{ "id": 3365394, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. HAYES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hayes", "decision_date": "2004-11-12", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201402\u20140981", "first_page": "355", "last_page": "361", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 355" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "685 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 635", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456190 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963678 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609707 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 1254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1260-61" }, { "page": "1261" }, { "page": "1261" }, { "page": "1261" }, { "page": "1261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473083 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 1257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5202381 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 N.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926044 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 1133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1144" }, { "page": "1144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587585 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" }, { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 698, "char_count": 13662, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.856319230494445e-08, "percentile": 0.30508052786089074 }, "sha256": "a865319408007174e6f3b885444cb8553df2f99a6134837d9f84706597ba2da5", "simhash": "1:a21edc38d6458fb4", "word_count": 2302 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:37:49.624900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. HAYES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 2002, Michael A. Hayes was found guilty of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3 (West 2000)) and theft of property having a value exceeding $300 (720 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 2000)). In August 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 15 years in prison for residential burglary and 3 years in prison for theft of property having a value exceeding $300 with credit for 133 days served. Defendant appeals, arguing the court erred in (1) forcing him to walk in front of the jury and (2) crediting him only 133 days for his time spent in custody. We affirm as modified and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn April 11, 2002, an individual entered Charles and Jennifer Glass\u2019s home through an unlocked back door and removed jewelry, including a gold and diamond tennis bracelet, five gold rings, and other miscellaneous items. The tennis bracelet and rings were later found at a local pawnshop. Jennifer Glass identified the bracelet and rings as the jewelry taken from her home. Kathy Wynn, an employee of the pawnshop, informed the police that defendant pawned the jewelry on April 11, 2002. The pawnshop also produced a receipt for the jewelry signed by defendant.\nOne of the Glasses\u2019 neighbors, Monique Killion, told the police she saw an African-American man with an average build in his late 20s to early 30s knocking on the front door of the Glasses\u2019 home on April 11. Killion told the police the man walked with a limp.\nThe police arrested defendant for residential burglary on April 16, 2002. In addition, the State later charged defendant with theft of property having a value exceeding $300. Defendant was tried in July 2002. At the trial, the State presented the following witnesses: Charles Glass, Jennifer Glass, Monique Killion, Kathy Wynn, Officer Matthew Quinley, Investigator Bryan Seraphin, Tammy Prince, and Raulon Robinson. Killion and Wynn testified as set forth above.\nPrince testified she was Jennifer Glass\u2019s sister. According to her testimony, she lived with the Glasses before moving to Tennessee in March 2002. Prince testified she started having a sexual relationship with defendant in late February 2002. During their relationship, defendant came to the Glass residence. Prince testified she had not been back to Urbana since moving to Tennessee.\nRobinson testified he talked to defendant while they were in the county jail. According to Robinson\u2019s testimony, defendant admitted his guilt to Robinson. Robinson testified defendant told him he entered the Glass residence through the back door. Robinson also testified defendant informed him an African-American woman saw him before he entered the home.\nAfter the State presented its last witness, the trial, court ordered defendant to walk a short distance in front of the jury at the State\u2019s request. The court allowed this demonstration over defendant\u2019s objection. The defense then rested without putting on any evidence.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of both residential burglary and theft of property exceeding $300. The trial court treated defendant as a Class X offender pursuant to section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (West 2000)). The court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms in prison of 15 years for residential burglary and 3 years for theft of property having a value exceeding $300. The court also granted defendant credit for 133 days spent in custody. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in (1) forcing him to walk in front of the jury and (2) crediting him for 133 days spent in custody instead of 134 days.\nThe State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to walk before the jury. However, the State concedes the court should have credited defendant for 134 days. This leaves us to determine if the court erred in forcing defendant to walk in front of the jury.\nA. Standard of Review\nTrial courts have a wide degree of discretion in determining the admissibility of courtroom demonstrations. People v. Summers, 202 Ill. App. 3d 1, 19, 559 N.E.2d 1133, 1144 (1990). Absent an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion, the court\u2019s ruling whether to allow a demonstration will be allowed to stand. Summers, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 19, 559 N.E.2d at 1144.\nB. Walking Demonstration\nDefendant argues the trial court should not have allowed the walking demonstration because the demonstration\u2019s relevance \u201crests on an unproven assumption.\u201d Defendant points to the fact the State did not introduce any evidence defendant walked with a limp on the date of the burglary. According to defendant, \u201c[wjithout a proper foundation to establish that defendant had a limp around the time of this offense, a demonstration that only proved he had a limp at the time of the trial was irrelevant and should have been excluded.\u201d\nDefendant relies on People v. Newbury, 53 Ill. 2d 228, 290 N.E.2d 592 (1972), to support his argument. In Newbury, the defendant was accused of murdering his fianc\u00e9e. During the trial, the trial court allowed the State to introduce a torn photograph of the defendant found in a dresser drawer in the victim\u2019s apartment after her murder. The defendant objected to the admission of the photograph because there was no proof who tore the photograph or when it was torn. On appeal, in support of the court\u2019s ruling, the State argued:\n\u201c \u2018The torn photo found in the victim\u2019s apartment raises the inference and is consistent with the prosecution\u2019s theory and, thus, tends to substantiate the fact that there was a disagreement between the defendant and the victim. *** The inference is that it belonged to the victim and that she tore it, and any question with respect thereto was properly for the jury to consider.\u2019 \u201d Newbury, 53 Ill. 2d at 239, 290 N.E.2d at 598.\nOn review, the Supreme Court of Illinois held the photograph should not have been admitted into evidence because the relevance of the photograph \u201cdepended upon unproved assumptions \u2014 that it was torn recently and that it was torn deliberately and by the deceased.\u201d Newbury, 53 Ill. 2d at 240, 290 N.E.2d at 599.\nThis case is distinguishable from Newbury. In this case, the relevance of defendant\u2019s gait did not depend on an unproved assumption. Unlike in Newbury where no one testified who tore the picture or when it was torn, Killion here testified the individual she observed outside of the Glass residence on the day in question walked with a limp. \u201cRelevant evidence is evidence which makes the existence of any fact that is important to the outcome of the case more probable than it would be without the admission of the evidence.\u201d People v. Speirs, 231 Ill. App. 3d 807, 811, 596 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (1992). As a result, whether defendant walked with a limp was relevant because of Killion\u2019s testimony.\nIn addition, before the trial court determined it would allow the demonstration in this case, the court heard arguments from defendant\u2019s attorney as to why the demonstration should not be allowed:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Mr. Rumley, let me ask you about the identification question.\nMR. RUMLEY: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Is it your position that the description by Ms. Kil-lian of the individual pounding on the Glass front door is sufficient in connection with the unexplained possession of recently stolen property to get the State past a directed verdict? Was that description of the perpetrator sufficient enough to get past directed verdict?\nMR. RUMLEY: It\u2019s a very sly question, Judge.\nWell\u2014\nTHE COURT: Cause I\u2019m wondering if your argument would then change if I do not allow him to walk.\nMR. RUMLEY: Well, I guess you\u2019re saying that my argument is their identification was plenty good enough, it doesn\u2019t need anymore help, and then I might be talking out the other side of my mouth if I say, well, you know, you can\u2019t hook him up to the crime. And I guess my answer is, well, they\u2019re both correct.\nI think there\u2019s enough in their description that some jurors would infer or at least decide that it probably was [defendant] on the doorstep.\nAnd I am prepared to deal with that in argument.\nOn the other hand, the identification^] let\u2019s look at the particulars. 5\u20197\u201d to 5\u20198\u201d, of average build. Well, this gentleman is heavily muscled. [Defendant.] It appears to me. I wouldn\u2019t describe him as average.\nI don\u2019t think he is 5\u20197\u201d. As he stands next to me, he\u2019s a good deal shorter than I am, and I\u2019m 6\u20191\u201d.\nSo \u2014 But none of that\u2019s in front of the jury. They don\u2019t know how tall I am.\nI had asked the witness \u2014 asked\u2014I asked the jury \u2014 Excuse me. I asked the witness how tall I was, and she said 5\u20197\u201d. I\u2019m hoping, and I\u2019m not gonna tell the jury \u2019cause I\u2019m not testifying, but I\u2019m hoping the jury will understand that her perceptions are questionable.\nNo, Your Honor, her identification is not sufficient to tie [defendant] to the crime; although, I think some jurors could think it is.\u201d\nAfter this exchange, the court ruled it would allow the demonstration because the issue of whether defendant limps was relevant and probative. Although the court does not say so and defendant\u2019s attorney previously stated identification was not at issue, from this exchange it appears one of defendant\u2019s trial strategies was to call into question whether the man Killion saw on the day in question was defendant.\nIn People v. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d 112, 126, 413 N.E.2d 1254, 1260-61 (1980), the defendant argued the trial court erred in forcing him to model clothing before the jury. The defendant argued the \u201cfit of the clothing was not at issue, that the demonstration was not relevant to any other issue in the case, and that the demonstration would only serve to show that [the] defendant was one of many people whom the clothes would fit.\u201d Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d at 126, 413 N.E.2d at 1261. However, one of the defense witnesses at the trial testified the clothing belonged to someone else and would not fit the defendant. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d at 126, 413 N.E.2d at 1261. This testimony brought the fit of the clothing into issue. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d at 126, 413 N.E.2d at 1261. In explaining why the demonstration in Warmack was relevant, the supreme court stated:\n\u201cA demonstration that the clothing fit [the] defendant, though not of itself establishing that [the] defendant wore that clothing at the time and scene of the crimes, would be entitled to some weight, to be considered by the jury in conjunction with other corroborative evidence from which the guilt or innocence of [the] defendant could be determined.\u201d Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d at 126, 413 N.E.2d at 1261.\nThe same is true in the instant case. A demonstration showing defendant limps would not establish he was the man Killian saw at the Glass residence on the day in question. However, the demonstration was relevant for the jury to weigh with the other information it saw and heard during the trial to determine if it believed defendant was the man Killion saw at the Glass residence on the day in question and if it believed defendant was guilty. As a result, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this demonstration.\nFurther, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the demonstration in this case, the error would have been harmless. Even without the demonstration, the State presented overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction but remand the case so the trial court can amend its written judgment to give defendant credit for 134 days, not 133 days, spent in custody.\nAffirmed as modified and cause remanded with directions.\nTURNER, J., concurs.\nJUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring:\nAlthough I fully agree with the majority\u2019s opinion, I write specially to commend the trial court for thoroughly exploring defense counsel\u2019s objection to the in-court demonstration of defendant\u2019s limp before ruling on the issue.\nSeveral good reasons support engaging in the type of discussion the trial court undertook in this case, including the following: (1) the court is likely to become better informed regarding (a) precisely what is being offered, (b) why the party offering the evidence thinks it is appropriate, and (c) why the opponent thinks it is not; (2) if the State is offering the evidence, the defendant\u2019s objection thereto is overruled, and the defendant is ultimately convicted, the defendant may challenge the court\u2019s ruling on appeal only on the basis of the grounds asserted to the trial court (see Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 32-33, 787 N.E.2d 796, 813-14 (2003); People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347, 739 N.E.2d 455, 477 (2000); Fichen v. Alton & Southern Ry. Co., 291 Ill. App. 3d 635, 644-45, 685 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1996)); and (3) on appeal, as in this case, the reviewing court will have a much better record to consider when addressing the argument that the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling.\nI commend the trial court for its extensive discussion with defense counsel regarding the proffered evidence before making the court\u2019s ruling, and I urge other trial courts to do the same.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Susan M. Wilham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jason E Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. HAYES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201402\u20140981\nOpinion filed November 12, 2004.\nSTEIGMANN, J., specially concurring.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Susan M. Wilham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJohn C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jason E Young, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0355-01", "first_page_order": 371, "last_page_order": 377 }