{ "id": 3217364, "name": "BRIAN VOGEL, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Hogan's Plumbing, Inc., Appellant); HOGAN'S PLUMBING, INC., Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Brian Vogel, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Vogel v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "2005-01-04", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-04-0291WC, 2-04-0293WC cons.", "first_page": "780", "last_page": "789", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 780" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075322 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5287753 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5117922 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 899", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252233 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908", "parenthetical": "second fall involving use of crutches was not an intervening accident that broke the causal connection between condition of ill-being and first fall where claimant would not have been using the crutches but for the first injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5108952 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0834-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222760 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980725 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 828", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472322 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209126 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" }, { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898605 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "where the work injury itself causes a subsequent injury, the chain of causation is not broken" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 890", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291557 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0890-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887237 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" }, { "page": "742-43" }, { "page": "742" }, { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4023620 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974996 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281473 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0185-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 908, "char_count": 22569, "ocr_confidence": 0.706, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6921200673378235e-07, "percentile": 0.6993822805885594 }, "sha256": "eef520e5bd30e175eae6bbe9da4cc2d22f4c920dc316b14ab263e6654b4ebc17", "simhash": "1:a5a5c0c337896e7c", "word_count": 3601 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:29.254043+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRIAN VOGEL, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Hogan\u2019s Plumbing, Inc., Appellant).\u2014HOGAN\u2019S PLUMBING, INC., Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Brian Vogel, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nI. INTRODUCTION\nClaimant, Brian Vogel, sustained cervical injuries while working for employer, Hogan\u2019s Plumbing, Inc. An arbitrator awarded claimant 45 weeks of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and $32,987.80 in medical expenses. The arbitrator found that injuries claimant received as a result of three automobile accidents broke the causal chain and therefore that his current condition of ill-being was not causally related to his work injury. The Industrial Commission (Commission) adopted the arbitrator\u2019s findings. On judicial review, the trial court found that the Commission\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law. On remand, the Commission awarded claimant 85 weeks of TTD benefits and $36,915 in medical expenses and ordered employer to authorize surgery prescribed by claimant\u2019s treating physician. The trial court confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision on remand. On appeal, employer argues that the trial court erred in holding that the Commission\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nII. BACKGROUND\nThe arbitration hearing took place on August 23, 2001. Claimant began working for employer on June 22, 1998. On July 10, 1998, he was delivering a whirlpool tub to a customer\u2019s home. While dragging the tub, which weighed 275 to 300 pounds, he tripped over some debris. Claimant felt pain in his neck that radiated down his right arm and into his fingers. Claimant reported the accident upon returning to employer\u2019s office. He continued working until July 26, 1998, when he went to the emergency room at Central Du Page Hospital.\nClaimant saw Dr. Harb Boury, a neurosurgeon, on July 29, 1998. Dr. Boury diagnosed herniated discs at C4-C5 and C5-C6 and a bulging disc at C6-C7 and also noted his impression that claimant had a congenitally narrow cervical spinal canal. Dr. Boury ordered claimant off of work.\nClaimant underwent surgery on March 12, 1999. Dr. Boury performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C4-C5 and C5-C6. During his deposition, Dr. Boury testified that claimant\u2019s fusion had been progressing nicely. According to Dr. Boury, a person with a job like claimant\u2019s typically would not be able to return to work until about six months after the surgery. On April 26, 1999, Dr. Boury reported that X rays showed that the graft height and alignment were well maintained. The bone graft was beginning to fuse but was not yet solid. On June 7, 1999, Dr. Boury reported that an X ray taken on June 4, 1999, showed that the alignment was good and the height of the graft was maintained, but the fusion was not completely solid. He advised claimant to wean himself off of his rigid neck brace over the next 7 to 10 days and, after that period, to continue to wear the brace while driving.\nClaimant testified that he \u201cwas doing fine\u201d and was experiencing no pain until he was involved in an automobile accident on June 9, 1999. Another car hit claimant\u2019s vehicle from behind while claimant was traveling to his first session of physical therapy. Claimant was wearing a soft brace at the time. After the accident, claimant experienced pain in his neck, shoulder, and arm.\nClaimant saw Dr. Boury on June 10, 1999, and informed him about the auto accident. Dr. Boury reviewed the X rays taken at the emergency room and determined that the bone graft remained in place and the alignment remained satisfactory. He advised claimant to wear a rigid neck brace for another six weeks.\nClaimant saw Dr. Boury again on June 14, 1999. Claimant complained of pain in the upper part of his right arm. The pain radiated downward but not all the way into his hand. Dr. Boury testified that claimant\u2019s symptoms were \u201calmost like a throw back to\u201d what claimant experienced before the surgery. On July 12, 1999, claimant informed Dr. Boury that he had taken a job delivering pizzas. Dr. Boury advised claimant that such work was appropriate because it was \u201cnot a physical job.\u201d An X ray taken on July 24, 1999, showed that the graft was in a good position and the alignment was satisfactory.\nA functional capacity evaluation conducted on August 16, 1999, concluded that claimant was able to lift 50 pounds occasionally and could function in a job requiring a medium physical demand level. Claimant\u2019s job with employer was rated at the very heavy physical demand level. Claimant underwent two weeks of work hardening but was unable to achieve any physical or functional gains. On August 30, 1999, Dr. Boury authorized claimant to return to work within the restrictions prescribed in the functional capacity evaluation.\nClaimant remained symptomatic, and, in September 1999, Dr. Boury referred claimant to Dr. Steven Baker, an orthopaedic surgeon. In his referral letter to Dr. Baker, Dr. Boury related claimant\u2019s complaint that \u201cever since the car accident, my shoulder never felt the same.\u201d Dr. Baker noted that claimant\u2019s condition failed to improve with physical therapy and referred claimant back to Dr. Boury.\nOn October 5, 1999, claimant underwent a myelogram and postmyelogram CT scan. These studies showed a slight narrowing of the neuroforamina on the right side at C5-C6. Dr. Boury advised claimant that he probably would develop pseudoarthrosis, or a failed fusion, at that level and referred him to Dr. Fred Geisler, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Geisler examined claimant. A CT scan performed at Dr. Geisler\u2019s behest on November 5, 1999, revealed a failed fusion, at C5-C6.\nDr. Boury testified that he wanted to attempt conservative treatment before considering surgery. He advised claimant to wear a neck brace in the hope that the external fixation would help the fusion to become solid. Also, he prescribed physical therapy. When the conservative treatment concluded, Dr. Boury believed that claimant required a second surgery, including an additional graft and plating.\nDr. Boury opined that the problems claimant experienced after the auto accident were caused primarily by the auto accident and not claimant\u2019s work accident. According to Dr. Boury:\n\u201cThe accident clearly played a major role in his worsening clinical condition. And *** what\u2019s unfortunate is the timing of the accident, that the accident happened not quite three months *** from the anniversary of his surgery; that a fusion is not solid by that time, *** and, therefore, the accident clearly will set back the fusion and sometimes may lead into a pseudoarthrosis, which [proved] to be the case.\u201d\nThus, Dr. Boury believed that, if claimant had not been involved in the auto accident, he probably would not have developed pseudoarthrosis. He explained that pseudoarthrosis \u201cis a very specific term used to describe the *** lack of a bony fusion. In and of itself, it implies a pre-existing operation.\u201d\nClaimant was involved in a second automobile accident on April 7, 2000. Again, he was struck from the rear. Claimant complained of pain in his left shoulder and arm, pain in his lower back, pain in his right upper arm, and numbness in his right middle finger and right ring finger. X rays taken at the emergency room showed the incomplete fusion at C5-C6 and the narrowing of the neural foramina at C4-C5 and C5-C6.\nClaimant was involved in a third accident on June 18, 2000, when he struck a vehicle that had pulled out in front of him. Claimant\u2019s head struck the windshield. Emergency room X rays revealed the incomplete fusion at C5-C6, effusion at C4-C5, and narrowing at C6-C7. Dr. Boury opined that \u201c[a]ll these accidents are aggravating the pre-existing condition which is pseudoarthrosis at [C]5-[C]-6. The pseudoarthrosis is *** a result of the first accident of 6-9-99.\u201d\nClaimant acknowledged that he exercised at a health club regularly from March 1, 2000, until May 31, 2000. He rode a stationary bicycle and did some weight training, mostly using his legs. He did upper body work to the extent he could tolerate it and lifted no more than 25 to 50 pounds. Claimant worked full-time as a driver for Black Gold Septic from March 13, 2000, until April 24, 2001. Claimant injured his ankle while working for Black Gold Septic and, at the time of the hearing, was receiving TTD benefits for that injury. At the time of the hearing, claimant had lawsuits pending against the other drivers involved in claimant\u2019s first and third auto accidents.\nAt employer\u2019s request, Dr. Gary Skaletsky, a neurosurgeon, examined claimant on March 8, 2001, and reviewed claimant\u2019s medical records. He opined that the graft at C5-C6 failed to fuse \u201cfor inherent biological reasons\u201d and that the June 9, 1999, auto accident did not contribute to claimant\u2019s pseudoarthrosis. According to Dr. Skaletsky, the auto accident at most would have delayed the fusion but would not have prevented the fusion from occurring. He added that the post-accident studies showing that the bone graft remained properly aligned indicated that the accident did not contribute to claimant\u2019s condition. Accordingly, he opined that the automobile accidents did not contribute in any way to claimant\u2019s current condition. Dr. Skaletsky believed that one cause contributing to claimant\u2019s pseudoarthrosis was his failure to comply with Dr. Boury\u2019s directive to wear a rigid brace while driving. He explained that any activity that causes hypermobility of the neck while fusion is occurring could delay the fusion and lead to pseudoarthrosis. Also, he believed that claimant\u2019s work at Black Gold Septic was inappropriate given claimant\u2019s work restrictions and was probably a factor contributing to claimant\u2019s condition.\nThe arbitrator awarded claimant TTD benefits from July 28, 1998, until June 9, 1999, or 45 weeks, and $32,987.80 in medical expenses. Relying on Dr. Boury\u2019s opinion, the arbitrator found that the auto accidents \u201cfurther aggravated [claimant\u2019s] medical condition and resulted in the need for additional medical treatment and lost time.\u201d Accordingly, claimant\u2019s current condition of ill-being was not causally related to the July 10, 1998, work injury The Commission adopted the arbitrator\u2019s decision.\nClaimant sought judicial review. On October 7, 2002, the trial court ruled that the Commission\u2019s decision was \u201ccontrary to law and [against] the manifest weight of the evidence in that the 6/9/99 auto accident and subsequent auto accidents did not break the chain of causation between [claimant\u2019s] 7/10/98 work accident and his pseudoarthrosis, in that the work and auto accidents were concurrent causes.\u201d The trial court remanded the cause to the Commission with instructions to enter an award consistent with the court\u2019s ruling. Employer appealed the trial court\u2019s ruling, but this court dismissed the appeal because a final judgment had not yet been entered. Vogel v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, No. 2\u201402\u20141211 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn remand, the Commission awarded claimant TTD benefits from July 28, 1998, through March 13, 2000, or 85 weeks, and $36,915 in medical expenses and found that claimant was entitled to the second surgery that Dr. Boury had recommended. The trial court confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision, and employer timely appealed.\nIII. DISCUSSION\nOn appeal, employer argues that the trial court erred in setting aside the Commission\u2019s original decision that the auto accidents were intervening events that broke the causal connection between claimant\u2019s work injury and his current condition of ill-being. Where, as here, the trial court reverses the Commission\u2019s initial decision and the Commission enters a new decision on remand, this court must decide whether the Commission\u2019s initial decision was proper. InterCity Products Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 326 Ill. App. 3d 185, 196 (2001).\nTo obtain compensation under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2002)), a claimant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has suffered a disabling injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 203 (2003). The \u201carising out of\u2019 component addresses the causal connection between a work-related injury and the claimant\u2019s condition of ill-being. Sisbro, 207 Ill. 2d at 203. A claimant need prove only that some act or phase of his or her employment was a causative factor in the ensuing injury. Twice Over Clean, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 348 Ill. App. 3d 638, 643 (2004), appeal allowed, 211 Ill. 2d 617 (2004). A work-related injury need not be the sole or principal causative factor, as long as it was a causative factor in the resulting condition of ill-being. Sisbro, 207 Ill. 2d at 205.\nEvery natural consequence that flows from an injury that arose out of and in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment is compensable unless caused by an independent intervening accident that breaks the chain of causation between a work-related injury and an ensuing disability or injury. Teska v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 266 Ill. App. 3d 740, 742 (1994). That other incidents, whether work-related or not, may have aggravated the claimant\u2019s condition is irrelevant. Lasley Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 274 Ill. App. 3d 890, 893 (1995); see also International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 46 Ill. 2d 238, 245 (1970) (where the work injury itself causes a subsequent injury, the chain of causation is not broken).\nWhether a causal connection exists is a question of fact for the Commission, and a reviewing court will overturn the Commission\u2019s decision only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Navistar International Transportation Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 331 Ill. App. 3d 405, 415 (2002). It is the Commission\u2019s duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence, particularly medical opinion evidence. Navistar, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 415. The test is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission\u2019s finding, not whether this court or any other tribunal might reach an opposite conclusion. Pietrzak v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 329 Ill. App. 3d 828, 833 (2002). For the Commission\u2019s decision to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, the record must disclose that an opposite conclusion clearly was the proper result. Gallianetti v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 315 Ill. App. 3d 721, 729-30 (2000).\nThe trial court appropriately applied the causation principles discussed above in ruling that the Commission\u2019s original decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court has recognized repeatedly that, when the claimant\u2019s condition is weakened by a work-related accident, a subsequent accident that aggravates the condition does not break the causal chain. See Lee v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 167 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (1995). For example, in Mendota Township High School v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 243 Ill. App. 3d 834 (1993), the claimant injured his lower back while playing basketball in connection with his duties as an athletic coach. Less than one month later, the claimant aggravated his condition while playing racquetball. The claimant underwent conservative treatment, but his condition worsened. Several months later, the claimant suffered a sneezing episode while attending a high school football game. Immediately, he experienced excruciating lower-back pain that radiated down his leg. There was medical evidence that the basketball injury probably resulted in a tear of the posterior longitudinal ligament or of the annulus fibrosis, which weakened and ruptured during the sneezing episode.\nThe court noted that, although there was no dispute that the sneezing episode was the immediate cause of the rupture, it was not necessarily the sole cause. Mendota, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 837. \u201cHad it not been for the original basketball injury, in all probability claimant\u2019s back problems would not have reached the stage they did in such a short period of time.\u201d Mendota, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 837. The court held that the Commission\u2019s finding that the racquetball injury and the sneezing episode were only contributing, not intervening, causes was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mendota, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 837-38; see also International Harvester, 46 Ill. 2d at 247 (evidence supported Commission\u2019s finding that claimant was suffering from a continuing condition of traumatic neurosis that resulted from a work-related head injury and that the existence of the condition was a causative factor in the total and permanent disability that occurred four years later when claimant\u2019s wife struck him); Fermi National Accelerator Lab v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 224 Ill. App. 3d 899, 908 (1992) (second fall involving use of crutches was not an intervening accident that broke the causal connection between condition of ill-being and first fall where claimant would not have been using the crutches but for the first injury).\nThis court has applied the above principles to overturn a Commission finding that a second accident broke the causal connection between the claimant\u2019s work injury and his subsequent condition of ill-being. In Teska, the claimant sustained a cervical injury while at work. He underwent surgery and was released to work about two months later. The claimant continued to experience numbness and pain. An MRI taken several months after the surgery revealed a recurrent herniated disc at the same level upon which the surgery was performed. About one year after the surgery, the claimant experienced sharp pain while bowling and did not return to work thereafter.\nThe court reasoned that merely because the claimant experienced an upsurge of neck pain while bowling did not mean that the causal connection was broken. Teska, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 742-43. According to the court, the claimant\u2019s condition would not have progressed to the point it did but for his original work-related accident. Teska, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 742. Because the claimant\u2019s work-related accident played a causative role in his current condition of ill-being, the Commission\u2019s decision to the contrary was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Teska, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 743.\nHere, claimant\u2019s first auto accident clearly aggravated his condition resulting from his work-related injury. There is no dispute that, when claimant was involved in the first auto accident, he had not fully recovered from his surgery. Just before the first auto accident, Dr. Boury reported that the fusion was progressing nicely but was not complete. Claimant had not yet been released to full-duty work. Even if the accident was responsible for the failed fusion, such a condition could not have developed but for the surgery, which everyone agreed was necessary as a result of claimant\u2019s work injury.\nThe evidence that appears to support the Commission\u2019s initial decision is illusory. Claimant testified that he \u201cwas doing fine\u201d and was experiencing no pain until he was involved in the first auto accident. This testimony about a lack of symptoms does nothing to change the fact that claimant was still recovering from the surgery and therefore was susceptible to complications such as pseudoarthrosis. The Commission relied on Dr. Boury\u2019s opinion that the first auto accident played a \u201cmajor\u201d role in claimant\u2019s worsening clinical condition. Dr. Boury\u2019s opinion, however, does nothing to eliminate claimant\u2019s work-related injury as a causative factor in his current condition of ill-being. Dr. Boury recognized that the timing of the auto accident shortly after the surgery, while claimant was still recovering, was a crucial factor. Also, he explained that the existence of pseudoarthrosis implies a previous surgery. Although Dr. Boury testified that the pseudoarthrosis would not have occurred but for the auto accident, it is equally true that the pseudoarthrosis would not have occurred but for claimant\u2019s work injury. Therefore, Dr. Boury\u2019s opinion merely established that the auto accident was a concurrent cause, along with the work injury.\nThe same analysis applies to the subsequent auto accidents. There was no evidence that the accidents changed the nature of the injury other than to aggravate it, and the need for the second surgery became apparent before the second auto accident. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that claimant\u2019s work-related injury was a causative factor in his resulting condition.\nWe note that the arbitrator and the Commission never expressly found that the auto accidents broke the causal chain, but instead found merely that they \u201cfurther aggravated [claimant\u2019s] medical condition.\u201d The law is clear, however, that the fact that other nonworkrelated accidents may have aggravated claimant\u2019s condition is irrelevant.\nIn Zion-Benton Township High School District 126 v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 242 Ill. App. 3d 109, 114 (1993), and Ditola v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 216 Ill. App. 3d 531, 535-36 (1991), the courts upheld Commission decisions finding that the second accidents broke the causal chains. Those decisions are distinguishable. The claimants in those cases had returned to work after receiving treatment for their work injuries and had been working for several months at the times of their second accidents. Here, claimant was still recovering from surgery and had not yet been released to return to full-duty work.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly ruled on October 7, 2002, that the Commission\u2019s initial decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and remanded the cause so that the Commission could enter an award consistent with the court\u2019s ruling. The parties do not take issue with any aspects of the Commission\u2019s decision on remand.\nTherefore, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 78 Ill. 2d 327 (1980).\nAffirmed and remanded to Industrial Commission.\nMcCullough, ej., and HOFFMAN, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.\nThe name of the Industrial Commission was changed to the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission on January 1, 2005. However, for the sake of consistency, we will continue to use \u201cIndustrial Commission\u201d in this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul W Pasche, of Brady, Connolly & Masuda, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.", "James J. Marszalek, of Marszalek & Marszalek, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRIAN VOGEL, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Hogan\u2019s Plumbing, Inc., Appellant).\u2014HOGAN\u2019S PLUMBING, INC., Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Brian Vogel, Appellee).\nSecond District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNos. 2\u201404\u20140291WC, 2\u201404\u20140293WC cons.\nOpinion filed January 4, 2005.\nPaul W Pasche, of Brady, Connolly & Masuda, PC., of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames J. Marszalek, of Marszalek & Marszalek, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0780-01", "first_page_order": 798, "last_page_order": 807 }