{ "id": 3218110, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dennis", "decision_date": "2004-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 4-03-1032", "first_page": "491", "last_page": "497", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 491" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "471 N.E.2d 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3493132 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" }, { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2952306 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/58/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 503", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639147 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959171 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408-09" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473887 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329-30" }, { "page": "327-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160364 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126614 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302612 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 971", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975" }, { "page": "975" }, { "page": "974" }, { "page": "975" }, { "page": "975" }, { "page": "973" }, { "page": "975" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29950 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0173-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 593, "char_count": 11239, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0782233143708005e-07, "percentile": 0.5618296665172371 }, "sha256": "a7a9862277650bbe9573408382ca688a5905debe4f169fd2e7f94d7905bdc746", "simhash": "1:ba271b8cff6c9c37", "word_count": 1882 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:29.254043+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nInstead of requiring the State to prove its petition to revoke probation, defendant, Michael Dennis, admitted one of the alleged violations. On the strength of that admission, the trial court granted the petition and resentenced him to imprisonment. He appeals because in the hearing on the petition, the trial court failed to give him all the admonitions the supreme court required in People v. Hall, 198 Ill. 2d 173, 181, 760 N.E.2d 971, 975 (2001). We find substantial compliance with Hall and, therefore, affirm the judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn October 1999, pursuant to a negotiated plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998)), the trial court sentenced defendant to two years\u2019 probation. The State filed a petition to revoke his probation on October 26, 2000, and filed a second such petition on May 22, 2001. Both times, defendant admitted the petitions, and both times, after admonishing him on his constitutional rights (including his rights to be represented by an attorney and to confront his accusers) and asking him if he understood those rights, the court accepted the admissions and resentenced him to 30 months\u2019 probation.\nOn May 28, 2003, the State filed a third petition to revoke probation. On June 13, 2003, the trial court arraigned defendant on that petition, admonishing him on his rights to be represented and \u201cto confront or cross-examine every witness [whom] the [S]tate intend[ed] to call against [him,] right [t]here in open court.\u201d\nOn July 15, 2003, in the hearing on the third petition, defense counsel told the trial court:\n\u201cMR. McINTIRE: Judge, Mr. Dennis is going to admit *** [p]aragraph [3 of the petition,] which alleges he failed to report [to the probation office] for the months of November and December[ ] 2002 and February and April[ ] 2003. I believe the State will withdraw the other paragraphs of the petition. There is no agreement as to sentence.\n^ $\nTHE COURT: *** You understand that you have the right to require the State to prove these charges?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I do.\nTHE COURT: All right. And if I accept an agreement today, you would be giving up your right to require the State to prove what the petition says, and [it] won\u2019t have to present any evidence. Do you understand that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\n^ $\nTHE COURT: All right. Well, this charge \u2014 the underlying offense is a Class [4] felony, so the maximum penalty would be one to three years in the penitentiary. If there are certain enhanced\u2014 enhancing factors present, it would be [3] to [6] years, up to [272] years on probation, and [a] [l-]year mandatory supervised release term, up to $25,000 fine. Do you have any question about what the maximum possible penalty could be?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m told that you want to enter into an agreement today on this? Is that true?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Is anybody forcing you to enter into this agreement?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re doing it freely and voluntarily?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\n# % *\nTHE COURT: All sentencing options are available, so you can be evaluated and see what might be appropriate. Any other questions at this time?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: All right. Well, let\u2019s see. Do I need a factual basis on this kind of a petition?\nMR. BRINEGAR [(Prosecutor)]: No, [Y]our Honor.\nMR. McINTIRE: I don\u2019t know that you do. I think we would agree that for his scheduled appointments in the probation office [in] November and December of 2002 and [in] February and April[ ] 2003, Mr. Dennis, in fact, did not appear ***.\nTHE COURT: All right. Would you agree with that, Mr. Dennis? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I would.\nTHE COURT: Do you have anything else you\u2019d like to say about that?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: All right. Well, there is a factual basis for the admission. I will accept the admission as to [p]aragraph [3] of the petition to revoke [probation]. The other allegations will be dismissed.\u201d\nOn October 14, 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant to 35 months\u2019 imprisonment, with credit for 125 days.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Rights to Confrontation and Representation\nA defendant can admit a violation of probation instead of requiring the State to prove it, but before accepting the admission, the trial court must admonish the defendant and make sure the following propositions are true:\n\u201c(1) the defendant understands the specific allegations in the State\u2019s petition to revoke probation;\n(2) the defendant understands that he has the right to a hearing[,] with defense counsel present\u00ed,] at which the State must prove the alleged violation, and that he has the rights of confrontation and cross-examination at such a hearing;\n(3) the defendant\u2019s admission is voluntarily made and not made on the basis of any coercion or promises, other than any agreement as to the disposition of his case;\n(4) the defendant understands the consequences of his admission or the sentencing range for the underlying offense; and\n(5) a factual basis exists for the admission.\u201d Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 181, 760 N.E.2d at 975.\n(Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402A, entitled \u201cAdmissions or Stipulations in Proceedings to Revoke Probation, Conditional Discharge[,] or Supervision,\u201d went into effect on November 1, 2003. 210 Ill. 2d R. 402A. Defendant does not contend this new rule has retroactive application.)\nIn the present case, in the hearing in which defendant admitted paragraph 3 of the State\u2019s third petition to revoke probation, the trial court failed to admonish him on two of his rights: (1) his right to have \u201cdefense counsel present\u201d in the hearing on the petition to revoke probation and (2) his right to cross-examine witnesses in the hearing. In previous hearings, however, the court admonished defendant on those rights.\nThe State invites us to consider cases interpreting Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)). Rule 402 does not apply to proceedings to revoke probation (Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 179, 760 N.E.2d at 974), but the requirements in that rule and in Hall mostly overlap. Cf. 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 402(a), (b), (e), with Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 181, 760 N.E.2d at 975. For example, both Rule 402(a)(4) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)(4)) and Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 181, 760 N.E.2d at 975, require an admonition on the right to confront one\u2019s accusers. A defendant in a proceeding to revoke probation has fewer, rather than more, procedural rights than a defendant who still awaits trial. Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 177, 760 N.E.2d at 973. The supreme court has held that \u201csubstantial compliance\u201d with Rule 402(a) satisfies due process. People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 323, 793 N.E.2d 526, 537 (2002). \u201cSubstantial compliance\u201d means that although the trial court did not recite to the defendant, and ask the defendant if he or she understood, an item listed in Rule 402(a), the record nevertheless affirmatively and specifically shows that the defendant in fact understood that item. People v. Walker, 109 Ill. 2d 484, 498-99, 488 N.E.2d 529, 535 (1985); People v. Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d 470, 485-86, 463 N.E.2d 677, 685 (1984); People v. Barker, 83 Ill. 2d 319, 329-30, 415 N.E.2d 404, 408-09 (1980); People v. Ellis, 59 Ill. 2d 255, 257, 320 N.E.2d 15, 16 (1974).\nAs Hall in effect adopted the same admonition required by Rule 402 for admissions at a probation revocation hearing, it would seem logical that the case law developed under that rule, which requires substantial compliance, would apply to the mandate of Hall and the subsequently adopted Rule 402(a).\nIf substantial compliance with Rule 402(a) satisfies due process and defendants in proceedings to revoke probation have no more procedural rights than defendants in criminal trials, it must follow that substantial compliance with Hall would likewise satisfy due process. Decisions finding substantial compliance with Rule 402(a) apply to Hall. Even though Rule 402A was enacted too recently to apply to this case, we note it requires only \u201csubstantial compliance.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 402A.\nThe goal is to ensure that defendant understood his admission, the rights he was waiving, and the potential consequences of his admission. See People v. Louderback, 137 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435, 484 N.E.2d 503, 505 (1985). As the doctrine of substantial compliance recognizes, that goal is achievable by means other than reciting all of the information to the defendant at the time of the admission. (Literal compliance is preferable, however, because it leaves no room for doubt or dispute.) We may consider the entire record, including the record of earlier proceedings, to decide whether a defendant understood the items listed in Rule 402(a) or in Hall. See People v. Krantz, 58 Ill. 2d 187, 192, 317 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1974). \u201cAlthough the best practice is to give the admonition at the time of accepting the waiver, the failure to do so is not necessarily fatal. Each case must be determined on its own peculiar circumstances, with the principal focus upon the length of time between the waiver *** and the plea.\u201d People v. Ray, 130 Ill. App. 3d 362, 365, 471 N.E.2d 933, 936 (1984).\nWe ask whether, realistically, an ordinary person in defendant\u2019s position would have understood, from the earlier proceedings, that by admitting paragraph 3 of the third petition to revoke his probation, he was giving up his right to cross-examine his accusers in an evidentiary hearing in which he would be represented by an attorney. See Krantz, 58 Ill. 2d at 193, 317 N.E.2d at 563. The only reasonable answer is yes. The trial court admonished him over and over again on those rights, most recently a month before the admission at issue in this case. Considering the repetition and recency of the admonitions, we find substantial compliance with Hall.\nB. Factual Basis\nAs defendant points out, the attorneys for both parties incorrectly told the trial court a factual basis was unnecessary. See Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 181, 760 N.E.2d at 975. Their faulty advice caused no harm, however, because defense counsel went ahead and gave a factual basis: he admitted that defendant failed to report to his probation officer during a four-month period. From that information, the court could have reasonably concluded that defendant had violated a condition of probation. \u201cAll that is required to appear on the record is a basis from which the judge could reasonably reach the conclusion that the defendant actually committed the acts *** required to constitute the offense to which the defendant is pleading guilty.\u201d Barker, 83 Ill. 2d at 327-28, 415 N.E.2d at 408.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Frank Young, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL DENNIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 03\u20141032\nOpinion filed December 20, 2004.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Lawrence J. Essig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nFrank Young, State\u2019s Attorney, of Danville (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0491-01", "first_page_order": 509, "last_page_order": 515 }