{ "id": 3599090, "name": "DANIEL A. McDOUGALL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "McDougall v. White", "decision_date": "2005-01-21", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140391", "first_page": "483", "last_page": "488", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 483" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "26 Ill. Reg. 9380", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755-56" }, { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5120462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "798 N.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2555342 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0799-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477051 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1065" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3738957 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "820 N.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448393 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 10735, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.4715568359390837 }, "sha256": "eeac4d996864e5855a12dbc94867d78b181fa6671c8088c391d0c525da6ce291", "simhash": "1:b9f247750943af20", "word_count": 1703 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:57:27.413698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DANIEL A. McDOUGALL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Daniel A. McDougall, filed an action in the circuit court of Sangamon County for administrative review of the decision of defendant, Jesse White, Illinois Secretary of State (Secretary), denying plaintiffs petition for reinstatement of driving privileges. The circuit court reversed the Secretary and ordered full reinstatement. We reverse the circuit court and reinstate the Secretary\u2019s decision.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn September 19, 1992, plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501). He refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test, resulting in the automatic suspension of his driver\u2019s license. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 95V2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1. He pleaded guilty to DUI and received court supervision. Plaintiff regained his driving privileges only to be arrested a second time for DUI on February 22, 1999. Plaintiff again pleaded guilty to DUI, and on January 29, 2000, the Secretary entered an order revoking his driver\u2019s license pursuant to section 6 \u2014 205(a)(2) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 205(a)(2) (West 1998)). Plaintiff was eligible for full reinstatement after April 9, 2000. Through the formal hearing process, plaintiff on three occasions unsuccessfully attempted to regain some type of driving relief.\nOn July 24, 2002, after plaintiffs fourth hearing, the Secretary issued an order denying him full reinstatement but granting him a restricted driving permit (RDP) for work purposes valid through September 16, 2003. Because plaintiff was considered a recidivist, he was ordered to comply with the RDP procedures related to the use of a breath-alcohol-ignition-interlock device (BAUD). See 625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 205(h) (West 2000). Plaintiff installed the BAUD in his vehicle and complied with all conditions related thereto until July 22, 2003.\nDuring his formal hearing on July 31, 2003, plaintiff informed the hearing officer that he had the BAUD removed from his vehicle \u201cbecause [he] fulfilled [his] contract.\u201d The hearing officer then prepared his findings and recommendations, and on August 29, 2003, the Secretary issued his order adopting the same. According to the hearing officer, plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence to carry his burden of proving that his alcohol problem had been resolved. However, in light of plaintiff\u2019s testimony that he had the BAUD removed from his vehicle, the hearing officer recommended plaintiff be denied full reinstatement. The hearing officer noted that a report had been sent to the BAUD Unit (presumably by the BAUD technician who removed the device), which indicated the device was \u201cdeinstalled\u201d on July 22, 2003. The report indicated plaintiff asked that the BAUD be removed from his vehicle because he had a hearing scheduled on July 31, 2002, and he no longer wanted to pay for the device. The hearing officer found plaintiffs failure to voluntarily surrender his RDP after the device was removed from his vehicle was a violation of the Secretary\u2019s regulations pertaining to the use of the BAUD and justified denying him relief.\nOn September 30, 2003, plaintiff filed a petition for administrative review with the circuit court. On March 25, 2004, the circuit court reversed the Secretary\u2019s decision and granted plaintiff full reinstatement. The court found the Secretary\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and an abuse of discretion. On April 21, 2004, the Secretary filed a motion for stay of judgment pending appeal. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Secretary\u2019s Administrative Decision\nThe Secretary appeals the circuit court\u2019s order reversing his denial of plaintiffs petition for reinstatement. The Secretary contends his decision denying plaintiff\u2019s request was not against the manifest weight of the evidence or a result of an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. We agree.\nWe first note plaintiff has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief. However, because the record is simple and the issue is such that we can easily decide it without the aid of a brief, we will consider the appeal on its merits. In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129, 135, 820 N.E.2d 386, 389 (2004).\nWhen reviewing the appeal of an administrative decision, this court reviews the agency\u2019s decision, not the decision of the circuit court. Harris v. Department of Human Services, 345 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766, 803 N.E.2d 1063, 1065 (2004). If the decision involves a pure question of law, our review is de novo. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 369, 776 N.E.2d 166, 177 (2002). \u201cThe legal effect of undisputed facts is such a legal question.\u201d Castillo v. Jackson, 207 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803, 566 N.E.2d 404, 405 (1990).\nCourts must give substantial weight and deference to the interpretation placed on a statute or regulation by the agency charged with its administration and enforcement. Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 152, 447 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1983). Courts will not interfere with the administrative body\u2019s authority unless it was a result of an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion or the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Clark v. White, 343 Ill. App. 3d 689, 693, 798 N.E.2d 412, 416 (2003). \u201cIf the record contains any evidence which fairly supports the agency\u2019s decision, such decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and must be sustained upon review.\u201d Conklin v. Ryan, 242 Ill. App. 3d 32, 37, 610 N.E.2d 751, 755-56 (1993).\nThe fact plaintiff had the BAUD removed from his vehicle during the term of his RDP is undisputed. The question is whether that removal violates the Secretary\u2019s regulations and constitutes grounds for denying the reinstatement of driving privileges.\nSection 6 \u2014 205(h) of the Code provides:\n\u201cThe Secretary of State shall require the use of ignition interlock devices on all vehicles owned by an individual who has been convicted of a second or subsequent offense under [sjection 11\u2014 501 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance. The Secretary shall establish by rule and regulation the procedures for certification and use of the interlock system.\u201d 625ILCS 5/6 \u2014 205(h) (West 2002).\nThe Secretary has enacted regulations that establish standards for issuing RDPs and the conditions related thereto. See 92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a7 1001.400 through 1001.490 (Conway Greene CD-ROM April 2001). Those regulations have the force and effect of law. Conklin, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 610 N.E.2d at 753. Included in those regulations are procedures related to the use of BAIIDs, which provide the following:\n\u201cIf the hearing officer determines that a RDP should be granted *** the RDP is conditioned upon the installation and continued use of the [BAUD] device. All RDPs issued under the program shall require continued use of the device until the driving privileges of the petitioner are reinstated.\u201d 92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1001.441(f)(2), as amended by 26 Ill. Reg. 9380, 9444 (amended June 13, 2002).\nThe regulations further provide that \u201c[w]ritten notification from a manufacturer/installer on a removal/deinstallation report form stating that their device *** has been removed\u201d shall be grounds for immediate cancellation of an RDP issued under the BAUD program. 92 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1001.441(j)(3) (Conway Greene CD-ROM March 2002).\nPlaintiffs actions of (1) removing the BAUD from his vehicle prior to the expiration of his RDP and before being granted full reinstatement and (2) failing to voluntarily surrender his RDP upon the removal of the device were in violation of the Secretary\u2019s regulations.\nThe legislature specifically required the use of ignition interlock devices by an individual who had been convicted of two or more DUI offenses and specifically granted the Secretary the authority to establish the rules and regulations related to the use of the devices. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 205(h) (West 2002). Therefore, we cannot say that denying plaintiff full reinstatement due to his violation of the regulations established by the Secretary was either an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion or against the manifest weight of the evidence. We reverse the circuit court and reinstate the Secretary\u2019s decision denying plaintiff full reinstatement.\nB. Plaintiffs Motion To Strike\nOn June 10, 2004, while this appeal was pending, the circuit court denied the Secretary\u2019s April 21, 2004, motion for a stay pending appeal. On July 15, 2004, plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of the Secretary\u2019s motion for stay, alleging the Secretary \u201crefer[red] to information which was not produced at hearing with respect to this matter and as such is inappropriately being introduced as evidence in this matter.\u201d The Secretary filed an objection and a response thereto, and this court ordered plaintiffs motion be taken with the case.\nPlaintiffs allegations and the grounds supporting his motion are suspect at best. Although plaintiff does not specifically indicate what \u201cinformation\u201d was improperly included \u201cas evidence,\u201d we surmise he is referring to the BAUD-removal report the hearing officer referred to in his findings and recommendations. There, the hearing officer indicated the report was received after plaintiffs hearing.\nFirst, the Secretary\u2019s motion for stay does not mention or refer to the report. If, in fact, the report is the \u201cinformation\u201d to which plaintiff refers, the Secretary\u2019s motion contains nothing to strike.\nSecond (assuming plaintiff wishes the reference to the report be stricken from the record), the report contained nothing that would prejudice plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted in the hearing that he had the BAUD removed; therefore, no harm resulted from referring to or considering a report from the BAUD vendor stating the same thing. For these reasons and based upon our decision in this appeal, plaintiffs motion is denied.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe reverse the order of the circuit court of Sangamon County directing the Secretary to grant plaintiff full reinstatement of his driving privileges. We reinstate the Secretary\u2019s decision.\nReversed; decision of the Secretary of State reinstated.\nMYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Mary Patricia Kerns, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Chris E. Reif, of Grosboll, Becker, Tice & Reif, of Petersburg, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANIEL A. McDOUGALL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140391\nOpinion filed January 21, 2005.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Mary Patricia Kerns, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nChris E. Reif, of Grosboll, Becker, Tice & Reif, of Petersburg, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0483-01", "first_page_order": 501, "last_page_order": 506 }