{ "id": 3600178, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY GILBERT, Petitioner-Appellant, and LYNETTE GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Gilbert", "decision_date": "2004-12-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201403\u20140497", "first_page": "104", "last_page": "123", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 104" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183276 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571645 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252116 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801353 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5298672 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5433277 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 1151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1172", "parenthetical": "'We would be justified in reversing the judgment on the grounds that the judge exceeded his statutory authority and that the Domestic Violence Act was misused ***'" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2494961 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2645905 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "finding that child's drawing indicating where her father placed his penis was insufficient to corroborate the child's hearsay statement of sexual abuse; the drawing constituted hearsay because it was offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195352 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 1156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411726 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1164-65" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/1156-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183276 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" }, { "page": "604" }, { "page": "611" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612-13" }, { "page": "605" }, { "page": "610-13" }, { "page": "614-15" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571645 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493-94" }, { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252116 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801353 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" }, { "page": "198" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5433277 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268-69" }, { "page": "268-69" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1482, "char_count": 50324, "ocr_confidence": 0.71, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10269054296215725 }, "sha256": "3bc9760240dec32d37240956d81236f81cd70bc9dc97db0c574766eedd2dfde3", "simhash": "1:bdeaf7ae4e4659f5", "word_count": 8418 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:57:27.413698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY GILBERT, Petitioner-Appellant, and LYNETTE GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner, Bradley Gilbert, appeals the decision of the circuit court of Cook County which issued on behalf of the respondent, Lynette Gilbert, a plenary order of protection. On appeal, Bradley argues (1) the trial court erred in applying section 8 \u2014 2601 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2601 (West 2002)) in admitting hearsay testimony that he sexually assaulted his daughter; (2) the trial court failed to conduct a reliability hearing with reference to such hearsay; and (3) the hearsay statements lacked the corroboration required by the statute. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.\nBradley and Lynette were married in 1994. During their marriage, they had two children, a son, C.G., and a daughter, B.G. On October 17, 1997, Bradley filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On March 2, 2000, a judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered. The parties also executed a marital settlement agreement and a joint parenting agreement, which were both entered on March 2, 2000. In the joint parenting agreement, the parties agreed that Lynette would serve as the primary residential parent for the couple\u2019s two children.\nOn August 11, 2000, under the original dissolution case, Lynette filed an ex parte petition for an order of protection on behalf of C.G. and B.G. against Bradley, pursuant to the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Domestic Violence Act) (750 ILCS 60/214 (West 2000)). An affidavit in support of the emergency order of protection was attached to the petition. In the affidavit, it was alleged that, on August 10, 2000, B.G., who was four years old at the time, was visiting Bradley at his home when he sexually abused her. Specifically, it was alleged in the affidavit that B.G. informed Lynette that during the visit, Bradley\u2019s penis, or \u201cproject\u201d as she referred to it, touched her \u201cprivate parts.\u201d\nOn August 11, 2000, the trial court found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that abuse had occurred and given the emergency nature of the situation, entered an ex parte order of protection.\nThereafter, a hearing on the matter was held. At that hearing, Lynette testified that on the evening of August 10, 2000, C.G. and B.G. arrived at her home at approximately 8 p.m. after visiting with Bradley. Later that evening, as Lynette was giving B.G. a bath, B.G. said, \u201c \u2018[Mjommy, daddy\u2019s private parts touched my private parts today.\u2019 \u201d Lynette said that prior to B.G. making this statement, she had not been asking B.G. what she had been doing with her father earlier that day. Lynette testified that this was the first instance that B.G. had ever made such a statement to her. Lynette said that she was not surprised that B.G. referred to her genitals as \u201cprivate parts\u201d since this is how she had taught B.G. to refer to them.\nAfter B.G. made this statement, Lynette said that she asked B.G. \u201cWhat did you just say?\u201d Lynette then testified that B.G. again said, \u201c \u2018Daddy\u2019s private parts touched my private parts today, mommy.\u2019 \u201d Lynette said that she then took B.G. out of the tub, dried her off, and put some clothes on her so they could sit down and talk in the bedroom.\nOnce they were in the bedroom, Lynette said that she asked B.G. to tell her what she did with her daddy. Lynette testified that B.G. explained that \u201cdaddy said that he had a project for her to do.\u201d B.G. explained that Bradley also had a project for C.G. to perform, which was scooping dog \u201cpoop\u201d in the backyard. When Lynette asked B.G. what her project was, Lynette said that B.G. began to \u201cwithdraw a little bit and say, \u2018well, I don\u2019t know the words, mommy.\u2019 \u201d Lynette said that she reassured B.G. and just asked her to explain what she did at \u201cdaddy\u2019s house.\u201d\nB.G. then explained, \u201c \u2018well, he had this project, and he laid her down on the bed and took off her clothes. There was a red pillow and a green pillow. That he then took off his pants or let down his pants and that the project was real little and it got real big.\u2019 \u201d Lynette stated that B.G. was referring to Bradley\u2019s penis as the \u201cproject\u201d at first and then as the \u201cfinger\u201d so that she became a little confused as B.G. was telling her story. Lynette said that B.G. said that she \u201cheld her mouth like in a circle like uh, and she was real good that she didn\u2019t bite.\u201d When asked what went into B.G.\u2019s mouth, Lynette responded, \u201cShe kept calling it the project and the finger. I was very confused.\u201d\nLynette then testified that \u201c[B.G.] kept telling me she didn\u2019t know the words but that it tickled, that when daddy\u2019s private part touched her it tickled. She showed me it was between her legs and her bottom. She told me that it touched her bottom. And I asked her if it hurt. She said, no, it kind of tickled. And then I realized it was getting late and I still needed to get the laundry, so I just kind of said well, \u2018you know, you can tell me anything at any time, right?\u2019 And she said, \u2018yes.\u2019 I said, \u2018why don\u2019t we go get [C.G.], and let\u2019s go downstairs and get the laundry out of the dryer and come back up. Its getting late, and I think we need to go to bed.\u2019 \u201d\nAfter they retrieved the laundry, Lynette asked B.G. what color the project was, and B.G. responded that it was \u201cbrown and purple.\u201d At that point, Lynette said that was the end of their conversation. After consulting with her parents, she decided to call a doctor. Thereafter, she called a doctor and made an appointment for B.G. to see him the next day.\nThe next day, during the doctor\u2019s examination, Lynette said that B.G. refused to answer questions concerning the previous day. The doctor found no physical injury to the child. Before they left the doctor\u2019s office, Lynette testified that the doctor informed her that he had an obligation to report the occurrence to the proper authorities. Lynette testified that she responded, \u201c[Y]ou do what you have to do.\u201d\nLater that afternoon, on August 11, 2000, Lynette and her attorney appeared in court to request an emergency order of protection. Thereafter, she reported the incident to the police.\nLater, Lynette said that she had another conversation with B.G. During the conversation, Lynette testified that she asked B.G., \u201cNow when you were telling me about the project you also called it the finger, where was the project? Was it this or was the project something different? And she said \u2018no,\u2019 and she pointed down to her private area. She said, \u2018the project was down here.\u2019 I said, okay. And when you said the project and the finger went in your mouth and you held your mouth like this, but you didn\u2019t bite, was it the finger or was it the project down there? And she said, \u2018it was the project down there.\u2019 And I said \u2014 I couldn\u2019t help myself \u2014 I said, \u2018well, what did you think?\u2019 She said, \u2018it was yucky. I told daddy to get it out.\u2019 I said, \u2018good girl. Thanks. You can go play.\u2019 \u201d\nThereafter, B.G. was referred to the Children\u2019s Advocacy Center for a victim-sensitive interview on August 15, 2000. B.G. was interviewed by Caryn Brauweiler, who was the assistant director and had conducted 1,000 interviews of allegedly abused children, 300 of which involved a child under the age of four. Detective Dave Bruno of the Hanover Park police department, Investigator Ron Miller of the Department of Children and Family Services, and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) Ruth Howes of the Cook County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office observed the interview through a one-way glass.\nDuring the interview, B.G. was asked if mommy touched her privates outside of the bathtub and she said \u201cno.\u201d When asked if daddy touched her privates outside of the bathtub, she paused and looked away. B.G. then responded, \u201cNo, he doesn\u2019t.\u201d\nLater in the interview, B.G. was asked if anyone touched her where she goes potty, she responded, \u201cYes.\u201d When asked who, she shrugged her shoulders but did not respond. When asked to talk about it, B.G. said that she would respond later if she were given some time to color. Thereafter, B.G. was asked about the touching that happened on her private parts and she stated, \u201cI\u2019m scared about it. Daddy does that.\u201d\nB.G. was then shown anatomically correct dolls and she was able to correctly identify the parts of the dolls, including their genitalia, which she referred to as private parts. Then the interviewer reminded B.G. that they were going to talk about the kind of touching that was scary for her. B.G. responded, \u201cMom told me if dad touched my private again, I should scream.\u201d When asked if that really happened, B.G. stated, \u201cOne time he does, a lot of times he does.\u201d When asked where this occurred, B.G. stated, \u201cIn his bedroom.\u201d B.G. then stated that it occurred \u201c[i]n his bed.\u201d B.G. then said that her father took her clothes off and that he took his own underwear off.\nWhen asked what happened next, B.G. stated that, \u201cHe stuck his private there,\u201d as she pointed to her vagina and buttocks. When asked what her father\u2019s private\u2019s looked like, B.G. responded, \u201cIt looks like a boy\u2019s private.\u201d When she was asked if it looked liked the doll\u2019s private, she stated, \u201cIt was sticking up.\u201d She spontaneously added, \u201cC.G. was picking Lady\u2019s poop up.\u201d When asked where her father\u2019s fianc\u00e9e was at when this occurred, B.G. responded that she was at work.\nB.G. then had the interviewer draw her so that she was lying on her stomach on her father\u2019s bed. When asked what happened, she stated, \u201cHe put his private on my bottom and stuck it through my legs, and put it here on my private.\u201d When asked how it felt, she said \u201csilly.\u201d When asked if anything came out of his privates, she responded, \u201cLet\u2019s not talk about it. It\u2019s yucky.\u201d\nLater, B.G. began playing with the anatomically correct dolls. During this time, Brauweiler asked B.G. to show her how daddy touched her. B.G. took the small female doll and put it on the floor facedown. She pulled the underwear off and took the large male doll, pulling his pants off, and inserted the penis in the rectum of the small female doll. She then explained that daddy then put his private between her legs and said that it touched her on the private. She then stated, \u201cLet\u2019s not talk about it. I\u2019m scared.\u201d\nBradley testified that on August 10, 2000, he picked up both B.G. and C.G. from Lynette\u2019s house. He said that he spent approximately two hours alone with the children, outside the presence of his fianc\u00e9e. He explained that during this time he gave C.G. a \u201cproject\u201d to do, which was to scoop their dog\u2019s \u201cpoop\u201d up in the backyard. He stated that C.G. did this task for approximately five minutes. He stated that he did not assign a task to B.G. Bradley said that he used the term \u201cproject\u201d because of his job.\nHe denied ever going into a bedroom with B.G. He stated that there were no red or green pillows in the bedroom at his home. He denied having any sexual contact with B.G. He stated that B.G. never touched his penis. He stated that he had never touched her private parts in an inappropriate way.\nNancy Mulso testified that she was an employee of Judicial Monitoring Resources (JMR) an organization appointed by the trial court to supervise visitation. Mulso stated that JMR provided services to Bradley and the children after the allegations of abuse had been levied. As an employee of JMR, it was Mulso\u2019s job to observe the visitation periods that Bradley had with his children.\nMulso testified that Bradley\u2019s behavior during visits with his children was appropriate. Mulso testified that when B.G. visited with her father at the Schaumburg library, the child was reluctant to return to her father and stated she was afraid of him. When asked why by Ms. Mulso, B.G. stated \u201cbecause he did that bad thing.\u201d Mulso testified that during one particular visit, B.G. asked Bradley, \u201c[W]hy did you do that?\u201d And he said, \u201c[W]hy did I do what?\u201d B.G. responded, \u201cWhy did you touch me when you weren\u2019t supposed to?\u201d And he said, \u201c[Wjhen did I do that?\u201d And she said, \u201c[Mjommy said you did.\u201d And he said, \u201c[W]ell you\u2019ll have to ask mommy when it happened because I didn\u2019t do it.\u201d\nMulso further testified that on a separate visit, while Bradley and the children were at an ice cream shop, \u201cthe children told [Bradley] that he wasn\u2019t going to heaven, he was going to hell because he didn\u2019t have Jesus in his heart.\u201d\nOn another visit Mulso overheard C.G. telling B.G. that she had to watch out what she said in front of Mulso, \u201cthat she\u2019s [B.G.] not supposed to say things in front of us that mommy said.\u201d\nRon Miller, an investigator with the Department of Children and Family Services, observed that in his experience he had never found a case where a four-year-old was able to make false allegations of sexual abuse.\nFollowing the hearing, on September 10, 2002, the trial court issued a memorandum order. In the order, the trial court initially stated that the matter was \u201ccoming on to be heard upon the petition of Lynette Gilbert for an order of protection filed on August 11, 2000.\u201d Although improperly captioned Lynette Gilbert v. Bradley Gilbert, it was filed under the original dissolution case number wherein Bradley filed as petitioner and Lynette was the respondent. In the order, the trial court determined that B.G. had been abused by Bradley. The trial court issued a plenary order of protection pursuant to section 220 of the Act, which it incorporated into the March 20, 2000, final judgment for dissolution of marriage. The trial court further provided that visitation with the children would \u201ccontinue subject to Bradley\u2019s compliance with the court\u2019s order regarding the counseling program of the Social Service Department.\u201d\nThereafter, Bradley filed a petition to vacate, modify, reopen, or reconsider the order entered on September 10, 2002, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1203 (West 2002)), which the trial court denied on December 19, 2002.\nOn January 17, 2003, Bradley timely filed his notice of appeal wherein he appealed the trial court\u2019s orders of September 10, 2002, and December 19, 2002.\nOn appeal Bradley argues that it is inappropriate to enter an order of protection pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 that would vary the visitation rights determined in the dissolution proceedings. Although at least one Illinois case in the Third District, Radke v. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 264 (2004), held that the Illinois Domestic Violence Act had been inappropriately used to alter the defendant\u2019s visitation with his minor child, we are not faced with that problem in this case. Here the order of protection was filed under the original dissolution case number so that the thoughtful opinion of the trial court was entered pursuant to that initial dissolution case.\nMoreover, in Radke, the court determined that the substance of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint was not proven so that the issue of the application of the Domestic Violence Act was, in essence, dicta.\nEven if the petition had not been filed under the original dissolution case number, the Domestic Violence Act does not impose any jurisdictional limitations. Section 103(6) of the Domestic Violence Act defines family or household members as any \u201cchildren\u201d without any reference to previous dissolution proceedings. 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2002).\nSimilarly, section 205(a), in determining the applicability of the rules of civil procedure, references \u201c[a]ny proceeding to obtain, modify, reopen or appeal an order of protection, whether commenced alone or in conjunction with a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this [sjtate.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/205(a) (West 2002). Here, again, the drafters suggest that domestic violence proceedings may be commenced in conjunction with other civil proceedings or when another action is pending.\nReference is again made in section 210(a) dealing with process that relates to an action \u201ccommenced alone or in conjunction with another proceeding.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/210(a) (West 2002). Similarly, section 210.1 refers to seeking an order of protection in conjunction with a pending civil case. 750 ILCS 60/210.1 (West 2002).\nThe trial court\u2019s thorough order provides Bradley with every opportunity to submit recommendations for reasonable alternative arrangements for supervised visitation of the minor children of the parties as well as providing obligations of petitioner to be involved with social service agency supervision and counseling.\nPetitioner argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the hearsay evidence of B.G.\u2019s statement as to the sexual abuse imposed by Bradley. While generally hearsay statements are not admissible to prove certain conduct, the Illinois General Assembly has established certain statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule in connection with alleged child abuse.\nSection 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that \u201c[pjrevious statements made by the child relating to any allegations that the child is an abused or neglected child *** shall be admissible in evidence in a hearing concerning custody of or visitation with the child. No such statement, however, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/606(e) (West 2002).\nThe Domestic Violence Act provides that the rules of civil procedure shall be applicable to domestic violence actions (750 ILCS 60/205 (West 2002)). With that in mind, we note that section 8 \u2014 2601(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure states \u201c[a]n out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of 13 describing any act of child abuse or any conduct involving an unlawful sexual act *** is admissible in any civil proceedings, if *** the child *** is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2601(a) (West 2002).\nA similar provision with almost identical language is contained in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 18(4) (c) (West 2002)).\nAlthough the relief sought in the instant petition refers to the Domestic Violence Act, the essence of the court\u2019s ruling clearly implicates questions of custody and visitation. Accordingly, we find section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act would apply. In re Marriage of Rudd, 293 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1997).\nWe recognize that if this were a proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act, it might be argued that the guiding rules are those set out in the Domestic Violence Act or perhaps even those set out in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.\nIn examining the cases, it does not seem to make a difference. All of the statutes relate to statements of abuse by the child and the requirement that there must be corroborating evidence.\nHowever, we believe that section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act is the appropriate statute to consider in relation to these hearsay statements because the instant petition was brought under the name and title of the original dissolution petition. 750 ILCS 5/606(e) (West 2002).\nNext, we consider whether it was error for the trial court not to conduct a reliability hearing with reference to B.G.\u2019s hearsay. Section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act does not provide for a reliability hearing and we find that none is required in a bench trial. Of the several acts dealing with hearsay of an allegedly abused child, only section 8 \u2014 2601(a) provides that the statements shall be admitted only if \u201cthe court conducts a hearing outside the presence of the jury and finds that the time, content and circumstance of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2601(a) (West 2002)) Subsection (b) of section 8 \u2014 2601 sets forth the content of instructions to the jury where such a statement has been allowed into evidence. Section 8 \u2014 2601 contemplates use of the hearsay statements in jury trials and seemingly imposes the reliability hearing in these matters. Since no such provision is set forth in section 606(b), we do not believe the requirement is imposed upon the trial courts hearing matters under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.\nEven if such a hearing was required in jury cases, in a bench trial the trial judge is presumed to have considered the time, content and circumstances under which the statement was made in determining the reliability of the statements. People v. Hart, 214 Ill. App. 3d 512 (1991). In the Hart case, the failure to hold a separate hearing in a bench trial was harmless error. It is difficult to imagine that the plethora of evidence and testimony surrounding B.G.\u2019s statement would not satisfy the safeguards of reliability as to time, content and circumstances of their making. In re Marriage of Rudd, 293 Ill. App. 3d 367 (1997).\nLastly, we address Bradley\u2019s claim that B.G.\u2019s hearsay statements lack the corroboration required by the statute.\nIn In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184 (1997), which was a case arising under the Juvenile Court Act, our supreme court acknowledged that the \u201cform of corroboration will vary depending on the facts of each case and can include physical or circumstantial evidence.\u201d In re A.P, 179 Ill. 2d at 199.\nThe language of the governing statute under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act contains precisely the same language as that set forth in the Juvenile Court Act.\nThe trial court properly relied heavily upon two cases. In the First District case In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1991), as in the case at bar, C.C. told his story of his father\u2019s sexual abuse. The court determined there was appropriate corroboration where the declarant, playing a game with puppets, described the sexual activity of his father, a social worker observed him playing that game, and an interdisciplinary group made up of child rights specialists, psychologists, social workers, psychiatrists and nurses examined the activities of the declarant, and although there were no physical issues noted, they concluded from their interviews, evaluations and observations that the declarant was a victim of sexual abuse. The conclusion was reached in part by C.C.\u2019s discussion about touching his penis, touching his father\u2019s penis when both were erect and then soft again, and about \u201c \u2018yell\u00b0w stuff.\u2019 \u201d In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d at 210.\nIn evaluating the minor\u2019s out-of-court statements, the In re C.C. court determined that these evaluations and observations were corroborative evidence within the purview of an earlier case, In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1986).\nIn In re K.L.M., the court found sufficient corroboration in the testimony of caseworkers and a psychotherapist that the four-year-old child was anxious, that the child would have had limited opportunity to have learned about sexual matters that she purported to describe, and that there was some skin irritation in her genital area.\nA recent case would suggest a different outcome. In In re Marriage of Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d 602 (2002), the court determined that merely observing the physical evidence of the child\u2019s hearsay statements of sexual abuse, such as using puppets or other \u201cgames,\u201d was insufficient to provide corroboration under any of the operative statutes. The statements relating to observation of the child were also hearsay.\nIf the Flannery case is bedrock precedent, it would be almost impossible to obtain a finding of sexual abuse unless there was some physical evidence on the body of the child or unless the abuser had other witnesses to his abuse, a matter that is certainly unlikely.\nThe trial court had available the observation of Caryn Brauweiler, the assistant director of the Child Advocacy Center of Northwest Cook County, who has, as we have noted, conducted 1,000 interviews of allegedly abused children, 300 of which involved a child under the age of four. She witnessed B.G.\u2019s use of anatomically correct dolls to demonstrate the abuse, noting that B.G. was able to discuss the fact that Bradley\u2019s penis was \u201csticking up.\u201d She also was the person who responded to B.G.\u2019s request to draw a picture of B.G. lying in her father\u2019s bed and a physical demonstration of what happened to her in that position.\nAdditionally, there were the observations of the victim-sensitive interview by Detective David Bruno of the Hanover Park police department and DCFS Investigator Ron Miller, who observed that in his experience he had never found a case where a four-year-old was able to make false allegations of sexual abuse, particularly in view of the lengthy details and complex victim-sensitive interview. He also observed B.G. discussing the \u201ctouching\u201d before the dolls were brought out.\nPerhaps the most compelling testimony is that of Nancy Mulso of the Judicial Monitoring Resources, who observed B.G. confronting Bradley with respect to allegations of abuse. It is difficult to imagine that a four-year-old would confront her father over deeds that never happened.\nMoreover, B.G. visited with her father at the Schaumburg library and as she was reluctant to return to her father, she stated she was afraid of him. When asked why by Ms. Mulso, she responded \u201cbecause he did that bad thing.\u201d\nAdditionally, Bradley used the word \u201cproject\u201d often in speech and B.G. used it in identifying the incident as a \u201cproject,\u201d as well as in referencing genitals as a \u201cproject.\u201d\nThe trial court also noted the improbability that B.G. would be aware of knowledge about a penile erection in that it would be \u201creal little and then it would get real big\u201d or that she had some knowledge of ejaculation as evidenced by her comment, \u201cLet\u2019s not talk about it. It\u2019s yucky.\u201d\nAll of the above fall within the ambit of the First District case In re C.C. and the Fourth District case In re K.LM.\nBradley suggests that Lynette had motivation to fabricate the entire scenario and that during the course of the dissolution proceedings, she threatened to raise issues of interfamily sexual abuse that had occurred in Bradley\u2019s family. To the contrary, the trial court\u2019s opinion states that \u201cthere is no evidence of any motivation in this child or the mother to fabricate this story.\u201d The trial court goes on to note that Lynette was aware of Bradley\u2019s relationship with his fianc\u00e9e for a very long time.\nThe trial court had an opportunity to hear the evidence, view the witnesses and make judgments as to their credibility, and in its well-considered order, it stated that the evidence \u201cis just simply not enough to form a basis to conclude there was fabrication, or to infer it from these facts.\u201d Additionally, the trial court suggests the young age of the child and the facts of the case make it unlikely that the child fabricated.\nBased upon the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAffirmed.\nQUINN, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REID,\ndissenting:\nI dissent. I would reverse and remand this matter with directions to vacate the order of protection.\nThe first issue I will address is whether Lynette\u2019s use of an order of protection to alter Bradley\u2019s visitation rights with regard to B.G. was proper. Here, I believe that Radke v. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d 264 (2004), and Wilson v. Jackson, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1156 (2000), are very instructive.\nIn Radke, the petitioner, Kathryn, was formerly married to the respondent, Ross. Following the dissolution of their marriage, Kathryn was granted residential custody of the parties\u2019 12-year-old daughter, Laine. Ross was granted visitation.\nThereafter, Kathryn filed a petition for an order of protection on behalf of Laine. Kathryn sought, inter alia, an order prohibiting Ross from abusing, harassing or intimidating Laine. The trial court subsequently issued an emergency ex parte order of protection.\nAt the subsequent hearing on the petition, Laine testified that she visited her father in January 2003. At that time, she informed Ross that she did not enjoy spending time at his home and that she wanted to return to her mother\u2019s house. When she attempted to call her mother, Ross \u201cripped the telephone off of the wall\u201d and grounded her. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 265.\nThereafter, Laine said that she attempted to leave and walk to her mother\u2019s house. When she did, Ross followed her outside, held her arms behind her back, then pushed her inside and into her room. Laine testified that Ross attempted to hit her, but said that she was able to avoid contact by moving backwards. She also said that she suffered a bruise on her arm as a result of this incident.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that issues of visitation would not be addressed in the order of protection. \u201cThe court specifically noted that it would not restrict Ross\u2019s visitation, correctly recognizing that the purpose of an order of protection, \u2018is to protect, not to effectuate changes in visitation.\u2019 \u201d Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 267.\nThe court accepted Laine\u2019s testimony that physical force had been used to prevent her from returning to her mother\u2019s house and that Ross had denied her access to a telephone to call her mother. The trial court determined that Ross had improperly prevented Laine from calling Kathryn. Consequently, the court entered a plenary order of protection requiring Ross to refrain from physical abuse, harassment, intimidation or interference with the personal liberty of his daughter for two years from the date of the order. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 267.\nOn appeal, Ross argued that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in granting the order of protection because the evidence failed to establish that he had harassed his daughter, and (2) the order of protection should be vacated because any action to restrict his visitation with his daughter should have been taken under the existing dissolution action rather than by obtaining an order of protection. The Radke court rejected the trial court\u2019s legal conclusion that Ross\u2019s action of denying Laine the ability to use the phone under the circumstances constituted harassment. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 268.\nThe Radke court then turned to the question of whether or not the order of protection should be vacated because any action to restrict his visitation should have been taken under the existing dissolution action rather than by obtaining an order of protection. The Radke court agreed with Ross. Its reasoning follows:\n\u201cThe primary purpose of the Domestic Violence Act is to aid victims of domestic violence and to prevent further violence. 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2002); Wilson v. Jackson, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1156, 728 N.E.2d 832 (2000). Obtaining an order of protection is not the proper procedure for resolving child custody or visitation issues. Those issues should be resolved under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2002)). Wilson, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1156, 728 N.E.2d 832, citing in re Marriage of Gordon, 233 Ill. App. 3d 617, 599 N.E.2d 1151 (1992).\nIn Wilson, this court found that the petitioner\u2019s primary purpose in seeking an order of protection was to obtain visitation and custody of his child rather than to prevent abuse. We vacated the order of protection granted by the trial court due to the petitioner\u2019s misuse of the Act, as well as insufficient evidence of abuse. Wilson, 312 Ill. App. 3d 1156, 728 N.E.2d 832.\nIn this case, Kathryn admitted that she obtained the order of protection to temporarily suspend visitation. Laine also indicated that the order of protection was sought so that she could see her father only when she wanted to see him. The Domestic Violence Act is not the appropriate vehicle for resolving such issues. We note that the order of protection did not restrict Ross\u2019s visitation or contact with Laine. The court narrowly drafted the order to prohibit physical abuse, harassment, interference with personal liberty or intimidation. Nevertheless, based on this record, we believe that Kathryn misused the Domestic Violence Act for the purpose of attempting to alter Ross\u2019s visitation with Laine. For that reason, and because we find that no harassment occurred, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and vacate the order of protection.\u201d Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 268-69.\nIn Wilson, the petitioner sought an ex parte order of protection under the Domestic Violence Act in order to obtain custody of his daughter. The Wilson court determined that the petitioner misused the Domestic Violence Act as a means to obtain possession and custody of his daughter from his ex-girlfriend. The ruling of the Wilson court follows:\n\u201cIn this case petitioner could have filed a petition for visitation or custody under the Parentage Act (see 750 ILCS 45/6(e) (West 1998)) or the Marriage Act (see 750 ILCS 5/601(b)(l)(ii) (West 1998)). Instead, petitioner waited until he had physical custody of the child and then sought an ex parte order of protection. A careful review of the entire record convinces this court that petitioner\u2019s primary purpose in seeking an order of protection was not to prevent abuse but was to obtain visitation with and custody of the child. While petitioner\u2019s desire to be a part of his child\u2019s life is laudable, obtaining an order of protection is not the proper procedure for establishing visitation. Petitioner\u2019s misuse of the Domestic Violence Act in this manner warrants reversal of the plenary order of protection entered in this case. Cf. Gordon, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 648, 599 N.E.2d at 1172 (\u2018We would be justified in reversing the judgment on the grounds that the judge exceeded his statutory authority and that the Domestic Violence Act was misused ***\u2019). We emphasize that not every case of improper use of the Act would require reversal. It is both the misuse of the Act and the dearth of evidence of abuse, as explained below, that compel reversal.\u201d Wilson, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1164-65.\nThe Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) provides parents with certain safeguards and protections that they are not afforded under the Domestic Violence Act. Under the Marriage Act, in order to modify a parent\u2019s custodial rights, proper notice must be given and a subsequent hearing must be held. 750 ILCS 5/610(b), 601(c), (d), 603 (West 2000).\nThis is not so under the Domestic Violence Act. Under the Domestic Violence Act, a parent can circumvent the protections guaranteed under the Marriage Act. In effect, the Domestic Violence Act could be used as a shortcut which would effectuate an ex parte change of status which would modify the status quo ante. In circumstances such as this one, the Domestic Violence Act could be abused and I do not believe that it was intended to be used this manner.\nHere, there was an agreed order between Bradley and Lynette that delineated both of their parental rights. If Lynette believed that Bradley was abusing B.G., instead of filing an ex parte petition seeking an order of protection on behalf of C.G. and B.G. against Bradley pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act, I believe that Lynette should have filed an emergency petition to change child custody and visitation under section 603 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/603 (West 2000)).\nLike the petitioners in Radke and Wilson, Lynette improperly sought an order of protection in order to suspend or alter Bradley\u2019s visitation rights with his daughter. As stated in both Radke and Wilson, the Domestic Violence Act is not the proper statute to use to alter a parent\u2019s visitation rights with his or her child. That is precisely what Lynette did. As such, the trial court\u2019s order of protection should be vacated.\nThe majority attempts to distinguish Radke. Initially, the majority states that Radke is inapplicable to this set of facts because \u201c[hjere the order of protection was filed under the original dissolution case number so that the thoughtful opinion of the trial court was entered pursuant to that initial dissolution case.\u201d 355 Ill. App. 3d at 110. However, the majority overlooks the fact that although the order of protection was originally filed under the original dissolution case number, the trial court went on to acknowledge that \u201ca search of the court file fails to disclose any response to the currently pending petition.\u201d The trial court then went on to set out and analyze the pertinent issues involved and held that \u201cin accordance with section 220(l)(ii) of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act the said plenary order of protection entered on even date herewith shall remain in effect until vacated or modified by this Court.\u201d The trial court also incorporated the plenary order into the final judgment for dissolution of marriage. The majority cannot ignore the fact that the trial court used the Illinois Domestic Violence Act to alter Bradley\u2019s visitation rights with his daughter.\nFurthermore, the majority attempts to characterize the holding in Radke, which concerned the application of the Domestic Violence Act, as dicta. This is just simply erroneous. A reading of the decision in Radke shows that its holding with regard to the Domestic Violence Act is also the law of the case. Radke, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 268-69.\nFurthermore, I do not believe that B.G.\u2019s statements were properly corroborated.\nSection 606(e) of the Marriage Act states:\n\u201cPrevious statements made by the child relating to any allegations that the child is an abused or neglected child within the meaning of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, or an abused or neglected minor within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, shall be admissible in evidence in a hearing concerning custody of or visitation with the child. No such statement, however, if uncorroborated and not subject to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding of abuse or neglect.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/606(e) (West 2002).\n\u201cIn In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184 (1997), our supreme court discussed the evidence necessary to corroborate a minor\u2019s hearsay statement of sexual abuse. The purpose of presenting corroborating evidence, the court wrote, was to balance the welfare interests of minors and the rights of those accused of abuse or neglect. A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 197. The court noted that sufficient corroboration requires more than witnesses testifying that a minor related instances of abuse to them. A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 198. The court stated:\n\u2018[Clorroborating evidence of *** abuse or neglect requires there to be independent evidence which would support a logical and reasonable inference that the act of abuse or neglect described in the hearsay statement occurred. In essence, corroborating evidence is evidence that makes it more probable that a minor was abused or neglected. The form of the corroboration will vary depending on the facts of each case and can include physical or circumstantial evidence.\u2019 A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 199.\u201d In re Marriage of Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d 602, 610 (2002).\nThe trial court in the case sub judice determined that the hearsay statements were corroborated with the following evidence: (1) B.G.\u2019s use of anatomically correct dolls to describe what took place, (2) B.G.\u2019s use of the term \u201cproject\u201d to describe Bradley\u2019s penis, (3) B.G.\u2019s statement that Bradley\u2019s project was \u201creal little then it got real big,\u201d (4) B.G. statement that Bradley\u2019s privates were different than that of the anatomically correct doll because his was \u201csticking up,\u201d and (5) when B.G. was asked if anything came out of Bradley\u2019s privates, she responded, \u201cLet\u2019s not talk about it. It\u2019s yucky.\u201d\nIn finding that there was corroborating evidence, the trial court relied heavily on the cases of In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1991), and In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1986). The trial court considered but refused to follow the decision reached in In re Marriage of Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d 602 (2002), which distinguished both In re C.C. and In re K.L.M. Taking our particular set of facts into consideration, I believe that Flannery is more persuasive.\nIn Flannery, a mother alleged that her three-year-old daughter, Amanda, informed a social worker that \u201c \u2018daddy put his finger in my buddy butt (vagina) and hurt me.\u2019 \u201d Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 604. A physical examination of the girl revealed that she suffered vaginal redness. However, the pediatrician who examined the child testified that vaginal redness is quite common among 2V2-year-old girls and explained that there were a lot of things that could explain the cause of the girl\u2019s vaginal redness. Except for the vaginal irritation, the pediatrician was unable to find anything abnormal. Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 611.\nFurthermore, there was evidence that Amanda, who was potty trained, began to \u201chav[e] accidents\u201d around the time of the alleged abuse. Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 612. There was testimony that Amanda began waking up in the middle of the night. There was testimony that after Amanda initially informed her mother of the abuse, she made further statements which suggested that her father had abused her. There was also testimony from a social worker who conducted a sexual-abuse-victim assessment of Amanda. The social worker, inter alia, testified about Amanda\u2019s physical actions when she spoke about the alleged sexual abuse she suffered from her father. Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 612-13.\nThe trial court determined that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate Amanda\u2019s hearsay statements. The trial court noted that the corroborating evidence consisted of physical evidence and testimony regarding Amanda\u2019s physical actions when she relayed the statements of abuse. Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 605.\nIn reversing the trial court, the Flannery court determined that there was inadequate physical evidence and testimony concerning the\nphysical actions of the child when she relayed the statements of abuse to corroborate the hearsay statement under section 8 \u2014 2601. Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 610-13. A portion of the Flannery court ruling follows:\n\u201c[Tjhis court has previously determined that evidence that is itself hearsay cannot provide the corroboration required by the statute. In re Alba, 185 Ill. App. 3d 286, 290 (1989). Although hearsay is defined as testimony of an out-of-court \u2018statement\u2019 that is offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted (People v. Garcia, 195 Ill. App. 3d 621, 626 (1990)), we have applied this definition to physical manifestations as well. See Alba, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 290 (finding that child\u2019s drawing indicating where her father placed his penis was insufficient to corroborate the child\u2019s hearsay statement of sexual abuse; the drawing constituted hearsay because it was offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted). In this case, Amanda\u2019s physical actions were offered to prove petitioner\u2019s claim that Amanda was sexually abused. Accordingly, the actions fit within the definition of hearsay and could not, by themselves, corroborate Amanda\u2019s out-of-court statements of sexual abuse. A contrary holding would effectively nullify the corroboration requirement. Thus, we hold that testimony regarding the physical manifestations that accompany a child\u2019s hearsay statements of abuse is insufficient to corroborate the out-of-court statements when the child\u2019s conduct is the only corroborative evidence presented. Consequently, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court.\nPetitioner first relies on In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1986). In K.L.M., the court found that the minor child\u2019s hearsay statements of sexual abuse by her father were corroborated by (1) testimony of a caseworker for the Department of Children and Family Services and a psychotherapist that the girl was anxious when she related the allegations of abuse; (2) the testimony of the child\u2019s father, who indicated that the four-year-old had limited opportunity to have learned about the sexual matters that she purported to have described; (3) testimony that the minor\u2019s mother had no opportunity to arrange for the child to provide false testimony; and (4) testimony that the girl had a skin irritation in the genital area. K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d at 493-94. Importantly, however, the court pointed out that the child was able to describe semen. K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d at 494. The court believed that the child would have been unable to describe semen unless she had seen it and that it would have been unlikely that she had seen semen unless the events she related had actually taken place.\nPetitioner also cites In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1991). C.C. involved the alleged sexual abuse of two minors, R.C. and C.C., by their father. In C.C., the court found that the minors\u2019 out-of-court statements of sexual abuse were corroborated by testimony that C.C. had used anatomically correct puppets to recreate a \u2018secret game\u2019 he played with R.C. and his father. Moreover, the five-year-old C.C. was able to describe semen, and there was testimony that the behavior of C.C. and R.C. began to change while living with their father. For instance, C.C. began crying over insignificant things, he wet his pants every day, he became less affectionate, he did not want to be touched, he stopped doing schoolwork, and he was hard to motivate. The seven-year-old R.C. frequently wet his pants, had bowel movements in his pants, had frequent tantrums, often cried and whined, and would not let anyone hug him. Further, a medical team interviewed, observed, and psychologically tested both hoys. The team then compiled a \u2018composite picture\u2019 of the children and concluded that they had been sexually abused. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that it was more probable than not that the children were sexually abused by their father. C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d at 215.\nWe find petitioner\u2019s reliance on K.LM. and C.C. misplaced. In both of those cases there was a myriad of factors beyond the children\u2019s physical manifestations that, when taken together, could support a finding of corroboration. Here, the trial court found only two factors corroborated Amanda\u2019s hearsay statements. However, we have already concluded that there was no physical evidence to corroborate Amanda\u2019s hearsay statements of sexual abuse. Thus, we are left only with Amanda\u2019s physical manifestations. As noted above, there is no authority supporting a finding of corroboration based on the child\u2019s physical conduct alone, and we decline to impose such a finding here.\u201d Flannery, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 614-15.\nHere, I believe the trial court improperly determined that the hearsay statements in question had been corroborated. The trial court made this erroneous determination because it only relied on further hearsay to corroborate the original hearsay statements. Taking into consideration the particular set of facts before us, I cannot agree with the decision reached by the majority and the trial court.\nIn this matter, there was absolutely no physical evidence that corroborated the hearsay statements. Furthermore, the day after the abuse allegedly occurred, when Lynette initially took B.G. to the doctor for an examination, B.G. made no statements to the doctor concerning any alleged abuse. Thereafter, during B.G.\u2019s victim-sensitive interview with Brauweiler, initially B.G. unequivocally informed Brauweiler that Bradley had never touched her privates outside of him giving her a bath.\nMoreover, it appears that the trial court failed to realize that Lynette was the only person to state that B.G. referred to Bradley\u2019s penis as a \u201cproject.\u201d During B.G.\u2019s interview with Brauweiler, B.G. never referred to Bradley\u2019s penis as a \u201cproject.\u201d The only person who did so was Brauweiler, which occurred when Brauweiler asked B.G. \u201cif daddy had asked her about a special project,\u201d and B.G. response was \u201cYes.\u201d However, B.G. also added \u201cI don\u2019t know what it is and we\u2019re not going to talk about it.\u201d\nLynette was also the only person to say that B.G. informed her that Bradley put his penis in her mouth. This accusation was never repeated by B.G. to anyone other than Lynette. We find this to be unsettling in this matter because there was evidence given by Mulso of JMR which suggested that Lynette may have been in fact coaching B.G. as to what she should say. It also appears that the trial court failed to adequately consider Bradley\u2019s allegations that before their divorce, Lynette had threatened to use his family history of sexual abuse, i.e., his father molesting his sister, against him with regard to the custody of their children.\nFurthermore, it also appears that the trial court as well as the majority has ignored the evidence which suggested that Lynette had a strong motive to lie about the alleged abuse. For instance, Lynette admitted that she prevented Bradley from having normal unsupervised visits with the children until he obtained a court order in the context of the divorce proceedings. There was also evidence that Lynette did not like Bradley\u2019s fianc\u00e9e, Jennifer Ann Licka, and that she did not want her around the children.\nLicka also testified that she saw the children on the day that the alleged abuse occurred. In fact Licka saw the children after the abuse allegedly occurred. Licka stated that she did not see anything unusual about the children\u2019s behavior. Licka stated that she was with the children for four hours until they returned home that particular evening. Also, Licka testified that on the day of the alleged abuse, she and Bradley informed the children that they would be getting married and also informed them that they would be participating in the wedding. After this conversation, B.G. then asked if she could come and live with her and Bradley.\nAs such, I disagree with the majority and believe that, in this particular case, the hearsay statements were not sufficiently corroborated.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REID," } ], "attorneys": [ "Gleason & Schroeder, of Chicago (Margaret E. Daniele, Judith Anne Gleason, and Nancy J. Gleason, of counsel), for appellant.", "Barbara J. Agnew, of llene M. Wolf, EC., of Arlington Heights, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY GILBERT, Petitioner-Appellant, and LYNETTE GILBERT, Respondent-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20140497\nOpinion filed December 30, 2004.\nREID, EJ., dissenting.\nGleason & Schroeder, of Chicago (Margaret E. Daniele, Judith Anne Gleason, and Nancy J. Gleason, of counsel), for appellant.\nBarbara J. Agnew, of llene M. Wolf, EC., of Arlington Heights, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0104-01", "first_page_order": 122, "last_page_order": 141 }