{ "id": 3216031, "name": "JASON RODIMEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Rodimel v. Cook County Sheriff's Office", "decision_date": "2004-12-23", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-2967", "first_page": "744", "last_page": "748", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 744" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258589 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963706 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418-19" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "419, 424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 U.S.C. \u00a7 928", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "Article 128 of the Military Code, defining assault as attempting or offering with unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to another" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 M.J. 140", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "M.J.", "case_ids": [ 3634788 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145", "parenthetical": "one element of indecent assault is that the accused assaulted the victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mj/40/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609702 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536023 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 U.S.C. \u00a7 934", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 522, "char_count": 11436, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.776454897751662e-08, "percentile": 0.4564412828701596 }, "sha256": "d39d68527b0dc89348b8912a8be8914c44906c924327f68dd431e06601ceb19f", "simhash": "1:f5b6cdcac6e7bf52", "word_count": 1871 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:29.254043+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JASON RODIMEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE COOK COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S OFFICE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Jason Rodimel, appeals from the circuit court\u2019s order dismissing his declaratory judgment action against defendants, Cook County sheriffs office, Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and Illinois State Police. Plaintiffs complaint sought the court\u2019s declaration that the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002)) did not require plaintiff to register as a sex offender in Illinois. On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint because the offense of which he was convicted by a military court is not explicitly included in the Registration Act, nor is it substantially equivalent to any of the offenses listed in the Registration Act. We affirm.\nIn October, 2001, plaintiff was convicted of indecent assault under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Military Code) (10 U.S.C. \u00a7 934 (2000)). Specifically, the military court found plaintiff guilty of \u201ccommit[ting] an indecent assault upon [the victim], a person not his wife, by kissing her on the mouth, by straddling her, and by grabbing her breasts, with the intent to gratify his sexual desires.\u201d Plaintiffs sentence included a reduction in military grade, one month\u2019s confinement and a discharge for \u201cbad conduct.\u201d\nAfter his discharge, plaintiff established residence in Indiana and registered with the Porter County police as a sex offender. He renewed his registration the following year. Plaintiff moved to Chicago in December 2002 and informed the Porter County police and the Cook County sheriffs office of his move. Plaintiff also informed them, upon his counsel\u2019s advice, of his belief that he need not register as a sex offender in Illinois. Plaintiff then filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the Registration Act does not require him to register as a sex offender. The State Police filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to sections 2\u2014615 and 2\u2014619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014615, 2\u2014619 (West 2002)).\nOn September 17, 2003, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss under section 2\u2014619 of the Code, finding the offense of indecent assault was \u201csubstantially similar\u201d to criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12\u201415 (West 2002)), and therefore plaintiff must register as a sex offender under Illinois law. Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.\nDismissal of the complaint under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code is proper where the \u201cclaim asserted *** is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014619(a)(9) (West 2002). \u201cAffirmative matter\u201d refers to \u201ca defense that negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.\u201d Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999). The trial court\u2019s order granting defendants\u2019 section 2\u2014619 motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 220.\nPlaintiff argues the trial court improperly dismissed his complaint because indecent assault, the offense for which he was convicted by a military court, is not explicitly included in the Registration Act, nor is it substantially equivalent to any of the listed offenses. Section 2 of the Registration Act states as follows:\n\u201c(A) As used in this Article, \u2018sex offender\u2019 means any person who is:\n(1) charged pursuant to Illinois law, or any substantially similar federal, Uniform Code of Military Justice, sister state, or foreign country law, with a sex offense set forth in subsection (B) of this Section or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and:\n(a) is convicted of such offense or an attempt to commit such offense[.]\n\u00edji \u00cdJ\u00cd\n(B) As used in this Article, \u2018sex offense\u2019 means:\n(1) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961:\n11 \u2014 20.1 (child pornography),\n11 \u2014 6 (indecent solicitation of a child),\n11 \u2014 9.1 (sexual exploitation of a child),\n11 \u2014 15.1 (soliciting for a juvenile prostitute),\n11 \u2014 18.1 (patronizing a juvenile prostitute),\n11 \u2014 17.1 (keeping a place of juvenile prostitution),\n11 \u2014 19.1 (juvenile pimping),\n11\u2014 19.2 (exploitation of a child),\n12\u2014 13 (criminal sexual assault),\n12 \u2014 14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault),\n12 \u2014 14.1 (predatory criminal sexual assault of a child),\n12 \u2014 15 (criminal sexual abuse),\n12 \u2014 16 (aggravated criminal sexual abuse),\n12 \u2014 33 (ritualized abuse of a child).\nAn attempt to commit any of these offenses.\n\u2756 # *\n(C) A conviction for an offense of federal law, Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the law of another state or a foreign country that is substantially equivalent to any offense listed in subsections (B), (C), and (E) of this Section shall constitute a conviction for the purpose of this Article.\u201d 730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002).\nThe Registration Act provides that \u201c[a] sex offender, as defined in Section 2 of this Act, or sexual predator shall, within the time period prescribed in subsections (b) and (c), register in person and provide accurate information as required by the Department of State Police.\u201d 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2002).\nHere, plaintiff was convicted of indecent assault under the Military Code, an offense not explicitly listed in section 2(B) above. Therefore, plaintiff must register as a sex offender in Illinois only if the offense of indecent assault is substantially equivalent to any of the offenses listed in subsection (B). Defendants contend the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs declaratory judgment action under section 2\u2014619 because indecent assault is substantially equivalent to the listed offense of criminal sexual abuse. Two crimes are considered substantially equivalent if similar elements are required to prove the commission of each offense. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 189-90 (2003).\nA comparison of the elements of indecent assault and criminal sexual abuse reveals that the offenses indeed are substantially equivalent to one another. To prove indecent assault, the government must show:\n\u201c(1) That the accused assaulted a certain person not the spouse of the accused in a certain manner;\n(2) That the acts were done with the intent to gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused; and\n(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.\u201d United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 145 (C.M.A. 1994), citing Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, pt. IV par. 636 (1984).\nThe Military Code describes \u201cassault\u201d as follows:\n\u201cAny person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another person, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.\u201d 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 928(a) (2000).\nSimilarly, a person commits criminal sexual abuse if he \u201ccommits an act of sexual conduct by the use of force or threat of force.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12\u201415(a)(1) (West 2002). \u201cSexual conduct\u201d is defined as \u201cany intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age, *** for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12\u201412(e) (West 2002).\nPlaintiff was convicted of indecent assault for kissing the victim on the mouth, straddling her, and touching her breasts with the intent to gratify his sexual desires. Proof of these facts also satisfies the elements required to find plaintiff guilty of criminal sexual abuse. Therefore, the offense of indecent assault is substantially equivalent to criminal sexual abuse and plaintiffs conviction for indecent assault requires him to register in Illinois as a sex offender under the Registration Act. The trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs action under section 2\u2014619 of the Code.\nPlaintiff, however, argues that the conduct for which he was convicted could not be prosecuted as criminal sexual abuse, because criminal sexual abuse is an offense committed against a child below the age of 13. Plaintiffs argument is based on a misreading of section 12\u201412(e) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12\u201412(e) (West 2002)), which defines \u201csexual conduct\u201d as used in the definition of criminal sexual abuse. As discussed above, \u201csexual conduct\u201d means the touching \u201cof the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 12(e) (West 2002). Clearly, criminal sexual abuse is committed against a person of any age if the sex organs, anus or breasts are intentionally or knowingly fondled by the use of force or threat of force and for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused. Thus, contrary to plaintiff\u2019s contention, criminal sexual abuse does not require that the offense be committed against a child below the age of 13.\nPlaintiff also argues that the two offenses are not substantially equivalent because criminal sexual abuse requires an element of force whereas indecent assault does not explicitly refer to the use of force. As outlined above, although the offense of indecent assault does not explicitly state that force is an element of the offense, force or threat of force is implied in the use of the word \u201cassault.\u201d See United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 145 (C.M.A. 1994) (one element of indecent assault is that the accused assaulted the victim); 10 U.S.C. \u00a7 928(a) (2000) (Article 128 of the Military Code, defining assault as attempting or offering with unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to another).\nFinally, plaintiff argues that he need not register because his conviction for indecent assault occurred in October 2000 and the Registration Act did not specifically include convictions under the Military Code as a requirement to register until August 2002. Plaintiffs contention has no merit. The Registration Act and the Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2002)) have retroactive effect. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418-19 (2000). Furthermore, the retroactive effect of the Registration Act does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 418. A statute is an unconstitutional ex post facto law if it makes conduct criminal which was previously legal or increases the punishment for an existing crime. People v. Starnes, 273 Ill. App. 3d 911, 914 (1995). Since registration under the Act is not considered punishment, the Registration Act is not an ex post facto law. See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 419, 424.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, PJ., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gardiner, Koch & Weisherg, of Chicago (James B. Koch and Daniel J. Nickel, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JASON RODIMEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE COOK COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S OFFICE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20142967\nOpinion filed December 23, 2004.\nGardiner, Koch & Weisherg, of Chicago (James B. Koch and Daniel J. Nickel, of counsel), for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0744-01", "first_page_order": 762, "last_page_order": 766 }