{ "id": 5455385, "name": "In re T.W. et al., Alleged to be Neglected Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Rena Wright, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wright", "decision_date": "2004-10-14", "docket_number": "No. 4-04-0492", "first_page": "1208", "last_page": "1214", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1208" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "786 N.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "662" }, { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894452 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0764-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 633, "char_count": 14503, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.591356421208395e-08, "percentile": 0.4497515106093058 }, "sha256": "44da0f569941599e5327339a885ce2b869109b08e15bc48f169d47c09feab326", "simhash": "1:ab07d416620adef7", "word_count": 2443 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:57:06.765456+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "COOK and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re T.W. et al., Alleged to be Neglected Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Rena Wright, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Rena Wright, appeals from the trial court\u2019s order reinstating neglect proceedings relating to her minor children, T.W. (born April 3, 1992) and B.J.W (born January 21, 1989). Respondent contends the court was without jurisdiction and was therefore without authority to enter the reinstatement order when no appeal from the order closing the case was taken. We reverse and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn November 4, 2002, upon the State\u2019s petition, the trial court entered an order for shelter care as to T.W and B.J.W The petition alleged the minors were neglected pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(1) (b) (West 2000)) due to respondent\u2019s unresolved issues of substance abuse. At the time, all parties resided in McLean County. B.J.W. was in residential treatment as a condition of juvenile probation from a De Witt County criminal conviction.\nOn November 8, 2002, the trial court entered an order for both minors to reside with their maternal grandmother, Janelle Reid. The same order named Reid and the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as temporary cocustodians. By December 10, 2002, the date of a pretrial hearing, respondent had moved to Bastrop, Louisiana, and Reid was living in Granville, Ohio. At the hearing, DCFS informed the court that B.J.W. was not living with either cocustodian but was believed to be living with respondent in Louisiana. The court issued a juvenile warrant for B.J.W\u2019s return.\nOn January 31, 2003, the State filed a motion to vacate the trial corut\u2019s order entered on November 8, 2002, claiming the court had no authority by order to permit the minors to reside with Reid in Ohio. On January 31, 2003, the court (1) entered an adjudicatory order finding the minors neglected, (2) vacated its November 8, 2002, order, and (3) appointed DCFS as temporary guardian of both minors. The warrant for B.J.W. remained outstanding.\nOn March 7, 2003, the trial court entered a dispositional order, finding respondent unfit and unable to care for the minors because of her unresolved substance abuse. DCFS was appointed guardian of the minors. T.W. was placed with Reid, who then resided in Tennessee. DCFS believed B.J.W. resided with respondent in Louisiana.\nAt the permanency hearing on May 20, 2003, the trial court entered the following order:\n\u201cCourt appoints Janelle Reid as guardian of minor [T.W]. Court dismisses case as it relates to minor [B.J.W.] because mother continues to harbor [B.J.W.] and refuses to return him to this jurisdiction; Louisiana authorities have refused to honor the warrant for minor. No services offered or performed by mother as she left the jurisdiction!,] and nothing has been resolved.\u201d\nThe order further stated: \u201cDCFS is discharged as both minors\u2019 guardian. Court, over State\u2019s objection, closes case.\u201d The docket entry stated: \u201cOver State\u2019s objection, case dismissed as to [B.J.W.]. Guardianship of [T.W.] awarded to [grandmother] Janelle Reid. DCFS discharged, wardship terminated!,] and case closed. See order. Closed.\u201d The State did not appeal the trial court\u2019s order.\nOn January 22, 2004, eight months later, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship as to B.J.W. in a new case, No. 04 \u2014 JA\u2014 15. The trial court took judicial notice of the previous case (No. 02\u2014 JA \u2014 78) and entered a shelter-care order appointing DCFS as temporary custodian. According to the petition, B.J.W was detained in the McLean County juvenile detention facility for delinquency matters pending in De Witt County.\nRespondent filed a motion to dismiss or transfer venue on April 5, 2004, in case No. 04 \u2014 JA\u201415, seeking to have the case dismissed or transferred to De Witt County, where she and B.J.W resided. While a copy of respondent\u2019s motion does not appear in the record, all parties agree the same was filed.\nOn April 20, 2004, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing and a hearing on respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss or transfer venue in case No. 04 \u2014 JA\u201415. The court concluded, \u201cIt was a mistake to dismiss the [p]etition in [No.] 02 \u2014 JA\u201478.\u201d The following exchange occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: The court notes it has been less than a year since the [No.] 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 case was dismissed over both [T.W.] and [B.J.W.] and reinstates this case. Wardship of the minors resides with the court. DCFS is reinstated as guardian of the minors. And I will set a hearing on whether the minors should be left in their current placement or placed somewhere else.\nMR. McPHEE [(respondent\u2019s attorney)]: Just so I understand, you are reinstating a case on the court\u2019s motion and this new case in the original [No.] 04 \u2014 JA\u201415?\nTHE COURT: That is correct. I will set a hearing on whether the minors will reside in their current placement ***.\nMR. McPHEE: Giving DCFS guardianship over the minors?\nTHE COURT: Yeah. I am reinstating it where it was before. If you reinstate it[,] don\u2019t go back and prove the [p]etition. The only issue is where the custody of the minors should be. ***\nMR. McPHEE: I am sorry, judge, I am having trouble following. I need to be clear. Are you reinstating an old case that was dismissed on the court\u2019s motion?\nTHE COURT: No. I am reinstating a fairly new case. That is on the court\u2019s motion. Yeah. It is [No.] 02 \u2014 JA\u201478. It was a year ago. MR. McPHEE: Just wanted to be sure.\nTHE COURT: Thank you. Those are good questions.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered the following order:\n\u201cThis cause came on for hearing on mom\u2019s motion to dismiss or transfer venue. People by [Assistant State\u2019s Attorney] S. Thompson, minor by [guardian ad litem] A. Novick, mom Rena Wright by [Assistant Public Defender] J. McPhee. After hearing argument and taking judicial notice of [No.] 02[ \u2014 ]JA[\u2014]78 and [No.] 03[ \u2014 ]JA[\u2014] 44 [(neglect proceeding wherein B.J.W is the putative father of an alleged neglected minor)] (orders and pleadings only)[,] court denies motion to dismiss or transfer, sua sponte reinstates [No.] 02[ \u2014 ] JA[ \u2014 ]78 as it was improvidently dismissed over the State\u2019s objection, and reinstates wardship of both [B.J.W.] and [T.W.] and reinvests guardianship of both boys with DCFS. Further permanency and a decision as to shelter for [T.W.] set for June 1, 2004[,] [at] 10:30.\u201d\nOn May 20, 2004, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the cause more than 30 days after the order of dismissal, a final order, on May 20, 2003.\nOn June 1, 2004, the trial court conducted a hearing on permanency and on respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss. At the beginning of the hearing, the court noted the cases to be heard were No. 04 \u2014 JA\u201415 (B.J.W\u2019s new case) and No. 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 (original case). Respondent\u2019s counsel argued that the court was without authority to reinstate No. 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 after it had been dismissed and 30 days thereafter had passed. In its comments, the court stated: \u201cSo far as [No.] 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 is concernedt,] the court accepts the argument that the case was dismissed and closed, cannot be reinstated as to [B.J.W], but rules the case was never dismissed as to [T.W.].\u201d Thus, the court determined that No. 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 was dismissed as to B.J.W. but remained pending as to T.W This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nRespondent claims the trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to reinstate case No. 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 on its own motion. She argues the orders reinstating the case, transferring guardianship from Reid to DCFS, and addressing permanency goals should be vacated.\nIn her argument, respondent relies on the Second District\u2019s opinion in In re M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d 764, 773, 786 N.E.2d 654, 661 (2003), which held that a trial court\u2019s order closing a juvenile case is a final order for purposes of appeal. She contends, because the State did not appeal that final order, the trial court lost jurisdiction of the case and thus had no authority to enter the order on June 1, 2004.\nIn opposition, the State argues the trial court\u2019s order of June 1, 2004, was \u201cwholly consistent\u201d with the terms of its May 30, 2003, order. The State claims T.W\u2019s case could be reinstated because it was closed, but was never formally dismissed, and a new case was filed against B.J.W. because his case was formally dismissed. The State claims respondent\u2019s appeal is without merit.\nFirst, we agree with respondent that by closing the case, the trial court absolutely and finally determined the rights of the parties and terminated the litigation (see M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 786 N.E.2d at 661), making the May 20, 2003, order final for purposes of appeal under Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301). However, unlike M.M., that is not the issue here. The issue is whether the court can regain jurisdiction of a closed case pursuant to the terms of section 2 \u2014 33 of the Juvenile Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 33 (West 2000)). Unfortunately, neither party argues the applicability of this section, but because it specifically allows the reinstatement of previously closed cases, we find it cannot be ignored.\nSection 2 \u2014 33 of the Juvenile Act sets forth as follows:\n\u201c(1) Any time prior to a minor\u2019s 18th birthday, pursuant to a supplemental petition filed under this [sjection, the court may reinstate wardship and open a previously closed case when:\n(b) the minor is not presently a ward of the court under [a]rticle II of this Act nor is there a petition for adjudication of wardship pending on behalf of the minor; and\n(c) it is in the minor\u2019s best interest that wardship be reinstated. (2) The supplemental petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the original adjudication order was entered.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 33 (West 2000).\nThis section, which became effective on June 30, 1998, allows the trial court to reinstate a case under certain circumstances. The question before us then is whether those circumstances exist in this case.\nBoth the trial court and the State made a distinction between dismissing the case pertaining to B.J.W. and closing the case pertaining to T.W. We find the Juvenile Act does not contemplate a distinction between the two under the circumstances here.\nIn interpreting the Juvenile Act, our task is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, while presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 786 N.E.2d at 662. The starting point for determining legislative intent is always the language of the statute because it is the most reliable indicator of the legislature\u2019s objectives in enacting the particular law. M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d at 773-74, 786 N.E.2d at 662.\nSections 2 \u2014 31 and 2 \u2014 33 use the terms \u201cclosed,\u201d \u201cterminated,\u201d and \u201cdischarged\u201d when referring to an action taken by the trial court when it determines that wardship is no longer required or necessary. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 31, 2 \u2014 33 (West 2000). A strict reading of the statutory sections suggests they do not contemplate or apply to a \u201cdismissal\u201d of the case.\nWe look to the language the trial court used in ordering the \u201cdismissal\u201d to better determine its intent. The court said it \u201cdismissed\u201d the case as it related to B.J.W. because respondent harbored him and refused to return him to the court\u2019s jurisdiction. The court, over the State\u2019s objection, closed the case. The court also ordered \u201cDCFS discharged, wardship terminated.\u201d\nBecause the trial court did not \u201cdismiss\u201d the case based upon anything the State did or did not do, we find the court\u2019s \u201cdismissal\u201d was the equivalent of \u201cclosing\u201d the case within the meaning of the Juvenile Act. The petition was not defective, and the State did not fail to prove certain allegations or fail to take certain actions. \u201cDismissal\u201d was what the court saw as its last resort when the offered services were not being utilized and not helping remedy the family\u2019s situation. Respondent was out of the court\u2019s jurisdiction. Because T.W., unlike B.J.W., remained with Reid as ordered, his progress could be monitored; but because respondent left the court\u2019s jurisdiction and had not taken advantage of the services offered, there would likely be no demonstrable progress on her case and thus no change in T.W.\u2019s status. For the time being, the court found T.W\u2019s best interest would be served by appointing Reid as his guardian and terminating wardship.\nWe find terminating wardship with regard to B.J.W was done for the same purpose. At the time, no progress was being made. Until respondent and/or B.J.W took affirmative steps toward progress, there was little the trial court could do to help remedy the situation. Although the court used the word \u201cdismiss,\u201d the court closed the case until further notice. We find no distinction between \u201cdismissing\u201d B.J.W.\u2019s case and \u201cclosing\u201d T.W.\u2019s case.\nWe find that section 2 \u2014 33 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 33 (West 2000)) gives the trial corut authority and jurisdiction to entertain reinstatement of the case upon the filing of a supplemental petition. Subsection (2) requires the supplemental petition to be filed in the same proceeding in which the original adjudication was entered. 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 33(2) (West 2000). We therefore reverse the trial court\u2019s orders entered in case No. 04 \u2014 JA\u201415, remand the action and direct the State to file a supplemental petition as to both minors in case No. 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 in compliance with section 2 \u2014 33 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 33 (West 2000)) for the court\u2019s consideration, and dismiss case No. 04 \u2014 JA\u201415 with prejudice.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the above reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s orders entered in case No. 04 \u2014 JA\u201415, remand and direct the State to file a supplemental petition to reinstate wardship as to both minors in case No. 02 \u2014 JA\u201478 in compliance with section 2 \u2014 33 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 33 (West 2000)) for the trial court\u2019s consideration, and dismiss with prejudice case No. 04 \u2014 JA\u201415.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nCOOK and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "David W Butler, of Bloomington, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Alan J. Novick, of Bloomington, guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re T.W. et al., Alleged to be Neglected Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Rena Wright, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140492\nOpinion filed October 14, 2004.\nDavid W Butler, of Bloomington, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nAlan J. Novick, of Bloomington, guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "1208-01", "first_page_order": 1226, "last_page_order": 1232 }