{ "id": 3218546, "name": "JOHN P. DUFFY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Duffy v. Department of Human Rights", "decision_date": "2004-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 4-04-0204", "first_page": "236", "last_page": "240", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 236" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469", "parenthetical": "scuba-diving school" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 904", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3718337 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910", "parenthetical": "scuba-diving school" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0904-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595-96", "parenthetical": "insurance company" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336095 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "insurance company" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "hereinafter referred to as SIU" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "academic program at a state-operated university" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781328 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211", "parenthetical": "hereinafter referred to as SIU" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "private dental practice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564641 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003" }, { "page": "1003" }, { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "754 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259133 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "815 N.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 1099", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083861 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/1099-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14", "parenthetical": "the right to engage in a physician-patient relationship is not absolute but is instead terminable at will" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462156 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "the right to engage in a physician-patient relationship is not absolute but is instead terminable at will" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0191-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 610, "char_count": 9909, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.09062111343170973 }, "sha256": "62a284c6c69325c0511d66ec14baf574a88bfc4388000731be443a338c20c1b6", "simhash": "1:2b3c1951ce54c68e", "word_count": 1547 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:29.254043+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOHN P. DUFFY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, John P Duffy, appeals the decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) adopting its administrative law judge\u2019s December 1, 2003, recommended order and decision to grant the motion to dismiss of respondents, Christie Clinic, PC., and Dr. Ellen E. Roney (collectively, the Clinic). On appeal, petitioner argues that the Commission erred in dismissing his complaint where he alleged facts sufficient to show the Clinic operated a \u201cplace of public accommodation,\u201d as defined by article 5 of the Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/5-101 through 5-103 (West 2000)). We affirm.\nOn December 4, 2001, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department), alleging that the Clinic discriminated against him because of his handicap, in violation of the Act. The Director of the Department did not act on the charge within the statutorily mandated 365-day period. See 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(1) (West 2000).\nOn December 11, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint with the Commission pursuant to section 7A-102(G)(2) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/7A-102(G)(2) (West 2002)), alleging one count of handicap discrimination by the Clinic. The complaint alleged that on or about June 11, 2001, he received a letter from Dr. Roney advising him that the Clinic\u2019s department of internal medicine would no longer offer him treatment beginning 30 days following receipt of the letter. Petitioner claimed that the Clinic\u2019s stated reasons for termination of treatment, that it was based upon his behavior at the Clinic and his failure to follow prescribed medical treatment, were pretextual and asserted only for the purpose of concealing its discriminatory motives. Petitioner further alleged that the Clinic operated a medical facility open to the public and was a \u201cplace of public accommodation,\u201d as defined by section 5-101(A)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1) (West 2002)).\nOn March 8, 2003, the Clinic filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Commission was without jurisdiction where the Clinic\u2019s internal medicine department was not a \u201cplace of public accommodation,\u201d as defined by the Act and as interpreted by case law. The administrative law judge (ALJ) recommended that the matter be dismissed, finding that a medical clinic dispensing medical services to the public is not a \u201cbusiness\u201d as contemplated under section 5-101(A)(1) of the Act and thus does not qualify as a \u201cplace of public accommodation\u201d as that term is defined under the Act (775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1) (West 2000)). The Commission declined review and adopted the ALJ\u2019s decision as its own, pursuant to section 8A-103(E)(1) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/8A-103(E)(1) (West 2002)). This appeal followed.\nPetitioner argues that the Clinic\u2019s department of internal medicine is a \u201cplace of public accommodation,\u201d as defined by the Act. Statutory construction is a question of law, and the standard of review is de novo. Ferrari v. Department of Human Rights, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1103, 815 N.E.2d 417, 422 (2004).\nSection 5-101(A) of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201c(A) Place of Public Accommodation. (1) \u2018Place of public accommodation\u2019 means a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.\n(2) By way of example, but not of limitation, \u2018place of public accommodation\u2019 includes facilities of the following types: inns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors, taverns, roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores, shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks, public golf courses, public golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or rooms, railroads, omnibuses, busses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water, or air, public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation and amusement.\u201d 775 ILCS 5/5\u2014101(A) (West 2000).\nStatutes should be construed as to render no word or phrase superfluous or meaningless. Langendorf v. City of Urbana, 197 Ill. 2d 100, 109, 754 N.E.2d 320, 325 (2001). Adopting petitioner\u2019s broad interpretation of \u201cbusiness *** facility of any kind\u201d would render the Act\u2019s definition of \u201cplace of public accommodation\u201d and the accompanying examples in section 5-101(A)(2) mere surplusage. See Baksh v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 304 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1003, 711 N.E.2d 416, 422 (1999). \u201cHad the legislature intended such an all-encompassing definition of a \u2018place of public accommodation\u2019 the definition would simply read \u2018a \u201cplace of public accommodation\u201d is a business facility of any kind.\u2019 \u201d Baksh, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 1003, 711 N.E.2d at 422.\nUnder the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where a statute lists several classes of persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, we interpret the class of unarticulated persons or things as those \u201cothers such like\u201d the named persons or things. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of Human Rights, 159 Ill. 2d 206, 211, 636 N.E.2d 528, 531 (1994) (hereinafter referred to as SIU).\nSection 5\u2014101(A) does not contain the terms \u201cmedical facility,\u201d \u201cmedical clinic,\u201d \u201cdoctor\u2019s office,\u201d \u201chealth-care facility,\u201d or other like terms. The examples listed in section 5-101(A)(2) are also fundamentally different from medical clinics, which dispense medical care. \u201cThe cited establishments are examples of facilities for overnight accommodations, entertainment, recreation or transportation.\u201d SIU, 159 Ill. 2d at 212, 636 N.E.2d at 531. \u201cThus, what was anticipated by the General Assembly is a restaurant, or a pub, or a bookstore.\u201d SIU, 159 Ill. 2d at 212, 636 N.E.2d at 531. What was not anticipated is a private medical clinic. Because the Clinic\u2019s internal medicine department is not a \u201cplace of public accommodation\u201d under the Act, we hold that the conduct alleged by petitioner does not fall within section 5-102(A); consequently, no jurisdiction is conferred by that section over this cause of action. See SIU, 159 Ill. 2d at 212, 636 N.E.2d at 531 (academic program at a state-operated university); Baksh, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 1006, 711 N.E.2d at 424 (private dental practice); Cut \u2019N Dried Salon v. Department of Human Rights, 306 Ill. App. 3d 142, 147, 713 N.E.2d 592, 595-96 (1999) (insurance company); Gilbert v. Department of Human Rights, 343 Ill. App. 3d 904, 910, 799 N.E.2d 465, 469 (2003) (scuba-diving school). The Commission properly dismissed petitioner\u2019s complaint.\nPetitioner also argues that the Clinic\u2019s participation in Medicare and Medicaid programs brings it under the definition of \u201cplace of public accommodation.\u201d However, he cites no on-point authority for this proposition, nor does the Act create such an inference from the mere receipt of federal funds (see 775 ILCS 5/1-101 through 10- 103 (West 2002)). Whether the Clinic would qualify as a \u201cplace of public accommodation\u201d under a different definition under federal statutes, rules, or regulations is irrelevant to our analysis under the Act.\nBecause we find that the Clinic\u2019s internal medicine department is not a \u201cplace of public accommodation\u201d under section 5 \u2014 101(A) of the Act, we need not address whether petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the Commission\u2019s decision dismissing petitioner\u2019s complaint.\nAffirmed.\nTURNER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur with the result reached by the majority but write separately to state my belief that the provisions of the Act have no application to this situation.\nPlaintiff had been a patient of the Christie Clinic department of internal medicine. Plaintiff did not attend the physical facility of the clinic as a destination but rather to be treated by medical personnel. For whatever reason, clinic personnel decided to terminate their professional relationship with plaintiff and had the right to do so. See Olaf v. Christie Clinic Ass\u2019n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 191, 195, 558 N.E.2d 610, 613-14 (1990) (the right to engage in a physician-patient relationship is not absolute but is instead terminable at will).\nI am aware of no law that requires a regulated professional\u2014 doctor, lawyer, dentist, accountant \u2014 to treat or serve every applicant, in fact, the service at issue here is recognized by the law above to be discretionary with the provider (after taking all abandonment and malpractice issues into consideration). Christie Clinic, as a place, may be forced to be open to all persons regardless of disability, but the medical personnel who work within the clinic\u2019s walls cannot be made to treat patients against their will.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Petition for review of order of Human Rights Commission.", "Peter Andjelkovich and Bradley Wartman (argued), both of Peter Andjelkovich & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Mary Patricia Kerns, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees Department of Human Rights and Human Rights Commission.", "Renee L. Monfort (argued), of Dobbins, Fraker, Tennant, Joy & Perlstein, EC., of Champaign, for appellees Christie Clinic, EC., and Ellen E. Roney.", "Max E Lapertosa, of Access Living, of Chicago, for amicus curiae ADAPT of Illinois.", "Robert John Kane, of Illinois State Medical Society, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois State Medical Society." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN P. DUFFY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-04-0204\nArgued November 17, 2004.\nOpinion filed December 20, 2004.\nAPPLETON, J., specially concurring.\nPetition for review of order of Human Rights Commission.\nPeter Andjelkovich and Bradley Wartman (argued), both of Peter Andjelkovich & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Mary Patricia Kerns, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees Department of Human Rights and Human Rights Commission.\nRenee L. Monfort (argued), of Dobbins, Fraker, Tennant, Joy & Perlstein, EC., of Champaign, for appellees Christie Clinic, EC., and Ellen E. Roney.\nMax E Lapertosa, of Access Living, of Chicago, for amicus curiae ADAPT of Illinois.\nRobert John Kane, of Illinois State Medical Society, of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois State Medical Society." }, "file_name": "0236-01", "first_page_order": 254, "last_page_order": 258 }