{ "id": 3215208, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOBBY MILTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Milton", "decision_date": "2004-12-07", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-2704", "first_page": "283", "last_page": "293", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 283" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "797 N.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974982 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 873", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" }, { "page": "883", "parenthetical": "defendant's bald allegation that counsel rendered inadequate representation was insufficient to meet the exception" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "751 N.E.2d 1219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 905", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126416 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0905-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139219 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25431 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260218 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2794169 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/23/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894516 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228419 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "770 N.E.2d 1143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statements made during closing argument were part of counsel's trial strategy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209189 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "statements made during closing argument were part of counsel's trial strategy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256644 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a defendant bears a \"high burden\" before the court will presume prejudice" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887227 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601", "parenthetical": "a defendant bears a \"high burden\" before the court will presume prejudice" }, { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204502 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 N.E.2d 616", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453251 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5367741 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 991, "char_count": 23614, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0532600333451002e-07, "percentile": 0.5546562753272488 }, "sha256": "ccaabee5c26c44cc972ce5098d54d878a1b2923394cae8a183817af0585455a6", "simhash": "1:ab4234fcb6a307ef", "word_count": 3820 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:29.254043+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOBBY MILTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter two separate bench trials, the trial court found defendant Bobby Milton guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance (02 CR 10622) and one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (01 CR 24095). The trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s posttrial motions for both trials, including his pro se motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. That same day, the court sentenced defendant to two concurrent two-year prison terms for possession of a controlled substance and a consecutive eight-year term for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.\nOn appeal, defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel during both trials and that the trial court failed to properly inquire into his pro se posttrial motions. We affirm.\nFACTS\nCase Number 02 CR 10622\nAt the first trial, Chicago police officer Tim Fitzpatrick testified he and his partner, Officer Devine, were patrolling in plain clothes in an unmarked car on the evening of March 23, 2002. At the intersection of Francisco Avenue and Flourney Street, they observed defendant approach the driver\u2019s side of a parked car. Defendant began talking to the driver. From a distance of 10 feet, Officer Fitzpatrick saw defendant holding small silver and plastic objects in his right hand. The driver held up money. At that point, the officers exited their car. When defendant saw the officers approaching, he turned around, closed his right hand, and started walking away from them. As he walked, he dropped the objects in his right hand to the ground. Officer Fitzpatrick testified he could not see the objects hit the ground because his car hood obstructed his view. Fitzpatrick believed the items were heroin and cocaine. Officer Devine collected the dropped items, which were six tinfoiled packets believed to contain heroin, and five small plastic bags of suspected crack cocaine. While conducting a custodial search, the officers found $120 on defendant\u2019s person. Fitzpatrick later inventoried the 11 suspected narcotics items under number 2686751.\nOn cross-examination, defense counsel asked several questions about the distance between the recovered narcotics, defendant, the parked car, and the officers. Fitzgerald testified the recovered drugs were four or five feet from the driver of the parked car. He also testified it was possible he lost sight of defendant and the driver of the car momentarily as he was exiting his vehicle.\nOfficer Devine testified regarding his observations of defendant on March 23, 2002. His account matched Officer Fitzpatrick\u2019s testimony.\nThe parties stipulated that Michelle Etheridge, if called as a witness, would be qualified as an expert in forensic chemistry. Etheridge would testify she tested the recovered items bearing inventory number 2686751. She concluded one of the items was 0.1 grams of heroin and five items tested positive for 1.05 grams of cocaine.\nAfter the stipulation was entered, both the State and the defense rested. The court found defendant guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance.\nCase Number 01 CR 24095\nDefendant was charged with four counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At defendant\u2019s second trial, Officer Patrick Thelan testified he was conducting narcotics surveillance with Officer Gorman at 2909 West Flournoy Street in Chicago on August 30, 2001. At around 7 p.m., Officer Thelan observed defendant standing on a sidewalk approximately 50 to 75 feet away. With the aid of binoculars, Thelan watched an individual approach defendant and have a brief conversation. The individual then handed defendant money. Defendant walked 20 feet to a concrete block. He picked up the block, took a plastic strip from underneath the block, tore a piece off the strip, and gave the piece to the other individual, who then walked away. Officer Thelan observed this same sequence of events occur three times and believed defendant was conducting narcotics transactions.\nOfficer Thelan radioed his backup officers, told them about his observations, gave a physical description of defendant and instructed Officer Gorman to recover the suspected narcotics from under the concrete block. Gorman recovered the suspected crack cocaine and showed it to Officer Thelan, who described the recovered items as a plastic strip of tape connecting six small plastic bags. Each bag was tinted and contained a white rock substance. Officer Thelan later inventoried the items under number 2579357. During a custodial search, the officers discovered defendant was carrying $190.\nOn cross-examination, Officer Thelan testified he did not overhear any of the conversations between defendant and the three individuals who approached him. He also said he could not see exactly what the items were that defendant handed to the individuals.\nOfficer Gorman testified Officer Thelan radioed him to arrest defendant because Thelan suspected he was dealing drugs. Gorman approached defendant in an unmarked police car driven by Officer Parker. Gorman detained defendant and then followed Thelan\u2019s directions to recover the suspected cocaine from underneath a concrete block.\nThe parties stipulated that, if called, additional witnesses would testify as follows: (1) forensic chemist Thomas Halloran would testify he weighed and tested three of the recovered items and found they were 1.2 grams of cocaine; (2) State\u2019s Attorney Investigator Golnick would testify 2909 West Flournoy is 54 feet from the Harrison Courts Public Housing at 2910 West Harrison, \u201cpart of the [Chicago Housing Authority]\u201d; and (3) the same investigator would testify the distance between 2909 West Flournoy and the Greater Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church at 2929 West Harrison is 414 feet.\nAfter the stipulations were entered and the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for a directed finding of not guilty on all counts. The trial court granted the motion on two of the four counts, II and III, leaving count I for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a residential property owned, operated or managed by the Chicago Housing Authority and count IV for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.\nAfter a brief recess, the defense rested without presenting evidence. Defense counsel gave his closing argument, and the trial court found defendant not guilty on count I and guilty on count IV\nPosttrial Hearing on August 14, 2003\nDefendant\u2019s attorney filed a posttrial motion for a new trial for the first trial (02 CR 10622). At the hearing, counsel told the court he was moving for a new trial in both cases, and the trial court heard arguments on both cases. Among other things, counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to show the recovered items were narcotics or that defendant had an intent to deliver. He said he did not present any evidence at the second trial because he wanted to preserve the issue regarding the denial of the motion for a directed finding at the close of the State\u2019s case.\nThe trial court denied counsel\u2019s motions for a new trial. Counsel informed the court that defendant wished to file pro se motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at both trials. The trial court accepted the pro se motions and made the following findings:\n\u201cIn regards to the motion for new trial on case 01 CR 24095 [second trial], that motion consists of 9 or 10 paragraphs alleging that there was ineffective assistance of counsel, that he was not properly prepared and the defense was not properly represented.\nI disagree with that. I believe the attorney did a good job. He cross-examined each witness. He was prepared in each and every instance.\nIn regards to the paragraph 9, that the attorney explained to him the possibility of an offer by the State, that is the duty of the attorney to do that.\nThe defendant may not like the options that he had, hut the attorney has an interest to or has a duty to inform him of what the State has offered.\n* * *\n*** I believe in that case, the defense had asked numerous times to interview a witness who was in custody. That witness had been brought to the courtroom and interviewed. Based on the attorney\u2019s strategy, that witness was not used.\nAgain, that is something that the attorney must do in preparing for the case and I feel like he did.\nNow, going back to 02 10622 [first trial], this is also a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Again, this is an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, that the defendant\u2019s attorney did not ask appropriate questions.\nOnce again *** I felt the attorney did his job. He questioned, he cross-examined each witness in records [sic] to the stipulation. He stipulated to the proper evidence.\nIn regards to the time log, I\u2019m not too sure what the defendant is looking for, but all discovery material was tendered and any additional discovery that was asked for was given.\nAnd I believe the issues that were raised by the defense counsel were appropriate.\u201d\nThe court denied defendant\u2019s pro se motions and proceeded with sentencing. After the State and defense counsel presented aggravating and mitigating factors, the court asked defendant if he had anything to say. Defendant replied, \u201cYour Honor, basically I think you [sic] making an error denying my motions, because it was several elements in these cases that could have been proven on physical inability just alone,\u201d and argued the police officers\u2019 testimony was incredible. He said, \u201cThey recreated the story on their own and I have no proof to offer accept [sic] what the counsel could have put together and he didn\u2019t do.\u201d\nThe trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent two-year prison terms for the possession of a controlled substance charges and a consecutive eight-year term for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.\nOn appeal, defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his first trial because his attorney pursued an implausible defense theory and conceded defendant\u2019s guilt. Defendant contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the second trial because he failed to present evidence on the mistaken belief he would waive for the purpose of appeal any issue related to his request for a directed finding. Defendant also contends the trial court failed to properly inquire into his pro se posttrial motions; he asks us to remand the cause to the trial court for further inquiry.\nDECISION\nI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nFirst, we examine defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from both trials.\nTo establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel\u2019s representation was objectively unreasonable and, but for the attorney\u2019s errors, there was a reasonable probability the outcome at trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984); People v. Harre, 263 Ill. App. 3d 447, 451, 636 N.E.2d 23 (1994). A defendant\u2019s claim must satisfy both parts of the Strickland test, and the failure to satisfy either part precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 107, 735 N.E.2d 616 (2000). If the defendant can show his trial counsel failed to perform any meaningful adversarial testing of the State\u2019s case, the court will presume the defendant was prejudiced. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984); see also People v. Kozlowski, 266 Ill. App. 3d 595, 601, 639 N.E.2d 1369 (1994) (a defendant bears a \u201chigh burden\u201d before the court will presume prejudice). In addition, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel\u2019s challenged actions were a part of sound trial strategy and not due to incompetence. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998).\nA. Defendant\u2019s First Trial\u2014No. 02 CR 10622\nDefendant contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the first trial when he advanced the implausible defense theory of \u201cattempt possession\u201d and, in doing so, conceded defendant\u2019s guilt to the charge of simple possession. Defendant also contends his trial counsel\u2019s representation was deficient because he failed to subject the State\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing, and we should presume prejudice. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 668, 104 S. Ct. at 2047; Kozlowski, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 600. We disagree.\nCounsel\u2019s decision to argue a particular defense theory during closing argument is a matter of trial strategy. People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 119, 552 N.E.2d 743 (1990); People v. Daniels, 331 Ill. App. 3d 380, 393, 770 N.E.2d 1143 (2002) (statements made during closing argument were part of counsel\u2019s trial strategy). Counsel\u2019s choice does not constitute ineffective assistance simply because it was unsuccessful. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d at 119.\nDefendant contends trial counsel\u2019s strategy constitutes per se ineffective assistance of counsel because he conceded defendant\u2019s guilt of possession and relied on a legally inapplicable \u201cattempt\u201d defense. We disagree. Even when counsel concedes guilt, the court will not presume prejudice unless the strategy amounted to a complete failure to subject the prosecution\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing. People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 269, 538 N.E.2d 1118. (1989).\nIn this case, trial counsel\u2019s strategy was to attack the element of knowledge. For the State to successfully prove possession of a controlled substance, it had to show that defendant \u201chad knowledge of the presence of the narcotics and that the narcotics were in his immediate and exclusive control.\u201d People v. Cooper, 337 Ill. App. 3d 106, 110, 785 N.E.2d 86 (2003). Counsel implemented his strategy throughout the case. When he cross-examined the police officers, he elicited testimony that defendant possessed the narcotics for only a few seconds after walking away from the parked car. Later in closing, counsel argued in part:\n\u201cWe don\u2019t know what it was he was trying to receive from the driver of the vehicle under that analysis and pursuant to the statute I don\u2019t think that the State would be able to show that it was knowing possession \u2014 knowing and voluntary possession long enough to establish the necessary elements of the offense, in which case it would be near attempt possession of contraband or controlled substance. We don\u2019t know what it was, but attempt.\u201d\nWe believe counsel\u2019s closing argument was reasonable. The record shows counsel vigorously defended the case and, using a degree of creativity, he fashioned a defense where no other was available. He argued defendant lacked knowledge of the drugs, or at most, only attempted to possess some unknown item. We believe defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the first trial fails the Strickland test.\nB. Defendant\u2019s Second Trial\u2014No. 01 CR 24095\nDefendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the second trial because his attorney rested his case without presenting any evidence. Defendant contends his attorney\u2019s decision was based on a misunderstanding of the law regarding waiver.\nAt trial, defendant\u2019s attorney rested his case shortly after the court denied his motion for a directed finding of not guilty. During the posttrial hearing on counsel\u2019s motion for a new trial, he argued the only reason he rested was to preserve the court\u2019s denial of the directed finding as an issue on appeal. In doing so, counsel relied on People v. Washington, 23 Ill. 2d 546, 548, 179 N.E.2d 635 (1962), which held, \u201ca motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the plaintiffs case is waived when the defendant introduces evidence after the motion has been denied.\u201d\nWe agree with defendant that defense counsel mistakenly relied on the statement in Washington. The Illinois Supreme Court has since held, \u201can election by the defendant to present evidence after a motion for directed verdict has been overruled waives any error in the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion [citation], except when the defendant renews the motion at the close of all the evidence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 249, 549 N.E.2d 240 (1989). Defense counsel did not renew the motion.\nStill, there is some confusion remaining about whether the reviewing court should consider all the evidence presented at trial, including the evidence presented during the defendant\u2019s case, when reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for a directed finding at the close of the State\u2019s case. People v. Kelley, 338 Ill. App. 3d 273, 279-80, 788 N.E.2d 775 (2003). In Kelley, we said the situation is \u201cunclear.\u201d Kelley, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 280.\nAfter reviewing the transcript in this case, we are of the view that defense counsel was doing more than preserving his motion at the close of the State\u2019s case. He was making a sound strategic decision that little or nothing would be gained from offering any defense testimony. Matters of defense strategy, even those that do not work out, do not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201, 214, 478 N.E.2d 392 (1985).\nDefense counsel might have understood and relied on the change in standard that takes place when the defendant rests without offering any evidence. That is, a motion for a finding of not guilty at the close of the State\u2019s case in a bench trial is considered in the light most favorable to the State, but once the defendant has rested without presenting any evidence, the trial judge weighs the credibility of the State\u2019s witnesses when determining the ultimate issue of guilt. The favorable light standard no longer applies. See People v. Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d 905, 915-18, 751 N.E.2d 1219 (2001).\nAt any rate, mistake or not, we do not see any reasonable probability that had the defendant testified or presented some other testimony, whatever it might be, the outcome of the proceeding would have been any different. See Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d at 249.\nNothing in this record indicates which defense witnesses would have testified, what they would have said, and whether defendant would have been any better off \u2014 especially given his lengthy criminal record (one prior felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance and two felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver).\nWe conclude defense counsel\u2019s decision to rest at the close of the State\u2019s case did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, he did not provide ineffective assistance.\nII. Trial Court\u2019s Inquiry Into Defendant\u2019s Pro Se Posttrial Motions\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by failing to inquire about the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his pro se posttrial motions.\nTypically, a trial court cannot consider pro se motions filed by a criminal defendant while he is represented by counsel. People v. Rucker, 346 Ill. App. 3d 873, 882, 803 N.E.2d 31 (2003). There is an exception to this rule: represented defendants are allowed to raise pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel so long as they include supporting facts and specific claims. Rucker, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 883 (defendant\u2019s bald allegation that counsel rendered inadequate representation was insufficient to meet the exception). In this case, defendant filed two detailed pro se motions alleging several specific errors by his attorney. We find defendant\u2019s pro se motions fall within the exception. We also find the court gave them adequate consideration.\nOnce a defendant files a sufficient pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court must conduct an adequate inquiry into the factual basis for the defendant\u2019s claim. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78, 797 N.E.2d 631 (2003). If the defendant\u2019s claim is without merit or raises only matters of trial strategy, the court may deny the pro se motion without appointing new counsel. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. The supreme court listed three ways a trial court can conduct its evaluation: (1) the court may ask trial counsel about the facts and circumstances related to the defendant\u2019s allegations; (2) the court may ask the defendant for more specific information; or (3) the court may rely on its knowledge of counsel\u2019s performance at trial and \u201cthe insufficiency of the defendant\u2019s allegations on their face.\u201d Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79.\nThis case is easily distinguished from Moore, where the supreme court found the trial court\u2019s inquiry into the defendant\u2019s pro se motions was inadequate. In Moore, the trial court did not consider the defendant\u2019s pro se motion at all. The motion never was denied; instead, the court simply allowed it into the record, so it could be considered later on appeal. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79.\nHere, the court carefully reviewed the defendant\u2019s motions. The trial judge ordered the trial transcript and reviewed it before he ruled. Although the judge denied the motions, he did not brush them off; he simply had nothing left to ask defendant or his attorney. Based on the specific facts and claims in defendant\u2019s motions, the court concluded the alleged errors were matters of trial strategy or could be disposed of based upon the trial judge\u2019s knowledge of what occurred at trial.\nDefendant contends the trial judge did not have the necessary information to deny defendant\u2019s motion because the trial judge said he \u201cdid not know what defendant was looking for\u201d with respect to the \u201ctime log.\u201d In defendant\u2019s motion, defendant stated he wanted the arrest time log from the police station to show \u201cinappropriate police procedure\u201d and that he was arrested to meet the officer\u2019s \u201cquota.\u201d Reviewing the court\u2019s comments in light of defendant\u2019s allegations, we conclude the trial judge knew what defendant wanted but did not see how it would help his case.\nIn addition, defendant had the opportunity to raise any additional facts to support his motions during sentencing, which was conducted at the same hearing. The court allowed defendant to speak, and although defendant chose to talk about his motions, he did not present any specific facts to support his allegations. Instead, he focused on attacking the police officers\u2019 credibility.\nWe believe the trial court\u2019s consideration of defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motions was adequate. Given the specific allegations in defendant\u2019s motions, further questioning of defendant and his attorney was unnecessary.\nCONCLUSION\nBased on our review, we conclude defendant\u2019s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should fail. We also believe the trial court conducted a proper inquiry of defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial motions.\nWe affirm defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences.\nAffirmed.\nBURKE, EJ., and GARCIA, J., concur.\nWe use the phrase \u201cdirected finding\u201d because defendant uses it, but we understand it would be more correctly described as a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State\u2019s case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Linda Olthoff, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarh, Mary L. Boland, and Leanna Baly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOBBY MILTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20142704\nOpinion filed December 7, 2004.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied January 6, 2005.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Linda Olthoff, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarh, Mary L. Boland, and Leanna Baly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0283-01", "first_page_order": 301, "last_page_order": 311 }