{ "id": 5457877, "name": "DANIEL PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD L. SNYDER, JR., Director, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Parker v. Snyder", "decision_date": "2004-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 4-03-0745", "first_page": "886", "last_page": "890", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 886" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570195 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5468493 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477007 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 1267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1272" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542386 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243955 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434483 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "811 N.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451324 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "813 N.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451693 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "811 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451346 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 3738", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 10714, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15978383295705656 }, "sha256": "aee96c2a2a8ca2122f6c3c9e1b3eecc58a3bcc5ea761a5442bd5ac2694f7ec88", "simhash": "1:a360d89c09135ba4", "word_count": 1717 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:06.765456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "COOK and TURNER, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "DANIEL PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD L. SNYDER, JR., Director, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Daniel Parker, appeals the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in his pro se action for mandamus, in favor of defendants, Donald L. Snyder, Jr. (Director), and the Department of Corrections (DOC). On appeal, the issue is whether plaintiff is entitled to mandamus relief. We affirm.\nOn March 16, 1995, DOC classified plaintiff as a Level E inmate, reflecting that he presented an extremely high risk of escape. Plaintiff had previously been found guilty of the offense of attempted escape in a prison disciplinary proceeding.\nOn July 27, 2000, Roger D. Cowan, warden of Menard Correctional Center, issued a procedural bulletin addressed to all Level E inmates, stating the following: \u201cEffective August 1, 2000, the following changes mandated by Administrative Directive will require your visits be non-contact only. The number of adult visitors on your visiting list will be limited to ten.\u201d\nOn September 7, 2000, defendant Kenneth R. Briley, warden of Stateville Correctional Center, issued Warden\u2019s Bulletin No. 00 \u2014 111, regarding extremely high level escape risk visits. The bulletin stated the following:\n\u201cEffective 10/1/00, all visits for inmates who are classified as extremely high level escape risks will be conducted in the non-contact visiting room. Only ten persons, 17 years or older, will be approved to visit an inmate who is classified as an extremely high level escape risk. Only two persons may visit at any one time. Special visiting lists will be distributed to all affected inmates. Inmates are responsible for notifying prospective visitors of these policy changes.\u201d\nPlaintiff filed a number of grievances related to the aforementioned administrative directives. Grievance officers denied those grievances contained in the record on appeal, stating that each such denial was based on plaintiffs high risk of escape and/or Level E status and was mandated by an administrative directive. (One grievance filed and the response thereto are not contained in the record.)\nOn June 21, 2002, plaintiff filed a pro se petition for mandamus relief pursuant to article XTV of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 101 through 14 \u2014 109 (West 2002)) against defendants, the Director; Briley; George E. DeTella, Associate Director of DOC; and Jonathan R. Walls, warden of Menard Correctional Center. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the loss of contact visitation privileges violated state law and substantive due process. On February 11, 2003, the trial court dismissed without prejudice defendants DeTella, Briley, and Walls, where they were sued in their official capacities. On May 19, 2003, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On June 16, 2003, the State filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On July 28, 2003, the court denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted the State\u2019s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment and granting the State\u2019s motion for summary judgment where the facts show (1) restriction of his visiting privileges to \u201cnon-contact only\u201d was inconsistent with the relevant statutes as they existed prior to the enactment of Public Act 89 \u2014 688 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 688, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 3738)), which has been declared unconstitutional (People v. Burdunice, 211 Ill. 2d 264, 271, 811 N.E.2d 678, 683 (2004)), and (2) such restrictions violated his substantive due-process rights.\nSummary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Roth v. Opiela, 211 Ill. 2d 536, 542, 813 N.E.2d 114, 117 (2004); 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005 (West 2002). The standard of review on appeal for the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 258, 811 N.E.2d 670, 674 (2004).\nAs we stated recently in Lucas v. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998, 812 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2004):\n\u201c \u2018Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, \u201cthe performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.\u201d \u2019 Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229, 710 N.E.2d 798, 813 (1999), quoting Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514, 501 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (1986). A court will award a writ of mandamus \u2018only if a plaintiff establishes a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ.\u2019 People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552, 555, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (2002). A plaintiff must set forth every material fact necessary to show he or she is entitled to a writ of mandamus, and the plaintiff bears the burden to establish a clear, legal right to it. Chicago Ass\u2019n of Commerce & Industry v. Regional Transportation Authority, 86 Ill. 2d 179, 185, 427 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1981).\u201d\nPlaintiff first argues that his visitation restrictions are inconsistent with sections 3 \u2014 7\u20142(f) and 3 \u2014 8\u20147(b)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) as they existed prior to the enactment of Public Act 89 \u2014 688, which was declared unconstitutional. See 730 ILCS 5/3\u20147\u20142(f), 3\u20148\u20147(b)(2) (West 1996). The State acknowledges that Public Act 89 \u2014 688 is unconstitutional and therefore void but argues that defendants complied with state law as it existed prior to Public Act 89 \u2014 688\u2019s enactment.\nThe previous version of section 3 \u2014 7\u20142(f) of the Unified Code provided as follows:\n\u201cAll of the institutions and facilities of the Department shall permit every committed person to receive visitors, except in case of abuse of the visiting privilege or when the chief administrative officer determines that such visiting would be harmful or dangerous to the security, safety or morale of the institution or facility. Clergy, religious chaplain and attorney visiting privileges shall be as broad as the security of the institution or facility will allow.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 7\u20142(f) (West 1996).\nThe plain language of section 3 \u2014 7\u20142(f) does not grant unrestricted visitation; it merely allows inmates to receive visitors, and even then just to the extent it does not hinder the safety or security of the institution or facility. Here, plaintiff was not denied all visitation, nor were the restrictions so burdensome as to constructively deny him visitation under section 3 \u2014 7\u20142(f). The visitation restrictions placed on plaintiff were not disciplinary; rather, they were discretionary safety and security measures applied to all prisoners in the respective facilities. Accordingly, section 3 \u2014 7\u20142(f) would not even apply to plaintiffs situation.\nThe previous version of section 3 \u2014 8\u20147(b)(2) of the Unified Code, addressing disciplinary procedures, read as follows:\n\u201cDisciplinary restrictions on visitations, work, education or program assignments, and the use of the prison\u2019s library shall be related as closely as practicable to abuse of such privileges or facilities. This paragraph shall not apply to segregation or isolation of persons for purposes of institutional control.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8\u2014 7(b)(2) (West 1996).\nCiting section 3 \u2014 1\u20142(h) of the Unified Code, which defines \u201cdiscipline\u201d (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142(h) (West 2000)), plaintiff contends that his visitation restrictions constitute \u201cdisciplinary restrictions\u201d that bring his situation within the scope of section 3 \u2014 8\u20147(b)(2).\nSection 3 \u2014 1\u20142(h) defines \u201cdiscipline\u201d as \u201cthe rules and regulations for the maintenance of order and the protection of persons and property within the institutions and facilities of the Department and their enforcement.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20142(h) (West 2000). The Unified Code does not define \u201cdisciplinary restriction,\u201d but where the words and phrases defined under the Unified Code have a particular context that clearly requires a different meaning, the contextual meaning controls (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20141 (West 2000)).\nWe reject plaintiffs attempt to equate the general term \u201cdiscipline\u201d with the specific term \u201cdisciplinary restrictions\u201d under the Unified Code. A review of the statutory sections within the Unified Code conclusively shows that \u201cdisciplinary\u201d is applied to individual acts and the sanctions thereto, while \u201cdiscipline\u201d applies to institutional control generally. See 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20141 through 8 \u2014 6\u20141 (West 1996 & 2000). Section 3 \u2014 8\u20147 of the Unified Code is no different.\nThe restrictions attached to the Level E classification were \u201creasonable security measures to classify those inmates who have exhibited behavior which indicates they are likely to attempt an escape.\u201d The restrictions were not a \u201cdisciplinary\u201d measure for plaintiffs 1995 attempted escape, an infraction for which DOC imposed separate sanctions against plaintiff only. We find no suggestion that defendants acted outside the scope of their discretionary powers \u201c[t]o develop and maintain programs of control\u201d and \u201c[t]o make all rules and regulations and exercise all powers and duties vested by law in the Department.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 2\u20142(d), (m) (West 2000).\nPlaintiff also argues that his visitation restrictions deprived him of his substantive due-process rights. We need not address whether plaintiff has a protectable liberty interest in the level of visitation allowed. Even if plaintiff had such an interest, these matters do not involve fundamental constitutional rights; therefore, the rational-basis test applies. People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342, 546 N.E.2d 533, 540 (1989).\nThe restrictions attached to the Level E classification were reasonable security measures to classify those inmates exhibiting behavior indicating they are likely to attempt an escape. Placing restrictions on the contact of such inmates with outside individuals is rationally related to safety and security concerns. Accordingly, plaintiffs substantive due-process argument fails.\nPlaintiff had no clear right to relief, and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court properly denied plaintiffs petition for mandamus.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK and TURNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel Parker, of Menard, appellant pro se.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Carol A. Cera, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANIEL PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DONALD L. SNYDER, JR., Director, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201403\u20140745\nOpinion filed September 29, 2004.\nDaniel Parker, of Menard, appellant pro se.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Carol A. Cera, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0886-01", "first_page_order": 904, "last_page_order": 908 }