{ "id": 3364990, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN H. ROLFE III, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rolfe", "decision_date": "2004-10-05", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201402\u20140760", "first_page": "1005", "last_page": "1014", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 1005" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "771 N.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209151 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "791 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469283 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403-04" }, { "page": "404", "parenthetical": "an extraordinarily brutal attack on a toddler resulting in extensive head injuries was indicative of the intent to kill, regardless of the fact that the child's death was averted by heroic medical intervention" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483552 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574074 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1145" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351227 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450979 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 839", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436214 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0839-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1002, "char_count": 21171, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.09416263264769491 }, "sha256": "6bdaa6802b5d9ac53aaf8a63a083ae64bafeb9ac58bdda24f6135164b04e8dbf", "simhash": "1:ba36f26c97f484d1", "word_count": 3544 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:37:49.624900+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN H. ROLFE III, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WELCH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJohn H. Rolfe III, the defendant, was convicted by a Jasper County jury of one count of home invasion, three counts of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated battery. He was ultimately sentenced to serve 22 years\u2019 imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, 7 years\u2019 imprisonment each for two of the attempted first-degree murder convictions, 9 years\u2019 imprisonment for the third attempted first-degree murder conviction, and 30 months\u2019 probation for the aggravated battery conviction. The court found that it was mandatory that the sentences he served consecutively, under section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a) (i) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (i) (West 2002)). The court ordered the defendant to serve 85% of his sentence.\nOn appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, because \u201csevere bodily injury\u201d was inherent in the offenses as charged, and that, thus, the use of the infliction of severe bodily injury to impose consecutive sentences constituted an improper double enhancement of his sentence. He also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by giving a nonpattern jury instruction that improperly emphasized the State\u2019s theory of the case. He seeks the reversal of his conviction and a remand of the case to the circuit court for a retrial.\nBACKGROUND\nThe record on appeal, which is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution in order to preserve the role of the jury as the weigher of the evidence (see People v. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 839, 844, 812 N.E.2d 759, 764 (2004)), discloses the following information.\nOn November 8, 2001, the defendant armed himself with a claw hammer and a knife and went in the early hours of the morning to the home of his mother-in-law, Robyn Spicer. He was motivated to do so because he correctly suspected that his estranged wife, Shana Rolfe, was having an affair with her coworker, Steve Stout. The defendant saw Stout\u2019s vehicle parked outside the darkened Spicer residence, surmised that Stout was inside the home with Rolfe, and entered the front door. Having gained entry to the darkened dwelling, the defendant stood in the kitchen with his back pressed against the wall in an attempt to conceal his presence from Spicer, who had risen to use the bathroom. Spicer noticed him, walked into the kitchen, and asked what he was doing in her house. The defendant retorted that Spicer knew what he was doing, and Spicer turned to retreat to her bedroom. As she walked into her bedroom, Spicer saw the defendant\u2019s arm rising behind her head, prompting her to put her hand up defensively to deflect the blow struck by the defendant. Spicer\u2019s memory of the events that immediately followed the initial blow was obliterated by her injuries, but she did recall regaining consciousness in her bloody bedroom, drenched in blood and in great pain. She was conscious on intake at the hospital and told the emergency room physician that she had sustained multiple hammer blows to the head, as well as blows to the hands and left forearm.\nThe record substantiates that Spicer had sustained a broken hand, with \u201ctwo puncture wounds that looked like the claw marks of a hammer,\u201d and a large bruise on her palm, bruises to her left forearm, a large laceration on her forehead, and head injuries. She had a depressed skull fracture that was consistent with being struck with a rounded object like a hammerhead. It was so severe that bone fragments pressed into her brain and created a pneumocephalus, meaning that outside air entered the brain through the fracture. Spicer was airlifted to the Carle Clinic, where a part of her brain was removed and five steel plates and 18 screws were inserted in her skull to repair the damage caused by the defendant\u2019s attack. Spicer developed balance problems, expressive aphasia, pain, and increased fatigue, and she sustained permanent facial scarring as a result of the attack. She also has the potential to develop seizures in the future due to her brain injury.\nAfter he attacked Spicer, the defendant entered the bedroom where Steve Stout and Shana Rolfe were sleeping, and he attacked the couple. The emergency room physician who treated Stout when he arrived at the emergency room testified at the sentencing hearing that Stout was conscious when he was admitted and told the personnel that he had been attacked with a hammer and that he had been stabbed in the face. He sustained hammer and stab wounds that required his evacuation by airlift to the Carle Clinic. Once there, he endured surgery, an 8-day stay in the intensive care unit, and an additional 14 days in the rehabilitation unit. He had multiple facial bone fractures over his upper jaw that extended into his sinuses, a depressed skull fracture with bone fragments and air penetrating the brain, stab wounds to his face and hands, and a through-and-through stab wound in his upper left thigh. After surgery and physical therapy, Stout was left with multiple permanent scars, many of which were on his face, and he had memory loss and permanent damage to his leg, arm, and hand, which left him with a limp and the inability to write well with his dominant hand. Stout was no longer able to work in the restaurant industry as a result of his injuries, and he had no assurance that all his muscle tone would ever return.\nShana Rolfe woke to find the defendant in her bedroom yelling as he reached over her and struck Stout with a hammer. She fled the room and went to her mother\u2019s bedroom, where she found her mother lying on the floor, breathing oddly. Rolfe grabbed a portable telephone and ran out of the house to summon aid from the neighbors. The defendant caught up with her and attacked her with the hammer and his fists, striking the top of her head. The neighbor intervened when he got up to investigate who was screaming outside his bedroom window and saw the defendant beating Rolfe. He chased the defendant away from Rolfe, the defendant ran back into Spicer\u2019s home, and the neighbor returned to help Rolfe. The neighbor called the authorities, and Rolfe was transported to the hospital at the same time that her mother and Stout were taken there. The emergency room doctor testified at the sentencing hearing that Rolfe was able to tell hospital personnel that she had been struck with a hammer on her face, head, and right hand and that she possibly had been stabbed. The emergency room physician testified that the injuries to her lower jaw and cheekbones were consistent with being struck with a hammer or some other weapon and were inconsistent with being struck with a fist.\nRolfe was found to have multiple lacerations over her scalp, pain and swelling over her cheekbones and her entire lower jaw, and pain over her left forearm, wrist, and hand, as well as scattered areas of bruising and swelling over her right lower leg and right buttock. She sustained permanent damage to her right hand and her face. She had two hand surgeries, which resulted in the installation of a plate in her hand, held by five screws, and two maxillofacial surgeries to implant a plate in her jaw, which had multiple fractures. The injuries to Rolfe\u2019s head resulted in permanent scarring, and she had lessened utility of her hand as a result of the injuries to her hand.\nThe doctor who performed triage on all three of the victims when they were brought to the hospital was of the opinion that all three victims sustained \u201cgreat bodily harm,\u201d a term that he believed to be syi.onymous with \u201csevere bodily injury.\u201d He assessed the injuries to Spicer and Stout as \u201clife-threatening\u201d depressed skull fractures and stressed that Rolfe\u2019s facial injuries resulted in marked disfigurement and a threat to her health.\nThe defendant returned to Spicer\u2019s home after his attack on Rolfe had been interrupted by the neighbor. Once there, he slashed his wrists and throat. He was later taken to the hospital for treatment.\nThe defendant\u2019s trial testimony was somewhat convoluted and was clearly intended to minimize the ferocity and severity of the attacks on the victims. He exhibited selective amnesia about various aspects of his assaults on his victims. He claimed not to even remember seeing Spicer and asserted that his attack on Stout was mutual combat during which he \u201cprobably\u201d had the hammer in his possession. This claim was belied by his recorded statement to the police, in which he stated as follows: \u201cI was beating Steve with a hammer that I\u2019d grabbed from my car[,] mind you[,] like[,] two or three times [sic]. He got up out of bed. He was defending himself pretty good.\u201d The defendant maintained that he had pursued his terrified wife from the house because he \u201cjust wanted to converse with her\u201d and that he struck Rolfe with his hand once or twice. He testified that he only intended to \u201cscare the hell\u201d out of his wife and Stout and that he had conceived the idea of going to his mother-in-law\u2019s house to place a knife between his unfaithful wife and her lover after seeing a \u201cmedieval\u201d television show that depicted such a scene.\nAt the final instructions conference, the trial court informed the parties that it would give the State\u2019s instruction number 17, a nonpat-tern jury instruction on the law of intent, over defense counsel\u2019s renewed objection that it unduly emphasized the State\u2019s theory of the case and that a nonpattern instruction should not be given \u201con [a] crucial element of the case.\u201d During closing argument, the State argued that the defendant\u2019s intent to kill the victims could be inferred from the manner and circumstances of the attack, that his attack on Spicer had been prompted by her interruption of the defendant\u2019s planned attack on her daughter and her lover, and that defendant had \u201cwanted a murder/suicide\u201d but \u201chis plan got messed up\u201d and he failed to either murder his three victims or kill himself. Defense counsel responded by claiming that the defendant\u2019s lack of intent to kill was evident because \u201cif [he] wanted those people to be dead[,] they would be dead.\u201d This assertion echoed the defendant\u2019s opening statement, in which counsel told the jury that although the basic facts of the attack were not disputed, the jury would have to determine what the defendant\u2019s intentions were when he committed the attacks. Counsel stated that the jury was going to have to decide what the defendant\u2019s intentions were, \u201cbased on the type and nature of the injuries, [the] attendant circumstances of everything that happened[,] and the relationship of the parties.\u201d He implied that the defendant had not intended to kill the victims, stating that they had been \u201cvirtually helpless against the defendant\u2019s attacks\u201d but noting that all of them were there to testify.\nFollowing his June 13, 2002, convictions, the defendant filed various posttrial motions, which were denied at the July 26, 2002, sentencing hearing. The trial court found that the giving of the State\u2019s instruction number 17 was an appropriate exercise of its discretion, that even defense counsel conceded that it was an accurate statement of the law, that the instruction was short and simple, and that it was not argumentative. The State\u2019s instruction number 17 was given in order to fill a gap in the instructions to assist the jury in reaching a just resolution. In sentencing the defendant, the court found, inter alia, that consecutive sentences were required under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (i) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (i) (West 2002)) and that section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) (West 2002)) also applied because the public needed to be protected from further criminal conduct. The defendant\u2019s August 23, 2002, motion to reduce his sentences was granted in part on November 8, 2002, and the instant appeal was pursued.\nCONTENTIONS ON APPEAL\nOn appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court imposed improper mandatory consecutive sentences, because bodily injury was inherent in the offenses of home invasion and attempted first-degree murder as charged, thereby creating a double enhancement of his punishment. He also asserts that the trial court erroneously allowed a nonpattern jury instruction on intent that unduly emphasized the State\u2019s theory of the case.\nDISCUSSION\nI. Sentencing Issue\nThe defendant was convicted of Class X crimes in which the infliction of severe bodily injury was an element and was then sentenced to serve consecutive terms under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (i) of the Unified Code, which authorizes consecutive sentences where the crimes were committed as a part of a single course of conduct, there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, one of the offenses for which he was convicted was a Class X felony, and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury. He asserts that he was subjected to improper double enhancement, warranting the modification of his sentence by this court to make the terms of imprisonment run concurrently with one another.\nThe recent Illinois Supreme Court case of People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 809 N.E.2d 1214 (2004), is dispositive of this issue. The Phelps court noted that double enhancement occurs when a single factor is used both as an element of an offense and as the basis for imposing a harsher sentence than would have otherwise been imposed. It went on to find that where a defendant is sentenced for Class X felonies that had as an element of the crimes the infliction of severe bodily injury, consecutive sentences may be imposed pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 4(a) (i) of the Unified Code. It found that \u201cno double enhancement occurred because consecutive sentencing is not a sentencing enhancement\u201d; rather, it \u201c \u2018determines only the manner in which a defendant will serve his sentences for multiple offenses.\u2019 \u201d Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 14, 809 N.E.2d at 1222, quoting People v. Carney, 196 Ill. 2d 518, 532, 752 N.E.2d 1137, 1145 (2001).\nThe imposition of consecutive sentences was appropriate under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (i) of the Unified Code, and the defendant\u2019s sentence was clearly not the product of double enhancement.\nII. Instruction\nThe defendant contends that the court\u2019s giving of the State\u2019s jury instruction on intent was an abuse of discretion because the jury was already adequately informed of the law and the nonpattern instruction unduly stressed the State\u2019s theory of the case, that being that the defendant\u2019s attacks had been perpetrated with the express intent to kill the victims.\nTo prove the defendant guilty of attempted first-degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant performed an act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the murder and that he possessed the specific intent to kill; a specific intent to kill may be shown by the surrounding circumstances, including the character of the assault and the use of a deadly weapon. People v. Brown, 341 Ill. App. 3d 774, 781, 793 N.E.2d 75, 80 (2003).\n\u201cBecause intent is a state of mind, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. As a result, this court has recognized that where intent is not admitted by the defendant, it can be shown by surrounding circumstances [citation], including the character of the assault and the nature and seriousness of the injury [citation].\nIn discussing the proof necessary to satisfy the intent element of attempt to commit murder, this court has further held:\n\u2018 \u201cSince every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural and probable consequences flowing from his own deliberate act, it follows that if one wilfully does an act, the direct and natural tendency of which is to destroy another\u2019s life, the natural and irresistible conclusion, in the absence of qualifying facts, is that the destruction of such other person\u2019s life was intended.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d People v. Williams, 165 Ill. 2d 51, 64, 649 N.E.2d 397, 403-04 (1995).\nThe law governing the giving of nonpattern jury instructions was succinctly set forth by the supreme court as follows in People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 780 N.E.2d 669 (2002):\n\u201cA trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, draft and give nonpattern instructions. [Citations.] The decision to instruct a jury using nonpattern instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Whether a court has abused its discretion will depend on whether the nonpattern instruction tendered is an accurate, simple, brief, impartial, and nonargumentative statement of the law. [Citations.] As a general rule, where an appropriate IPI instruction exists on a subject upon which the trial court has determined the jury should be instructed, the IPI must be used. [Citations.] Illinois pattern instructions were \u2018painstakingly drafted with the use of simple, brief[,] and unslanted language so as to clearly and concisely state the law,\u2019 and, for that reason, \u2018the use of additional instructions on a subject already covered by IPI would defeat the goal that all instructions be simple, brief, impartial!,] and free from argument.\u2019 [Citation.] Thus, while nonpattern instructions may be given, the instructions, as a whole, must not be misleading or confusing.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d at 211-12, 780 N.E.2d at 682.\nThe nonpattern instruction at issue was proffered by the State and ultimately given to the jury over the defendant\u2019s objections, although the defendant conceded that it was an accurate statement of the law. It offered a definition of proof of the intent to kill that read as follows:\n\u201cIntent to kill can be established by proof of surrounding circumstances!,] including the character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon!,] and other matters from which an intent to kill may be inferred!,] and such intent may be inferred when it has been demonstrated that the defendant voluntarily and willingly committed an act, the natural tendency of which is to destroy another\u2019s life.\u201d\nAs noted above, the defendant\u2019s opening statement to the jury emphasized that the jury was going to have to determine the defendant\u2019s intentions for the attacks, \u201cbased on the type and nature of the injuries, [the] attendant circumstances of everything that happened^] and the relationship of the parties.\u201d That statement, while not as carefully crafted as the instruction, embodied the gist of the nonpattern instruction that was given to the jury. The instruction is a simple, straightforward, brief, impartial, and accurate statement of the law that fills in a gap in the instructions. Thus, its tender to the jury cannot be viewed as an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion.\nWe note in passing that the defendant\u2019s suggestion on appeal that the alleged prejudice resulting from the giving of the State\u2019s instruction number 17 would have been mitigated had the trial court given the jury a nonpattern instruction that emphasized his theory of the case \u2014 that the survival of the victims reflected that he did not intend to kill them \u2014 is meritless. Not only did he not proffer such an instruction to the trial court, but had he done so, the court would not have given it to the jury. His contention is reminiscent of the defendant\u2019s stance in People v. Green, 339 Ill. App. 3d 443, 791 N.E.2d 134 (2003), where the defendant argued that had he intended to kill the police officers at whom he had fired four or five shots from close range from a moving vehicle, he could easily have done so. The court observed that the facts supported the inference that the defendant\u2019s lack of competence with a pistol was just as likely a conclusion to draw from the facts and that \u201c[p]oor marksmanship is not a defense to attempt (murder).\u201d Green, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 452, 791 N.E.2d at 141; accord People v. Johnson, 331 Ill. App. 3d 239, 771 N.E.2d 477 (2002).\nThe shocking injuries and the ferocity with which the defendant inflicted those upon his victims were such that no sane adult would have engaged in such brutality or inflicted such injuries unless he intended to extinguish their lives. See Williams, 165 Ill. 2d at 65, 649 N.E.2d at 404 (an extraordinarily brutal attack on a toddler resulting in extensive head injuries was indicative of the intent to kill, regardless of the fact that the child\u2019s death was averted by heroic medical intervention). The fact that the objects of his rage and violence survived the defendant\u2019s attacks speaks to the wizardry of modern medical practice and the extraordinary dedication of their physicians, not to any intention on the part of the defendant to spare their lives.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nKUEHN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WELCH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Michelle Zalisko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Earn Koester, State\u2019s Attorney, of Newton (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Trent M. Marshall, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN H. ROLFE III, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201402\u20140760\nOpinion filed October 5, 2004.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Michelle Zalisko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nEarn Koester, State\u2019s Attorney, of Newton (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Trent M. Marshall, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1005-01", "first_page_order": 1025, "last_page_order": 1034 }