{ "id": 1083934, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF CHATHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE COUNTY OF SANGAMON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon", "decision_date": "2004-08-11", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201403\u20140878", "first_page": "889", "last_page": "907", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 889" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950-51", "parenthetical": "\"[Pjetitions for detachment and annexation should be granted only where the overall benefit to the annexing district and the detachment area clearly outweighs the resulting detriment to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472747 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640-41", "parenthetical": "\"[Pjetitions for detachment and annexation should be granted only where the overall benefit to the annexing district and the detachment area clearly outweighs the resulting detriment to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725334 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456188 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 N.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499610 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045584 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 N.E.2d 1278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1282" }, { "page": "1282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790-91" }, { "page": "790-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074828 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114-15" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upheld a population classification set at 80,000 and distinguished Cristen" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3357720 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upheld a population classification set at 80,000 and distinguished Cristen" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 1265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "First District" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456134 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "First District" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "invalidated the Domestic Relations Act, intended to combat \"the evils attending the breaking of family relationships,\" that posed a serious threat to the general welfare, health, moral, and safety of the state but was applicable only in Cook County" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "398 Ill. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2460093 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "invalidated the Domestic Relations Act, intended to combat \"the evils attending the breaking of family relationships,\" that posed a serious threat to the general welfare, health, moral, and safety of the state but was applicable only in Cook County" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/398/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 N.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2879332 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778591 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367-68" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307267 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 1057", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1069-70" }, { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 1385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1388" }, { "page": "1388" }, { "page": "1388" }, { "page": "1388" }, { "page": "1389" }, { "page": "1388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3167524 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379-80" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 N.E.2d 1216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1219", "parenthetical": "Third District" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. 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App. 3d 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5239557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 377", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N. Ill. U. L. Rev.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380-82", "parenthetical": "noncontiguous property not annexed within a short period of time may present problems in regard to conflicting zoning concepts between a county and municipality" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576546 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247-48" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "263" }, { "page": "263" }, { "page": "263" }, { "page": "263" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536015 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5319655 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463159 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 N.E.2d 1105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1110" }, { "page": "1110" }, { "page": "1110" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198916 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "774 N.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034181 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "746 N.E.2d 1272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1277-78" }, { "page": "1276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132397 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246-47" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "1992 Ill. Laws 3091", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1990 Ill. Laws 1611", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Second District" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2689811 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Second District" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "1963 Ill. Laws 2157", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "eff. July 31, 1963" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 1031", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3282947 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179946 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1210" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477545 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 U.S. 197", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 631825 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "572" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "572" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "915" }, { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/237/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576546 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0242-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1516, "char_count": 45103, "ocr_confidence": 0.72, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1950677230566667e-07, "percentile": 0.592250358997764 }, "sha256": "2f6adff75249181d61d88c82e4f7345fc01d19a366ad06f299f713c79c7d0cb9", "simhash": "1:2335bc50fca53d57", "word_count": 7196 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:22:07.473803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TURNER, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF CHATHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE COUNTY OF SANGAMON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, County of Sangamon (County), appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, Village of Chatham (Village), and its finding that Division 15.1 (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 1 through 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 5 (West 2002)) of the Illinois Municipal Code (Municipal Code) (65 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1 \u2014 1 through 11 \u2014 152 \u2014 4 (West 2002)) granted the Village zoning and building-code jurisdiction over lands subject to annexation agreements. Specifically, the County argues (1) the court erred in finding the Village had zoning and building-code jurisdiction; (2) section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1 is unconstitutional special legislation; (3) the court\u2019s interpretation of Division 15.1 made it an invalid exercise of police power; (4) issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment; and (5) declaratory judgment was improper. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. Overview of Relevant Statutory and Case Law\nIn 1963, the Illinois legislature passed Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code, granting municipalities the power to enter into annexation agreements with owners of unincorporated territory, providing that the land could be annexed to the municipality once it became contiguous to the property. 1963 Ill. Laws 2157 (eff. July 31, 1963) (adding Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 24, pars. 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 1 through 11\u2014 15.1\u2014 5). In 1989, the Second District held the land subject to these agreements had to be contiguous. Annexation agreements concerning noncontiguous land were declared invalid. Village of Lisle v. Action Outdoor Advertising Co., 188 Ill. App. 3d 751, 544 N.E.2d 836 (1989) (Second District). In 1990, the legislature amended section 11\u2014 15.1\u2014 1 of the Municipal Code to provide for municipal jurisdiction over the lands subject to annexation agreements and to permit annexation agreements to cover noncontiguous lands as follows:\n\u201cProperty that is the subject of an annexation agreement adopted under this [s]ection is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality in all respects the same as property owned by the municipality that lies within its corporate limits.\nLack of contiguity to the municipality of property that is the subject of an annexation agreement does not affect the validity of the agreement whether approved by the corporate authorities before or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990.\u201d Pub. Act 86 \u2014 1169, \u00a7 1, eff. January 1, 1991 (1990 Ill. Laws 1611, 1612-13).\nIn 1993, the first paragraph quoted above was moved to a new section (section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1) of the Municipal Code, and a provision mandating contiguity as a condition of jurisdiction in Cook County, the collar counties, and the metro-east area was added. Pub. Act 87\u2014 1137, \u00a7 1, eff. January 1, 1993 (1992 Ill. Laws 3091); as amended, see 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 1, 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1 (West Supp. 1993).\nIn April 2001, this court decided City of Springfield v. Judith Jones Dietsch Trust, 321 Ill. App. 3d 239, 746 N.E.2d 1272 (2001), to determine whether the City of Springfield or the Village had jurisdiction to regulate the subdivision of property contiguous to Springfield and within its statutory planning jurisdiction but subject to an annexation agreement between the property owner and the Village. This court held in cases where property is subject to conflicting claims of jurisdiction, the annexing municipality\u2019s subdivision and zoning jurisdiction overrides another municipality\u2019s statutory grant of planning jurisdiction over its formerly unincorporated planning area.\nIn January 2002 and July 2002, this court held the City of Springfield had statutory rights superior to both the Village and the County to regulate septic systems extraterritorially, even over lands subject to an annexation agreement, pursuant to section 11 \u2014 125 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code and section 96.019 of City of Springfield Code of Ordinances. City of Springfield v. Hashman, No. 4 \u2014 01 \u2014 0002 (January 17, 2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), vacated & reconsidered, 332 Ill. App. 3d 748, 774 N.E.2d 427 (2002); Springfield Code of Ordinances, ch. 96, \u00a7 96.019 (1988). In its later resolution, this court did not discuss Judith Jones Dietsch Trust or consider the City\u2019s arguments concerning the annexation agreement and zoning ordinances.\nB. Procedural Background of This Controversy\nIn March 2003, the Village filed a complaint against the County for declaratory judgment that it had zoning and building-code jurisdiction over the lands subject to annexation agreements pursuant to section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1 of the Municipal Code. In May 2002, the County filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment that it, not the Village, had legal jurisdiction over the lands in issue for zoning, building-code, and Plat Act (765 ILCS 205/1 through 14 (West 2002)) purposes. The County later dropped the Plat Act portion of the counterclaim.\nThe County also filed two affirmative defenses to the Village\u2019s claim. The County claimed section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1 of the Municipal Code was unconstitutional as special legislation. It also claimed Division 15.1 was an invalid exercise of police powers.\nIn May 2002, while awaiting the outcome of this litigation, the Village and County entered into a stipulation whereby both the County and Village could issue building permits for lands subject to annexation agreements but only the County would charge a fee. Those fees are maintained by the clerk of the county and held in escrow until the resolution of this case.\nIn June 2002 and October 2002, the Village and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In June 2003, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Village. The court found \u201cDivision 15.1 of the Municipal Code grants jurisdiction over lands subject to annexation agreements.\u201d The court relied on this court\u2019s holding in Judith Jones Dietsch Trust and agreed with the Village that \u201cthe intent of the legislature\u2019s amendments to [Division 15.1] following Lisle was an overt attempt to overrule that decision legislatively and give full extraterritorial building and zoning jurisdiction over lands subject to annexation agreements.\u201d This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nWe must determine whether the Village or the County has zoning and building-code jurisdiction of unincorporated property within the statutory zoning jurisdiction of the County but subject to an annexation agreement with the Village. This case is on appeal from the trial court\u2019s grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the Village.\nSummary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, show no genuine issues as to any material fact appear and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2002); First of America Bank v. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d 165, 176, 651 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (1995). Where the matter before the trial court can be decided as a question of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d at 176, 651 N.E.2d at 1110. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and we review the trial court\u2019s interpretation de novo. Hall v. Henn, 208 Ill. 2d 325, 328, 802 N.E.2d 797, 798 (2003).\nA. Zoning and Building-Code Jurisdiction\nThe County argues it has zoning jurisdiction under section 11\u2014 13 \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code and building-code jurisdiction pursuant to section 5 \u2014 1063 (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1063 (West 2002)) of the Illinois Counties Code (Counties Code) (55 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1001 through 7 \u2014 1001 (West 2002)). The Village contends Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code controls and grants municipalities zoning and building-code jurisdiction in areas governed by annexation agreements.\nUnless expressly granted by the legislature, municipalities have no jurisdiction beyond their corporate limits. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 243, 137 N.E.2d 371, 377 (1956). Section Ills \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code grants a municipality zoning power within its corporate limits and within contiguous territory not more than lVa miles beyond the municipality\u2019s corporate limits and not belonging to another municipality. 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 (West 2002).\nThis section limits the zoning power of municipalities in counties with a zoning plan as follows:\n\u201cNo municipality shall exercise any power set forth in this Division 13 outside the corporate limits thereof, if the county in which such municipality is situated has adopted \u2018An Act in relation to county zoning\u2019, approved June 12, 1935, as amended.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11\u2014 13 \u2014 1 (West 2002).\nSection 5 \u2014 1063 of the Counties Code grants counties building-code power over buildings located outside a municipality\u2019s corporate limits as follows:\n\u201cFor the purpose of promoting and safeguarding the public health, safety, comfort!,] and welfare, a county board may prescribe by resolution or ordinance reasonable rules and regulations *** governing the construction and alteration of all buildings *** where such buildings *** are located outside the limits of cities, villages!,] and incorporated towns, but excluding those for agricultural purposes on farms including farm residences.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1063 (West 2002).\nPursuant to section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2(b) of the Municipal Code, annexation agreements can provide for, among other things:\n\u201c(b) The continuation in effect, or amendment, or continuation in effect as amended, of any ordinance relating to subdivision controls, zoning, official plan, and building, housing!,] and related restrictions; provided, however, that any public hearing required by law to be held before the adoption of any ordinance amendment provided in such agreement shall be held prior to the execution of the agreement, and all ordinance amendments provided in such agreement shall be enacted according to law.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1\u2014 2(b) (West 2002).\nThe property subject to these agreements is \u201csubject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the annexing municipality in all respects the same as property that lies within the annexing municipality\u2019s corporate limits.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1(a) (West 2002).\nThe interpretation of a statute is a matter of law, and we review the trial court\u2019s decision de novo. County of Knox v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 723 N.E.2d 256, 260 (1999). \u201cThe fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature.\u201d County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 556, 723 N.E.2d at 263. We first look to the words of the statute as the best indication of legislative intent. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 556, 723 N.E.2d at 263. If the plain language of the statute is clear, it must be given effect without looking to other tools of statutory construction. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 556, 723 N.E.2d at 263. We will not depart from the plain language of the statute and find exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clear legislative intent. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 556, 723 N.E.2d at 263. Language free from ambiguity and doubt will be given effect even if the consequences are harsh, absurd, or unwise. County of Knox, 188 Ill. 2d at 557, 723 N.E.2d at 263.\nLooking to the language of Municipal Code sections 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 and 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1 and Counties Code section 5 \u2014 1063, we find the language of the provisions clear and unambiguous. Under section 11\u2014 13 \u2014 1, a county that has adopted a county zoning ordinance has authority to exercise zoning jurisdiction over land within the county and outside a municipality\u2019s corporate limits. 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 (West 2002). Counties Code section 5 \u2014 1063 permits a county board to adopt rules and ordinances governing building construction outside a municipality\u2019s corporate limits. 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1063 (West 2002). Municipal Code section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1 grants a municipality jurisdiction over an area subject to an annexation agreement as if the property were within the municipality\u2019s corporate limits. 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1\u2014 2.1(a) (West 2002).\nWe presume the legislature, in enacting different statutes, acted rationally and with full knowledge of other statutes and judicial decisions concerning existing law. State of Illinois Secretary of State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247-48, 562 N.E.2d 168, 170 (1990). We further presume the legislature would not enact a law that completely contradicts an earlier statute without expressly repealing that statute. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d at 248, 562 N.E.2d at 170. A construction allowing both statutes to stand will be favored. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d at 248, 562 N.E.2d at 170.\nDespite these presumptions, we find the statutes in question directly conflict with one another, and we now must determine which statute prevails. See generally R. Cope, Annexation Agreements-Boundary Agreements: Walking a Fine Line Into the Future \u2014 A Map of the Dangers to the Unwary Land Use Traveler, 17 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 377, 380-82 (1997) (noncontiguous property not annexed within a short period of time may present problems in regard to conflicting zoning concepts between a county and municipality).\nThe County argues the specific statutory provisions relating to the county\u2019s zoning and building-code jurisdiction control over the general jurisdictional provisions concerning annexation agreements. Further, Division 15.1\u2019s provision relating to zoning can be construed in pari materia with the long-standing specific zoning statutes. Specifically, the County argues this issue is controlled by the Third District\u2019s decision in County of Will v. City of Naperville, 226 Ill. App. 3d 662, 589 N.E.2d 1090 (1992).\nIn County of Will, the county and city disputed zoning jurisdiction over lands owned by the city but not within or contiguous to the corporate limits of the city. The county argued it had zoning jurisdiction pursuant to section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code, while the city claimed jurisdiction under section 7 \u2014 4 \u2014 2. Similar to the language in the statute at issue in this case, section 7 \u2014 4 \u2014 2 provided that land owned by the municipality but outside its corporate limits \u201cshall be subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality in all respects the same as the property owned by the municipality which lies within the corporate limits thereof.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 24, par. 7 \u2014 4 \u2014 2.\nThe Third District held the statutes were not inconsistent, but that section 7 \u2014 4 \u2014 2 was a general provision describing the jurisdictional scope of a municipality\u2019s authority, while section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 specifically detailed a municipality\u2019s zoning powers. The court held section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 was controlling and could not be broadened by the general jurisdiction provisions of section 7 \u2014 4 \u2014 2. County of Will, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 664, 589 N.E.2d at 1092.\nThe Village argues County of Will is not controlling because the Third District specifically noted the jurisdictional statute at issue never mentioned zoning, whereas section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 1 specifically permits annexation agreements to incorporate zoning-, subdivision-, and building-regulation provisions. The Village argues these provisions are nonsensical without zoning and building-control jurisdiction. The Village also argn.es Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code is controlling because it was enacted long after section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 and therefore represents the legislature\u2019s most recent pronouncement on this issue.\nWhere two statutes appear to be in conflict, the more specific controls over the more general. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d at 254, 562 N.E.2d at 173. A general statute is one that applies to cases generally while a specific statute is particular and relates to only one subject. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195, 595 N.E.2d 561, 563 (1992). At the same time, where two statutes are equally applicable to a particular set of facts, the more recent controls. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d at 254, 562 N.E.2d at 173; see N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction \u00a7 51.02, at 186-87 (6th ed. 2000) (\u201cWhere two statutes are involved each of which by its terms applies to the facts before the court, the statute which is the more recent of the two irreconcilably conflicting statutes prevails or one of the statutes can be deemed an exception to the general rule enunciated\u201d).\nAlthough similar to the provisions considered in County of Will, we find the provisions in this case to be considerably more specific. Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code makes clear the zoning provisions of annexation agreements are enforceable for the effective period of the agreement up to 20 years. Langendorf v. City of Urbana, 197 Ill. 2d 100, 107, 754 N.E.2d 320, 323-24 (2001). Further, section 11\u2014 15.1 \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code permits a municipality to enter into annexation agreements with owners of land not contiguous to the municipality. 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 1 (West 2002). Section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code and section 5 \u2014 1063 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1063 (West 2002)) specifically concern zoning and building-code jurisdiction, while Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code specifically concerns lands subject to annexation agreements. The question at issue in this case concerns zoning and building-code jurisdiction over lands subject to annexation agreements; thus the specifics of each statute are implicated. We find the most recent legislative pronouncement, Division 15.1, controlling.\nEven assuming section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code and section 5 \u2014 1063 of the Counties Code are more specific to the issues in this case, a more specific statute will not control where it appears the legislature intended to make the general act controlling. Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review, 151 Ill. 2d 257, 266, 602 N.E.2d 808, 812 (1992). By providing \u201c[pjroperty that is the subject of an annexation agreement *** is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the annexing municipality in all respects the same as property that lies within the annexing municipality\u2019s corporate limits\u201d (emphasis added) (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1(a) (West 2002)), the legislature manifested its intent to make this general provision controlling in cases where the land is subject to an annexation agreement.\nFurther, in Judith Jones Dietsch Trust, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 246-47, 746 N.E.2d at 1277-78, we held in cases where property is subject to conflicting claims of jurisdiction, the annexing municipality\u2019s subdivision and zoning jurisdiction overrides another municipality\u2019s statutory grant of planning jurisdiction over its formerly unincorporated planning area. The same can be said of a county\u2019s statutory grant of zoning jurisdiction over unincorporated property outside a municipality\u2019s corporate limit. Accordingly, we find Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code controls zoning and building construction of property subject to annexation agreements.\nWe also note when a statute is not ambiguous, the rule of in pari materia is not applicable. Kozak v. Retirement Board of Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 219, 447 N.E.2d 394, 398 (1983).\nB. Special Legislation\nAs an affirmative defense, the County contends section 11 \u2014 15.1\u2014 2.1 of the Municipal Code is unconstitutional as it violates the special-legislation provision of article 4, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I\\( \u00a7 13), which provides as follows:\n\u201cThe General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination.\u201d\nSpecifically, the County argues the following language violates the constitution:\n\u201c(b) This [s]ection shall not apply in (i) a county with a population of more than 3,000,000, (ii) a county that borders a county with a population of more than 3,000,000[,] or (iii) a county with a population of more than 246,000 according to the 1990 federal census and bordered by the Mississippi River, unless the parties to the annexation agreement have, at the time the agreement is signed, ownership or control of all property that would make the property that is the subject of the agreement contiguous to the annexing municipality, in which case the property that is the subject of the annexation agreement is subject to the ordinances, control, and jurisdiction of the municipality in all respects the same as property owned by the municipality that lies within its corporate limits.\u201d 65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2.1 (West 2002).\nA county or other local unit of government has standing to assert a legislative classification is invalid under the Illinois Constitution if the county is a member of the class being discriminated against. John v. Troy Fire Protection District, 255 Ill. App. 3d 933, 936, 627 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (1994) (Third District). Because the County is treated differently than the classified counties and its zoning and building-code jurisdiction is affected, we find the County has standing to bring this claim.\nThe special-legislation provision prohibits the legislature from conferring special rights, privileges, or immunity or imposing a specific burden on a specified portion of the population while excluding others who are similarly situated. In re Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d 373, 379, 489 N.E.2d 1385, 1388 (1986). The special-legislation clause prevents the legislature from creating arbitrary classifications that discriminate in favor of a selected group without a reasonable basis. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1069-70 (1997). It does not, however, prohibit all legislative classifications. In re Petition of Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 122, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367 (1995). The legislature is permitted to classify counties and municipalities on the basis of population or territorial differences, so long as the classification is not arbitrary or does not grant a particular class special or exclusive legislative favors. Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d at 379-80, 489 N.E.2d at 1388. A statute is not invalid simply because it operates in a limited area of the state. Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 125, 623 N.E.2d 281, 285 (1993).\nA special-legislation challenge is generally judged the same as an equal-protection challenge, and the controlling question is whether the legislative classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 123, 658 N.E.2d at 367-68. Under this test, \u201cthe classification must be based upon a rational difference of situation or condition found to exist in the persons or objects upon which the classification rests.\u201d Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d at 380, 489 N.E.2d at 1388. Additionally, the classification must bear a rational relationship to the evil to be remedied and the purpose of the legislation. Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d at 380, 489 N.E.2d at 1388. \u201cIf any set of facts can be reasonably conceived that justifies distinguishing the class to which the statute applies from the class to which the statute is inapplicable, then the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or control, and may enact law applicable only to those persons or objects.\u201d Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122, 658 N.E.2d at 367.\n\u201c \u2018Only if it can be said that the classification is clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary will the courts act to hold the classifying enactment invalid.\u2019 [Citation.] There is no requirement that classifications *** be drawn with mathematical precision [citation] for \u2018[e]ven if the difference be one degree, only, it may be sufficiently great to require a difference in the methods of municipal action.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 130, 623 N.E.2d at 287.\nLegislative classifications are presumed to be constitutionally valid, and any reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of upholding the classification. Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122-23, 658 N.E.2d at 367. A reviewing court will also presume the legislature acted conscientiously and considered the conditions prevailing in the counties before enacting the legislation. Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d at 380, 489 N.E.2d at 1389. However, where appropriate we will declare a statute unconstitutional and invalid. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 378, 689 N.E.2d at 1064.\nThe party attacking the validity of the statute must demonstrate the unreasonableness or arbitrariness of the classification. Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d at 380, 489 N.E.2d at 1388. The County points us to a number of cases where a classification based on population alone was struck down as arbitrary. See Belmont Fire Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d 373, 489 N.E.2d 1385 (a statute based on population that affected only Du Page County was held invalid because other counties faced similar situations and the population classification did not aid in remedying the evil); Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 658 N.E.2d 365 (essentially the same issue as in Belmont Fire Protection District, but only Will County was affected); Christen v. County of Winnebago, 34 Ill. 2d 617, 218 N.E.2d 103 (1966) (found unconstitutional an act applicable only to counties with a population between 200,000 and 1 million that eliminated the referendum requirement for the issuance of general obligation bonds, where a great need for courthouse improvements existed throughout the state and no proof showed the need was greater in the six counties falling within the classification); Hunt v. County of Cook, 398 Ill. 412, 415, 76 N.E.2d 48, 50 (1947) (invalidated the Domestic Relations Act, intended to combat \u201cthe evils attending the breaking of family relationships,\u201d that posed a serious threat to the general welfare, health, moral, and safety of the state but was applicable only in Cook County); Lacny v. Police Board, 291 Ill. App. 3d 397, 683 N.E.2d 1265 (1997) (First District) (classification based on population and affecting only Chicago held invalid because the court could find no rational difference between the situation or condition existing between complaints filed in Chicago and complaints filed outside Chicago); compare Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 623 N.E.2d 281 (upheld a provision of the Public Employee Disability Act that distinguished between home rule municipalities in excess of and less than 1 million); County of Champaign v. Adams, 59 Ill. App. 3d 62, 375 N.E.2d 184 (1978) (upheld a population classification set at 80,000 and distinguished Cristen).\nThe scant legislative history concerning this amendment suggests the law was enacted to stop municipalities from leapfrogging over unincorporated lands and entering into annexation and preannexation agreements. 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 26, 1992, at 16 (statements of Representative Hoffman). In the Senate, Senator John Cullerton noted this had been a problem in the classified counties and explained the purpose of the amendment as follows:\n\u201cThis has posed a problem up in the suburban area, and so what we\u2019ve done witl: this bill is to not change the law with respect to most of the State, but for certain counties, and those counties are Cook, Lake, McHenry, Du Page, Will, Kane, St. Clair[,] and Madison. We say that that provision shall only apply if the parties to this annexation agreement have, at the time of the agreement is signed, ownership or control of all property that would make the property that is subject \u2014 the subject of the agreement, contiguous to the annexing municipalities.\u201d 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 25, 1992, at 47-48 (statements of Senator Cullerton).\nThe County argues the problem of leapfrogging jurisdiction exists not only in the classified counties but throughout the state, as evidenced by the affidavit of Bruce Knight, planning director for the City of Champaign and the County\u2019s professional land-use expert. Knight opined that because lands covered by annexation agreements need not be contiguous to a municipality\u2019s corporate boundary, \u201c[t]his creates the potential for islands of land away from the corporate limits of a municipality, without limitation as to the distance of the lands from the municipality.\u201d Further, \u201c[t]he patchwork of irregular and inconsistent jurisdiction that may be created under these conditions in unincorporated areas violate[s] [professional [l]and[-][u]se [principles, which encourage the growth of expanding urban areas in a uniform and contiguous manner to the existing corporate limits.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Knight pointed to a number of potential problems, including urban sprawl, inappropriate zoning not consistent with the county\u2019s comprehensive plan, little incentive for proper zoning, the increased cost and compromised quality of municipal services, boundary confusion, and inconsistency in the uniform application of land-use controls.\nWe agree with the County that potential problems could arise in any county in Illinois, but this is an issue for the legislature, not this court. Senator Cullerton indicated actual problems existed in the classified counties, and this distinction alone is sufficient to show the classification was not arbitrary and was supported by a rational basis. Further, the cases cited by the County are inapposite because the evils sought to be remedied by the laws actually existed in other parts of the State. The County has failed to demonstrate such is the case here and failed to meet its burden of showing the classification was arbitrary and unreasonable.\nC. Police Powers\nIn its second affirmative defense, the County argues Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code is an invalid use of police powers by the legislature because it does not bear a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, morals, and general welfare or convenience. Specifically, the County contends the division defeats the sound land-use principles of unity and contiguity in the extension of corporate jurisdiction and permits municipalities with no valid government interest in zoning to bargain away the public interest of those legitimately concerned with the land\u2019s zoning.\nUnder its police powers, the legislature has broad discretion to enact legislation to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare or convenience of the State. City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d 111, 114-15, 398 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1979). A valid exercise of police power requires the legislation to bear a reasonable relationship to the interest sought to be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such an objective. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d at 115, 398 N.E.2d at 831.\nAlthough the question of reasonableness will be determined by the court, \u201cthe legislature has broad discretion to determine not only what the interests of the public welfare require but what measures are necessary to secure such interest.\u201d Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d at 115, 398 N.E.2d at 831. Where the legislature has considered a problem and enacted legislation, we presume the law evidences a valid exercise of that power. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d at 114, 398 N.E.2d at 831. We will not disturb an enactment merely over a difference of opinion concerning its wisdom, necessity, and expediency. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d at 115, 398 N.E.2d at 831. The party challenging the validity of the law has the burden to show the law is entirely arbitrary and without reasonable basis. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d at 114, 398 N.E.2d at 831.\nThis court has recognized the requirement that land be contiguous before it can be annexed promotes the gradual and natural extension of municipal limits. In re Annexation of Certain Territory to the Village of Chatham, Illinois, 245 Ill. App. 3d 786, 790-91, 614 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (1993). This court explained, \u201c \u2018delivery of services is more convenient for the city and more efficient for its citizens. Sewer lines, and fire, policet,] and other services, as far as practicable, should not have to pass under or over lands not within municipal boundaries.\u2019 \u201d Certain Territory, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 790-91, 614 N.E.2d at 1282, quoting People ex rel. County of St. Clair v. City of Belleville, 84 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 417 N.E.2d 125, 130 (1981). However, this court also recognized \u2018 \u2018[p]reannexation agreements serve to further important governmental purposes, such as the encouragement of expanding urban areas uniformly, economically, efficiently, and fairly, with optimum provisions made for the establishment of land[-]use controls and necessary municipal improvements\u201d and rejected a similar argument by the City of Springfield. Judith Jones Dietsch Trust, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 245, 746 N.E.2d at 1276. The County\u2019s concerns are neither borne out by the evidence in the record nor sufficiently supported by the affidavit of its land-use expert. The County had the burden to prove the law was entirely arbitrary and without reasonable basis, but it failed to do so. We find Division 15.1 of the Municipal Code to be a valid use of the legislature\u2019s police powers.\nD. Genuine Issue of Material Fact\nThe County also argues summary judgment was not appropriate because, in its complaint, the Village alleged it had entered into annexation agreements it claimed as the basis for its alleged building-code and zoning jurisdiction, but it failed to provide proof, date, or lands affected by the annexation agreements. The Village argues the legal dispute between the Village and the County does not concern specific annexation agreements but does concern who has jurisdiction over any lands subject to any annexation agreement.\nSummary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, show no genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2002); Netsch, 166 Ill. 2d at 176, 651 N.E.2d at 1110. In this case, although demanding strict proof of the agreements, the County admitted a dispute with the Village over zoning and building-code jurisdiction in both its answer to the Village\u2019s complaint and in its counterclaim. Additionally, the County provided the trial court with a map showing the location of some of these disputed lands. We find no dispute as to this issue; this factual issue is not material to the ultimate legal issue presented in the Village\u2019s complaint.\nE. Declaratory Judgment\nThe County argues because the Village failed to prove up the information about the annexation agreements and the lands allegedly covered by the annexation agreements, the trial court\u2019s ruling was abstract and will not terminate the dispute between the parties. The Village contends a declaratory judgment did terminate the controversy at issue in this case, namely, which of them has jurisdiction in areas subject to annexation agreements. We note both the Village and the County sought declaratory judgment as to which has zoning and building-code jurisdiction over land subject to an annexation agreement.\nIn a declaratory judgment action concerning the validity of a statute, a party is entitled to a declaration of rights if (1) it pleads facts showing a protectible interest clearly falling within the operative language of the statute and (2) it will be adversely affected by its enforcement. Boles Trucking, Inc. v. O\u2019Connor, 138 Ill. App. 3d 764, 773, 486 N.E.2d 362, 366 (1985). Where declaratory judgment is the only relief requested, it may be decided on a motion for summary judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 701(b) (West 2002); Bossman v. Village of Riverton, 291 Ill. App. 3d 769, 780, 684 N.E.2d 427, 434 (1997). Courts, however, should refuse to enter declaratory judgments if it appears the judgment would not terminate the controversy or some nart thereof. Illinois Press Ass\u2019n v. Ryan, 195 Ill. 2d 63, 66-67, 743 N.E.2d 568, 569 (2001).\nWe find declaratory judgment was proper in this case and should terminate the controversy between the Village and the County concerning zoning and building-code jurisdiction over the property subject to preannexation agreements.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nThe legislature\u2019s current statutory provisions compelled the results in this case. We recognize, however, this decision does not properly take into account the County\u2019s and Village\u2019s competing land-use goals. This county, as well as other counties throughout the state, has developed zoning and building-code plans meant to preserve the rural character of the county and protect rich farmland from development. The legislature\u2019s policy in permitting annexation agreements and giving municipalities zoning and building-code jurisdiction is meant to promote urbanization. Reconciling these competing considerations is most properly left to the legislature and not this court.\nThus, we invite the legislature to carefully review the statutes at issue in this case and carefully consider the implications of granting municipalities zoning and building-code jurisdiction over lands subject to annexation agreements but not contiguous to the municipality. We urge the legislature to consider whether additional standards, such as those required for school-district annexation, need to be met before a municipality is permitted to exercise this jurisdiction. See Dukett v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 342 Ill. App. 3d 635, 640-41, 795 N.E.2d 945, 950-51 (2003) (\u201c[Pjetitions for detachment and annexation should be granted only where the overall benefit to the annexing district and the detachment area clearly outweighs the resulting detriment to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole\u201d). Further, we invite the legislature to consider the County\u2019s argument that a municipality\u2019s zoning and building-code jurisdiction should not attach until the land subject to the annexation agreement is actually annexed.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nTURNER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. In determining that section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 (West 2002)) \u201cprevails,\u201d the majority has rendered two Illinois statutes, section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 (West 2002)) and section 5 \u2014 1063 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1063 (West 2002)), invalid. I am troubled by such an \u201cisolated\u201d approach and by the majority\u2019s dismissal of the County\u2019s suggestion that the three seemingly conflicting statutes can be constructed in pari materia (the majority states: \u201cWe also note when a statute is not ambiguous, the rule of in pari materia is not applicable. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 219, 447 N.E.2d 394, 398 (1983)\u201d (351 Ill. App. 3d at 897). I agree with the County that the statutes at issue should be interpreted to mean that a municipality\u2019s zoning power only becomes effective when the property is actually annexed, so that all the statutes involved are construed harmoniously and are given effect.\nThe doctrine of in pari materia is a long-established, fundamental statutory construction principle. \u201cUnder this doctrine of construction, two legislative acts that address the same subject are considered with reference to one another, so that they may be given harmonious effect.\u201d Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422, 781 N.E.2d 249, 254 (2002). The United States Supreme Court, in United States ex rel. Chott v. Ewing, 237 U.S. 197, 200, 59 L. Ed. 913, 915, 35 S. Ct. 571, 572 (1915), was faced with two provisions, which, when \u201c[ljooked at isolatedly,\u201d had \u201cabsolute conflict between\u201d them. The Court rejected the isolated approach and stated as follows: \u201c[Ejven if the method of isolated consideration were not otherwise plainly a mistaken one, it follows that it cannot be adopted since it affords no possible solution of the controversy.\u201d Ewing, 237 U.S. at 200, 59 L. Ed. at 915, 35 S. Ct. at 572. The Court then held: \u201c[S]uch solution must therefore be sought by following the elementary rules, that is, by turning primarily to the context of the section and secondarily to provisions in pari materia as affording an efficient means for discovering the legislative intent in enacting the statute thereby vivifying and enforcing the remedial purposes which it was adopted to accomplish.\u201d Ewing, 237 U.S. at 200, 59 L. Ed. at 915, 35 S. Ct. at 572. The Court\u2019s holding in Ewing fully applies here.\nIn the instant case, we have three Illinois statutes that appear to be in conflict, and to hold one valid would, in essence, repeal the others. The majority chose to uphold the validity of section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code while rejecting section 11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 13 \u2014 1 (West 2002)) and section 5 \u2014 1063 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1063 (West 2002)). The majority relied on Kozak, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 447 N.E.2d 394, to ignore the doctrine of in pari materia set forth above by the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Illinois, stating \u201c[w]e also note when a statute is not ambiguous, the rule of in pari materia is not applicable. [Citation.]\u201d 351 Ill. App. 3d at 897. Such reliance is misplaced as the statute here, section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 (West 2002)), is not clear and unambiguous.\nThe Supreme Court of Illinois stated in People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288, 642 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (1994), a statute is ambiguous if it \u201cis capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.\u201d As we know, ambiguity is of a dual nature: it may be either patent or latent. A patent ambiguity arises out of the words themselves, while a latent ambiguity arises out of the results of a literal application of the words. In Stewart v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 340, 504 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1987), for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a statute may contain a latent ambiguity. A latent ambiguity arises \u201c \u2018where the language employed is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings.\u2019 (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 102 (3d ed. 1933).)\u201d Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 148 Ill. 2d 272, 279, 592 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (1992).\nIn the instant case, section 11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 of the Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 15.1 \u2014 2 (West 2002)) may be interpreted two ways: a village has the zoning jurisdiction over any property with which the village enters annexation agreements (as the majority did) or a municipality\u2019s zoning power only becomes effective when the property is actually annexed. The fact that there are two possible interpretations of the statute renders it latently ambiguous, and we should apply the principle of in pari materia to determine the correct interpretation.\nLast, I note the majority stated that \u201c[t]he legislature\u2019s current statutory provisions compelled the results in this case\u201d (351 Ill. App. 3d at 904) and \u201c[Reconciling these competing considerations is most properly left to the legislature and not this court\u201d (351 Ill. App. 3d at 904). The majority, however, placed itself in the role of the legislature when it declared that one statute prevailed over the other two \u201cconflicting\u201d statutes. The majority\u2019s holding also violates the statutory construction principles as stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in State v. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247-48, 562 N.E.2d 168, 170 (1990): \u201cIt is presumed that the legislature, in enacting various statutes, acts rationally and with full knowledge of all previous enactments. [Citation.] It is further presumed that the legislature will not enact a law which completely contradicts a prior statute without an express repeal of it and that statutes which relate to the same subject are to be governed by one spirit and a single policy\u201d and \u201cit is not unusual for two or more bills to be passed at the same session of the legislature which pertain to the same subject. For the later enactment to operate as a repeal by implication of the earlier one, therefore, there must be such manifest and total repugnance that the two cannot stand together. A construction, if possible, of the two statutes which allows both to stand will be favored.\u201d For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "John E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, and J. William Roberts and D. Bradley Blodgett (argued), both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, both of Springfield, for appellant.", "John M. Myers (argued), of Rabin, Myers, Hanken & Durr, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF CHATHAM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE COUNTY OF SANGAMON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201403\u20140878\nArgued April 14, 2004.\nOpinion filed August 11, 2004.\nJohn E Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, and J. William Roberts and D. Bradley Blodgett (argued), both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, both of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn M. Myers (argued), of Rabin, Myers, Hanken & Durr, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0889-01", "first_page_order": 907, "last_page_order": 925 }