{ "id": 1083892, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS J. ROLAND, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Roland", "decision_date": "2004-09-07", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201403\u20140441", "first_page": "1012", "last_page": "1016", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 1012" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3739480 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" }, { "page": "188-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778382 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "\"A third violation of section 11 - 501 is a Class 3 felony under section 11 - 501(c - 1)(2) of the Code\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609702 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536114 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0091-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 380, "char_count": 8157, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0446031217563963e-07, "percentile": 0.7493869333694745 }, "sha256": "b5cb2e1d855f4328a907e864446680802a505c54ac4d667eff79730c21adac42", "simhash": "1:b3a5bbbb1c303a34", "word_count": 1404 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:22:07.473803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "BYRNE and CALLUM, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS J. ROLAND, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue before us is the meaning of section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) (West 2000)). In appealing the partial dismissal of his postconviction petition, defendant, Thomas J. Roland, argues that his conviction of violating section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) is invalid because the statute is ambiguous. We disagree, and thus we affirm.\nDefendant pleaded guilty to two counts of Class 3 felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) (West 2000)), one count of Class 4 felony DUI (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501(d)(1)(A) (West 2000)), one count of driving while his license was suspended (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(d) (West 2000)), and one count of unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(c) (West 2000)). The Class 3 DUIs were based on the fact that defendant had two previous DUI convictions and the present violations occurred while his license was revoked. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) (West 2000). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of 5 years\u2019 imprisonment for the Class 3 DUIs, 3 years\u2019 imprisonment for the Class 4 DUI, 3 years\u2019 imprisonment for driving with a suspended license, and 364 days\u2019 imprisonment for possession of cannabis. Defendant did not appeal his sentence.\nDefendant later filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)). In his petition, defendant alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney advised him to plead guilty to the Class 3 DUIs. He asserted that he should not have been charged with these offenses because his previous DUI violations had not occurred while his license was revoked or suspended. He also argued that based on the \u201cone-act, one-crime\u201d doctrine, he should have been convicted of only one of the three DUI counts. The State moved to dismiss the petition, the court appointed defendant counsel, and defendant filed a written response to the State\u2019s motion. Following a hearing, the court vacated defendant\u2019s convictions of the Class 4 DUI and one of the Class 3 DUIs. However, the court found that defendant\u2019s remaining Class 3 DUI conviction should stand, because section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) required only that defendant\u2019s license be revoked or suspended at the time of the third DUI, not at the time of the two prior violations. Defendant appealed.\nDefendant argues that section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) of the Code is ambiguous. Section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) provides:\n\u201cA person who violates this Section a third time during a period in which his or her driving privileges are revoked or suspended where the revocation or suspension was for a violation of this Section, Section 11 \u2014 501.1, paragraph (b) of Section 11 \u2014 401, or Section 9 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 is guilty of a Class 3 felony.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) (West 2000).\nDefendant contends that section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) has two possible meanings: (1) that all three violations must have occurred while the defendant\u2019s license was revoked or suspended, or (2) that only the third violation must have occurred while the defendant\u2019s license was revoked or suspended. Defendant further argues that because the section is ambiguous, we must construe it in his favor and thus follow the first interpretation. See People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999).\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 171 (2003). The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 171. \u201cA statute is ambiguous if it is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations.\u201d Donoho, 204 111. 2d at 172. Where, however, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, its plain meaning will be given effect. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 97. We review de novo the interpretation of a statute. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 172.\nWe hold that section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) of the Code is not ambiguous. The plain language of the statute reveals that the phrase \u201cduring a period in which his or her driving privileges are revoked or suspended\u201d qualifies the phrase \u201cviolates this Section a third time.\u201d Thus, only the third DUI violation must occur while the individual\u2019s license is revoked or suspended. In order for defendant\u2019s alternate reading of the statute to make sense, we would have to interpret the term \u201cthis Section\u201d to mean \u201csubsection 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 l)(l).\u201d However, the term \u201cthis Section\u201d clearly means section 11 \u2014 501. See People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d 678, 680 (2003) (\u201cA third violation of section 11 \u2014 501 is a Class 3 felony under section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) of the Code\u201d (emphasis added)). Had the legislature intended to condition a Class 3 felony on the commission of three violations of subsection 11\u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(1), it easily could have done so. Indeed, in other parts of section 11 \u2014 501, the legislature explicitly conditioned penalties on violations of specific subsections of section 11 \u2014 501. See 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501(c \u2014 4)(3) (West 2000) (\u201c[a] person who is convicted of violating subsection (a) of Section 11 \u2014 501 of this Code *** is guilty of a Class 4 felony\u201d); 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 4)(4) (West 2000) (\u201c[a] person who is convicted of violating this subsection (c \u2014 4) a fourth or subsequent time is guilty of a Class 2 felony\u201d). In section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) of the Code, however, it did not do so.\nWe also find support for our decision in People v. Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d 179 (2004). There, the defendant was convicted of a violation of section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(3), a subsection identical to section 11\u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2), except that it requires three prior DUI violations. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had improperly considered a previous DUI conviction that had resulted from a bond forfeiture. We affirmed. Although we did not address whether section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(3) was ambiguous, we did reason that pursuant to that section \u201ca DUI offender with three or more prior DUI offenses may be sentenced as a Class 2 felon if the offender has committed the present offense while his or her driver\u2019s license was revoked or suspended for a violation of the DUI statute.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 188. We therefore held that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant because he had three prior DUI convictions and the present conviction occurred while his license was revoked. Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 188-89.\nAccordingly, section 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(2) provides that an individual with two prior violations of any provision of section 11 \u2014 501, whose third DUI violation occurs while the individual\u2019s license is revoked or suspended, is guilty of a Class 3 felony. Here, it is undisputed that defendant had two prior violations of section 11 \u2014 501 and that his third DUI violation occurred while his license was revoked because of a DUI violation. This is a violation of section 11 \u2014 501(c\u2014 1)(2). Thus, the trial court properly dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in defendant\u2019s postconviction petition.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Jo Daviess County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBYRNE and CALLUM, JJ., concur.\nSection 11 \u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(1) of the Code provides: \u201cA person who violates this Section during a period in which his or her driving privileges are revoked or suspended, where the revocation or suspension was for a violation of this Section, Section 11 \u2014 501.1, paragraph (b) of Section 11 \u2014 401, or Section 9 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 is guilty of a Class 4 felony.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501(c \u2014 1)(1) (West 2000).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Glen R. Weber, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galena (Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for the Feople." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THOMAS J. ROLAND, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201403\u20140441\nOpinion filed September 7, 2004.\nG. Joseph Weller and Thomas A. Lilien, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nGlen R. Weber, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galena (Martin E Moltz and Joan M. Kripke, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for the Feople." }, "file_name": "1012-01", "first_page_order": 1030, "last_page_order": 1034 }