{ "id": 5455527, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUDREY A. KLIMAWICZE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Klimawicze", "decision_date": "2004-08-17", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-3531", "first_page": "13", "last_page": "32", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 13" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Ill. App. 3d 960", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5147309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "968" }, { "page": "969" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/239/0960-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 N.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 Ill. App. 3d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871109 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/33/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2959864 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 1295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the evidence must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in the defendant's favor" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238453 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "the evidence must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in the defendant's favor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 N.E.2d 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2889133 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "265" }, { "page": "265" }, { "page": "265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" }, { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in the absence of any promise of leniency, the statement at most showed a desire to be released from custody; admission of prior consistent statements was harmless error and did not warrant reversal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201694 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71-72", "parenthetical": "in the absence of any promise of leniency, the statement at most showed a desire to be released from custody; admission of prior consistent statements was harmless error and did not warrant reversal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 983", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278448 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 869", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2555839 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349601 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "159" }, { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201150 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096637 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "an alleged trial error must be raised both at trial and in a posttrial motion or the issue is waived" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "an alleged trial error must be raised both at trial and in a posttrial motion or the issue is waived" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 N.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2639217 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "no error when the court allowed questions that tested the jurors' understanding of the law of accountability" }, { "page": "274-75", "parenthetical": "second degree murder jury instruction is not necessary when the evidence shows the provocation was slight or defendant retaliated disproportionately to the alleged provocation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5139949 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 995", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166591 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 979", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182763 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "986" }, { "page": "988-89" }, { "page": "989" }, { "page": "989" }, { "page": "989" }, { "page": "986", "parenthetical": "trial court does not abuse discretion by allowing questions that assure any bias would be discovered, but should not allow either side to use voir dire for the purpose of impaneling a jury with particular predispositions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 1318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3557191 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5253922 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "153-54", "parenthetical": "trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving same sentence to both defendants who were not similarly situated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767670 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 1011", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2991790 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "confronting defendant with his brother's implicating statement served as an intervening circumstance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35396 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "confronting defendant with his brother's implicating statement served as an intervening circumstance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 1303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5437021 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"It is an elementary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting arguments in support of it. This court will not research and argue a case for an appellant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 799", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5365742 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810", "parenthetical": "\"It is an elementary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting arguments in support of it. This court will not research and argue a case for an appellant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "codefendant's statement, which was found sufficiently reliable, provided probable cause to arrest defendant even though it was illegally obtained" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224-26", "parenthetical": "codefendant's statement, which was found sufficiently reliable, provided probable cause to arrest defendant even though it was illegally obtained" }, { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "\"admissions against penal interest may, by their very nature, possess inherent indicia of reliability\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461817 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" }, { "page": "159" }, { "page": "161-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847597 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" }, { "page": "790-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545221 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3255347 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486127 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 981", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3776980 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "884-85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4021795 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "this factor weighed in favor of attenuation where the defendant waived his rights six times" }, { "page": "86-87" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9639 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603-04" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "2261-62" }, { "page": "603-04" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "2261-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0590-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1477, "char_count": 44213, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7353224373216004e-07, "percentile": 0.7061998595284898 }, "sha256": "12bd0d9f0126f78e0534e714ce5824ec7b2bfc9e178c80befe4f656a9523b3a5", "simhash": "1:bbbd360f6f4bddf7", "word_count": 6958 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:06.765456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HOFFMAN and SOUTH, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUDREY A. KLIMAWICZE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Audrey Klimawicze was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, and home invasion. The trial court sentenced her to an extended term of 92 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and two concurrent 30-year sentences for the remaining counts of armed robbery and home invasion. On appeal, defendant challenged the legality of her arrest and the admission of her subsequent hand-written statement at trial. This court found the police lacked probable cause to justify defendant\u2019s arrest and remanded the matter to the trial court for an attenuation hearing. People v. Klimawicze, No. 1\u201400\u20143531 (2003) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). Following our instructions, the trial court made several factual findings and concluded defendant\u2019s statement was sufficiently attenuated from her illegal arrest.\nIn addition to appealing the trial court\u2019s finding regarding attenuation, defendant contends: (1) the trial court violated defendant\u2019s right to confront witnesses by allowing hearsay statements into evidence; (2) jury selection was fundamentally unfair because the State falsely educated the jury on the law of accountability during voir dire; (3) the prosecution improperly questioned defense witnesses about defendant\u2019s prior bad acts; (4) the prosecution improperly used prior consistent statements to bolster its witness\u2019s credibility; (5) the prosecution improperly asked defendant to comment on other witnesses\u2019 truthfulness; (6) the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on second degree murder; and (7) defendant\u2019s 92-year sentence was unfairly disproportionate. We affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentences.\nFACTS\nWe rely on the trial court\u2019s factual findings at the attenuation hearing. They are supported by the record.\nThe Chicago police found the partially burned body of Audrey V Klimawicze on August 2, 1997, in a garbage container located in the alley of the 3300 block of South Emerald Avenue. The victim had been stabbed and strangled. At 7:05 that evening, the police arrested defendant, who was the victim\u2019s daughter, and codefendant Hector Mercado.\nPolice questioned both defendant and codefendant Mercado at 9:30 p.m. on August 2, 1997, and they denied any knowledge of the crime. At 10 p.m., an eyewitness identified Mercado in a lineup as the man she saw pushing the garbage cart down the alley the previous evening. At 12:30 a.m. on August 3, 1997, police told Mercado he had been identified in the lineup. Mercado told police that defendant told him she had a fight with her mother and that she had stabbed her. Defendant and a man named Mario placed the victim in a garbage can behind her apartment building. Mercado admitted he later moved the can farther down the alley.\nAt 4 a.m. on August 3, 1997, taxi driver Joe Martinez told police he drove defendant and Mercado on August 2, 1997. Defendant told Martinez she had an argument with her mother and had stabbed her. According to Martinez, defendant said, \u201cThe bitch deserved it,\u201d and Mercado replied, \u201cYou\u2019re right. She deserved it. They can\u2019t prove a thing.\u201d\nAt 4:30 a.m., police advised defendant of her Miranda rights and confronted her with Mercado\u2019s and Martinez\u2019s statements. She told police she had an argument with her mother and that her mother pulled a knife on her. Defendant was able to take the knife away. When she told Mercado what happened, he took the knife, went to the victim\u2019s apartment, and stabbed her. According to defendant, Mercado placed her mother\u2019s body in the garbage container. Defendant gave the same version of the story when interviewed by police three hours later.\nAt 8:30 a.m., Mercado repeated his 12:30 a.m. statement. The police again confronted defendant with Mercado\u2019s and Martinez\u2019s statements. She gave the same statement as earlier and agreed to repeat her statement to Mercado.\nAfter listening to defendant, Mercado told police defendant had talked about killing her mother for three weeks. At 10:30 p.m. on July 31, 1997, defendant asked Mercado to accompany her to her mother\u2019s apartment so they could kill her. Mercado told police he refused but went down to the second-floor apartment when he heard a loud noise. He saw defendant stab her mother with a large knife several times. Over the next 20 hours, he used money defendant found in the victim\u2019s apartment to buy heroin. On August 1, 1997, he placed the victim in the garbage container and later pushed it down the alley.\nPolice then confronted defendant with Mercado\u2019s latest statement. Defendant repeated her earlier statements. At 4 p.m. defendant initiated a conversation with police. She reiterated her earlier statement but added Mercado did not return to their apartment on the night of August 1, 1997. On the morning of August 2, 1997, Mercado told defendant he had burned the garbage cart and police were investigating.\nAt 7:30 p.m. on August 3, 1997, defendant, after being informed of her rights, gave the same statement to Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Thomas Bilyk.\nAn hour later, Mercado gave Bilyk a different story. He said defendant told him she was going \u201cto do\u201d her mother. Defendant returned because her mother would not let her enter the apartment. Defendant then took a long black cord and Mercado took a hunting knife to the victim\u2019s apartment. Defendant kicked her mother and forced her way into the apartment. Mercado followed. Defendant then strangled the victim with the cord and instructed Mercado to stab her. He stabbed the victim three times while defendant continued to choke her. After taking money from the victim\u2019s apartment, they went to the projects to buy heroin and dispose of their weapons. The next day, Mercado placed the victim and a carpet into a garbage container from the alley. Later, they moved the container to the alley and set it on fire. He also said defendant told the cabdriver named Joe that she killed her mother.\nAt 9:15 p.m., defendant was confronted with Mercado\u2019s 8:30 p.m. statement. She expressed disbelief that Mercado made the statement; the police brought him into defendant\u2019s interview room. He told defendant, \u201cI told them the truth.\u201d Police escorted him from the room, and Bilyk informed defendant of her rights. She agreed to give a hand-written statement, which was later admitted at trial.\nThe testimony at trial, including the contents of defendant\u2019s handwritten statement, was summarized in our previous order. See Klimawicze, No. 1 \u2014 00\u20143531. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, armed robbery, and home invasion.\nDefendant waived her right to a jury trial to determine her eligibility for the death penalty. At sentencing, the court heard evidence in mitigation and aggravation and determined defendant and Mercado were eligible for the death penalty because the murder occurred during an armed robbery. Based on the mitigating evidence, the court declined to impose the death penalty. The court also considered imposing life sentences, saying a life sentence \u201cseems to be awfully appropriate.\u201d Instead, the court sentenced both defendants to 92 years\u2019 imprisonment based on the brutal nature of the murder. The court also imposed two concurrent 30-year terms for the armed robbery and home invasion convictions.\nDECISION\nI. Attenuation Analysis\nDefendant contends the trial court erred when it found her statement was attenuated from her illegal arrest.\nEvidence collected following an illegal arrest may be admissible if it is sufficiently attenuated from any illegality. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62 (1975). Courts use four factors in attenuation analysis: (1) the existence of Miranda warnings; (2) the proximity in time between the arrest and the statement; (3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (4) the flagrancy of police misconduct. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427, 95 S. Ct. at 2261-62; People v. Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d 82, 85, 809 N.E.2d 745 (2004). Typically, intervening circumstances and flagrancy of police misconduct are the two key factors in determining whether police exploited the illegal arrest to obtain a confession. People v. Willis, 344 Ill. App. 3d 868, 884-85, 801 N.E.2d 47 (2003), appeal allowed, 207 Ill. 2d 627, 807 N.E.2d 981 (2004); People v. Ollie, 333 Ill. App. 3d 971, 986, 777 N.E.2d 529 (2002). The prosecution bears the burden of showing the confession was not a product of the illegal arrest. People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 86, 554 N.E.2d 192 (1990).\nA trial court\u2019s decision regarding a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed de novo-, however, great deference is given to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, which will not be reversed unless they are found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502 (2004).\nA. Miranda warnings\nCourts have held that the presence of Miranda warnings alone will not purge the taint of an illegal arrest. Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 85. \u201cAlthough police cannot dissipate the taint of an illegal arrest simply by giving Miranda warnings, the presence of the warnings prior to interrogation carries some weight.\u201d Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 85 (this factor weighed in favor of attenuation where the defendant waived his rights six times). In this case, the trial court found defendant was given the Miranda warnings each time police questioned her. She waived those rights seven times. We agree with the trial court that this factor weighs in favor of attenuation.\nB. Proximity in time between arrest and confession\nThe length of time between the illegal arrest and a confession is an ambiguous attenuation factor.\n\u201c[W]here intervening circumstances are present, a long period between arrest and confession may support the inference that it was the intervening circumstance, and not the illegal arrest, which prompted the confession. However, where no intervening circumstances are present, a long and illegal detention may in itself impel the defendant to confess.\u201d People v. White, 117 Ill. 2d 194, 224, 512 N.E.2d 677 (1987).\nIn this case, we cannot determine whether the 27-hour period between defendant\u2019s arrest and her hand-written statement favors attenuation without determining whether there were intervening circumstances.\nC. Intervening circumstances\nIntervening circumstances are an important factor in attenuation because they break the causal connection between unconstitutional police conduct and a confession. Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 86-87. \u201cIntervening circumstances support attenuation when they are capable of inducing a voluntary desire to confess.\u201d Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 86; People v. Austin, 293 Ill. App. 3d 784, 788, 688 N.E.2d 740 (1997).\nIn this case, the court found Mercado\u2019s and Martinez\u2019s statements, which occurred before all but one of defendant\u2019s statements, were intervening circumstances for two reasons. First, the statements provided the police with probable cause they previously lacked to arrest defendant. Second, the statements \u201csparked the desire of the defendant to confess voluntarily.\u201d\n1. Intervening probable cause\n\u201cIntervening acquisition of probable cause is \u2018an important factor in the attenuation analysis,\u2019 even though it does not always assure the police did not exploit a fourth amendment violation.\u201d Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 87, quoting People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137, 158, 809 N.E.2d 377 (2004) overruled in part, Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512-13 (overruled Morris to the extent it was inconsistent with the standard of review set forth in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996)). In Morris, our supreme court explained why intervening probable cause weighs heavily in favor of attenuation, rather than application of the exclusionary rule: \u201c[I]t would place an unreasonable burden on the police *** to release an illegally arrested defendant and then, based on probable cause obtained after the illegal arrest, arrest him again when he reached the sidewalk.\u201d Morris, 209 Ill. 2d at 159.\nA codefendant\u2019s statement can constitute intervening probable cause and serve as an attenuating circumstance if it is legally obtained and reliable. Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 88; see also People v. James, 118 Ill. 2d 214, 224-26, 514 N.E.2d 998 (1987) (codefendant\u2019s statement, which was found sufficiently reliable, provided probable cause to arrest defendant even though it was illegally obtained).\nIn this case, Mercado\u2019s statement meets both requirements. Although Mercado challenged his arrest before trial, he was unsuccessful and did not raise the issue again on appeal. Based on the record, we have no reason to doubt the legality of Mercado\u2019s arrest. Second, Mercado\u2019s statement was sufficiently reliable. The details of his statement were corroborated by Martinez\u2019s statement and the physical evidence. Additionally, Mercado\u2019s statement was against his penal interest because he admitted helping defendant dispose of the victim\u2019s body. See generally James, 118 Ill. 2d at 223 (\u201cadmissions against penal interest may, by their very nature, possess inherent indicia of reliability\u201d).\nWhile Mercado\u2019s statement supports intervening probable cause, we need not rely on it exclusively. Martinez\u2019s statement that defendant admitted stabbing her mother also provides intervening probable cause and weighs in favor of attenuation.\nWe do not examine the legality of Martinez\u2019s detention because defendant failed to sufficiently raise the issue in her brief. Defendant simply stated Martinez was detained without probable cause without arguing specific facts and applicable law. Bare contentions lacking sufficient legal argument do not warrant our consideration. In re Estate of Divine, 263 Ill. App. 3d 799, 810, 635 N.E.2d 581 (1994) (\u201cIt is an elementary rule of appellate practice that an appellant may not make a point merely by stating it without presenting arguments in support of it. This court will not research and argue a case for an appellant\u201d). For purposes of this appeal, we assume no error in Martinez\u2019s detention.\n2. Confronting defendant with Mercado\u2019s and Martinez\u2019s statements\n\u201cWhen police confront a defendant in custody with evidence police obtained legally, the evidence may attenuate the connection between an illegal arrest and the defendant\u2019s subsequent statements.\u201d People v. Clay, 349 Ill. App. 3d 517, 524 (2004); People v. Jennings, 296 Ill. App. 3d 761, 766, 695 N.E.2d 1303 (1998).\nIn Wilberton, the police confronted defendant with another suspect\u2019s statement implicating defendant in a fatal shooting. The defendant did not challenge the legality of the other suspect\u2019s arrest. This court held the suspect\u2019s statement not only gave police probable cause, it served as an intervening circumstance when the police confronted defendant with it. Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 89; see also People v. Wright, 294 Ill. App. 3d 606, 613, 691 N.E.2d 94 (1998) (confronting defendant with his brother\u2019s implicating statement served as an intervening circumstance).\nIn Austin, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 790-91, and People v. Beamon, 255 Ill. App. 3d 63, 70, 572 N.E.2d 1011 (1993), this court held that confronting a defendant with incriminating statements made against him by others does not serve as an intervening circumstance if those statements were made by someone who also was arrested illegally.\nIn this case, before defendant gave her second statement at 4:30 a.m. on August 3, 1997, police confronted defendant with two statements by Mercado and Martinez implicating her in the crime. Unlike Austin and Beamon, Mercado\u2019s and Martinez\u2019s statements were not fruits of illegal arrests. The trial judge properly found confrontation of defendant with these incriminating statements, rather than her illegal arrest, sparked her desire to voluntarily give a statement. At that point, neither her statement nor those of Mercado and Martinez were tainted by the illegal arrest. The causal chain was broken, and the police were free to use the statements, including defendant\u2019s subsequent statements, in their continuing interrogations. These additional statements and confrontations by Mercado, which were not tainted by the illegal arrest, became additional intervening circumstances. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of attenuation.\nDefendant contends Mercado\u2019s and Martinez\u2019s statements cannot be considered intervening circumstances because they resulted from defendant\u2019s illegal custody. We find the facts do not support this contention.\nMercado and defendant gave their first statements to police at 9:30 p.m. on August 2, 1997. Both denied any knowledge of or involvement in the crime. Mercado did not incriminate defendant until 12:30 the next morning, after police told him he had been identified in the lineup. Contrary to defendant\u2019s allegation, there is no evidence that police told Mercado about defendant\u2019s initial denial to get his 12:30 a.m. statement.\nInstead, we conclude Mercado\u2019s 12:30 a.m. statement was the result of police confronting him with his lineup identification, and not defendant\u2019s initial denial or the fact Mercado knew defendant was in police custody.\nWe also disagree with defendant\u2019s contention that Martinez\u2019s statement was a product of defendant\u2019s illegal arrest. Although defendant contends police would not have independently discovered Martinez absent her statements, this contention is not supported by the facts. Detective Patrick McDonald testified the police learned Martinez\u2019s cab number through defendant\u2019s half-sister Bonnie Gentile and her uncle. Although Gentile testified she did not see defendant leave in a cab, she did see a cab waiting for defendant in front of their apartment building. Accordingly, we cannot conclude Gentile\u2019s testimony disproves McDonald\u2019s testimony regarding the source of information about Martinez. Likewise, we find nothing to support defendant\u2019s contention that Martinez knew defendant had been arrested or that he gave his statement to police based on that knowledge.\nD. Flagrancy of Police Misconduct\nThe presence of purposeful and flagrant police misconduct weighs against attenuation. Wilberton, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 89. \u201cPolice action is flagrant where the investigation is carried out in such a manner as to cause surprise, fear, and confusion, or where it otherwise has a \u2018quality of purposefulness,\u2019 i.e., where the police embark upon a course of illegal conduct in the hope that some incriminating evidence (such as the very statement obtained) might be found.\u201d Jennings, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 765, citing Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d at 86.\nHere, the trial court found no evidence of flagrant police misconduct:\n\u201cThe police did not mistreat the defendant during her detention and provided food, drink, opportunities to use the bathroom facilities, and she was left alone in the interview room from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. the next day. She was not incessantly interrogated and was given plenty of time to ponder her situation.\u201d\nNothing in the record persuades us the trial court\u2019s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant contends police misconduct was flagrant in this case because of their method of interrogation, \u201cplaying three people *** against one another.\u201d Although the police interrogation strategy was purposeful, we do not believe it was done for the purpose of exploiting illegality. The first time detectives confronted defendant with Mercado\u2019s statement, or Mercado with defendant\u2019s statement, occurred after the intervening probable cause arose. Even before that point, the facts do not suggest police were unreasonable in their belief that they had sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant. See generally Morris, 209 Ill. 2d at 161-62.\nII. Confrontation Clause\nDefendant contends the prosecution violated her sixth amendment rights by making numerous references to Martinez\u2019s statement to police, especially during Officer Coughlin\u2019s testimony. Officer Coughlin testified about confronting defendant with Martinez\u2019s statement and that Martinez told the police defendant had admitted stabbing her mother.\nBefore Coughlin testified, the State called Martinez as a witness. Martinez testified that defendant told him she stabbed her mother. Defense counsel cross-examined Martinez thoroughly regarding the statement he gave police and focused on the circumstances of his interrogation.\nBefore a testimonial out-of-court statement can be admitted against a criminal defendant, the State must show the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 203, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004).\nHere, Martinez testified and was cross-examined by defendant\u2019s attorney. We find no sixth amendment violation of defendant\u2019s confrontation rights with regard to Martinez\u2019s testimony.\nNext, defendant challenges the prosecution\u2019s repeated references to Mercado\u2019s multiple statements to police. At trial, Detective Danzl testified he told defendant that Mercado had given police a \u201cdifferent story.\u201d Both Detective Danzl and Asistant State\u2019s Attorney Bilyk testified that Mercado was brought into defendant\u2019s interview room. Mercado then told defendant that he had given police \u201cthe true story.\u201d Although the substance of Mercado\u2019s story was not admitted into evidence, defendant contends she was prejudiced by the State\u2019s references to his statements.\nDefendant relies heavily on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968), to support her contention. In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held a criminal defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses is violated when a codefendant\u2019s incriminating statement is admitted into evidence during a joint trial.\nThis case differs from Bruton in two ways: (1) defendant\u2019s and Mercado\u2019s jury trials were severed; and (2) the substance of Mercado\u2019s statement was not admitted during defendant\u2019s trial.\nPeople v. Fauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d 140, 147, 586 N.E.2d 292 (1991), is very similar to this case. In Fauntleroy, the State introduced evidence that a codefendant told the defendant during the course of interrogation, \u201c \u2018 \u201cTell the truth, I did.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Flauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 145. The defendant and codefendant were tried by severed juries and convicted. On appeal, the defendant contended the codefendant\u2019s statement, admitted through the assistant State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s testimony, violated his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses. This court found no violation under Bruton, because the trials were severed and the substance of codefendant\u2019s statement was not admitted. The court said:\n\u201cIllinois cases have repeatedly held that where the substance of a codefendant\u2019s statement is not revealed, an officer may properly testify concerning investigatory procedures, even though the jury can reasonably infer therefrom that the accomplice implicated the defendant. [Citation.]\nIn rejecting defendant\u2019s contention, we recognize that [the codefendant\u2019s] statement to [the defendant] \u2018to tell the truth\u2019 is the statement of a nontestifying codefendant which carries with it a strong inference of implication. We believe, however, that its admission was not error as it was offered for the nonhearsay purpose of showing the jury the circumstances surrounding [the defendant\u2019s] confession and the effect [the codefendant\u2019s] presence and his \u2018truth\u2019 remark had on [the defendant].\u201d Fauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 147.\nDefendant contends we should follow People v. Campbell, 115 Ill. App. 3d 631, 450 N.E.2d 1318 (1983). In that case, the State introduced evidence that a codefendant implicated the defendant in a robbery. The defendants\u2019 trials were severed and the substance of the codefendant\u2019s statement was not used. The prosecutor argued the jury should infer the codefendant implicated defendant in the crime, because police arrested the defendant shortly after speaking with the codefendant. The court determined evidence regarding the codefendant\u2019s statements to police was used solely for the purpose of convincing the jury to convict on the basis the codefendant implicated the defendant in the crime. Campbell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 637.\nHere, the State had another reason for using Mercado\u2019s statements to police: the prosecution was explaining why defendant decided to confess, thereby bolstering the reliability of her confession. Following Fauntleroy, we find defendant\u2019s sixth amendment rights were not violated by the way the State referred to Mercado\u2019s statements.\nIII. Jury Selection\nDefendant raises three challenges related to voir dire. First, defendant contends the trial court improperly allowed the State to question potential jurors about the law of accountability and their ability to apply it. Second, defendant contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to ask the venire members whether they would feel sympathy toward defendant because she was a woman and a mother. Third, defendant contends the trial court improperly denied defense counsel\u2019s request to question potential jurors about their familiarity with articles on false confessions, which defendant contends would have uncovered any potential bias on the issue of police misconduct.\n\u201c \u2018The purpose of the voir dire examination is to assure selection of an impartial jury; it is not to be used as a means of indoctrinating a jury, or impaneling a jury with a particular predisposition.\u2019 \u201d People v. Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d 979, 986, 670 N.E.2d 852 (1996), quoting People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 64, 488 N.E.2d 995 (1986). The scope of questions allowed on voir dire is left to the trial judge\u2019s \u201cbroad discretion.\u201d Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 988-89; People v. Dow, 240 Ill. App. 3d 392, 396, 608 N.E.2d 259 (1992).\nIn Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 989, this court held potential jurors may be given a \u201cbrief and fair summary of accountability principles\u201d and asked if they could apply those principles to the case. The court said such questions served the purpose of voir dire, \u201c \u2018to discern fundamental bias or misperception of the prospective jurors.\u2019 \u201d Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 989, quoting People v. Nunn, 184 Ill. App. 3d 253, 273, 541 N.E.2d 182 (1989).\nWe find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to ask jurors, \u201cDo you understand under the law of accountability, that someone may be found accountable or responsible for the actions of another?\u201d See Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 989, citing Nunn, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 273 (no error when the court allowed questions that tested the jurors\u2019 understanding of the law of accountability).\nNext, defendant contends on appeal the court erred in allowing the prosecution to probe the venire regarding any sympathies they might have towards defendant based on her gender or motherhood. Defendant contends the question may have \u201cunfairly conveyed the subliminal message that sympathy toward the deceased was acceptable.\u201d Defendant failed to object to this question at trial or in her posttrial motion. As a result, the issue is waived. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988) (an alleged trial error must be raised both at trial and in a posttrial motion or the issue is waived). Waiver aside, we see no danger of the prosecution\u2019s question rousing sympathy for the victim, who also was a mother.\nThird, we find the trial court acted within its discretion by preventing the defense from asking the following question during voir dire: \u201c[H]as anybody read any articles in the newspaper, a series of articles recently about people that have been convicted of crimes and have given confessions and confessions were later found to be not true?\u201d This question was directed at the venire\u2019s knowledge of newspaper articles discussing false confessions rather than uncovering any bias toward police misconduct. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing it. See Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 986 (trial court does not abuse discretion by allowing questions that assure any bias would be discovered, but should not allow either side to use voir dire for the purpose of impaneling a jury with particular predispositions).\nIV \u201cPrior Bad Acts\u201d Testimony\nDefendant contends trial error occurred when the State questioned defendant, her father, and defendant\u2019s half-sister about \u201cprior bad acts.\u201d\nThe admissibility of evidence is a matter left to the trial court\u2019s discretion. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991). The decision to admit evidence will be overturned only if we find an abuse of discretion which manifestly prejudiced the defendant. People v. Sutton, 316 Ill. App. 3d 874, 891, 739 N.E.2d 543 (2000); Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364; People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 441-42, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988).\nGenerally, evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible unless it is offered for a specific relevant purpose, such as modus operandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. People v. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159, 722 N.E.2d 749 (1999). Courts must weigh the probative value of any evidence against its prejudicial effect. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 365.\nDefendant challenges two questions the State asked about her drug purchases: (1) the State cross-examined defendant\u2019s father and asked, \u201cAnd were you aware, sir, that [defendant] and Mercado would go to the projects to buy narcotics?\u201d and (2) the prosecution asked defendant, \u201cAnd at that time, you were using public aid money for [your daughter] to buy drugs?\u201d\nThe State contends these questions were proper because they established defendant\u2019s motive to kill her mother: her need for money to buy drugs. In some cases, evidence of the defendant\u2019s drug use can be admitted to show motive; however, the State has the burden of showing both that the defendant lacked financial resources and that the defendant was addicted to narcotics. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 159. In Maounis, this court determined the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of the defendant\u2019s drug use to establish motive for armed robbery where the State failed to show he needed money or was an addict. Maounis, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 159. There, the admission of the evidence constituted prejudicial error.\nHere, defendant was not prejudiced by the State\u2019s questions about her drug use, although neither question should have been asked. First, the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the question asked of her father, and the witness did not answer the question. We find no prejudice occurred.\nThe second challenged question to defendant is different. There, defendant did answer the prosecutor\u2019s question regarding her use of public aid to buy drugs. Considering the State had already offered evidence that defendant used the victim\u2019s money to buy drugs, the question about her use of public aid was more unfairly prejudicial than probative. Although we conclude the question was improper, we do not believe it was harmful enough to constitute reversible error.\nDefendant also contends she was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor asked her half-sister about prior arguments between defendant and their mother. When the State called defendant\u2019s half-sister Bonnie Gentile as a rebuttal witness, the following exchange occurred:\n\u201c[ASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY]: Bonnie, if I can draw your attention to July and August of 1997, had you ever been in your mother and [defendant\u2019s] presence when they were arguing?\n[GENTILE]: Yes\n[ASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY]: Were they ordinary arguments?\n[GENTILE]: No.\u201d\nAt that point, defense counsel objected to use of the word \u201cordinary,\u201d and the court sustained the objection.\nThe State contends Gentile\u2019s questioning was necessary to impeach defendant\u2019s testimony as to the substance and severity of the arguments with her mother. Defendant contends the State improperly used collateral matter to impeach defendant.\nAt trial, defendant did not object to the question on the basis of relevancy. Instead, defense counsel specifically objected to the form of the question.\nAlthough the question was improper, we find no unfair prejudice because the trial court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection. We conclude the improper questioning did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.\nV Improper Cross-Examination of Defendant Regarding Veracity of Other Witnesses\nDefendant contends the prosecution denied her a fair trial by repeatedly asking defendant about the veracity of the State\u2019s witnesses.\n\u201cAlthough asking the defendant\u2019s opinion of the veracity of other witnesses has been condemned [citations], the practice generally has not, by itself, been held reversible [citation].\u201d People v. Nwadiei, 207 Ill. App. 3d 869, 876, 566 N.E.2d 470 (1990). In Nwadiei, the prosecuting attorney asked the defendant 23 questions about the veracity of six of the State\u2019s witnesses. Defense counsel did not object to the questions, and the defendant answered them. This court found the extensiveness of the improper questioning constituted reversible error.\nIn this case, the State improperly asked defendant: (1) whether Martinez misheard her or lied about what she told him; (2) whether the assistant State\u2019s Attorney \u201cmade up\u201d facts about defendant\u2019s relationship with her mother; and (3) whether the assistant State\u2019s Attorney \u201cmade up\u201d parts of defendant\u2019s written statement.\nAlthough the prosecuting attorney\u2019s questions were improper, they are not so pervasive as to warrant reversal in this case. Additionally, unlike in Nwadiei, the trial court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objections each time the prosecutor asked the offending questions\u2014 defendant did not answer. We do not find reversible error.\nVI. Martinez\u2019s Prior Consistent Statements\nDefendant contends the prosecution committed reversible error by questioning Martinez about his prior consistent statements to police, which defendant contends improperly bolstered Martinez\u2019s credibility.\nPrior consistent statements cannot be used to corroborate a witness\u2019s testimony on direct examination, but they can be used to rebut an inference that the witness\u2019s testimony was recently fabricated or the witness was motivated to testify falsely if the inference arose after the consistent statements were made. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 227, 588 N.E.2d 983 (1991).\nIn this case, both parties questioned Martinez about the statements he made to police. On direct, Martinez\u2019s testimony included detailed facts which, as defense counsel pointed out through cross-examination, were not included in his -written statement to police.\nOn redirect examination, the State asked Martinez about some of the oral statements he made to police officers, but none of these questions covered the damaging statements the defendant purportedly made about the killing of her mother.\nThe State also asked Martinez if his testimony was the same as his prior statements, and the court sustained all but one of defense counsel\u2019s objections. The following question was allowed:\n\u201c[ASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY]: You have never changed the story you have told to the police from the beginning right?\n[MARTINEZ]: Right.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.\n[THE COURT]: *** I will allow the answer to stand. Let\u2019s proceed.\u201d\nMartinez testified the police detectives several times told him they were going to charge him as an \u201caccessory after the fact,\u201d which Martinez understood to mean he would be put in jail. However, Martinez never specified when he was threatened. Was it before his oral statement or after his oral statement but before the written statement? We cannot tell. He did say that after making his statement, the police did not charge him with a crime or take away his taxi.\nBased on this record, we cannot say whether Martinez\u2019s alleged motive to fabricate his testimony \u2014 police coercion \u2014 occurred before, during or after his oral statement to police. The oral statement was the first statement he gave and is the statement the State used to rehabilitate Martinez after cross-examination. Even if police threatened to charge Martinez with a crime before he made his statements, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 71-72, 520 N.E.2d 332 (1988) (in the absence of any promise of leniency, the statement at most showed a desire to be released from custody; admission of prior consistent statements was harmless error and did not warrant reversal).\nVII. Jury Instruction on Second Degree Murder\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by denying her request to give the jury an instruction on second degree murder.\nAlthough jury instructions are left to the trial court\u2019s discretion, the court abuses its discretion if there is some evidence to support the instruction and the court fails to give it. People v. Castillo, 188 Ill. 2d 536, 540, 723 N.E.2d 274 (1999). A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser offense if there is \u201cslight\u201d evidence to support it, even though defendant\u2019s own testimony contradicts it. Castillo, 188 Ill. 2d at 540; People v. Jefferson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 258, 265, 628 N.E.2d 925 (1993). An instruction is not warranted if it is \u201cbased on the merest factual reference or witness comment.\u201d Jefferson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 265. An instruction on second degree murder is not necessary in every case where the victim is alleged to have provoked the defendant. Jefferson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 265. \u201cInstead, sufficient evidence must exist that at the time of the killing, the defendant was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed.\u201d Jefferson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 265-66; People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 156, 565 N.E.2d 1295 (1990) (the evidence must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in the defendant\u2019s favor).\nHere, the only evidence of any provocation on the victim\u2019s part was Martinez\u2019s statement. Martinez testified, \u201c[Defendant] said she got into an argument with her mother and that her mother pulled a knife out on her and that she took the knife away from her mother and she stabbed her with it.\u201d Defendant contends his statement is evidence that the victim\u2019s use of a knife during an argument incited a sudden and intense passion within defendant, which provoked her to choke and stab her mother repeatedly.\nMartinez\u2019s statement is not enough to justify the second degree murder instruction. When defendant testified, she said she only told Martinez that Mercado had killed her mother, with no mention of her mother pulling a knife. More importantly, no other evidence supported the theory defendant stabbed her mother due to a serious provocation.\nEven if the jury could reasonably believe what defendant told Martinez, the instruction would not be proper. According to Martinez, defendant said she disarmed her mother. There was no mutual combat \u2014 only an argument. In turn, defendant stabbed her mother three times and choked her with an electrical cord. This degree of retaliation is disproportionate to the alleged provocation and would not justify the second degree murder instruction. See Nunn, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 274-75 (second degree murder jury instruction is not necessary when the evidence shows the provocation was slight or defendant retaliated disproportionately to the alleged provocation). We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on second degree murder.\nVIII. Excessive Sentencing\nDefendant contends her extended 92-year prison term for first degree murder was unfair and excessive because Mercado received the same sentence. Defendant contends that, unlike Mercado, she has no criminal record and greater rehabilitative potential.\nTrial courts are given great deference when making sentencing decisions. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 379. If a sentence falls within the statutory guidelines, it will not be disturbed on review unless it constitutes an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion (Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 379) and it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the case (People v. Nussbaum, 251 Ill. App. 3d 779, 783, 623 N.E.2d 755 (1993)).\nAn abuse of discretion might also occur when two codefendants receive the same sentence, despite having different criminal records or roles in the particular crime, and have different mitigating and aggravating factors. People v. Stambor, 33 Ill. App. 3d 324, 326, 337 N.E.2d 63 (1975).\n\u201c[T]he factors which normally should be uppermost in the mind of the trial court during the sentencing process should be (1) the nature of the particular crime; (2) the role of the defendant in committing the crime (such as who instigated it and what each party did in connection with the crime); and (3) the history and character of defendant, including age, prior record, family situation, employment and other related factors.\u201d Stambor, 33 Ill. App. 3d at 326.\nAbsent an abuse of discretion, this court will not alter a sentence on appeal simply because we might have weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors differently. People v. Cord, 239 Ill. App. 3d 960, 968, 607 N.E.2d 574 (1993). Furthermore, the rehabilitative potential of the defendant is not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense, the protection of the public, and punishment. Cord, 239 Ill. App. 3d at 969.\nIn this case, the trial court focused on the nature of the crime, the facts and method of the killing, including burning the body in a garbage container. The court described the crime as brutal and heinous. The court also found defendant\u2019s role in the crime egregious because the victim was her 64-year-old mother. The court said:\n\u201cMurdering, in [defendant\u2019s] behalf, murdering your mother. The murder itself, going to the facts, where choking enough to break the cartilage in the neck, the stabbing three or four times. It\u2019s obvious that two people were involved in this and it\u2019s obvious that you both were.\u201d\nThe court also reviewed the mitigation evidence. The trial judge noted defendant was younger than Mercado, was the mother of a small child, and had no previous criminal history.\nWhen addressing Mercado, the court said it found the pending attempted murder charge had more significance than his previous narcotics-related felony. The court also commented both defendants were \u201cmodel inmates\u201d and \u201cboth were active participants in this murder that occurred.\u201d\nThe court found both defendants eligible for the death penalty because the murder was a felony murder. After reviewing all the mitigation evidence, the court declined to impose the death penalty or a life sentence and instead chose to sentence both defendants to extended terms of 92 years\u2019 imprisonment for first degree murder.\nThe record clearly shows the court relied on the important factors given in Stambor. The trial court focused particularly on the brutal nature of the crime and defendant\u2019s role in committing the murder. In addition to the trial court\u2019s comments at sentencing, we note the evidence at trial indicated defendant instigated the attack against her mother. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the same sentence to both defendants, even though the mitigating factors for defendant and Mercado differed. See Fauntleroy, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 153-54 (trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving same sentence to both defendants who were not similarly situated).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the above stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN and SOUTH, JJ., concur.\ndefendant and Mercado were tried at the same time, but before separate juries.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emily Eisner, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, John E. Nowak, and Janet Powers Doyle, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUDREY A. KLIMAWICZE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201400\u20143531\nOpinion filed August 17, 2004.\nRehearing denied September 23, 2004.\nEdwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emily Eisner, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, John E. Nowak, and Janet Powers Doyle, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0013-01", "first_page_order": 31, "last_page_order": 50 }