{ "id": 1083861, "name": "NANCY FERRARI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Ferrari v. Department of Human Rights", "decision_date": "2004-08-04", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201403\u20140737", "first_page": "1099", "last_page": "1108", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 1099" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "695 F. Supp. 963", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4026810 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "970" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/695/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 722", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79410 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592224 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 N.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854" }, { "page": "854" }, { "page": "854" }, { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372231 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57346 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 936", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "764 N.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579-80" }, { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" }, { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 N.E.2d 1156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462732 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894456 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1141" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147590 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0469-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 838, "char_count": 23740, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0080470099816133e-07, "percentile": 0.5412861908165302 }, "sha256": "8cf7abf7d89324269b14eb87534be17a191078211c464106fb0314d739a19ea6", "simhash": "1:e3f3bd606e80f146", "word_count": 3834 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:22:07.473803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "KNECHT, EJ., and TURNER, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "NANCY FERRARI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Nancy Ferrari, appeals the decision of the acting chief legal counsel (Chief Legal Counsel) of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department) affirming the Department\u2019s dismissal of her sex-discrimination complaint filed pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 through 10 \u2014 103 (West 2002)). We reverse and remand with directions.\nOn June 26, 2002, petitioner filed a verified charge with the Department, alleging that respondent, the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), sexually discriminated against her on January 31, 2002, by discharging her from her job as an educator because of her gender. Specifically, she stated that DOC claimed the discharge was necessitated by inappropriate conduct of a sexual nature but that objective investigation would reveal DOC was aware similarly employed males had engaged in such conduct but remained employed.\nOn September 26, 2002, the Department issued notice of a fact-finding conference scheduled for November 20, 2002. A fact-finding conference is \u201can investigative forum intended to define the issues, determine which facts are undisputed, obtain evidence and ascertain whether there is a basis for a negotiated settlement of the charge.\u201d The notice indicated that a complainant\u2019s failure to attend the conference could result in dismissal of the charge.\nOn September 30, 2002, petitioner\u2019s counsel sent the Department a letter, stating she was reiterating her request that the Department issue a notice to show cause why DOC should not be held in default for failing to file a timely verified response in accordance with section 7A \u2014 102(B) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002)). The letter referenced a September 23, 2003, phone conversation between petitioner\u2019s counsel and Department investigator Annette VanHooser, where VanHooser told petitioner\u2019s counsel that she had asked respondent why it had not filed a verified response but was not given a reason why it was not filed. Petitioner\u2019s counsel further stated that investigative activities, including the November 20 fact-finding conference, should not continue where, if DOC does not show good cause, all allegations would be deemed admitted pursuant to statute.\nOn October 30, 2002, petitioner\u2019s counsel sent the Department another letter, noting that settlement negotiations were ongoing. It also stated that she could not recommend that petitioner attend the fact-finding conference unless and until the Department complied with its statutory duty to address DOC\u2019s failure to file a verified response within the 60-day time period and to issue DOC a notice to show cause.\nOn November 4, 2002, DOC sent a copy of its verified response (dated October 1, 2002) to petitioner\u2019s counsel. On November 7, 2002, VanHooser sent a letter to the parties, noting that DOC had by that date submitted a verified response and served a copy on petitioner. She also reminded the parties of the November 20 hearing. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to strike DOC\u2019s verified response, arguing that DOC failed to file and serve it within the statutorily mandated 60-day period (775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002)) following receipt of notice of the charge. Petitioner argued that such failure required the Department to issue a notice to show cause. Absent a showing of good cause, petitioner stated that all allegations were to be deemed admitted by DOC. See 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002). On November 18, 2002, petitioner sent another letter to the Department, requesting a response to her motion to strike the verified response, again citing the need to rule on such motion before the fact-finding conference. She formally requested that the conference be cancelled or postponed.\nIn a November 19, 2002, letter that was faxed to petitioner, VanHooser stated that \u201cthe Department is not a motion entertaining body and therefore cannot respond to Complainant\u2019s Motion to Strike Respondent\u2019s Verified Answer. The motion has been noted and place [sic] in Complainant\u2019s file and will be given the weight it is due when the report is written.\u201d The letter further denied petitioner\u2019s request to continue the fact-finding conference.\nOn November 19, 2002, petitioner\u2019s counsel sent a letter to VanHooser in reply, stating that \u201c[o]ther than a motion, I am not sure how a complainant can raise procedural issues to the Department before the conclusion of the Department\u2019s investigation or how to terminate an \u2018investigation\u2019 when the respondent does not act in accordance with its statutory obligations.\u201d She reiterated that she had made four requests prior to the conference that it be postponed or cancelled. She stated that petitioner would not be attending the fact-finding conference because no factual issues remained to be addressed in light of the Department\u2019s failure to comply with its statutory duties.\nOn November 20, 2002, the Department held a fact-finding conference with witnesses for DOC in attendance. Neither petitioner nor her counsel attended. Besides the list of witnesses present, no record was made of the proceedings.\nOn December 26, 2002, the Department dismissed the complaint, finding that on September 25, 2002, petitioner agreed to attend the fact-finding conference on November 20, 2002, but did not in fact attend. It also noted that on November 19, 2002, petitioner\u2019s counsel contacted the Department and indicated that petitioner would not attend the conference because no factual questions remained to be addressed and petitioner had a resolution agreement pending that would result in petitioner withdrawing her charge from the Department. The dismissal order made mention neither of petitioner\u2019s motion and requests to strike DOC\u2019s verified response nor her request for default judgment.\nPetitioner filed a timely request for review with the Chief Legal Counsel, requesting that the charge be reinstated and a notice to show cause issue in light of the Department\u2019s noncompliance with section 7A \u2014 102(B) of the Act in failing to address DOC\u2019s late-filed verified response. On July 28, 2003, the Chief Legal Counsel affirmed the dismissal order on the grounds of failure to proceed. See 56 111. Adm. Code \u00a7 2520.560(b)(2) (Conway Greene CD-ROM March 2002). In affirming the dismissal, the Chief Legal Counsel reasoned as follows:\n\u201c[T]he record demonstrates that Complainant elected not to attend the fact finding conference because Complainant disagreed with the Department\u2019s decision to accept Respondent\u2019s verified response. However, the Department notified Complainant on November 7, 2002, and again on November 19, 2002, that Respondent\u2019s verified answer had been accepted and that the fact finding conference would take place as scheduled.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nWhen reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, the agency\u2019s findings of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct, and those findings will be sustained unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Raintree Health Care Center v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 173 Ill. 2d 469, 479, 672 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (1996). The Chief Legal Counsel found that petitioner\u2019s verified charge was filed on June 26, 2002, and DOC\u2019s verified response was filed on November 4, 2002. A careful review of the record shows that these findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Any combination of the dates suggested by the parties would not change the outcome of this disposition.\nThe first issue in this case is whether the Department has the discretion to accept a verified response filed by a respondent outside the 60-day period under section 7A \u2014 102(B) of the Act without either considering a petitioner\u2019s requests to strike or sua sponte striking any response filed outside the requisite statutory period, absent a finding of good cause by the Department for not filing the response within 60 days.\nThe standard of review as to the Chief Legal Counsel\u2019s decision to sustain the dismissal of a human-rights-violation charge is generally determining whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious, or constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Deen v. Lustig, 337 Ill. App. 3d 294, 302, 785 N.E.2d 521, 529 (2003). However, as an administrative agency, the Department has no general or common-law powers; its only powers are those granted to it by the legislature, and any action it takes must be specifically authorized by statute. Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173, 186, 802 N.E.2d 1156, 1164 (2003). \u201cThe term \u2018jurisdiction,\u2019 although not strictly applicable to an administrative body, may be used to designate the authority of the administrative body to act.\u201d Byington v. Department of Agriculture, 327 Ill. App. 3d 726, 730, 764 N.E.2d 576, 579-80 (2002). Where an administrative agency acts outside its specific statutory authority, it acts without jurisdiction, and thus, its actions are void. Daniels v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 201 Ill. 2d 160, 165, 775 N.E.2d 936, 940 (2002). Whether an administrative agency acts with jurisdiction is a question of law, and the standard of review is de novo. Byington, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 730, 764 N.E.2d at 580. Construction of a statute is also a matter of law that we review de novo. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 237, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1996).\nUnder the Act, a complainant may file a charge alleging a civil-rights violation with the Department. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(A)(1) (West 2002). After the respondent receives notice of the charge, the Department fully investigates the allegations set forth therein. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(C)(1) (West 2002). Such an investigation is performed by the Director or his or her designated representatives. 775 ILCS 5/7A\u2014 102(C) (West 2002). Section 7A \u2014 102 of the Act, which addresses the notice of, response to, and review of charges brought under the Act, states, in pertinent part, the following:\n\u201cThe Department shall require the respondent to file a verified response to the allegations contained in the charge within 60 days of receipt of the notice of the charge. *** All allegations contained in the charge not timely denied by the respondent shall be deemed admitted, unless the respondent states that it is without sufficient information to form a belief with respect to such allegation. The Department shall issue a notice of default directed to any respondent who fails to file a verified response to a charge within 60 days of receipt of the notice of the charge, unless the respondent can demonstrate good cause as to why such notice should not issue.\u201d (Emphases added.) 775 ILCS 5/7A\u2014 102(B) (West 2002).\nAfter a petitioner is served with respondent\u2019s response, he or she is afforded 30 days to file with the Department a reply to that response. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002).\nOn reasonable notice to the parties, a fact-finding conference is generally held prior to 365 days after the date on which the charge is filed \u201cunless the Director has determined whether there is substantial evidence that the alleged civil rights violation has been committed or the charge has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.\u201d 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(C)(4) (West 2002). Any party\u2019s failure to attend the conference, except for \u201cgood cause,\u201d necessarily results in either dismissal or default, as appropriate. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(C)(4) (West 2002). \u201cGood cause\u201d is defined as \u201cconditions such that a reasonable person would not attend a fact-finding conference\u201d (56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 2520.10 (Conway Greene CD-ROM March 2002)) and includes, but is not limited to, death or sudden illness of the petitioner or an immediate family member (56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 2520.440(d)(3) (Conway Greene March 2002)). Upon dismissal of a charge, a petitioner may seek review with the Chief Legal Counsel within 30 days of receipt of notice of the dismissal. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(C)(4) (West 2002).\nEach charge is also subject to an evidentiary report, which Department staff submits to the Director. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(D)(1) (West 2002). Based on this report, the Director concludes whether substantial evidence exists that a civil-rights violation has in fact occurred. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(D)(2) (West 2002). If the Director concludes no substantial, evidence exists to support the charge, he or she is required to dismiss the charge. Upon dismissal, a petitioner may appeal to the Chief Legal Counsel. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(D)(2)(a) (West 2002). If the Director finds that substantial evidence does exist, he or she must designate a Department employee who is an attorney to eliminate the effect of the civil-rights violation and prevent its repetition by means of conference and conciliation. 775 ILCS 5/7A\u2014 102(D)(2)(b) (West 2002).\nThe language of section 7A \u2014 102(B) is clear. The Department has an affirmative duty to disallow any verified response after 60 days and to enter a notice of default judgment where a respondent cannot show good cause for failing to file a response within the 60-day period (Wallace v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 261 Ill. App. 3d 564, 569, 633 N.E.2d 851, 854 (1994)). 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002). Because all allegations in the petition not timely denied are admitted pursuant to statute (775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002)), a late-filed verified response, absent good cause, is treated as if no response was filed at all. Cf. 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1120.30(d)(3) (Conway Greene CD-ROM March 2002) (Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board regulation providing that \u201c[o]n motion of a party, failure to file a timely answer shall be deemed an admission of all allegations in the complaint\u201d (emphasis added)).\nThe Department has not enacted any rule indicating when, if, or how it complies with its duties under section 7A \u2014 102(B) as to late-filed verified responses. The question then arises whether its duty to enforce the 60-day requirement for filing a verified response is sua sponte or contingent on being raised by a petitioner. First and foremost, the Act does not provide that a petitioner must file a motion or otherwise raise the issue to trigger the Department\u2019s obligation to enforce the statute. In this case, the Department informed petitioner that it did not entertain motions. This statement is consistent with the fact that the Department has not promulgated any rule explicitly providing when or if a petitioner may file such a motion at the investigative stage of Department proceedings. The vast majority of Human Rights Commission (Commission) decisions further suggest that the duty is sua sponte rather than one triggered by petition or motion. We conclude that the Department has a sua sponte duty to enforce the 60-day period for filing a verified response.\nNotwithstanding the above analysis, a distinction must be made whether the 60-day period for filing a verified response is statutory or jurisdictional in nature. If the requirement is jurisdictional, a petitioner may raise the failure of the Department to comply with its statutory duties at any time, even on appeal. Robinson v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 722, 726, 559 N.E.2d 229, 231 (1990). If the mandate is statutory, the Department must provide a vehicle by which a petitioner can raise the issue before the Department because he or she may forfeit the issue by failing to so inform the Department (Wallace, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 569, 633 N.E.2d at 854).\nThe legislature explicitly stated that the 10-day service requirement under section 7A \u2014 102(B) was not jurisdictional. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002). Had the legislature desired to do the same for the time requirements for filing a charge and a verified response, it certainly could have so stated. However, the absence of specific language stating that a time deadline is not jurisdictional does not necessarily require the inverse inference that the 60-day response period is necessarily jurisdictional. The court in Wallace suggests that the response period is statutory where it found a petitioner could forfeit the issue of whether the Department had neglected to require the respondent to file its verified response within such period where he did not raise it before the Department. Wallace, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 569, 633 N.E.2d at 854.\nWhile the time period for the filing of a charge is jurisdictional (Graves v. Chief Legal Counsel of the Department of Human Rights, 327 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296, 762 N.E.2d 722, 724 (2002)), the same does not necessarily hold true for that of filing of a response. Unlike the filing of a charge, \u201cthe filing of a verified response to a charge *** is not a procedural requisite for further proceedings under the Act.\u201d In re Ufford, 66 Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm\u2019n Rep. 1992SA0409, at 807 (September 29, 1994). Further, the Department has discretionary authority to refrain from issuing a notice of default if a respondent shows good cause for the delay. 775 ILCS 5/7A\u2014 102(B) (West 2002). We find that the time period for the filing of a verified response is statutory.\nWhile the 60-day period for filing a response is mandatory, its statutory nature requires that a mechanism be in place under which a petitioner may raise the issue before the Department. Otherwise, a petitioner is faced with forfeiture of the issue in later proceedings because she failed to so raise the issue where the Department fails to meet its statutory duties. See Wallace, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 569, 633 N.E.2d at 854.\nHere, the Department has failed to promulgate any rule providing such a vehicle for petitioners. However, the failure to enact a rule giving effect to a statute does not diminish an administrative agency\u2019s duties thereunder. The Department did not sua sponte reject DOC\u2019s late-filed verified response, nor did it act on petitioner\u2019s requests and later formal motion to strike the response and issue a notice to show cause, in derogation of the mandates of section 7A \u2014 102(B). See 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002). The Department indicated that it declined to address the motion because it was not a motion-entertaining body. The Department does not suggest that it issued DOC a notice to show cause or DOC provided good cause for the late filing; rather, it accepted DOC\u2019s late-filed response without either issuing any such notice or granting DOC leave to file a late response.\nWhile the Department may or may not have been required to actually rule on petitioner\u2019s motion, it was required to comply with the statute. Section 7A \u2014 102(B) is clear that the Department has no discretion to accept a late-filed verified response without a showing of good cause. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002). The Chief Legal Counsel\u2019s sustainment of the acceptance of DOC\u2019s verified response without such a showing was erroneous where it contravened legislative intent and exceeded the Department\u2019s statutory authority.\nThe Department contends that the above issue is irrelevant where petitioner failed to show good cause for not attending the fact-finding conference. Section 7A \u2014 102(B) of the Act requires that a petitioner be afforded 30 days to file a reply to a respondent\u2019s verified response. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002). Under the Act, \u201cclaimants have an opportunity to reply to the respondent\u2019s defenses and present reasons why claimant\u2019s charge should not be dismissed.\u201d Lemon v. Tucker, 695 F. Supp. 963, 970 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Where the fact-finding conference is the primary opportunity for a petitioner to support any arguments made in her reply, holding the conference before a reply is filed would lead to the absurd result of limiting a petitioner\u2019s opportunity to rebut a respondent\u2019s defenses and otherwise prove her case. The Department\u2019s interpretation of section 7A \u2014 102 of the Act essentially would give effect to subsection (C) addressing fact-finding conference procedures but would render a nullity the provisions of subsection (B) regarding the Department\u2019s duties as to late-filed verified responses.\nPetitioner\u2019s failure to attend the fact-finding conference does not relieve the Department of its duty to enforce the provisions of section 7A \u2014 102(B) requiring DOC to file its verified response within 60 days. The Department did not issue DOC a notice to show cause, even though 111 days elapsed before DOC filed its response. The Department has not cited any authority showing that it had the power to accept a late response except under the conditions of section 7A \u2014 102(B) of the Act. The gathering of evidence at a fact-finding conference would be meaningless where timely objection is made and DOC fails to show good cause for the late filing as all facts not timely denied are deemed admitted. 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(B) (West 2002).\nWe further reject the Department\u2019s argument that the Director would have considered DOC\u2019s failure to file its responsive pleading had petitioner attended the fact-finding conference. While the Department indicated that DOC\u2019s late filing would be given due \u201cweight\u201d in its investigative report, that report is to be considered by the Director only in determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the claim. See 775 ILCS 5/7A\u2014 102(D) (West 2002) (\u201cUpon review of the report, the Director shall determine whether there is substantial evidence that the alleged civil rights violation has been committed\u201d). We note also that the Department did not mention the report in its decision. Whether DOC filed a verified response within 60 days and whether the Department was required to issue a notice to show cause are matters of law.\nThe Department exceeded its statutory authority by unconditionally accepting DOC\u2019s verified response notwithstanding the failure to show good cause for failing to file it within the mandatory 60-day period. We direct the Chief Legal Counsel on remand to make a finding as to whether the DOC response was filed late for good cause.\nUnder the facts of this case, petitioner\u2019s failure to attend the fact-finding conference does not control the outcome of the instant matter. Ordinarily, failure to appear is an appropriate reason to dismiss a charge. Petitioner\u2019s counsel made no assertion in petitioner\u2019s appellate briefs that petitioner would forfeit her right to contest the lateness of the verified response if she attended the hearing. At oral argument, petitioner\u2019s counsel clearly stated that forfeiture would not apply. In not attending the conference, petitioner thus had nothing to gain by ignoring the Department\u2019s administrative authority and everything to lose in the subsequent dismissal of her claim. Under ordinary circumstances, the Department would have been fully justified in dismissing petitioner\u2019s action for failure to appear.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the Chief Legal Counsel\u2019s decision sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of petitioner\u2019s claim, reinstate petitioner\u2019s charge, and remand to the Chief Legal Counsel with instructions to determine whether there was good cause for failure to file a response and for further proceedings. Again, nothing in this order should be considered by petitioner as cause for not appearing at a proper hearing.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nKNECHT, EJ., and TURNER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sandra J. Holman (argued), of Illinois Education Association-NEA, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Leslye Jones-Beatty (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NANCY FERRARI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201403\u20140737\nArgued July 14, 2004.\nOpinion filed August 4, 2004.\nRehearing denied September 29, 2004.\nSandra J. Holman (argued), of Illinois Education Association-NEA, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Leslye Jones-Beatty (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "1099-01", "first_page_order": 1117, "last_page_order": 1126 }