{ "id": 5455646, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES B. PALMER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Palmer", "decision_date": "2004-10-08", "docket_number": "No. 4-02-1039", "first_page": "877", "last_page": "886", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 877" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1106", "parenthetical": "\"A court may also properly dismiss a post-conviction petition if the record of proceedings at trial shows the petition to be nonmeritorious\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464304 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "\"A court may also properly dismiss a post-conviction petition if the record of proceedings at trial shows the petition to be nonmeritorious\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096315 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578235 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "811 N.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4022185 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1034" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461490 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "\"courts will uphold the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant's allegations\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487186 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329", "parenthetical": "\"courts will uphold the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant's allegations\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259047 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 N.E.2d 957", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "962" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637035 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1051" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/1046-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 N.E.2d 1092", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1105-06" }, { "page": "1105" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453257 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "766 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 922, "char_count": 20836, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.548627546539126e-08, "percentile": 0.285172224326592 }, "sha256": "f21212f3fffead241ca66fdccdb6e1f729781a8f64fbc81ae705e27eafb33125", "simhash": "1:9a7010b9b7a4b39b", "word_count": 3317 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:06.765456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES B. PALMER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn April 2000, a jury convicted defendant, Charles B. Palmer, of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997)), and the trial court sentenced him to natural life in prison. In August 2002, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. In November 2002, the court summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s petition, finding his claims were frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition. We affirm.\nIn February 1999, the State charged defendant by information with five counts of first degree murder in that defendant (1) \u201cwith the intent to kill or do great bodily harm to William Helmbacher, repeatedly struck [him] on the head, thereby causing the death of [him]\u201d (count I); (2) \u201crepeatedly struck [Helmbacher] on the head, knowing said act would cause the death of [Helmbacher], thereby causing the death of [him]\u201d (count II); (3) \u201crepeatedly struck [Helmbacher] [o]n the head, knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to [Helmbacher], thereby causing the death of [him]\u201d (count III); (4) \u201cwhile committing or *** attempting to commit a forcible felony, [r]obbery, *** repeatedly struck [Helmbacher] on the head and thereby caused the death of [Helmbacher]\u201d (count IV); and (5) \u201cwhile committing or attempting to commit a forcible felony, [residential [b]urglary, *** repeatedly struck [Helmbacher] on the head and thereby caused the death of [Helmbacher]\u201d (count V) (see 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3) (West Supp. 1997)). The State also charged defendant with residential burglary of Helmbacher\u2019s apartment (count VI) (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 1998)).\nThe evidence at defendant\u2019s April 2000 trial showed the following. Ray Taylor, defendant\u2019s cousin, testified that he lived upstairs in Helmbacher\u2019s apartment building in Decatur. Around dusk on August 26, 1998, defendant came to Taylor\u2019s apartment and told Taylor that he was going to break into Helmbacher\u2019s apartment. Defendant then went in the side window of Helmbacher\u2019s apartment, opened the front door, and asked Taylor to look out for him. Taylor \u201cstood there, and then *** went upstairs\u201d to his apartment. Shortly thereafter, defendant came upstairs to Taylor\u2019s apartment with some items, including beer and some change in a jar. He asked Taylor for a bag to put things in, and Taylor handed him a plastic garbage bag. Defendant put some of the items in the bag, and Taylor and defendant drank some of the beer. They then walked to a Dumpster a few blocks from Taylor\u2019s apartment, and Taylor threw the plastic bag in it. At that point, Taylor went to his mother\u2019s home. He did not see defendant again that night.\nOn the evening of August 27, 1998, Taylor saw defendant at the apartment of another cousin, John Bradford. Defendant asked Taylor to come inside Bradford\u2019s apartment. Once inside, Taylor noticed that defendant was wearing a different pair of shoes and different clothes from the previous day. Defendant said to Taylor, \u201cMan, you know I had to beat the dude to death.\u201d Taylor asked defendant, \u201cWhat dude?\u201d and defendant replied that it was the man who lived downstairs in Taylor\u2019s building \u2014 namely, Helmbacher. Defendant also said that Helmbacher only had $11 on him on August 27. Taylor then asked defendant where his new tennis shoes were that he was wearing the previous day during the burglary, and defendant replied that \u201cblood was everywhere.\u201d\nLater that night, police officers came to Taylor\u2019s apartment and questioned him about Helmbacher\u2019s murder. Police also questioned him again on September 1, 1998. During those interviews, Taylor did not tell them that he knew anything about the murder because he did not want to become involved. Later during September 1998, after police recovered the plastic bag containing Helmbacher\u2019s property and informed Taylor that they had found his fingerprints on the bag, he told them what he knew about defendant\u2019s participation in the burglary and Helmbacher\u2019s murder. (On September 10, 1998, a gardener at the James Millikin Homestead found a plastic bag containing empty beer bottles, a wallet, and a packet of business cards identifying Helmbacher as an attorney.)\nTaylor also stated that after Helmbacher\u2019s murder, police officers showed him a pair of tennis shoes, which he identified as the shoes defendant was wearing during the August 26, 1998, burglary of Helmbacher\u2019s apartment.\nTaylor acknowledged that he had been charged with residential burglary of Helmbacher\u2019s apartment (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 1998)), based on the August 26, 1998, burglary (Macon County case No. 98\u2014 CF \u2014 1476). Because Taylor agreed to testify for the State at defendant\u2019s trial, the State told him that his cooperation would be taken into account in case No. 98 \u2014 CF\u20141476. However, the State had not made any promises to Taylor regarding the outcome of his case. Taylor also acknowledged that he had two prior felony convictions.\nJoseph Moyer testified that in August 1998, he and Helmbacher both worked for Doug Lee. On the evening of August 27, 1998, Moyer and Lee were collecting rent from occupants of apartment buildings owned by Lee. At around 9:45 p.m., Moyer and Lee arrived at Helmbacher\u2019s apartment and knocked on the door. When no one answered, they left to collect rent at other buildings. At around 10:30 or 10:45 p.m., they returned to Helmbacher\u2019s apartment. Moyer looked through a small window in Helmbacher\u2019s front door and saw a half-eaten cheeseburger on a table and Helmbacher\u2019s shoes lying on the floor. Thinking something was wrong, Lee opened the door and found Helmbacher dead on the floor.\nMoyer acknowledged that on the night of the incident, Lee was upset with Helmbacher because Helmbacher was behind in collecting rent for Lee. Moyer also acknowledged that he had a prior felony burglary conviction.\nDecatur police officer Brian Cleary testified that on the evening of August 27, 1998, he responded to a call at Helmbacher\u2019s apartment. Upon arriving, he looked through a window and saw Helmbacher lying on the floor. Cleary saw no signs of forced entry.\nDecatur police detective Roger Ryan testified that he investigated the crime scene on August 27 and 28, 1998. Ryan stated that the inside of Helmbacher\u2019s front door was splattered with blood and a large pool of blood had formed around Helmbacher\u2019s body. However, Ryan did not observe bloody footprints or any blood outside Helmbacher\u2019s apartment. Ryan also stated that he found a hammer near Helmbacher\u2019s body.\nDr. Travis Hindman, a forensic pathologist, testified that he performed an autopsy on Helmbacher. Hindman opined that Helmbacher died as a result of brain trauma resulting from narrow surface blunt trauma to the head, compatible with blows from a hammer.\nMike Callaway testified that defendant spent the night with him on August 27, 1998. When defendant arrived at his apartment around 10 p.m., Callaway did not notice any blood on him. At some point, Callaway went to the liquor store. He returned about 45 minutes later and found defendant wearing one of Callaway\u2019s shirts. Callaway told defendant that he had to wash his own clothes out and wear them. Later during defendant\u2019s stay, Callaway saw defendant washing some clothes. Callaway was not sure whether he told Decatur police detective Tim Carlton that defendant had arrived at his apartment just before dark, although he acknowledged he may have.\nCarlton testified that when he interviewed Callaway, Callaway said that defendant had arrived at his apartment on August 27, 1998, around dark. During a September 22, 1998, interview of defendant, Carlton noticed that defendant was wearing a pair of white tennis shoes with red specks on them. Carlton took the shoes from defendant and showed them to Taylor. Carlton then placed the shoes in the police department\u2019s evidence storage area. The shoes were later sent to the Illinois State Police crime laboratory for analysis. After initial testing indicated that no human blood was on the shoes, Carlton sent the shoes back to the crime laboratory with instructions to \u201ctake them apart\u201d and analyze them again. Carlton testified that he did not touch the shoes before sending them back for further analysis.\nDecatur police officer Roger Morville testified that during August and September 1998, he was the evidence officer. On September 24, 1998, he transported defendant\u2019s tennis shoes to the crime laboratory. After the initial testing, Morville transported the shoes from the laboratory to the police department\u2019s evidence storage area. On October 15, 1998, he again transported the shoes to the crime laboratory. At that time, the shoes were still in a sealed evidence storage bag and had not been tampered with or altered in any fashion.\nJennifer Lu, a crime laboratory employee trained in forensic biology, testified that she initially analyzed defendant\u2019s tennis shoes on September 25, 1998. She tested the red specks on the laces and outside of the shoes and determined that the stains were not human blood. On November 4, 1998, Lu reexamined the shoes at the request of the Decatur police. Lu dismantled the shoes and discovered three stains on the right side of the right shoe (the first stain was located under a piece of leather covered with mesh and the second two stains were located under the mesh). After testing, Lu determined that the stains were human blood. Lu also stated that the police had sent Helmbacher\u2019s fingernail scrapings, which contained a blood-like substance, to the laboratory as well; however, she did not test those scrapings.\nDana Pitchford, an Illinois State Police forensic scientist, testified that she conducted a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis of a blood standard from Helmbacher and the bloodstains found on defendant\u2019s shoes. Pitchford opined that the DNA test results indicated that the blood on defendant\u2019s shoes came from Helmbacher. The likelihood that another individual could have been the source of the bloodstains is 1 out of 42 trillion in the \u201cWhite\u201d population and 1 out of 38 trillion in the \u201cBlack\u201d population. (Helmbacher was \u201cWhite.\u201d)\nDecatur police sergeant Brian Bell testified on defendant\u2019s behalf that during a September 21, 1998, interview of Taylor, Taylor admitted going into Helmbacher\u2019s apartment during the August 26, 1998, burglary. Decatur police officer Jeremy Welker testified that when he interviewed Taylor on August 28, 1998, Taylor stated that he had been home on the evening of August 27, 1998, but had not heard anything unusual.\nDefendant testified and denied committing the crimes. He stated that he spent the day and night of August 26, 1998, at Taylor\u2019s apartment. He slept off and on all day because he was not feeling well. On August 27, 1998, defendant woke up sometime between 11 a.m. and noon. Around 3:30 or 4 p.m., defendant went to Callaway\u2019s apartment, where he stayed until the next day. Defendant stated that he and Callaway often wore each other\u2019s clothes, and on the morning of August 27, 1998, defendant put on a pair of Callaway\u2019s pants and a shirt. Defendant also stated that he did not loan his shoes to anyone, but someone may have worn them without his permission.\nOn this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and not guilty of residential burglary. The trial court later sentenced him as stated.\nDefendant appealed, alleging that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder. Specifically, he claimed that (1) Taylor\u2019s testimony was \u201ccontradictory and inherently unreliable,\u201d (2) the evidence \u201ctend[ed] to point more towards Taylor\u2019s guilt,\u201d and (3) the only physical evidence \u201cthat in any way implicate[ed] [defendant] for this crime was trace amounts of blood\u201d on his shoes, which were \u201cdiscovered under suspicious and questionable circumstances.\u201d\nIn September 2001, this court affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment. People v. Palmer, No. 4\u201400\u20140634, slip order at 19 (September 25, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In February 2002, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. People v. Palmer, 198 Ill. 2d 603, 766 N.E.2d 243 (2002).\nIn August 2002, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, approximately 40 pages in length, asserting (1) he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel, (2) he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel, (3) \u201cprosecutorial misconduct,\u201d (4) \u201cinsufficient evidence,\u201d and (5) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant attached to his petition more than 100 pages of \u201cexhibits,\u201d mostly police reports.\nIn November 2002, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s petition as frivolous and patently without merit. This appeal followed.\nDefendant alleges the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his postconviction petition. This court reviews de novo a trial court\u2019s dismissal of a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 360, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1105-06 (2000).\nUnder the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 through 122 \u2014 8 (West 2002)), the trial court must first, independently and without considering any argument by the State, determine whether the petition is \u201cfrivolous or is patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2002). To survive dismissal at this first stage, the petition need only present \u201cthe gist of a constitutional claim,\u201d which is \u201ca low threshold.\u201d People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996).\n\u201cIn considering a petition pursuant to [section 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Act], the [trial] court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding^] and any transcripts of such proceeding.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(c) (West 2002). The court should examine those records to determine whether the allegations are positively rebutted by the record. That determination will assist the court in resolving the issue as to whether the petition is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Little, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1051, 782 N.E.2d 957, 962 (2003).\nOur supreme court has consistently upheld the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant\u2019s allegations. People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 222, 756 N.E.2d 831, 834 (2001); see People v. Jones, 66 Ill. 2d 152, 157, 361 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (1977) (\u201cA court may also properly dismiss a post-conviction petition if the record of proceedings at trial shows the petition to be nonmeritorious\u201d); see also People v. De Avila, 333 Ill. App. 3d 321, 329, 775 N.E.2d 79, 85 (2002) (\u201ccourts will uphold the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition when the record from the original trial proceedings contradicts the defendant\u2019s allegations\u201d).\nAdditionally, a petition brought under the Act is not a direct appeal but rather a collateral proceeding that permits inquiry only into constitutional issues that defendant did not raise and could not have raised on direct appeal. Thus, issues defendant raised on direct appeal are barred from consideration by the doctrine of res judicata, and issues that defendant could have raised, but did not, are considered waived. People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 233, 807 N.E.2d 448, 452 (2004). A defendant cannot avoid the bar of res judicata by simply rephrasing issues previously addressed on direct appeal. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d at 360, 736 N.E.2d at 1105. However, the doctrines of res judicata and waiver will be relaxed in the following three circumstances: (1) where fundamental fairness so requires, (2) where the waiver stems from the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or (3) where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face of the original appellate record. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 233, 807 N.E.2d at 452.\nIn this case, defendant claims that (1) on September 25, 1998, a crime laboratory employee analyzed his tennis shoes and determined that the stains were not human blood and appellate counsel \u201cfailed to bring this information to the attention of the *** court,\u201d (2) a detective \u201cplant[ed] blood\u201d on defendant\u2019s tennis shoes, and (3) law enforcement officials improperly seized the tennis shoes from defendant while he was incarcerated in the county jail.\nOn direct appeal, this court rejected defendant\u2019s contention that the blood on his shoes was \u201cdiscovered under suspicious and questionable circumstances.\u201d Defendant simply rephrases an issue previously addressed on direct appeal. A defendant cannot avoid res judicata by adding additional allegations that are encompassed by a previously adjudicated issue. People v. Kimble, 348 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1034, 811 N.E.2d 346, 348-49 (2004). Since defendant\u2019s arguments have already been addressed, the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant\u2019s postconviction petition.\nDefendant next claims that he was denied his right to conflict-free counsel because the victim was an attorney. In People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 472, 795 N.E.2d 231, 236 (2003), our supreme court addressed a criminal defendant\u2019s right to conflict-free counsel as follows:\n\u201cA criminal defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to effective representation includes the correlative right to conflict-free representation. [Citations.] Because a defendant is entitled to undivided loyalty from defense counsel, this court has adopted a per se conflict-of-interest rule. [Citation.] Under this rule, the defendant\u2019s conviction must be reversed if (1) defense counsel has an actual or potential conflict of interest stemming from a previous or current commitment to a party with interests adverse to the defendant, and (2) the defendant does not waive the conflict. [Citations.]\nA threshold inquiry in any conflict-of-interest case is whether, in fact, defense counsel represented or represents a party with conflicting interests to those of the defendant.\u201d\nCounsel acknowledged he knew the victim \u201cprofessionally\u201d but had no previous relationship with the victim that would give rise to divided loyalties.\nDefendant next claims he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to call multiple named witnesses. A claim that counsel failed to investigate and call a witness must be supported by an affidavit from the proposed witness. People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 380, 743 N.E.2d 1, 13 (2000). In the absence of such an affidavit, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the proposed witness could have provided testimony or information favorable to the defendant, and further review of the claim is not necessary. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 380, 743 N.E.2d at 13. Defendant has failed to support his claim with the appropriate affidavits.\nLast, defendant claims the trial court erred by \u201callowing [the State] to proceed to trial with insufficient evidence.\u201d Specifically, defendant argues the State failed to conduct tests on substances found under the victim\u2019s fingernails and, thus, \u201chas imprisoned the wrong man.\u201d On direct appeal, this court rejected defendant\u2019s argument that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder, stating:\n\u201cBased on the evidence that (1) defendant told Taylor that (a) he had to beat Helmhacher to death, and (h) blood was everywhere; and (2) Helmbacher\u2019s blood was found on defendant\u2019s shoes, the jury could conclude that defendant was guilty of Helmbacher\u2019s murder. Contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, the jury was not required to speculate regarding the possibility that the crime was committed by someone other than defendant. [Citation.] Reviewing the evidence presented under the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that a rational trier of fact reasonably could have found that defendant committed first degree murder.\u201d People v. Palmer, No. 4\u201400\u20140634, slip order at 10 (September 25, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nSince defendant\u2019s argument has already been addressed, the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant\u2019s postconviction petition.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nTURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Arden J. Lang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Scott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES B. PALMER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20141039\nOpinion filed October 8, 2004.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Arden J. Lang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nScott Rueter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0877-01", "first_page_order": 895, "last_page_order": 904 }