{ "id": 5458457, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOANNE Y. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Phillips", "decision_date": "2004-10-14", "docket_number": "Nos. 3-00-0510, 3-00-0511 cons.", "first_page": "867", "last_page": "873", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 867" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602986 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "729 N.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229724 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" }, { "page": "137-38" }, { "page": "137-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 N.E.2d 1205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1210" }, { "page": "1214-15" }, { "page": "1215" }, { "page": "1209" }, { "page": "1215" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462898 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220-21" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "221" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "759 N.E.2d 946", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "948-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281436 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0157-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 612, "char_count": 14002, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0296536929071762e-07, "percentile": 0.7464145593044228 }, "sha256": "54d89ec8e25751cfcac98677a7dab54605c586ab3b0c337ce5827f0fce1a46cc", "simhash": "1:ba12d803e7b7285c", "word_count": 2284 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:06.765456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HOLDRIDGE, EJ., and LYTTON, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOANNE Y. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McDAJDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis matter is before us once again pursuant to a supervisory order of the Illinois Supreme Court directing this court to vacate its earlier judgment (People v. Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d 157, 759 N.E.2d 946 (2001)) and to reconsider its decision in light of People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 802 N.E.2d 1205 (2003), to determine if a different result is warranted.\nThe prior decision of this court affirmed the conviction by jury of Joanne Y. Phillips for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998)), unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1998)), and driving while license suspended (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303) (West 1998)). Defendant was sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment on the charge of possession with intent to deliver. The second conviction for possession of a controlled substance was vacated; defendant was sentenced to time served on the cannabis charge; and a conviction was entered on the suspended license charge. The sentence was also affirmed by this court.\nAt the trial of Joanne Phillips, the State had presented, by stipulation, laboratory reports establishing the contents, identity and weight of the controlled substances found in defendant\u2019s car at the time of her arrest. Defendant\u2019s attorney stipulated to their admission and defendant herself voiced no objection either when the reports were admitted without testimony of a laboratory technician or when the prosecutor alluded to them in the State\u2019s opening statement and closing argument. On appeal, defendant relied heavily on the recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000), striking down as unconstitutional a statute that provided for the admission of hearsay laboratory reports with only an affidavit unless the defendant objected. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 15 (West 1998). The court held that the statute impermissibly requires a defendant to take a procedural step to secure his constitutional right of confrontation and does not require a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of this right. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 140, 729 N.E.2d at 478.\nIn so holding, the supreme court said:\n\u201cIn the absence of this statute, the State would have to secure a knowing waiver of the confrontation right by acquiring a defendant\u2019s stipulation to allow the lab report into evidence without the testimony of the report\u2019s preparer. Unlike section 115 \u2014 15, these stipulations properly require a defendant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to waive his right to confront the preparer of the report.\u201d McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137-38.\nRelying on the quoted language, Phillips had argued that her sixth amendment right of confrontation had been violated because she was not given an opportunity to personally make a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right.\nBased on that same language, the defendant in People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 802 N.E.2d 1205 (2003), had argued in his case that any waiver of the right of confrontation must be a knowing waiver made by the defendant personally. The court responded to that contention by Campbell, saying:\n\u201cWe decline to read McClanahan so broadly. Contrary to defendant\u2019s interpretation of McClanahan, this court has never held that only a defendant can waive his sixth amendment right of confrontation. In fact, this court has never directly addressed the issue of whether defense counsel may waive a defendant\u2019s right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence.\u201d Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 212, 802 N.E.2d at 1210.\nIn Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 161, 759 N.E.2d at 948-49, this court distinguished the defendant\u2019s situation from that of McClanahan, noting, first, that, unlike McClanahan, Phillips had not objected to the stipulation and concluding, second, that her consent to the stipulation could be reasonably inferred from her failure to object. The court then held that because the reports were admitted pursuant to stipulation and not pursuant to the provisions of the unconstitutional statute, Phillips\u2019s argument that she was denied her sixth amendment right to confront witnesses must fail.\nIn People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 802 N.E.2d 1205 (2003), the supreme court considered a stipulation apparently agreed to by counsel without any evidence of consultation with or consent by the defendant. Unlike in McClanahan and Phillips, the stipulation concerned certain facts set forth in a statement that would have been testified to at trial but for the unavailability of the witness. It is not clear that the State could have secured a conviction without that testimony. At the time the stipulation was entered into, the trial judge had said the case would be dismissed if the witness could not be produced, and the jury had been selected and had heard testimony so jeopardy had attached. Nonetheless the majority found there was value to defendant in some aspects of the statement of the missing witness and therefore an agreement to stipulate was a matter of sound trial tactics and strategy. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 220, 802 N.E.2d at 1214-15.\nRejecting Campbell\u2019s reliance on McClanahan as based on a faulty interpretation, the court undertook a lengthy survey and evaluation of the existing decisions concerning who can appropriately waive a defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to be actually confronted by the witnesses against him or her. The Campbell court then held:\n\u201cFor the foregoing reasons, then, we hold that counsel in a criminal case may waive his client\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as the defendant does not object to or dissent from his attorney\u2019s decision, and where the decision to stipulate is a matter of legitimate trial tactics or prudent trial strategy. Where the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant or where the State\u2019s entire case is to be presented by stipulation, we find that a defendant must be personally admonished about the stipulation and must personally agree to the stipulation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 220-21, 802 N.E.2d at 1215.\nBecause Campbell had not objected and the court concluded that there were legitimate trial tactics or prudent strategic reasons for agreeing to the stipulation, Campbell\u2019s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses was appropriately waived by his counsel and not by him.\nThe supreme court has now advised us that Campbell, not Mc-Clanahan, is its seminal consideration of and decision on the issue of who can waive a defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation. Accordingly, we reanalyze Joanne Phillips\u2019s appeal once again.\nWe begin with the language of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, which states, in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him; *** and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. VI.\nSimilar language can be found in article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution, providing, in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel; *** [and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her ***.\u201d HI. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8.\nIt is clear from the plain language that the right is the defendant\u2019s. It also may be reasonably inferred that the attorney assisting with the defense may be authorized by the defendant to exercise the right on his or her behalf. We do not find anything in Campbell that suggests a contrary conclusion.\nIndeed, the Campbell court discussed its decision in People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41, 604 N.E.2d 275 (1992), in which it held:\n\u201c[T]here are four decisions that ultimately belong to the defendant in a criminal case after consultation with his attorney: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify in his own behalf; and (4) whether to appeal. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54. This court then stated that:\n\u2018Beyond these four decisions, however, trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also include the defense to be presented at trial.\u2019 Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d at 54.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 210, 802 N.E.2d at 1209.\nConstruing the fundamental constitutional right in conjunction with the supreme court\u2019s decision in Campbell, we conclude that in order to waive the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence, there must be some affirmative showing or indication by the defendant in the record that he or she did not object to or dissent from the attorney\u2019s decision to stipulate. In trying to determine what is necessary to find that \u201cthe defendant does not object to or dissent from his attorney\u2019s decision\u201d (Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 221, 802 N.E.2d at 1215), we refer again to McClanahan:\n\u201cUnlike section 115 \u2014 15, these stipulations properly require a defendant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to waive his right to confront the preparer of the report.\u201d McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137-38, 729 N.E.2d at 478.\nWe conclude from that language \u2014 as well as that previously quoted from Campbell and from Ramey \u2014 that the requirement of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver is inherent in defendant\u2019s election not to object to stipulating and that there needs to be some evidence in the record that defendant knowingly waived. That is to say that he or she was advised of the right to confront witnesses and of the nature and legal impact of waiving that right through the proposed stipulation, and either concurred with or objected to it.\nAccording to Campbell, whether that advice is given to her in the form of admonishments by the court or simply information from her attorney depends on the nature of the evidence that is the subject of the stipulation. In the case of Joanne Phillips, it is lab reports that prove that the substance in her possession was, in fact, contraband and that she possessed it in a sufficient amount to establish intent to deliver.\nThe standard that would require admonishments by the court was stated in Campbell as being i\u00a3[w]here the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant or where the State\u2019s entire case is to be presented by stipulation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 221. There is quite obviously in this case no such \u201cstatement\u201d because the need for one was unknown to the parties. While the stipulated evidence is clearly data without which defendant could not be convicted, something more is needed. She cannot be convicted without evidence that the drugs were in her possession and that they were properly seized. Inasmuch as the State presented other witnesses in support of its charge, it is clear that the State\u2019s entire case was not presented by stipulation. Judicial admonishments do not, therefore, appear to be mandated in this case.\nWith regard to advice from her attorney, a review of the record in the present case discloses nothing that demonstrates (or even suggests) that the attorney explained to Phillips what decisions were generally made by him absent her objection or, more specifically, what a stipulation is and its legal impact, what he intended to stipulate to, and what the implications were of stipulating to the specific data in the lab reports. A failure to provide the defendant with that basic information deprives her of a meaningful opportunity to make a reasoned objection. Nor is there any representation by the attorney to the court that he discussed these matters with his client and she did not object. In a situation such as the one suggested by nothing more than the absence of an objection in the instant record, the defendant would have needed a combination of some rudimentary understanding of the legal concept of stipulation (which we do not believe can be fairly assumed) and enough luck to \u201calert\u201d to the word in the course of the trial. Such a hit or miss proposition simply cannot result in either a reasoned objection or a knowing and voluntary assignment of her right to waive confrontation to her attorney, and we do not believe that it was the intent of our supreme court to validate a complete disregard of a defendant\u2019s interest in this constitutional right.\nWe, therefore, find that the record does not demonstrate defendant\u2019s knowing agreement with or objection to the stipulation. Having found that reliance on defendant\u2019s lack of objection would not be warranted, we need not consider whether the agreement to stipulate was a sound trial tactic or prudent trial strategy in order to conclude that the record is insufficient to show that Phillips\u2019s attorney did have authority to stipulate.\nWe believe that the record before us requires that defendant\u2019s conviction be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial, and we so order.\nConviction vacated; case remanded.\nHOLDRIDGE, EJ., and LYTTON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McDAJDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Donna K. Kelly (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Terence M. Patton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (Lawrence M. Bauer and Rita Kennedy Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOANNE Y. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201400\u20140510, 3\u201400\u20140511 cons.\nOpinion filed October 14, 2004.\nDonna K. Kelly (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nTerence M. Patton, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (Lawrence M. Bauer and Rita Kennedy Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0867-01", "first_page_order": 885, "last_page_order": 891 }