{ "id": 3218511, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO DiPACE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. DiPace", "decision_date": "2004-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 2-03-0469", "first_page": "104", "last_page": "118", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451541 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 3d 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3263112 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "reckless driving and transportation of liquor are separate acts because \"[ajlthough these acts may be done simultaneously, they are completely separate\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/73/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209119 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "describing driving while under the influence of alcohol as an act for purposes of the one-act, one-crime rule" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5310082 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209967 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "\"act of driving while intoxicated was independent of and had no relationship to the simultaneous act of driving while license revoked\" for purposes of joinder" }, { "page": "6-11" }, { "page": "6-7" }, { "page": "9-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131042 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69", "parenthetical": "describing driving while under the influence of alcohol as a single act" }, { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778428 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463653 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909165 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186" }, { "page": "188-89", "parenthetical": "in the context of home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault" }, { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "multiple convictions are improper if they are based on precisely the same physical act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599591 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5573545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 990", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468657 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "992" }, { "page": "992" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0990-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798184 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" }, { "page": "664-66" }, { "page": "665-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364-66" }, { "page": "364-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 904", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384816 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912", "parenthetical": "harmless error to admit alcohol test where other \"external indicators\" established intoxication" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5322431 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445-46", "parenthetical": "ironworker testifying as to operation of oil well and pump was lay witness testifying to facts he had observed through personal experience" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/92/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434007 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "allowing breath analysis results despite holding in Boughton, because the State provided evidence that the machine was working properly" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381809 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172-73" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "172-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233-34", "parenthetical": "fact that informant exposes self to liability for a false tip makes tip more reliable" }, { "page": "545", "parenthetical": "fact that informant exposes self to liability for a false tip makes tip more reliable" }, { "page": "2330", "parenthetical": "fact that informant exposes self to liability for a false tip makes tip more reliable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5455119 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218-19" }, { "page": "221" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294433 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544450 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9508406 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "1378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 1003", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2881696 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017", "parenthetical": "stating the rule in the context of finding probable cause" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514576 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69-70" }, { "page": "71", "parenthetical": "evidence of intoxication properly discovered pursuant to a legal stop" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9137003 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145-48" }, { "page": "616-18" }, { "page": "1922-24" }, { "page": "145-48" }, { "page": "616-18" }, { "page": "1922-24" }, { "page": "147-48" }, { "page": "617-18" }, { "page": "1923-24" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "1923" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "1923" }, { "page": "146-47" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "1923-24", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574541 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848" }, { "page": "851" }, { "page": "845, 850-52" }, { "page": "845" }, { "page": "845" }, { "page": "848", "parenthetical": "reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop based only on facts at the time of the stop" }, { "page": "848-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725111 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" }, { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "stating that the reliability determinations for probable cause and reasonable suspicion are analogous, with an allowance given for the lower standard of reasonable suspicion" }, { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0863-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" }, { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256284 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599-600" }, { "page": "600" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "1880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515994 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "941" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1208, "char_count": 34475, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2434829226370113e-07, "percentile": 0.6084874060225133 }, "sha256": "08738eda86b4d80162f13bb523b8526dd97a7dc53d720a64e9ee07831477c411", "simhash": "1:0bfcbdcf7d4ad5f5", "word_count": 5662 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:29.254043+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO DiPACE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Lorenzo DiPace, appeals from his convictions of Class 2 felony driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(c\u20141)(3) (West 2002)), and Class 4 felony driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014303(d) (West 2002)). Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) his breath alcohol analysis should not have been admitted by the trial court; (3) the State failed to prove his prior violations of the statutes as elements of both crimes; and (4) he cannot he convicted of both Class 2 felony driving under the influence and Class 4 felony driving while license revoked, because the crimes should be merged. We affirm.\nI. Facts\nOn February 14, 2002, two women were driving north on Interstate 355 when they noticed a red Mercury Mountaineer being driven erratically in front of them. After watching the car drift out of its lane and then jerk back into its lane several times, they called the police. They provided the dispatcher with a description of the car and its license plate number. They followed the Mountaineer as it exited onto Lake Street, where they watched it drift onto the shoulder, make contact with a raised curb, and also almost make contact with another car before finally pulling into a grocery store parking lot. While the two women waited in the parking lot for police to arrive, defendant exited the Mountaineer and went into the grocery store.\nDefendant was still inside the grocery store when Officer Michael Gicla arrived on the scene. The two women relayed to Gicla what they had seen. They pointed out defendant\u2019s car, which was parked in a relatively isolated area in the parking lot, and they described the driver as a white male, possibly in his forties. After providing Gicla with their names, birth dates, and phone numbers, the two women departed. One of the women later testified at trial.\nFrom his police car, Gicla watched the Mountaineer until he saw defendant return to his car and drive out of the parking lot. He followed defendant for approximately one mile before he saw defendant\u2019s car cross onto the dotted white lane-dividing lines. Gicla then activated his police lights to pull over defendant\u2019s car. Defendant slowed and continued driving for approximately one-half mile, passing a few minor streets, before pulling over at the next major intersection.\nWhen Gicla approached defendant\u2019s car, he noted a strong odor of alcohol on defendant\u2019s breath. Gicla also noted that defendant\u2019s speech was noticeably slurred. Defendant claimed that he had consumed IV2 beers. Gicla asked defendant to provide a driver\u2019s license, which defendant was unable to do. Gicla then asked defendant to exit the car so that Gicla could administer some field sobriety tests. As the two walked to the front of defendant\u2019s vehicle to perform the tests, Gicla noted that defendant had unsteady balance and was stutter-stepping and swaying as he walked. Gicla asked defendant to walk nine steps in a straight line, heel to toe, then turn and walk nine steps back to his starting point. Defendant attempted to comply, but he could not muster the balance to complete the test. He almost fell over trying to turn around after only seven steps. At that point, defendant informed Gicla that back and leg injuries would prevent him from completing the test.\nGicla asked him to perform a finger dexterity test, whereby defendant was required to touch his thumb to his other fingers and simultaneously count to four, and then go back through the same sequence in reverse. Defendant was unable to complete the task as instructed. Gicla then asked defendant to recite part of the alphabet, which defendant also was unable to do correctly. Gicla then arrested defendant and took him to the police station.\nAt the police station, Gicla continued to observe defendant before a breath alcohol analysis test was administered. The breath analysis showed that defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0.246. The breath analysis machine had been certified as operational on February 12, 2002, and it gave a reading of 0.000 for blank air just before defendant\u2019s reading. The machine was certified again on March 15, 2002, the same day that it was replaced because of \u201cfrequent false mouth alcohol display,\u201d which meant that the machine\u2019s mouth alcohol detector was incorrectly detecting the presence of alcohol in the mouth of a test subject and aborting the breath test.\nAfter a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of Class 2 felony driving under the influence and Class 4 felony driving with a revoked license. He timely appeals. Pursuant to the discussion below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nII. Discussion\nAs a threshold matter, the State argues that defendant\u2019s issues on appeal are waived because defendant did not file a posttrial motion preserving those issues. Although a written posttrial motion is generally required to preserve an issue for appeal (People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 185-87 (1988)), a posttrial motion is not necessary to preserve questions in a bench trial if the issues were presented to the trial court (People v. Crowder, 174 Ill. App. 3d 939, 941 (1988)). Therefore, defendant has not waived his arguments in this case, and we must address the merits of his appeal.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that the State lacked adequate grounds to stop his vehicle and thus that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to that stop. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons and property. U.S. Const., amend. IV Although a warrant supported by probable cause is generally required for a search or seizure to be considered reasonable under the fourth amendment, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968), an officer may make a valid investigatory stop without probable cause when the officer reasonably infers from all the facts and circumstances that a person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. People v. Welling, 324 Ill. App. 3d 594, 599-600 (2001). In order to stop a vehicle, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law. People v. Greco, 336 Ill. App. 3d 253, 257 (2003). Such reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts; a mere hunch is insufficient. Greco, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 257; Welling, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 600. A court will use a totality-of-the-circumstances approach in determining whether an officer\u2019s suspicion was reasonable. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 870 (1997). Only the facts known to the officer at the time of the stop can be considered in determining whether it was proper \u2014 information gained after the stop is made must be disregarded. Village of Mundelein v. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d 842, 848 (2003). We review de novo the trial court\u2019s legal determination of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Welling, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 599.\nWhile reasonable cause to stop an individual may be based on an informant\u2019s tip, some indicia of the tip\u2019s reliability must be provided to justify the stop. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-48, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 616-18, 92 S. Ct 1921, 1922-24 (1972); Village of Gurnee v. Gross, 174 Ill. App. 3d 66, 69-70 (1988). Corroboration of details of the informant\u2019s tip supports the veracity and reliability of that tip. See People v. Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1017 (1994) (stating the rule in the context of finding probable cause); see also Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 869 (stating that the reliability determinations for probable cause and reasonable suspicion are analogous, with an allowance given for the lower standard of reasonable suspicion). Tips from known informants are more reliable than those from anonymous informants, because a known informant\u2019s veracity, reputation, and basis of knowledge may be assessed by the investigating officer. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 259, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378 (2000). The fact that the information supporting the officer\u2019s reasonable suspicion came from the victim or an eyewitness does not make the tip presumptively reliable, but it is entitled to particularly great weight in evaluating the informant\u2019s reliability. People v. Aguilar, 286 Ill. App. 3d 493, 496-97 (1997); Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 870. When a tip comes from an identifiable witness, only a minimum of corroboration or other verification of the reliability of the information is required, because the witness puts himself or herself in position to be criminally hable for a false complaint. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 851.\nIn this case, the police had reasonable suspicion to support the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. The police obtained a tip from two eyewitnesses who observed and described defendant\u2019s erratic driving. The eyewitnesses gave a description of defendant\u2019s car and its location, and a specific description of the erratic driving they had witnessed. They provided the car\u2019s license number. They also provided their names and contact information. Defendant\u2019s car, which the witnesses pointed out to the police, met their description and bore the license number the witnesses had provided the police dispatcher. Given this corroboration of the witnesses\u2019 information, along with the fact that the tip was from identified citizen eyewitnesses who had provided a detailed tip to police in person, the information the police used in forming a reasonable suspicion was extremely reliable.\nA brief survey of relevant case law reveals that courts have found reasonable suspicion to support vehicle stops based on less compelling facts than we see here. For example, in Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 845, 850-52, an informant called police to report a driver in front of him who appeared to be drunk. The caller described the van in front of him and also gave its license number and location. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 845. The dispatcher did not obtain the caller\u2019s name until after police attempted to pull over the van. Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 845. The court found that there was reasonable suspicion because the caller was identified and was a fellow motorist and a witness. Here, the tipsters gave their identities and personally reported specific information to the police before the police attempted to stop defendant.\nLikewise, in Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-48, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 616-18, 92 S. Ct at 1922-24, the Supreme Court found that a tip was reliable where it was personally given to police by an informant. Though the police officer in Adams had no indication of where his informant obtained his knowledge, the Supreme Court gave great weight to the fact that the informant personally reported his tip. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147-48, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617-18, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-24. The Court stated, \u201c[t]he informant here came forward personally to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene.\u201d Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617, 92 S. Ct. at 1923. The Court also noted that the informant might have been subject to sanctions for making a false complaint had the investigation proved the tip incorrect. Adams, 407 U.S. at 147, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617, 92 S. Ct. at 1923. Just as in Adams, the informants here personally reported their tip to police (in addition to their phone call to the dispatcher), and the veracity of their complaint was readily ascertainable at the scene. The informants here also told the police the basis of their information about defendant, they provided their own contact information to police, and one of the witnesses even testified at trial.\nDefendant argues that the trial court (and the arresting officer) found reasonable suspicion based on the combination of eyewitness testimony and the officer\u2019s observing defendant weave onto the lane dividing line. He then argues that his momentary weaving onto the lane divider was not sufficient cause for a traffic stop. However, the important question is the correctness of the trial court\u2019s ruling and not the correctness of its reasoning in reaching that result. People v. Faletti, 215 Ill. App. 3d 61, 64 (1991). In this case, contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, we need not reach the issue of whether defendant\u2019s momentary contact with the lane marker supported stopping him, because we hold that reasonable suspicion to stop defendant existed regardless of whether the officer witnessed his weaving onto the lane marker. Therefore, the lower court was correct in finding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle. Since evidence of intoxication was properly discovered pursuant to a legal stop, the trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress that evidence. See Gross, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 71 (evidence of intoxication properly discovered pursuant to a legal stop).\nIn making our holding, we acknowledge the recent Second District holding in Village of Mundelein v. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d 216 (2004). In Minx, police acted on a tip from an unnamed informant in pulling over a driver. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 218-19. The informant was never identified, but he was considered reliable because he exposed himself to being identified at the time police formed reasonable suspicion. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 221. However, because the informant provided only vague allegations that the defendant was \u2018.\u2018driving recklessly\u201d without indicating what specific observations led him to that conclusion, the court found the tip itself to be unreliable. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 222. The court thus held that the police stop was unreasonable. Minx, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 222.\nWe agree with the Minx court\u2019s determination that the tipster was reliable because he exposed himself to being identified, even though he was never later identified. The proper focus in determining whether a tip is reliable is not whether the tipster\u2019s identity was ascertained after the seizure, but whether, at the time the officer formed reasonable suspicion, the tipster was identifiable, so that he was exposed to liability for a false tip. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 545, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330 (1983) (fact that informant exposes self to liability for a false tip makes tip more reliable); Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-24 (same). The reliability of the tip, then, is established not by the later identification of the tipster, but by the tipster\u2019s belief th\u00e1t he could be identified at the time he reported the information. See Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 848 (reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop based only on facts at the time of the stop).\nNevertheless, the holding in Minx does not affect our holding here, because the informants in this case were not only identifiable from the moment they told the police dispatcher they were following defendant\u2019s car, but they also provided police specific eyewitness observations in person to support their report that defendant was driving recklessly, and police independently corroborated some of their information. Thus, the tip in this case suffered from none of the vagueness that troubled the court in Minx.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention on appeal is that the trial court should not have admitted his breath alcohol analysis test. Defendant argues that the breath analyzer did not function properly and that the trial court improperly relied on testimony saying that it did.\nPolice conformance with rules promulgated pursuant to section 11\u2014501.2(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501.2(a)(1) (West 2002)) creates a rebuttable presumption that a breath alcohol analysis test was accurate at the particular time a subject test was performed. The rules require that police periodically certify the accuracy of a breath analysis machine. 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1286.200 (2004). The parties here do not dispute that the police were in compliance with the rules, because the breath analysis machine in this case was certified on February 12, 2002, and March 15, 2002. Therefore, there existed at trial a rebuttable presumption that the breath analysis machine gave an accurate reading at the time of defendant\u2019s arrest.\nDefendant cites People v. Boughton, 268 Ill. App. 3d 170 (1994), in support of his position that the breath analysis results were inadmissable. In Boughton, the court found that the prosecution did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of a breath analysis test result. Boughton, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 172-73. The police had certified the accuracy of the breath analysis machine within the time mandated by the administrative rules in effect at the time. However, after the defendant\u2019s test but before the breath analysis machine\u2019s next certification, the police took the machine out of service in order to make repairs on it. Boughton, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 172. The court in Boughton held that, since the rules required that the police carry the burden of showing compliance with the rules regarding certification of the breath analysis machine, they must also carry the burden of showing that the machine\u2019s malfunction between certifications did not affect the accuracy of the machine. Boughton, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 173. Since the prosecution in Boughton did not put forth any evidence to show the reason or nature of the repairs, it did not carry its burden. Boughton, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 172-73.\nIn the current case, just as in Boughton, the breath analysis machine\u2019s logbook shows that the machine was taken out of service for repairs. The State argues that Boughton can be distinguished because here, unlike in Boughton, the repairs occurred after the machine\u2019s second certification; that is, the machine was certified after defendant\u2019s test but before being taken out of service for repairs. Since the repair and the second certification occurred on the same day, though, that fact hardly distinguishes Boughton from the present case. However, Boughton is distinguishable from the current case in that here the logbook shows the reason for the repairs and the State adduced testimony to establish that the repairs did not affect the accuracy of defendant\u2019s test result. See People v. Robinson, 349 Ill. App. 3d 622, 628 (2004) (allowing breath analysis results despite holding in Boughton, because the State provided evidence that the machine was working properly).\nAt trial, the evidence showed an entry in the breath analysis machine\u2019s logbook, on the same day of its March 15 certification, stating that the machine had been taken out of service for \u201cfrequent false mouth alcohol\u201d readings. The State adduced the testimony of Commander Jeffrey Fritz, a certified breath analysis machine operator with 25 years of experience, who described his administration of the breath analysis test on defendant. He stated that, prior to defendant\u2019s test, the machine recorded a 0.000 alcohol reading for clean air. He also stated that there was no indication that the machine was malfunctioning at the time of defendant\u2019s test.\nCommander Fritz explained the meaning of the term \u201cfalse mouth alcohol.\u201d He stated that, in his experience, a \u201cmouth alcohol\u201d reading on the machine indicated that the subject had some kind of raw alcohol in his mouth. If the machine detected mouth alcohol, then, in his experience, it would abort the test and provide the police with no reading. Accordingly, had a \u201cfalse mouth alcohol\u201d problem occurred during defendant\u2019s breath analysis test, the machine would have aborted the test. Relying partially on Fritz\u2019s testimony, the trial court allowed the breath analysis reading to be admitted into evidence.\nDefendant contends that the trial court improperly relied on Fritz\u2019s testimony as expert testimony on the meaning of the term \u201cmouth alcohol,\u201d but, during Fritz\u2019s testimony, the trial court specifically stated that Fritz was testifying only as to what the term \u201cmeans to him.\u201d The trial court also characterized his testimony as not \u201ctechnical.\u201d Accordingly, Fritz\u2019s testimony was not expert testimony; he was testifying to facts he had observed through personal experience. See Baggett v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 92 Ill. App. 2d 433, 445-46 (1968) (ironworker testifying as to operation of oil well and pump was lay witness testifying to facts he had observed through personal experience).\nThe State was required to demonstrate that the defect in the breath analysis machine did not affect its accuracy during defendant\u2019s test. We hold that the State made such a showing in this case and that defendant\u2019s breath analysis results were properly admitted.\nWe further note that, even if the breath analysis test had not been admitted into evidence, defendant still would have been properly convicted. Though the trial court noted defendant\u2019s breath analysis test results in its ruling, it also stated that there was \u201csufficient evidence *** to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was under the influence of alcohol, separate and apart from the [breath analysis test].\u201d In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited the informant-witness\u2019s testimony that defendant was driving erratically, defendant\u2019s performance on the field sobriety tests, and the arresting officer\u2019s observations of defendant. The trial court stated that the breath analysis results \u201ccorroborated\u201d the other evidence. Thus, even if the breath analysis test were improperly admitted into evidence, that error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant\u2019s conviction would still stand. See People v. Niemiro, 256 Ill. App. 3d 904, 912 (1993) (harmless error to admit alcohol test where other \u201cexternal indicators\u201d established intoxication).\nDefendant\u2019s third argument on appeal is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as elements of his crimes, that his license was revoked for the grounds set forth in section 6\u2014 303(d) (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014303(d) (West 2002)) and section 11\u2014501(c\u20141)(3) (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(c\u20141)(3) (West 2002)). The essence of defendant\u2019s argument is that, in order to be convicted of Class 2 felony driving under the influence of alcohol or Class 4 felony driving while his license was revoked, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of each crime at trial, that the aggravating factors were present. However, \u201c[w]hen the State seeks an enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction,\u201d \u201cthe fact of such prior conviction *** [is] not [an] element[ ] of the offense ***. For the purposes of this [s]ection, \u2018enhanced sentence\u2019 means a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one classification of offense to another higher level classification ***.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/111\u20143(c)) (West 2002). Therefore, the State need not prove prior commissions of driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of Class 2 felony driving under the influence (People v. Thompson, 328 Ill. App. 3d 360, 364-66 (2002)), nor must it prove prior commissions of driving while license revoked as an element of Class 4 felony driving while license revoked (People v. Bowman, 221 Ill. App. 3d 663, 666 (1991)). The existence of these predicate offenses is used after a defendant\u2019s conviction to increase the classification of his crime at sentencing. Thompson, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 364-66.\nHere, the fact of defendant\u2019s prior convictions of driving under the influence, along with the fact that his license was revoked for driving under the influence, was used to raise the level of his conviction from a Class A misdemeanor of driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(c)) (West 2002)), to a Class 2 felony (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501 (c\u20141)(3) (West 2002)). The fact that defendant\u2019s license was revoked for driving under the influence, along with the fact that defendant had been previously convicted of driving while his license was revoked, was used to raise the level of his conviction from a Class A misdemeanor of driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014303(a) (West 2002)), to a Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 303(d) (West 2002)).\nDefendant relies on People v. Miller, 339 Ill. App. 3d 990, 992 (2003), and People v. Mann, 341 Ill. App. 3d 832, 840-41 (2003), to support his argument that the predicate crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as elements of the aggravated offenses. However, neither case stands for the proposition for which defendant uses it. Miller merely states that the elements of driving with a suspended license are included in the elements of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, and, thus, the defendant could not be convicted of both under one-act, one-crime principles. Miller, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 992. Mann, likewise, addresses a defendant\u2019s argument concerning whether his prosecution for driving while license revoked was for the same conduct as an aggravated-driving-while-license-revoked charge under one-act, one-crime principles. Mann, 341 Ill. App. 3d 832. Neither case discusses the elements of the crimes that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.\nDefendant further argues that the above case law applies only to the requirement of proving the fact of a prior conviction as an aggravating circumstance, and not to the requirement of proving revocation for certain grounds. We disagree. In Bowman, the defendant was convicted of aggravated driving with license revoked because he had a previous driving-while-license-revoked conviction and because his original revocation was for driving under the influence. Bowman, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 664-66. The State in Bowman was not required to show the defendant\u2019s prior convictions, or the grounds for those prior convictions, until sentencing. Bowman, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 665-66. We further note that requiring the State to prove the grounds for a conviction or revocation beyond a reasonable doubt at trial would effectively require the State to prove a prior conviction as an element of the crime, which would contravene the plain language of section 111\u20143(c)) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111\u20143(c)) (West 2002)). Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s argument. Defendant\u2019s prior convictions were not required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as elements of his crimes here.\nDefendant also argues that the State failed to establish at sentencing that at the time of his arrest his license had been revoked for driving under the influence, as required under the aggravated versions of both statutes. However, the presentencing report in this case reveals not only defendant\u2019s prior driving-under-the-influence convictions, but also the fact that at the time of his arrest his license was revoked due to those prior driving-under-the-influence convictions. A court properly may consider a presentencing report to determine a defendant\u2019s criminal record; such a report is a reliable source for the purpose of inquiring into a defendant\u2019s criminal history. People v. Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 491 (1992). Therefore, defendant\u2019s argument must fail.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument on appeal is that his conviction of Class 4 felony driving while license revoked must be vacated because it merges with his conviction of Class 2 felony driving under the influence. Under the one-act, one-crime rule, a court must first determine whether a defendant\u2019s conduct consisted of separate acts or a single physical act. People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1996); People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). Multiple convictions are improper if they are based on precisely the same physical act. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 186. If the court determines that the defendant committed multiple acts, the court then goes on to determine whether any of the offenses are lesser included offenses. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 186. As long as there are multiple acts as defined in King, their interrelationship does not preclude multiple convictions. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188-89 (in the context of home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault). An act is any overt or outward manifestation that will support a different offense. King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. A person can be guilty of two offenses when a common act is part of both offenses. People v. Forcum, 344 Ill. App. 3d 427, 447 (2003).\nHere, each of defendant\u2019s convictions is supported by a separate physical act, because driving while license revoked is a separate act from driving under the influence. People v. Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d 464, 468-69 (1999) (describing driving while under the influence of alcohol as a single act); People v. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1998) (\u201cact of driving while intoxicated was independent of and had no relationship to the simultaneous act of driving while license revoked\u201d for purposes of joinder), citing People v. Navis, 24 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846 (1974); People v. Bennett, 331 Ill. App. 3d 198, 203 (2002) (describing driving while under the influence of alcohol as an act for purposes of the one-act, one-crime rule).\nDefendant argues that the only act in this case was his \u201cdriving.\u201d Though driving was involved in both of defendant\u2019s crimes, each of his convictions was due to a separate offense based on separate conduct. See People v. Adolphson, 73 Ill. App. 3d 611, 613 (1979) (reckless driving and transportation of liquor are separate acts because \u201c[ajlthough these acts may be done simultaneously, they are completely separate\u201d). The acts to be considered here are \u201cdriving while license revoked\u201d and \u201cdriving while intoxicated,\u201d not simple \u201cdriving.\u201d While \u201cdriving\u201d may be a state of action, it is not an overt act that will support a criminal offense. See King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. The acts to be considered in applying the one-act, one-crime rule are defendant\u2019s culpable physical acts. There is nothing criminal in driving, per se; if defendant simply had been driving, then he would have committed no criminal act. However, driving while intoxicated is a criminal act, as is driving while license revoked. Defendant was sentenced based on those two separate, but simultaneous, acts and not based simply on his act of driving.\nDefendant argues that Navis does not apply here. Navis stated that the two acts were separate, but it came before the supreme court\u2019s announcement of the one-act, one-crime rule in King. Navis, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 846. However, defendant ignores Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d 1, which was decided after King. In Quigley, the supreme court stated that driving while intoxicated (as opposed to simple \u201cdriving\u201d) was an act, and it cited Navis with approval. Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d at 6-11. Defendant also argues that Navis is distinguishable because it considered the question of joinder and not the application of the one-act, one-crime rule. See Navis, 24 Ill. App. 3d 842. However, Navis was cited in Quigley, which quoted the test for compulsory joinder: whether several criminal offenses were \u201cbased on the same act.\u201d Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d at 6-7; cf Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 186 (multiple convictions are improper if they are based on precisely the same physical act). Regardless of the applicability of Navis, Quigley, and the other cases cited above, we hold that, for purposes of the one-act, one-crime rule, driving while intoxicated is a separate act from driving while license revoked.\nThe purpose of the one-act, one-crime rule is to prevent the State from carving out multiple offenses from the same culpable conduct. See People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 389 (2004). Defendant argues that the State is carving multiple offenses out of his single continuous act of driving. However, as explained above, defendant\u2019s driving was not his culpable conduct in this case; his culpable conduct was his driving while intoxicated and his driving while license revoked. The State is not carving out separate offenses to punish the same conduct; it is punishing both of defendant\u2019s culpable acts. Despite occurring simultaneously, defendant\u2019s driving while intoxicated was one act (see Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d at 469; Quigley, 183 Ill. 2d at 9-11; Bennett, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 203), and his driving while his license was revoked was another.\nUnder the second part of the one-act, one-crime test, defendant concedes that Class 4 felony driving while license revoked is not a lesser included offense of Class 2 felony driving under the influence by agreeing that \u201cthe State correctly points out that [Class 4 felony driving while license revoked] requires a second violation of [section 6\u2014303], while [Class 2 felony driving under the influence] requires only a single violation of that section.\u201d\nDefendant relies on Miller, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 992, to support his proposition that his convictions should be merged. However, Miller merged driving under a suspended license with aggravated driving under the influence, because the former was a lesser included offense. Miller, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 992. In the present case, by contrast, defendant was convicted of Class 4 felony driving while license revoked and Class 2 felony driving under the influence. As discussed above, the former requires a previous conviction of driving while license revoked and the latter does not. Therefore, defendant\u2019s convictions of both crimes must stand.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nAffirmed.\nGROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.\nWe note that, because a seizure does not begin until a vehicle begins to yield to a police officer (Thompson, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 848-49), defendant\u2019s failure to pull over immediately in response to police may be used to support reasonable suspicion (see Gross, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 68). However, we do not rest our decision on that issue in this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Geoffrey J. Heeren, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Paul Benjamin Linton, of Northbrook, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORENZO DiPACE, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-03-0469\nOpinion filed September 30, 2004.\nModified on denial of rehearing November 10, 2004.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Geoffrey J. Heeren, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P Moltz, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), and Paul Benjamin Linton, of Northbrook, for the People." }, "file_name": "0104-01", "first_page_order": 122, "last_page_order": 136 }