September 9, 2003, defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial. The court denied the motion and fined defendant $300. This appeal followed.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the trial court improperly rejected both his proffered nonpattern jury instructions and his verdict forms separating the domestic battery charge into its physical components. We first examine defendant\u2019s proffered jury instructions.\nA nonpattern jury instruction should be used if a pattern instruction does not contain an accurate instruction on the subject on which the jury should be instructed. People v. Mata, 316 Ill. App. 3d 849, 854, 737 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (2000). Whether to use a specific jury instruction is within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 412, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1133 (2000). Whether a court has abused its discretion will depend on whether the nonpattern instruction is an accurate, simple, brief, impartial, and nonargumentative statement of the law. 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(a); People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 211, 780 N.E.2d 669, 682 (2002).\nThe trial court issued a pattern instruction to the jury defining domestic battery that stated: \u201cA person commits the offense of domestic battery when he knowingly[,] without legal justification^,] and by any means causes bodily harm to any family or household member.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.11 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The committee note following the quoted instruction explains, \u201c[u]se the phrase \u2018without legal justification\u2019 whenever an instruction is to be given on an affirmative defense contained in [ajrticle 7 of [cjhapter 720.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.11, Committee Note, at 456. Article 7 of chapter 720 sets forth 13 affirmative defenses to the use of force, including the \u201cuse of force in defense of a person\u201d defense that the trial court allowed. 720 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 1 through 7 \u2014 14 (West 2002).\nAlthough not a statutory affirmative defense, the common-law rule that parents may take \u201creasonable steps to discipline their children when necessary\u201d has been previously recognized by this court. In re F.W., 261 Ill. App. 3d 894, 901, 634 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (1994); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 147(1), at 265 (1965) (\u201cA parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force *** upon his child as he reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education\u201d). In F.W., we stated:\n\u201c \u2018Discipline\u2019 [has] been interpreted by the courts to extend to reasonable corporal punishment. A parent who utilizes corporal punishment exceeding the boundaries of reasonableness may, depending on the circumstances, be subject to prosecution for *** domestic battery ***.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) F.W., 261 Ill. App. 3d at 898, 634 N.E.2d at 1126.\nIn addition, the domestic battery statute refers to the definitions found in \u201csubsection (3) of section 112A \u2014 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West 2002) (referring to 725 ILCS 5/112A \u2014 3(3) (West 2002)). Subsection (1) of section 112A \u2014 3 defines \u201cabuse\u201d to \u201cnot include reasonable direction of a minor child by a parent or person in loco parentis.\u201d 725 ILCS 112A\u2014 3(1) (West 2002).\nThe State cites People v. Walters, 211 Ill. App. 3d 102, 570 N.E.2d 6 (1991), in support of its contention that even if parental discipline is a legal justification for defendant\u2019s actions, defendant\u2019s proffered instructions were not impartial or free from argument and were properly rejected. In Walters, the defendant struck his 8-year-old son on the buttocks 20 or 30 times with a stick after the child had wet his bed. Walters, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 570 N.E.2d at 6. At his trial for aggravated battery, the defendant submitted a nonpattern jury instruction that read \u201c \u2018[pjarents have a legal right to spank their children.\u2019 \u201d Walters, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 570 N.E.2d at 7. The trial court refused the instruction on the grounds that it was argumentative because it was too unclear about what the term \u201cspank\u201d encompassed, \u201c \u2018what a parent can spank with, how long, [and] what injuries, if any.\u2019 \u201d Walters, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 105, 570 N.E.2d at 7. We upheld the trial court\u2019s ruling, stating that the tendered instruction was not \u201c \u2018impartial and free from argument.\u2019 \u201d Walters, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 105, 570 N.E.2d at 7, quoting People v. Pankey, 58 Ill. App. 3d 924, 927, 374 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (1978).\nWe find the present case to be distinguishable from Walters. Unlike in Walters, here, defendant\u2019s instructions did not contain a blanket statement about parental discipline that could potentially confuse the jury as to what amount of force in disciplining a child is acceptable. Both of defendant\u2019s tendered instructions used the qualifier \u201creasonably\u201d in describing the amount of force or discipline that is acceptable. In People v. Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 39, 317 N.E.2d 54, 56 (1974), the supreme court stated:\n\u201cThis court recognized in Fletcher v. People (1869), 52 Ill. 395, 397, that a parent\u2019s disciplinary authority over his children \u2018must be exercised within the bounds of reason and humanity.\u2019 Subsequent appellate court decisions have reiterated the view that parental rights of discipline are limited by a standard of reasonableness.\u201d\nThe Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 defines \u201cabuse\u201d to include physical abuse, harassment, or intimidation of a child but does not include reasonable direction of a child by a parent. 750 ILCS 60/103(1) (West 2002); see Radke v. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 264, 267 (2004). Reasonableness is the proper standard for the jury to apply in determining whether the parental discipline is justified. People v. Walker, 130 Ill. App. 3d 58, 60, 473 N.E.2d 995, 997 (1985) (\u201cIn matters of discipline *** a standard of reasonableness has been applied to determine whether a parent\u2019s conduct towards his child was legally justified and authorized by law\u201d). We do not find persuasive the State\u2019s further argument that \u201creasonable\u201d is not defined in defendant\u2019s proposed instruction. What force is reasonable and what exceeds reasonable force are proper questions.\nFurther, the instructions given to the jury at the trial, when taken as a whole, did not fully and fairly define the applicable law. The jury was instructed that \u201ca person commits the offense of domestic battery when he knowingly, without legal justification, and by any means causes bodily harm to any family or household member.\u201d The jury was not instructed that a parent is legally justified in the use of reasonable force in disciplining his child. See Ball, 58 Ill. 2d at 39, 317 N.E.2d at 56. Defendant tendered two alternative instructions that would have defined this justification for the jury. Defendant\u2019s No. 5 stated: \u201cA parent is legally justified in using reasonable force when necessary as part of reasonable discipline of a child.\u201d This instruction is an accurate, simple, brief, impartial, and nonargumentative statement of the law. The trial court should have allowed this instruction or one with similar language, and it was error to refuse it.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to provide separate verdict forms to the jury for each of the two acts alleged in the information, pulling T.S.R.\u2019s hair and striking T.S.R.\u2019s face. The trial court issued one set of verdict forms that allowed the jury to find defendant either guilty or not guilty on the sole count of domestic battery. Defendant argues that without separating the acts alleged in the information, the jury may not have reached a unanimous verdict, with some jurors finding him guilty for pulling T.S.R.\u2019s hair, and some jurors finding him guilty for striking her in the face. Defendant notes that the jury sent a question to the judge during deliberations asking, \u201cCan you give us a definition of bodily harm and is pulling hair considered bodily harm?\u201d Defendant states that this question suggests that the jury may have believed that defendant did not strike T.S.R. in the face, but without an instruction on parental discipline, may have found him guilty of domestic battery solely on the grounds that he pulled her hair.\nWe apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a trial court\u2019s decisions relating to verdict forms. Gold v. Ziff Communica tions Co., 322 Ill. App. 3d 32, 45, 748 N.E.2d 198, 207 (2001). In a criminal trial, a jury is required to return a general verdict as to each offense charged. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 4(j) (West 2002). In People v. Travis, 170 Id. App. 3d 873, 890, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1147 (1988), we stated:\n\u201c[T]he jury need only be unanimous with respect to the ultimate question of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence of the crime charged, and unanimity is not required concerning alternate ways in which the crime can be committed ***.\u201d\nBecause defendant was only charged with a single count of domestic battery, the trial court properly submitted only a single set of verdict forms to the jury. It is irrelevant whether the jurors believed that the hair-pulling caused the bodily harm or whether they thought the harm was a result of defendant striking T.S.R. in the face. \u201cAll that is necessary is that the jury is unanimous that he is guilty of the offense, regardless of their agreement on the underlying conduct.\u201d Travis, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 892, 525 N.E.2d at 1148. The trial court was within its discretion when it refused to issue separate verdict forms for each act alleged in the information.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court\u2019s judgment is reversed and remanded so that the jury may be instructed on the parental discipline justification.\nReversed.\nSTEIGMANN, J, concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" }, { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH,\ndissenting:\nI do not agree the trial court abused its discretion by refusing defendant\u2019s nonpattern instructions.\nA trial court may properly refuse a defendant\u2019s instruction when no evidence supports his theory. People v. Dunlap, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1024, 734 N.E.2d 973, 981 (2000). While defendant advanced multiple theories throughout trial, i.e., the victim\u2019s injuries were self-inflicted and defendant was attempting to come to the aid of his wife, he eventually argued that his conduct was justified as reasonable discipline. Defendant\u2019s admitted conduct of grabbing the victim by the hair, pushing her to the floor, and dragging her three feet clearly exceeded the limits of reasonable parental discipline. Defendant\u2019s own testimony therefore rendered instruction No. 5 inapplicable and unsupported by the evidence.\nAdditional evidence adduced during defendant\u2019s trial failed to support defendant\u2019s theory of reasonable discipline. Chris Miller, the victim\u2019s boyfriend at the time of the battery, testified that T.S.R. called him at approximately 9:30 p.m. on February 25, 2003, following the altercation with her parents. Chris testified that while he talked to T.S.R., he could hear defendant \u201cyelling\u201d in the background. Chris called his mother, Kathy Miller, and connected her to the call, creating a three-way conference call. Chris continued to hear defendant in the background while he and his mother talked to T.S.R. Chris testified he heard defendant call T.S.R. a liar and say \u201cits not like [Chris\u2019s] mom never hits her kids.\u201d Kathy Miller testified her son, Chris, called her while she was on duty as a registered nurse. Kathy testified T.S.R. was \u201chysterical\u201d during the three-way conversation and was \u201csobbing pretty hard.\u201d Kathy also testified to hearing defendant\u2019s \u201cangry\u201d and \u201cfrustrated\u201d voice in the background. When asked if she heard defendant say anything while she was talking to Chris and T.S.R., Kathy testified, \u201cI heard *** a comment that I hit my kids, too. *** And then I heard *** [\"']I didn\u2019t hit you that hard.[\u2019] \u201d Kathy ended her conversation with Chris and T.S.R. She testified, \u201cI didn\u2019t need to hear any more, I felt it was a volatile situation[,] and I was hanging up and calling the county sheriff.\u201d\nSergeant Tim Collins of the De Witt County sheriffs department responded to the call. He testified that he spoke to T.S.R. upon arriving at the Robertses\u2019 home. Collins testified that T.S.R. looked \u201cvery upset. She had been crying and she had a large bruise around her left eye.\u201d During Collins\u2019s testimony, the State introduced a photo of T.S.R. taken after the altercation. Collins confirmed that the photo fairly and accurately portrayed the condition of T.S.R.\u2019s bruised and swollen face as it looked when he arrived at the Robertses\u2019 home. The photo, People\u2019s exhibit No. 1, shows discoloration under both of T.S.R.\u2019s eyes and a large, swollen bruise under her left eye.\nIn light of defendant\u2019s testimony and this additional evidence, the court correctly refused to give defendant\u2019s instruction No. 5. While this court may have recognized the use of reasonable discipline, it did not sanction striking a child in the face, grabbing her by her hair, pushing her to the floor, and dragging her. This court recognized spanking in limited form. Swatting a young child on the behind cannot be equated to hitting and grabbing a 16-year-old young woman by the hair and dragging her three feet. Defendant\u2019s use of force was clearly unreasonable. Defendant\u2019s instruction No. 5 was unsupported by the evidence and was, therefore, correctly refused.\nDefendant\u2019s instruction No. 6 was also correctly refused because it inaccurately states the law. The majority explains a nonpattern instruction may be used if no instruction exists or if the existing instructions do not accurately state the law. See Mata, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 854, 737 N.E.2d at 1125. However, the proposed nonpattern instruction must also accurately state the law. 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(a); Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d at 211, 780 N.E.2d at 682. Our court has recognized a parental right to reasonable discipline. F.W., 261 Ill. App. 3d at 901, 634 N.E.2d at 1128. Defendant\u2019s instruction No. 6 stated that a parent is justified in using force \u201cwhen and to the extent that he reasonably believes such conduct is necessary for the proper and necessary discipline of his child.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This instruction applies a subjective standard to the administration of corporal punishment by instructing the jury to consider the parent\u2019s belief as to the reasonableness and necessity of discipline. No cases exist, including those defendant cited in support of this instruction (Walters, 211 Ill. App. 3d 102, 570 N.E.2d 6; People v. Parris, 130 Ill. App. 2d 933, 267 N.E.2d 39 (1971); Ball, 58 Ill. 2d 36, 317 N.E.2d 54), that support defendant\u2019s claim that the \u201creasonable belief\u201d of a parent that his use of force is necessary is a defense.\nFurther, this court, in Walters, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 105, 570 N.E.2d at 7, found that even where a jury instruction accurately states the parental right to reasonable discipline, it may be refused if it is misleading or argumentative. Here, similarly, the trial court agreed defendant\u2019s nonpattern instructions were simple and brief, but it found they were not impartial and were argumentative. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(a). In light of the foregoing, I do not agree the court abused its discretion by refusing to give defendant\u2019s nonpattern instructions. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Phillip R. Lamkin (argued), of Lamkin & Lamkin, EC., of Clinton, for appellant.", "Jerry A. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201403\u20140892\nOpinion filed July 30, 2004.\nPhillip R. Lamkin (argued), of Lamkin & Lamkin, EC., of Clinton, for appellant.\nJerry A. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Clinton (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0684-01", "first_page_order": 702, "last_page_order": 711 }