{ "id": 3363854, "name": "ESTATE OF DAVID F. SMIDA, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Estate of Smida v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund", "decision_date": "2004-08-04", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201403\u20141168", "first_page": "551", "last_page": "554-D", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 551" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511387 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "142-43" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544908 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469398 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599259 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725358 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126348 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511387 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142-43, 145" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "149" }, { "page": "148-49" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599259 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0199-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 616, "char_count": 18757, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.824101621054766e-08, "percentile": 0.362365527874405 }, "sha256": "0b7fa5282be2d8e7276ff14db9806189bdd1c30075a1db72d73899076fd0f1a3", "simhash": "1:0bba913a0903c481", "word_count": 3114 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:37:49.624900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ESTATE OF DAVID F. SMIDA, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the estate of David E Smida, appeals the trial court\u2019s dismissal of its complaint seeking the review of a decision of the Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (the Board). Plaintiff argues that the court erred by not allowing it leave to amend the complaint and, alternatively, that the court erred by dismissing the complaint. We reverse and remand.\nOn August 29, 2002, the Board decided the claims of plaintiff and defendant Donna Marcinski, regarding Smida\u2019s retirement fund death benefit. It determined that the death benefit should be paid to Marcin-ski.\nOn September 30, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review against defendants, the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) and Marcinski. The complaint does not reference that IMRF rendered its final administrative decision through the Board.\nOn November 4, 2002, IMRF and Marcinski filed answers to the complaint. Thereafter, the appellate court released the decision in Wilson v. State Employees\u2019 Retirement System, 336 Ill. App. 3d 199 (2002). The Wilson court held that, under section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2002)), in an action to review an administrative decision, the administrative agency must be named as a defendant. Wilson, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 203. Thus, where a plaintiff failed to name in a complaint for administrative review the administrative agency that rendered the final decision, the trial court must dismiss the complaint. Wilson, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 203. On January 22, 2003, Marcinski moved the court for leave to withdraw her answer and file a motion to dismiss. Relying on Wilson, she argued that plaintiffs complaint was fatally defective because it did not name the Board as a defendant. That same day, plaintiff moved the court for leave to file an amended complaint to add the Board as a defendant.\nOn April 8, 2003, after a hearing, the court denied plaintiffs motion. IMRF also moved to withdraw its answer and file a motion to dismiss. The court granted IMRF\u2019s and Marcinski\u2019s motions to withdraw their answers and to file motions to dismiss.\nDefendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2002)), arguing that plaintiff failed to comply with section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law by not naming a party of record, the Board, as a defendant. The court granted the motions, dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.\nInitially, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that, under section 3 \u2014 103 of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2002)), plaintiff could not file an amended complaint. We review de novo the trial court\u2019s interpretation of a statute. Puffer-Hefty School District No. 69 v. Du Page Regional Board of School Trustees, 339 Ill. App. 3d 194, 206 (2003).\nAccording to the Review Law, an \u201caction to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2002). The Review Law further provides that, if a complaint for administrative review is timely filed, that complaint may be amended \u201cto add an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding, if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2002). Therefore, section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Review Law creates a right to amend a complaint under specific circumstances.\nOur inquiry is whether the Board, the party that plaintiff sought to add to the complaint, qualified for amendment under section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Review Law. Defendants argue that the Board is an \u201cadministrative agency\u201d and, therefore, plaintiff was properly denied leave to amend its complaint, as the statute permits the addition of only \u201can employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2002). According to defendants, because the Board is an administrative agency, it cannot be an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency. For support, defendants rely on Wilson.\nThe Wilson court determined that a board that renders the final decision of an administrative agency satisfies the definition of \u201cadministrative agency\u201d in section 3 \u2014 101 of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2002)) and therefore must be named as a defendant under section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law or the complaint must be dismissed. Wilson, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 203. However, the Wilson court did not consider whether, under section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Review Law, a plaintiff should be granted leave to amend the complaint to add the board as a defendant. In fact, the plaintiff in Wilson never sought leave to amend the complaint. As a result, the holding in Wilson is of limited relevance to our analysis.\nFor a party to qualify for amendment under section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Review Law, three conditions must be met. First, an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity must be a party to the action. Next, the party sought to be added must be an \u201cemployee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2002). The Review Law does not define these terms. However, section 3 \u2014 103(2) does explain that an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency must have \u201cacted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding\u201d (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2) (West 2002)), the third condition for amendment. Whether this language includes the Board is unclear; thus, the language is ambiguous.\nWhen a statute is ambiguous, we may look beyond the language as written to discern the drafters\u2019 intent and consider the purpose of the statute and the evils that it was designed to remedy. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542-43 (1997). After carefully reviewing the statutory language, we conclude that the Board qualifies for amendment. In the complaint, plaintiff named a government entity, IMRF, as a party. Additionally, there is no dispute that the Board was a party of record to the administrative proceeding. As for the third condition, whether the Board is an employee, agent, or member of IMRF, we conclude that the Board is a member of IMRF.\nOur interpretation of section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Review Law is consistent with the legislature\u2019s intent when it enacted the right to amend a complaint under specific circumstances. While analyzing section 3 \u2014 103 of the Review Law, the court in Fragakis v. Police & Fire Comm\u2019n, 303 Ill. App. 3d 141, 149 (1999), applied a liberal construction of that section. The Fragakis court stated that, when the legislature amended section 3 \u2014 103 of the Review Law in 1997, it sought to \u201cbring peace to the dangerous minefield\u201d created by cases denying a plaintiff leave to amend a timely complaint to name the appropriate party. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43. \u201c[T]he legislature has recognized that these [administrative review] cases should not be dismissed for such technical violations [in naming the parties].\u201d Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 149.\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred when interpreting the statute and should have granted plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to add the Board.\nNext, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint for failing to name a party of record as a defendant, as required by section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 107(a) (West 2002)). Section 3 \u2014 107(a) provides that \u201cin any action to review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2002). Therefore, the trial court dismissed the complaint because the administrative agency, the Board, was not named as a defendant. As we previously have concluded that the trial court erred by not allowing plaintiff to amend the complaint to add the Board as a defendant, we need not address this argument.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nHUTCHINSON and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON,\ndissenting upon denial of rehearing:\nAlthough I agree with the public policy set forth by the majority\u2019s decision, allowing parties to amend a timely filed complaint for administrative review to name the appropriate parties, I must reluctantly dissent. In their petition for rehearing, the defendants argue that we overlooked the case of Veazey v. Baker, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599 (2001), in making our original decision. I note that in their appellate briefs, the defendants placed little emphasis on Veazey. Rather, Veazey was merely listed at the end of a long chain cite. Nonetheless, upon the defendants\u2019 request, I have reviewed Veazey\nVeazey involved an administrative review action in which the plaintiff appealed the order of the circuit court dismissing his complaint. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599, 601 (2001). In his complaint, the plaintiff challenged the decision of the defendants, the Illinois Department of Employment Security (the Department) and the Department\u2019s Director, finding him ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. In his complaint, the plaintiff named the Department and its Director. However, the plaintiffs complaint did not name the Board of Review (the Board) which issued the decision from which the plaintiff was appealing. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. Upon motion of the Department and its Director, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for failure to name the Board as a defendant and denied the plaintiffs request for leave to amend the complaint to add the Board as an adverse party. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. On appeal, the reviewing court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. The reviewing court determined that the Board was the body that issued the administrative decision that was subject to the review process. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 603. As such, the Board was the administrative agency from which the plaintiff had to seek review. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 603.\nIn so ruling, the Veazey court explained that section 3 \u2014 102 of the Administrative Review Law (the Act) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 102 (West 2002)) explicitly conditions review of an administrative decision upon compliance with its provisions:\n\u201cUnless review is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein provided, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 102 (West 1998); Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 602.\nFurthermore, the court explained that the Act is a departure from the common law and, as such, its provisions must be strictly adhered to by the parties. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 602. Because administrative review actions involve the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction, the court\u2019s power to hear such cases is limited to the language of the Act, and if the prescribed statutory procedure is not strictly followed, no jurisdiction can be invoked. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 602.\nPursuant to section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Act, a complaint must name \u201cthe administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency *** [as] defendants.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2002). Accordingly, in a complaint for administrative review, a plaintiff is required to name the body which made the final administrative decision at issue. Wilson, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 203. In the present case, it is undisputed that the Board of Trustees of the IMRF (the Board) made the final administrative decision from which the plaintiff is appealing. Accordingly, the plaintiff was required to name the Board as a defendant in his complaint. However, the plaintiff only named the IMRF.\nIn determining that the plaintiff could amend his complaint to add the Board, the majority, in relying on Fragakis, explains that 1997 amendments to the Act were intended to bring peace to the dangerous minefield created by cases denying a plaintiff leave to amend a timely filed complaint to name the appropriate party. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43, 145. Furthermore, the majority explains that the legislature has recognized that administrative review cases should not be dismissed for such technical violations in naming the parties. See Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 149. If the Veazey court had applied the rationale of the majority, it could have characterized the Department as a governmental entity of which the Board is a member and allowed the plaintiff\u2019s requested amendment under section 3 \u2014 103(2). However, the Veazey court did not allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to add the Board. Consequently, upon review of Veazey, I do not believe Fragakis should be construed as liberally as the majority suggests.\nIn Fragakis, the plaintiff, a police sergeant, appealed from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his complaint for administrative review of a five-day suspension imposed on him by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (the Board). Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 142. In his complaint, the plaintiff named and served only the Board. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 143. The trial court dismissed his complaint for failure to name the individual members of the Board and the chief of police as parties. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 143. On appeal, the reviewing court determined that the trial court erred in not allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint to add the chief of police and the individual members of the Board. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148.\nIn so ruling, the court explained that 1997 amendments to section 3 \u2014 103 of the Act created two specific exceptions to the filing requirements. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148. Under section 3 \u2014 103(1), the court held that the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to add the chief of police, and under section 3 \u2014 103(2), the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to add the individual Board members where the Board was a party to the action for administrative review. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148. Moreover, according to the Fragakis court, \u201c[s]ection 3 \u2014 103 clearly grants the right to amend in those situations where a party has filed a timely complaint but failed to name a police chief or failed to name an individual member of a board where the board was made a party.\u201d Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 149. As such, I believe that section 3 \u2014 103(2) was intended to allow a plaintiff to amend a complaint for administrative review to add an individual as an adverse party, if the individual was an employee, agent, or member of an agency, board, or entity, and the agency, board, or entity had been named in the original complaint. In the present case, the Board does not qualify as an individual.\nA review of the legislative history of the 1997 amendments to the Act lends support to this interpretation of section 3 \u2014 103(2). I agree with the majority that section 3 \u2014 103(2) of the Act is ambiguous. When a statute\u2019s meaning is unclear, the court may examine legislative history. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Teachers Insurance Co., 195 Ill. 2d 322, 330 (2001). The Act was amended by Public Act 89\u2014 685 (House Bill 346), which became effective June 1, 1997. The amendments included the addition of section 3 \u2014 103(2), and modifications to sections 3 \u2014 105 and 3 \u2014 107 of the Act. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103(2), 3 \u2014 105, 3 \u2014 107 (West 2002). When introducing the legislation, Senator Hawkinson stated the following:\n\u201c[House Bill 346] allows a plaintiff in an administrative review action to obtain service on the agency if they have already served the agency head or to refile against an employee acting in his official capacity if they have already served the agency. Without this change, we\u2019re finding them \u2014 some cases are being dismissed because all necessary parties have not been named and served.\u201d 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 8, 1996, at 12-13 (statements of Senator Hawkinson).\nThis indicates that the 1997 amendments to the Act were intended to allow a plaintiff to amend a timely filed complaint for administrative review by adding an agency, if the agency head was named, or by adding an individual, if the individual was an employee of a properly named agency. This interpretation is consistent with that found in Fragakis. See Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148-49.\nAccordingly, in light of Veazey, and upon closer review of Fragakis and the legislative history of section 3 \u2014 103(2), I do not think it is proper to interpret the Board as a member of the IMRF. I believe the amendment to section 3 \u2014 103(2) was intended to apply to individuals. Unfortunately, although the plaintiff named the IMRF in his complaint, he failed to name a necessary party to the administrative review action, specifically, the Board. As the Board is not an individual, the changes to the Act allowing amendments to the original complaint to name a necessary party do not apply in the present case. Accordingly, I believe the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Unfortunately, the current state of the administrative review law denies the plaintiff his day in court for what I perceive as a mere technical violation. Although I am not comfortable with this outcome, for the foregoing reasons, I must dissent. I would therefore grant the defendants\u2019 petition for rehearing.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard J. Tarulis, of Brooks, Adams & Tarulis, of Naperville, for appellant.", "Michael B. Weinstein, of Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, of Oak Brook, for appellee Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund.", "Stephen B. Mead, of McGuire Woods, L.L.R, of Chicago, for appellee Donna Mareinski." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ESTATE OF DAVID F. SMIDA, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201403\u20141168\nOpinion filed August 4, 2004.\nRehearing denied December 28, 2004.\nRichard J. Tarulis, of Brooks, Adams & Tarulis, of Naperville, for appellant.\nMichael B. Weinstein, of Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, of Oak Brook, for appellee Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund.\nStephen B. Mead, of McGuire Woods, L.L.R, of Chicago, for appellee Donna Mareinski." }, "file_name": "0551-01", "first_page_order": 567, "last_page_order": 574 }