{ "id": 3215294, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DUEL THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thomas", "decision_date": "2004-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 1-02-0318", "first_page": "868", "last_page": "885", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 868" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "699 N.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209980 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5246007 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544876 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222573 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" }, { "page": "744-45" }, { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a witness's out-of-court statement that harmonizes with his in-court testimony generally is inadmissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2926773 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "a witness's out-of-court statement that harmonizes with his in-court testimony generally is inadmissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "815 N.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821", "parenthetical": "plain error may warrant review where the evidence was closely balanced or a substantial right was affected" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5457435 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "plain error may warrant review where the evidence was closely balanced or a substantial right was affected" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2542420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "417-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281410 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131030 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609712 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 451", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777458 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reversal is proper where prior inconsistent statements are admitted but the requirements of section 115-10.1 are not met" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256584 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313-14", "parenthetical": "reversal is proper where prior inconsistent statements are admitted but the requirements of section 115-10.1 are not met" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. 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App. 3d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5457338 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79-80" }, { "page": "79-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464792 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257121 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 N.E.2d 531", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "714 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "696 N.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 991", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222643 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996-97" }, { "page": "999" }, { "page": "999" }, { "page": "999" }, { "page": "999" }, { "page": "996-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0991-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159518 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875-76" }, { "page": "871" }, { "page": "876" }, { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187200 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "764 N.E.2d 1174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "938" }, { "page": "938", "parenthetical": "an earlier inconsistent statement may be admissible as impeachment if it is truly inconsistent and deals with a matter that is more than collateral" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "808 N.E.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461336 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0194-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1403, "char_count": 42911, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0310491367810043e-07, "percentile": 0.5480659297125045 }, "sha256": "14409b2f16dbf21ac7ae6ad137f91df4a93ae36bdaf972d6706707c02c27ee05", "simhash": "1:0ffa35a47ed55c66", "word_count": 6939 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:31:29.254043+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DUEL THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the modified opinion of the court:\nDefendant Duel Thomas was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9\u20141(a)(1) (West 2000)) and aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10\u20142(a)(1) (West 2000)) after a jury trial. He was sentenced to 60 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and 30 years for aggravated kidnaping, to be served concurrently. Defendant appeals, claiming he is entitled to a new trial because: (1) the State did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the statement of a witness as a prior inconsistent statement; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence linking defendant to a gang; and (4) the State\u2019s closing arguments were improper. We affirm.\nWe simultaneously address arguments raised by defendant in his appellate brief and in his petition for rehearing filed after the release on August 31, 2004, of our affirmance of his conviction. Because the issues raised in his petition overlap with his arguments in his appellate brief and with our conclusions in our affirmance, we issue this modified opinion on denial of the petition for rehearing.\nQuinton Kirkwood\u2019s body was found on March 27, 1999, in a rear basement stairwell at 1648 S. Christiana Avenue in Chicago. He had been shot to death.\nJeff Henderson was arrested on March 28, 1999, in connection with the murder. The next day, he gave Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Luke Sheridan a statement, implicating defendant in the shooting. Henderson said he and several other people, including defendant, defendant\u2019s brother Antonio Thomas (Antonio) and Linord Thames were in the apartment of Frederick Laws at 8 p.m. on March 26, 1999. Thames told defendant and Antonio that Kirkwood was playing dice in another apartment, had won about $9,000 and was a good target for a robbery. Antonio gave Henderson a set of keys and told him to go get a car that was parked nearby. Henderson got the car and parked it in front of the building where the dice game was taking place. About 10 minutes later, Henderson saw Antonio walking Kirkwood at gunpoint from the building. Antonio pushed Kirkwood into the trunk of the car and closed the lid. Antonio ordered defendant and Henderson to get inside the car.\nHenderson said Antonio drove to an alley where he stopped and opened the trunk. Defendant and Antonio grabbed the victim and walked him to a cemented area under a porch behind a building. When defendant and Antonio demanded money, Kirkwood used a cellular phone to call relatives and ask for money. Henderson said he heard Kirkwood say he had lost money in a dice game, needed more money and was sending someone to get the money. Henderson then went to Kirkwood\u2019s relatives\u2019 house but they refused to give him money. Henderson returned to the location where defendant and Antonio were holding Kirkwood at gunpoint. When Henderson told defendant and Antonio that no money was given to him, Kirkwood asked to call his relatives again. Antonio dialed the number and handed the phone to Kirkwood as defendant shot Kirkwood multiple times with an automatic weapon. Then Antonio shot Kirkwood multiple times. Defendant fled on foot. Henderson and Antonio fled in the car. The statement said that Henderson was treated well by the police, he had read and signed each page of the statement and he was not threatened or promised anything in exchange for the statement.\nDefendant, Antonio, Thames and James Williams were arrested on March 29, 1999. Defendant was charged by indictment with first degree murder, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping and attempted armed robbery. Henderson\u2019s trial was held before defendant\u2019s trial. Henderson\u2019s testimony at his own trial was essentially the same as his statement to Sheridan, implicating defendant in the shooting. Henderson was acquitted. Defendant, Antonio and Williams then were tried concurrently before separate juries.\nBefore opening statements in defendant\u2019s trial, the trial judge instructed the jury, giving the following admonition as to closing arguments:\n\u201c[C]losing arguments [are] not evidence, but it\u2019s helpful for you to have the attorneys review the evidence presented in the case and also to discuss inferences to be drawn from the evidence. It\u2019s also your determination as to whether an inference that\u2019s argued is in fact a reasonable inference or not because you are the trier of the facts. You will decide what the facts in the case are.\u201d\nThe State called Officer Thomas McGreal, who testified that in investigating the crime scene, he found seven cartridge casings and four fired bullets.\nThe State called Henderson to testify. Henderson testified that he could not recall seeing defendant on the night of the murder, contrary to his testimony at his own trial, and stated that his entire testimony at his own trial was untrue. The State then examined Henderson on the basis of the transcript of his trial, impeaching his statements that his trial testimony was untrue. Defendant did not object. Henderson said he was not with defendant on the night of the murder and he knew defendant \u201cjust from around the neighborhood, that\u2019s all.\u201d Henderson admitted to testifying at his own trial that he was with defendant that night, but claimed \u201cthe whole transcript you\u2019re reading is [a] lie.\u201d\nFollowing a discussion outside the presence of the jury, the trial court determined that Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan could be admitted under section 115\u201410.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115\u201410.1 (West 2002)). That section allows a prior inconsistent statement that would otherwise be excluded as hearsay to be admitted as substantive evidence. Henderson testified the written statement was \u201cmade up\u201d by the assistant State\u2019s Attorney. Henderson said he signed the statement without reading it after being told he could go home if he signed.\nHenderson testified that, contrary to his earlier accounts of the murder, he alone forced Kirkwood at gunpoint into the trunk of a car and tried to rob him. He said that when he failed to get money from Kirkwood\u2019s relatives, he drove to the scene of the murder and shot Kirkwood, firing a .38-caliber weapon with one hand and a .45-caliber weapon with the other hand.\nAfter a discussion with the parties outside the presence of the jury, the trial court decided to allow the introduction of gang evidence despite its earlier refusal to do so. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the trial judge instructed the jury as to gang-related evidence:\n\u201c[Y]ou are going to be hearing evidence and testimony that is being admitted for a limited purpose, and the testimony involves the mention of gang membership. There is no evidence or inference or argument that this homicide in any way was gang related. So it is being offered for the limited purpose only of evaluation of the credibility of this witness as well as the consideration of any arguments concerning his motivation.\nSo for that limited purpose only it will be admissible. It will not be considered by you for any other purposes in deciding the case.\u201d\nWhen questioning resumed, Henderson denied ever being a member of the Black Souls street gang, of which defendant was the chief, but Henderson admitted that he so testified at his own trial. Henderson admitted that he testified that the number one law of the Black Souls was \u201cto never disown one of your brothers\u201d and \u201cto always look up to your older brothers and never disobey the mob, never go against the grain.\u201d\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Virginia Bigane asked Henderson if he had ever told anyone that he committed the crimes, and he replied that he had told her, but he could not recall the exact date. He claimed to have confessed to Bigane in private while he was waiting for a hearing to begin in the present courtroom on an earlier occasion. He said that on the day he confessed, he had been transported from the Pinckneyville Correctional Center by correctional officers, and although the officers accompanied him to court, they were not present when he confessed.\nThe State also examined Henderson as to whether he understood the extent of his immunity from further prosecution following his acquittal:\n\u201cQ. That was [at your own trial] where you told a jury that [defendant] and [Antonio] committed the murder, correct?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\n^ ^\nQ. You were found not guilty after that testimony, correct?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\nQ. And you now know that the State can never try you again for murder no matter what you say here today, correct?\nA. I don\u2019t know. ***\n* * *\nQ. And [your lawyer] informed you that you can say anything you want here today about the murder because you cannot be tried again for the murder, isn\u2019t that true?\n}]i jfc\nMR. WAGNER (Defense Counsel): Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nBY THE WITNESS:\nA. He told me something like that, but he said I could still get tried by federal, something about the federal government can try me for murder and stuff like that.\nQ. Well, you are aware that there was an agreement with the State\u2019s Attorney that you would not be tried again for murder if you tried to get up and say you did the murder either in this courtroom or any other courtroom\u2014\n* ><* \u2756\nA. No, ma\u2019am. I wasn\u2019t told that. ***\nQ. Your lawyer didn\u2019t tell you that you cannot be tried for this murder either here or anywhere else again?\nA. He didn\u2019t say nothing about if I said I committed the murder I couldn\u2019t be tried for it. No, he did not. ***\nQ. You know, Mr. Henderson, you have gotten up here and have now told us that you committed the murder, correct?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\nQ. But at your own trial [defendant] and [Antonio], according to you, committed the murder, correct?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\nQ. And you were found not guilty after that trial, correct?\nA. Yes, ma\u2019am.\nQ. And you know that the State cannot retry you for murder because you were found not guilty, correct?\nA. I don\u2019t know what you might do. *** The State pull[s] all types of stunts.\u201d\nFirst Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Arthur Hill was called by the State to rebut Henderson\u2019s claim he did not know the extent of his immunity from future prosecution after his acquittal. Hill testified that he was present when Henderson was offered blanket immunity from prosecution for \u201cany real or perceived perjury from any prior testimony as well as any involvement regarding the murder of the victim in this case.\u201d Hill said Henderson answered \u201cyes\u201d when asked if the immunity offered had been explained to him.\nThe State called two Pinckneyville correctional officers, Darron Arnett and Craig W. Wilkey, to testify that they transported Henderson from Pinckneyville Correctional Center to the circuit court in August 2, 2001. Defendant objected on the basis that the Pinckneyville officers were with Henderson only on August 2, 2001, and Henderson did not say that he confessed to Bigane on that date. In a discussion outside the presence of the jury, defendant argued that the officers\u2019 testimony should not be allowed to impeach Henderson\u2019s claim he confessed to Bigane because the officers could testify only as to August 2, 2001, and not as to other dates when Henderson was in court, including August 3, 2001, and October 12, 2001. On those other occasions, Henderson was brought to court by different guards. The trial court allowed the officers\u2019 testimony. The officers testified Henderson was never outside the presence of at least one of the officers on August 2, 2001; they denied that they heard Henderson confess to Bigane, and they stated they would have reported a confession if it occurred.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Luke Sheridan testified that Henderson agreed to have his statement memorialized in handwritten form on March 29, 1999. Henderson told Sheridan he had been well treated by the police, and he had not been threatened or promised anything in return for the statement. After Sheridan wrote out the statement, Henderson read the first paragraph aloud and then Sheridan continued to read the full statement aloud with Henderson reading along. Sheridan said he made corrections requested by Henderson and Henderson then initialed the corrections and signed each page. The statement was admitted as a prior inconsistent statement, and Sheridan read the entire statement to the jury. Sheridan said Henderson never admitted committing the crimes.\nKirkwood\u2019s aunt, Ernestine Reed, and his cousin, Shakela Kirk-wood, testified that Kirkwood called their home at about 9 p.m. on the night of his murder and said he was sending someone to pick up money. Both witnesses identified Henderson as the man who came to their door. They testified that they did not give Henderson money.\nFrederick Laws testified that he knew defendant because both of them grew up in the same neighborhood. Laws said on the day of the murder, he attended a party where he heard Thames, Antonio and defendant discuss robbing Kirkwood of his gambling winnings. Laws said he heard Antonio say, \u201clet\u2019s go,\u201d and defendant, Antonio and Thames then left the apartment. Henderson left about five minutes later. Laws admitted being convicted of controlled substance violations in 1989 and 1992.\nRonnie Wheatley testified that he was leaving the apartment where the dice game took place on the night of the murder. Wheatley said Antonio and Kirkwood left the apartment at the same time, and while the men were descending the stairs, Antonio pulled out a silver-colored automatic weapon and pointed it in Wheatley\u2019s face. Wheatley said Antonio then pushed Kirkwood against the wall and put the gun in Kirkwood\u2019s face. Wheatley said he fled, and when he exited to the street, he saw some men, including defendant, standing nearby. Wheatley said Thames told him the next morning that Kirkwood had been killed. Wheatley said he told Thames, \u201c[tjhey weren\u2019t supposed to kill him. It was only supposed to have been a stick up.\u201d\nWheatley admitted he was a heavy user of drugs and alcohol at the time of the murder. He admitted that while he was in jail for drug offenses in November 1999, he gave an assistant State\u2019s Attorney a statement, which was handwritten by the attorney, implicating defendant in Kirkwood\u2019s murder. Wheatley also admitted that he received probation for two drug offenses and was admitted to a rehabilitation program after making the statement. He admitted that the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office paid for his protection after he was threatened.\nOfficer Patrick Foley testified that he found two .45-caliber bullets and one .38-caliber or 9-millimeter bullet under Kirkwood\u2019s body. He said two guns were used. Foley said he advised defendant of his rights under Miranda and interviewed defendant at about 9:45 p.m. on March 29, 1999, in the presence of another officer. Foley said defendant admitted to being present when Henderson and Antonio shot Kirk-wood, using .45- and .38-caliber automatic pistols. On cross-examination, Foley admitted that defendant\u2019s alleged statement to him was never put in writing.\nSergeant Dominick Rizzi testified that he investigated the Kirk-wood murder and, based on his findings, arrested defendant. Rizzi said while defendant was in custody, defendant implicated Henderson and Antonio, but over the next several hours, defendant gave differing accounts of the events of that day. Rizzi, after being examined as to his expertise in firearms, said it would be difficult for someone to fire two weapons \u2014 one with each hand \u2014 as Henderson claimed to have done because the guns were not designed for left-hand use and the strong recoil or kickback could cause the shooter to lose control of the guns.\nIn closing arguments, the State said because Henderson knew he was immune from further prosecution after his acquittal, he felt free to give a new and false version of the events at this trial by testifying that he alone killed Kirkwood. The State claimed Henderson falsified his testimony to exonerate defendant because Henderson feared defendant, his gang\u2019s chief:\n\u201cThis man [defendant] and his brother [Antonio Thomas] were the muscle men behind [Kirkwood\u2019s] murder. And still their muscle power can be felt, his muscle power, not just in how he *** used these powerful guns to plug bullet after bullet after bullet into [Kirkwood\u2019s] body; no, the way in which his power is still being felt can be seen by the way you saw 19-year-old Jeff Henderson, substantially younger than him *** come in here and lie on his behalf.\n*** [Henderson] can be charged with perjury based on what he said [at defendant\u2019s trial] *** when he sat here and admitted that he lied ***.\nBut which do you think is harder to face? A few years on a perjury charge or [defendant], his gang chief!?]\nMR. WAGNER (Defense Counsel): Objection. There is no evidence of this.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nMR. WAGNER: There is not even a reasonable inference to be drawn. Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nMS. MORASK (Assistant State\u2019s Attorney): Last week was pay back time. After [Henderson\u2019s] trial he had to pay [defendant] back. Who was watching [Henderson\u2019s] trial? [Defendant], according to them. If [defendant] is watching [Henderson\u2019s] trial, [Henderson] knows he has to pay [defendant] back. ***\nMR. WAGNER: Objection. There is no evidence of that.\nTHE COURT: Overruled. The jury can determine if there is a\nreasonable inference or not.\nMS. MORASK: [A]t [Henderson\u2019s] trial he has [dual] motives, (a), he wants to get acquitted; and (b), he doesn\u2019t want to get killed.\nMR. WAGNER: Objection. I ask that be stricken.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\u201d\nThe State repeated this theme in its closing argument and defendant\u2019s objections were overruled. The State argued there was no evidence that Henderson committed peijury at his own trial when he inculpated defendant. The State characterized Laws as defendant\u2019s \u201cfriend,\u201d arguing that, as such, Laws had no motive to give testimony in the State\u2019s favor, but did so. Defendant\u2019s objection was overruled.\nAfter defendant was convicted and sentenced, he filed motions for a new trial and to reconsider sentencing, which were denied. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s main arguments for reversal are: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred in admitting Henderson\u2019s earlier statements as prior inconsistent statements; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence linking defendant to a gang; and (4) the State\u2019s closing arguments were improper. We review these in turn.\nDefendant first argues that the State failed to establish proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because its case depended entirely on the \u201cincredible\u201d testimony of Henderson. Defendant claims Henderson\u2019s testimony was fatally discredited because he was an accomplice, he had been immunized from prosecution, he had recanted his earlier statement and he appeared to be a habitual perjurer.\n\u201cWhen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of [the] court to retry the defendant.\u201d People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939 (2004). A reviewing court must determine whether, \u201cafter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209. The court \u201cwill not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209.\nA person commits first degree murder when he kills a person without lawful justification and, in performing the acts which cause the death, he \u201ceither intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/9\u20141(a)(1) (West 2000). A person commits aggravated kidnaping when he kidnaps for the purpose of obtaining ransom. 720 ILCS 5/10\u20142(a)(1) (West 2000).\nWhere, as here, the evidence includes testimony that normally would be barred as hearsay, the evidence is properly admitted if it meets the criteria in section 115\u201410.1 of the Code:\n\u201c(a) the statement is inconsistent with [the witness\u2019s] testimony at the hearing or trial, and\n(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and\n(c) the statement\u2014\n(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or\n(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge, and\n(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the witness, or\n(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding^]\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115\u201410.1 (West 2002).\nAn earlier statement that is inconsistent with a witness\u2019s testimony also may be admissible as impeachment, as long as it is truly inconsistent with the trial testimony and deals with a matter that is more than collateral. People v. Crowe, 327 Ill. App. 3d 930, 938, 764 N.E.2d 1174 (2002).\nWe first address defendant\u2019s claim that we must reverse his conviction because Henderson\u2019s uncorroborated earlier statement was the sole evidence against defendant and insufficient to support the jury\u2019s finding of defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant relies on three cases to support his argument: People v. Parker, 234 Ill. App. 3d 273, 280, 600 N.E.2d 529 (1992); People v. Arcos, 282 Ill. App. 3d 870, 875-76, 668 N.E.2d 1177 (1996); People v. Brown, 303 Ill. App. 3d 949, 965, 709 N.E.2d 609 (1999).\nIn Parker, the defendant\u2019s conviction was reversed because the prior inconsistent statements of three recanting witnesses were the only evidence against the defendant and the statements were so seriously impeached at his trial as to cast doubt on their authenticity. Parker, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 280. In Arcos, the trial judge erred in a bench trial when he convicted the defendant despite finding that the sole witness, who recanted his earlier statements, was a \u201c \u2018thoroughly disreputable person who cannot be believed.\u2019 \u201d Arcos, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 871. This court concluded that in light of the trial judge\u2019s assessment of the witness, corroborating evidence would have been required to remove all reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. Arcos, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 876. In Brown, reversal was warranted because the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime was a statement made by a witness two years after the crime and that statement was disavowed by the witness at the defendant\u2019s trial. Brown, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 965. There, we determined that because the witness\u2019s prior statement implicating the defendant was uncorroborated and was not made contemporaneously with the crime, it was insufficient as proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 965.\nWe find the cases relied on by defendant \u2014 Parker, Arcos and Brown \u2014 are distinguishable. In each case, the witnesses\u2019 prior statements suffered from serious weaknesses. In Parker, the prior statements were severely impeached. Parker, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 280. In Ar-cos, the trier of fact reached two logically incompatible conclusions: first, that the witness was thoroughly disreputable; and, second, that his prior statement was adequate proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Arcos, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 871. In Brown, the statement implicating the defendant was made two years after the crime. Brown, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 965.\nThere were no such weaknesses here. Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan was made two days after the murder. Henderson\u2019s own trial testimony, used as impeachment, was credible as shown by the fact that it won his acquittal. The State did not advance the theory that Henderson was an inveterate liar but, rather, painted him as a strategic bar whose immunity and fear of defendant prompted him to implicate himself falsely when defendant was on trial.\nThe cases relied on by defendant have been distinguished by other holdings that recanted prior inconsistent statements can be sufficient to support a conviction, even without corroborating evidence. See People v. Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d 426, 440, 778 N.E.2d 192 (2002), appeal denied, 202 Ill. 2d 679, 787 N.E.2d 175 (2003), and its antecedents, People v. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d 991, 996-97, 696 N.E.2d 372 (1998), appeal denied, 184 Ill. 2d 562, 714 N.E.2d 529 (1999); People v. Morrow, 303 IU. App. 3d 671, 677, 708 N.E.2d 430 (1999), appeal denied, 184 Ill. 2d 567, 714 N.E.2d 531 (1999); People v. Zizzo, 301 Ill. App. 3d 481, 489, 703 N.E.2d 546 (1998); and People v. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d 346, 349, 362 N.E.2d 291 (1977). See also People v. Logan, 352 Ill. App. 3d 73, 79-80, 815 N.E.2d 830 (2004).\nThis court in Craig distinguished Parker, Arcos and Brown:\n\u201cUltimately, in deciding whether there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we must decide whether cases such as Arcos and Parker require that convictions based solely upon prior inconsistent statements must also have corroborating evidence to support the conviction. *** [U]nder Morrow and Curtis, additional corroboration is not required and we are not to engage in looking for corroboration. In light of the fact that Morrow follows the guidance from the supreme court in [Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d at 349] (\u2018whether accomplice testimony, corroborated or uncorroborated, is a satisfactory basis for conviction goes to the weight of the evidence and is, therefore, in the province of the jury or the court\u2019), and that the supreme court denied the appeals in [Curtis and Morrow,] [citations] we follow that analysis.\u201d Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 440.\nIn Craig, this court affirmed the defendant\u2019s conviction, rejecting his claim that the evidence was insufficient because the primary evidence against him consisted of statements and grand jury testimony by two witnesses, both of whom recanted on the stand. Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 435. The court in Craig relied on Curtis, Morrow and Zizzo to conclude that \u201c \u2018previous inconsistent statements alone were sufficient to prove defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt\u2019 \u201d and if earlier statements meet the criteria in section 115\u201410.1, they are accepted as reliable and voluntary and no further analysis is needed. Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 438, quoting Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 677. The court further concluded that where a guilty verdict is based on a prior inconsistent statement, a reviewing court need not, and in fact may not, determine whether the witness testimony was \u201csubstantially corroborated\u201d or \u201cclear and convincing.\u201d Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 438.\nThe court in Craig went on to define the role of the appellate court in reviewing verdicts founded on prior inconsistent statements:\n\u201c[I]n determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, this court has held that there are no \u2018suspect categories\u2019 of properly admitted evidence that require a different standard of appellate review. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 999. Therefore, courts of review are not allowed to differentiate between types of evidence properly admitted before the trier of fact. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 999. In other words, when a defendant is convicted and then appeals, one standard of review applies to all evidence. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 999. As such, evidence of prior inconsistent statements properly admitted, even if later recanted, should be treated no differently. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 999.\u201d Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 439.\nWe adopt the reasoning in Curtis and decline to subject the jury\u2019s verdict to greater scrutiny by requiring \u201csubstantially corroborated\u201d or \u201cclear and convincing\u201d evidence merely because the jury convicted defendant after hearing the prior inconsistent statements of Henderson. Here, not only was Henderson impeached with testimony from his own trial where he was acquitted, but his statement to Sheridan was deemed reliable and admissible under section 115\u201410.1 (725 ILCS 5/115\u2014 10.1 (West 2002)). Whether Henderson\u2019s testimony formed a satisfactory basis for conviction was a question for the jury. Wilson, 66 Ill. 2d at 349.\nWhile Henderson\u2019s statements were the State\u2019s strongest evidence, there was other evidence before the jury to support conviction. Henderson\u2019s trial testimony and statement to Sheridan were consistent with the testimony of Shakela Kirkwood, Reed, Laws and Wheatley. Rizzi\u2019s testimony showed that defendant gave inconsistent accounts of his involvement and refuted Henderson\u2019s claim in his recanted testimony that he alone fired two weapons.\nBut even without this corroborative evidence:\n\u201c[I]t does not necessarily portend that, as a matter of law, a recanted prior inconsistent statement admitted under section 115\u201410.1 cannot support a conviction. [Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 996-97]; accord [Zizzo, 301 Ill. App. 3d 481, 703 N.E.2d 546]. In the present case, the previous inconsistent statements alone were sufficient to prove defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If a prior statement meets section 115\u201410.1\u2019s test, \u2018a finding of reliability and voluntariness is automatically made. *** Accordingly, no additional analysis is needed. *** |l]t is the jury\u2019s decision to assign weight to the statement and to decide if the statement was indeed voluntary, after hearing the declarant\u2019s inconsistent testimony.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 677.\nHere, Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan met the requirements of section 115\u201410.1. The statement was inconsistent with his testimony at defendant\u2019s trial where Henderson said he killed Kirk-wood. Henderson was subject to cross-examination about the statement by defense counsel. The statement described events of which Henderson had personal knowledge \u2014 he rode in the car with defendant while Kirkwood was locked in the trunk, he attempted to obtain money from Kirkwood\u2019s relatives and he was present when defendant and Antonio shot Kirkwood.\nHenderson\u2019s other inconsistent statements, recorded at his own trial, were properly admitted as impeachment when he said he could not recall the events of that night and his own trial testimony was false. His earlier statements were truly inconsistent with his trial testimony here and dealt with the most substantive matter: Who killed Kirkwood? See Crowe, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 938 (an earlier inconsistent statement may be admissible as impeachment if it is truly inconsistent and deals with a matter that is more than collateral).\nWe conclude that Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan and his testimony from his own trial, as well as his recantation, all were properly before the jury. We believe that, taken together and in the light most favorable to the State, these statements could lead a rational jury to conclude that Henderson told the truth when he implicated defendant, but he lied when he implicated himself. We find nothing here to justify the substitution of this court\u2019s judgment for that of the jury in weighing Henderson\u2019s statements. See Logan, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 79-80.\nDefendant takes issue with our reliance on Curtis, claiming that case was wrong and \u201cutterly antithetical to the concept of appellate review.\u201d He contends that by following Curtis, and not requiring the evidence against defendant to be \u201csubstantially corroborated\u201d or \u201cclear and convincing,\u201d we fail to discern that the State\u2019s proof was weak and the evidence was inadequate. Defendant argues that the threshold test of reliability and voluntariness prescribed in section 115\u201410.1 (725 ILCS 5/115\u201410.1 (West 2002)) does not contravene this court\u2019s obligation to ensure that only evidence which removes all reasonable doubt will sustain a conviction. Defendant argues that supreme court precedent mandates a \u201cfactual review of the evidence,\u201d under People v. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d 485, 492-93, 468 N.E.2d 1153 (1984), and People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541-42, 708 N.E.2d 365 (1999).\nIn Ash, the supreme court concluded that an appellate court must reverse a conviction where the State failed to sustain its burden of proof, and in Smith, it held that a jury\u2019s determination is not conclusive where the evidence is unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory. In Ash, an accomplice gave uncorroborated testimony, but the court determined that other weaknesses, including the fact that the testimony of the two victims was \u201cvague and doubtful,\u201d invalidated the jury\u2019s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ash, 102 Ill. 2d at 494-95. We do not believe that Ash supports defendant\u2019s assertion that Henderson\u2019s statements before his recantation cannot stand as proof beyond reasonable doubt. Here, there was evidence from other witnesses \u2014 Shakela Kirkwood, Reed, Laws, Wheatley and Rizzi \u2014 supporting Henderson\u2019s original versions of the events. While the credibility of Laws and Wheatley could be questioned and the opinion of Rizzi discounted, Shakela and her mother, Reed, testified to events that matched Henderson\u2019s original accounts. This differs from Ash where other evidence diminished, rather than supported, the credibility of an accomplice.\nIn Smith, where the State\u2019s case hinged on the testimony of a single witness, the supreme court determined that the defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because serious inconsistencies in and repeated impeachment of the details of the witness\u2019s testimony prevented the State from meeting its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 545. The facts here are unlike those in Smith. No witnesses here gave testimony that supported Henderson\u2019s claim that he alone killed Kirkwood. His statement to Sheridan and testimony at his own trial were not discredited by pervasive inconsistencies or impeachment. Henderson alone recanted his earlier statements, claiming that he, not defendant, killed Kirkwood.\nHere, the trial court tested Henderson\u2019s statement against the safeguards of reliability mandated in section 115\u201410.1 and deemed it admissible. The tests imposed by section 115\u201410.1 are sufficiently rigorous that if a statement is properly admitted under this section, its reliability can be trusted. Morrow, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 6.77. We believe that the trial court\u2019s analysis of Henderson\u2019s statement under section 115\u201410.1 was sound and Henderson\u2019s earlier statements, as admitted, were sufficient to sustain the conviction. We believe the legislature\u2019s purpose in enacting section 115\u201410.1 was fulfilled here. The statute was enacted to prevent \u201ca turncoat witness\u201d from merely denying an earlier statement when that statement was made under circumstances indicating it was likely to be true. People v. Fauber, 266 Ill. App. 3d 381, 390-91, 640 N.E.2d 689 (1994); accord Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 442.\nThis conclusion does not, as defendant argues, render all guilty verdicts based on recanted testimony immune from reversal. See, for example, People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 313-14, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990) (reversal is proper where prior inconsistent statements are admitted but the requirements of section 115\u201410.1 are not met).\nDefendant next argues he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred in admitting Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan under section 115 \u201410.1. The State contends and the record supports the conclusion that defendant waived this argument by not properly preserving it for review. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). But because waiver limits the parties\u2019 ability to raise an argument, not this court\u2019s right to entertain it (People v. Colin, 344 Ill. App. 3d 119, 129 n.4, 799 N.E.2d 451 (2003)), we will address this issue.\nDefendant asks us to review this matter de novo as a question of statutory construction: \u201c[D]id the enactment of section 115\u201410.1 repeal or [affect] the previously settled rule that it is error to adduce multiple consistent statements to a jury in an effort to bolster the credibility of each?\u201d Matters of statutory construction are purely issues of law subject to de novo review. In re Justin M.B., 204 Ill. 2d 120, 787 N.E.2d 823 (2003).\nWe disagree with defendant\u2019s contention that this presents a question of statutory construction. We do not accept the proposition that section 115\u2014 10.1, the statute governing prior inconsistent statements, was extended to prior consistent statements here. An inadmissible consistent statement generally is one made before a trial and then introduced to corroborate trial testimony. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 70, 718 N.E.2d 58 (1999). Defendant\u2019s statement to Sheridan, while made before trial, was not introduced to corroborate, but rather to contradict, Henderson\u2019s trial testimony. It was not a prior consistent statement. Section 115\u201410.1 was applied properly to a prior inconsistent statement \u2014 Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan. The statute was not extended to include prior consistent statements and de novo review is not warranted.\nThe proper standard of review where, as here, an issue concerns the admissibility of evidence is whether the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App. 3d 992, 995, 762 N.E.2d 46 (2001).\nDefendant asserts that Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan and his own trial testimony should not have been admitted because they were consistent with each other and had an improper bolstering effect \u2014 plain error under People v. Gray, 209 Ill. App. 3d 407, 418, 568 N.E.2d 219 (1991). See People v. Hasp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 180, 192, 815 N.E.2d 809, 821 (2004) (plain error may warrant review where the evidence was closely balanced or a substantial right was affected). In Gray, the defendant\u2019s conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault was reversed because the trial court improperly admitted the prior consistent statements of three witnesses, all of whom were told by the victim that she was \u201craped.\u201d Gray, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 417-18. The trial court also refused to allow the victim to be cross-examined. This case differs because Henderson\u2019s two earlier accounts of events were not consistent with his testimony at defendant\u2019s trial. Had Henderson told other witnesses that defendant killed Kirkwood, and those witnesses testified at trial that defendant killed Kirkwood, then the facts would parallel those in Gray. Those are not the facts here. Henderson was the only witness. His own trial testimony was used for impeachment. Only his statement to Sheridan was admitted as substantive evidence. No other consistent statements were admitted substantively. Finally, Henderson, unlike the victim in Gray, was subject to cross-examination. Gray does not require us to find that Henderson\u2019s two earlier statements, admitted for different purposes, should have been excluded as prior consistent statements.\nDefendant alternatively argues that Henderson\u2019s written statement to Sheridan was inadmissible because, under \u201ccommon law,\u201d prior consistent statements are inadmissible, citing People v. Powell, 53 Ill. 2d 465, 474, 292 N.E.2d 409 (1973) (a witness\u2019s out-of-court statement that harmonizes with his in-court testimony generally is inadmissible). The State responds that defendant\u2019s \u201centire argument is based on a misrepresentation as to how inconsistency is determined,\u201d under People v. Modrowski, 296 Ill. App. 3d 735, 750, 696 N.E.2d 28 (1998). An inconsistency for the purposes of section 115\u201410.1 refers to a contradiction between a witness\u2019s earlier statements and that witness\u2019s in-court testimony. Modrowski, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 744-45. In Modrowski, a witness\u2019s grand jury testimony was admitted as substantive evidence under section 115\u201410.1 and similar oral statements to police were admitted as impeachment. Modrowski, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 743. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the witness\u2019s grand jury testimony was admissible as substantive evidence under section 115\u201410.1 because it contradicted his trial testimony: \u201c[sjince the complained-of statements used by the State satisfied all of the requirements of section 115\u201410.1, we conclude that their use as substantive evidence was proper.\u201d Modrowski, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 746. We reach the same conclusion here.\nDefendant argues Modrowski in fact contradicts the conclusion that Henderson\u2019s prior inconsistent statement was properly admitted. He points to the fact that in Modrowski, one statement was admitted substantively as a prior inconsistent statement under section 115\u201410.1 while the other statement was not admitted substantively, but as impeachment. He avers that both statements here were admitted substantively. We disagree. The facts here parallel those in Modrowski. Henderson\u2019s own trial testimony was admitted as impeachment, not as substantive evidence. This comports with the rule that, in general, a prior inconsistent statement is admissible solely for impeachment purposes, not as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 360, 680 N.E.2d 321 (1997). By meeting the criteria of section 115\u201410.1, Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan was admitted properly as substantive evidence. We conclude that both Henderson\u2019s trial testimony and his statement to Sheridan were properly before the jury.\nDefendant cites People v. Mitchell, 225 Ill. App. 3d 708, 588 N.E.2d 1247 (1992), overruled on other grounds in People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103, 112, 699 N.E.2d 577 (1998), to argue that \u201csection 115\u2014 10.1 is not a vehicle designed or intended to allow the introduction of what are corroborative statements.\u201d In Mitchell, the court rejected the State\u2019s attempt to introduce a witness\u2019s videotaped statement under section 115\u201410.1 because the taped statements were generally consistent with the witness\u2019s in-court testimony. Mitchell, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 716. Here, Henderson\u2019s statement to Sheridan was not consistent with his in-court testimony at defendant\u2019s trial. The statement did not bolster, but contradicted, his trial testimony. We conclude that the purpose of section 115\u201410.1 was served: a turncoat witness was foiled in his attempt to back away from an earlier statement made under circumstances indicating it was likely to be true. See Fauber, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 390-91.\nThe judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBURKE and GARCIA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Robert Hirschhorn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DUEL THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 02\u20140318\nOpinion filed August 31, 2004.\nRehearings denied December 6, 2004, and January 28, 2005.\nModified opinion filed December 13, 2004.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Robert Hirschhorn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0868-01", "first_page_order": 886, "last_page_order": 903 }