{ "id": 3600301, "name": "CHARLES A. AUSSIEKER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Aussieker v. City of Bloomington", "decision_date": "2005-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140540", "first_page": "498", "last_page": "506", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 498" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159567 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 1066", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1068" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5254008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/223/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 1195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1198" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79368 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 N.E.2d 1157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261370 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259-60" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 485931 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "932" }, { "page": "932" }, { "page": "932" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975004 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461402 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637055 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2659522 ], "year": 1876, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407-08" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/83/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.E. 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5625996 ], "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/227/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5003555 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/338/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "715 N.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679", "parenthetical": "holding that \"once a motion for substitution of judge for cause is brought, the judge loses all power and authority over the case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336100 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1067", "parenthetical": "holding that \"once a motion for substitution of judge for cause is brought, the judge loses all power and authority over the case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330", "parenthetical": "granting a new trial after the judge improperly denied the plaintiffs motion for substitution of judge" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349575 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351-52", "parenthetical": "granting a new trial after the judge improperly denied the plaintiffs motion for substitution of judge" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5595837 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0311-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 842, "char_count": 19056, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.044122929003208e-08, "percentile": 0.5043780544734461 }, "sha256": "e583915276116aa71fcd88002fb420e7d8a188d5ca8d63235fb9574433c4a79f", "simhash": "1:148db1ebb2b05f64", "word_count": 3217 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:57:27.413698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLES A. AUSSIEKER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this case, we consider whether each plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff civil case is entitled to one motion for substitution of judge as of right under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) (West 2002)). We conclude that the answer is yes, and we reverse the trial court\u2019s order denying plaintiff Arnold R. Zimmer\u2019s motion for substitution of judge as of right.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn April 26, 2004, plaintiffs, 17 taxpayers and real estate owners, filed a declaratory judgment action against defendant, the City of Bloomington, alleging that the city did not exercise appropriate diligence in soliciting bids for the construction of a municipal arena. On April 27, 2004, the city filed a motion to dismiss, and a hearing was scheduled for April 30, 2004. Before the hearing was held, plaintiff James D. Elder filed a motion to substitute Judge Charles Reynard under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1001(a)(2) (West 2002)). On April 30, 2004, the trial court granted Elder\u2019s motion, and the case was later reassigned to Judge Donald D. Bernardi.\nThe trial court set a hearing on the city\u2019s motion to dismiss for May 14, 2004. On May 12, 2004, plaintiffs filed a response to the city\u2019s motion. Also on that day, Zimmer filed a motion for substitution of judge as of right under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code. On May 13, 2004, the city filed an objection to Zimmer\u2019s motion, alleging that (1) the motion was brought for the purpose of delay and should therefore be denied and, alternatively, (2) Zimmer had not preserved his right to file a second motion for substitution of judge by informing the court that he was not joining in Elder\u2019s motion for substitution of judge.\nOn May 14, 2004, the trial court first conducted a hearing on Zimmer\u2019s motion for substitution of judge and denied it. Specifically, the court found that the 17 named individual plaintiffs constituted one party and thus were collectively entitled to only one motion for substitution of judge under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code. The court further explained that multiple plaintiffs can be distinguished from multiple defendants who are considered separate parties entitled to multiple motions for substitution under Illinois law. The court then conducted a hearing on the city\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and granted that motion with leave to refile within 21 days.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. THE TRIAL COURT\u2019S DENIAL OF ZIMMER\u2019S MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGE\nPlaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by denying Zimmer\u2019s motion for substitution of judge because each plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff civil action is entitled to one motion for substitution of judge as of right under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) (West 2002)). We agree.\nWhen interpreting a statute, an appellate court must ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent, and the best indication of such intent is the language of the statute itself. People v. Olsson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 372, 374, 780 N.E.2d 816, 818 (2002). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning without resort to other tools of statutory construction. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 255, 807 N.E.2d 439, 444, (2004). Further, undefined words in a statute are given their plain and ordinary meaning. In re Estate of Poole, 207 Ill. 2d 393, 406, 799 N.E.2d 250, 258 (2003).\nSection 2 \u2014 1001(a) (2) (i) of the Civil Code provides that \u201cin any civil action *** [e]ach party shall be entitled to one substitution of judge without cause as a matter of right.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001(a)(2)(i) (West 2002). This statute is \u201c \u2018to be liberally construed, and where the conditions are met, the trial court has no discretion to deny the request unless it is shown that the motion was made simply to delay or avoid trial.\u2019 \u201d Illinois Licensed Beverage Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Advanta Leasing Services, 333 Ill. App. 3d 927, 932, 776 N.E.2d 255, 259-60 (2002), quoting Sahoury v. Moses, 308 Ill. App. 3d 413, 414, 719 N.E.2d 1157, 1158 (1999). If the motion requesting substitution of judge is filed before the presiding judge has made a substantial ruling, the right to substitution is absolute. Scroggins v. Scroggins, 327 Ill. App. 3d 333, 336, 762 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (2002). Additionally, any order entered after a motion for substitution of judge is improperly denied is void. Advanta, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 932, 776 N.E.2d at 260. The Fifth District has held that each individual defendant in a multiple-defendant action is deemed to be a separate party, and each such party has an independent right to one substitution of judge under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code. Boatman v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 223 Ill. App. 3d 121, 124, 584 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (1991); Beahringer v. Hardee\u2019s Food Systems, Inc., 282 Ill. App. 3d 600, 601, 668 N.E.2d 614, 615 (1996).\nIn this case, defendant attempts to distinguish multiple plaintiffs from multiple defendants for purposes of applying section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code. We are not persuaded. The statute refers to \u201ceach party\u201d without differentiating between plaintiffs and defendants, and the statute is silent with respect to situations involving multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants. See 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1001(a)(2)(i) (West 2002). Because the statute does not define the word \u201cparty,\u201d it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The word \u201cparty\u201d is defined as \u201c[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004). Each of the 17 plaintiffs in this case is bringing a lawsuit against the city and, according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \u201cparty,\u201d each plaintiff should be entitled to file a motion for substitution of judge under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code.\nBoth Boatman and Beahringer lend support to our holding that section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code applies to each plaintiff in this case. Although these cases only discuss multiple defendants, they do not rule out the application of section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) to situations involving multiple plaintiffs. See Boatman, 223 Ill. App. 3d 121, 584 N.E.2d 1066; Beahringer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 600, 668 N.E.2d 614.\nThe trial court\u2019s misinterpretation of the statute regarding its treatment of multiple parties is further shown by consideration of section 114 \u2014 5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 5(b) (West 2002)). This section, which has existed since the enactment of Illinois\u2019s modern code of criminal procedure in 1963, addresses the issue of multiple defendants in a criminal case regarding motions for substitution of judge as a matter of right and states as follows:\n\u201cWithin 24 hours after a motion is made for substitution of judge in a cause with multiple defendants!!,] each defendant shall have the right to move in accordance with subsection (a) of this [s]ection for a substitution of one judge. The total number of judges named as prejudiced by all defendants shall not exceed the total number of defendants. The first motion for substitution of judge in a cause with multiple defendants shall be made within 10 days after the cause has been placed on the trial call of a judge.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/114\u2014 5(b) (West 2002).\nThe references to multiple defendants and the implementation of a time limit in which a defendant may file a substitution-of-judge motion demonstrate the legislature\u2019s ability to restrict motions for substitution of judge as a matter of right in cases involving multiple parties when the legislature wishes to do so. The city here is effectively arguing that we should construe section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code as if it read along the lines of section 114 \u2014 5(b) of the Criminal Code. We decline to do so. Construing the statute as defendant suggests would amount to judicial legislating. We further note that the legislature has revised section 2 \u2014 1001 of the Civil Code three times in the last 20 years, and despite this legislative attention, the General Assembly has not opted to add the multiple-party provision it placed in section 114 \u2014 5(b) of the Criminal Code 40 years ago.\nWe thus hold that under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) (West 2002)), each plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff civil case is entitled to one motion for substitution of judge as of right. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Zimmer\u2019s motion to substitute judge.\nIn so concluding, we note that the city makes policy-related arguments in support of its contention that section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) of the Civil Code should be interpreted as distinguishing between multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants. In particular, the city asserts the following: (1) if plaintiffs in a multiple-plaintiff civil case have the right under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2) to file multiple motions to substitute judge without alleging grounds, the potential exists that defendants will be denied their right to obtain prompt justice, as guaranteed by article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 12), and (2) fundamental differences exist between plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases. Whatever merit the city\u2019s assertions may have, our duty is to apply statutes as they are written. The city should address its proposed change in the law to the institution in this state charged with making public policy \u2014 the General Assembly.\nIII. STANDING OF COPLAINTIFFS\nBecause we agree with Zimmer that the trial court erred by denying his motion for substitution of judge, all of the trial court\u2019s subsequent orders are null and void as to Zimmer. The other 16 plaintiffs, citing the null-and-void rule as discussed in Advanta, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 932, 776 N.E.2d at 260, assert that they are entitled to the same benefit of this rule as Zimmer \u2014 that is, that all of the trial court\u2019s orders entered after the court erroneously denied Zimmer\u2019s motion for substitution of judge are null and void as to them. They are mistaken.\nThe other 16 plaintiffs have no standing to raise this claim because the trial court\u2019s erroneous ruling did not affect them. Indeed, Elder, one of the other 16 plaintiffs, filed a motion for automatic substitution of judge before Zimmer, and Elder\u2019s motion was granted. Under these circumstances, a ruling reversing the trial court\u2019s dismissal of Elder\u2019s complaint on the sole ground that the court erroneously denied Zimmer\u2019s motion for substitution of judge simply makes no sense.\nFurther, we note that the theory underlying this claim of the other 16 plaintiffs \u2014 namely, that the trial court\u2019s erroneous ruling adversely affecting Zimmer should be viewed as similarly adversely affecting each of his 16 coplaintiffs \u2014 runs counter to those plaintiffs\u2019 fundamental argument with which we began this case, asserting that each of the 17 plaintiffs in this case is a separate party who may separately assert rights statutorily afforded to parties in a civil case and who is entitled to be treated separately from his or her coplaintiffs.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment dismissing the complaints of each of the plaintiffs except for Zimmer, and we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment as to Zimmer and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree with that part of the majority opinion that holds the other 16 plaintiffs have no standing to complain of any error in the denial of the motion for substitution. However, the reasons for my agreement cause me to dissent from that portion of the opinion which reverses the order on the motion for substitution as to plaintiff Zimmer.\nWhen this cause was filed, it was filed with the payment of one filing fee. Only one fee was charged because the plaintiffs \u2014 no matter how many individuals \u2014 are one party. By filing one complaint, plaintiffs chose to yoke themselves together as one party. As the Civil Code provides:\n\u201cAll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally!,] or in the alternative, whenever if those persons had brought separate actions any common question of law or fact would arise. If upon the application of any party it shall appear that joinder may embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the court may order separate trials or enter any other order that may be expedient. Judgment may be entered for any one or more of the plaintiffs who may be found to be entitled to relief, for the relief to which he or she or they may he entitled.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 404 (West 2002).\nViewing joined plaintiffs as one party, giving rise to the interpretation that such \u201cone party\u201d is entitled to only one substitution of judge without cause, is supported by the approach used by our supreme court under the old statute regarding peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges, like substitution of judges, are not creatures of the common law but of statute. Curtis v. Gedman, 338 Ill. App. 463, 472, 87 N.E.2d 865, 869 (1949).\nPrior to the enactment of section 2 \u2014 1106 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1106 (West 2002)), allowing for peremptory challenges in excess of the maximum for multiple joined parties, the court interpreted the award of peremptory challenges as a number of challenges allowed to each side of a case no matter the number of plaintiffs or defendants occupying a particular side. See North American Restaurant & Oyster House v. McElligott, 227 Ill. 317, 320, 81 N.E. 388, 389 (1907); Schmidt v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 83 Ill. 405, 407-08 (1876).\nAbsent an expression by the legislature of an intent to the contrary, I believe the statute allowing an automatic or no-fault substitution of judge as a matter of right applies to each side, no matter how populous the side may be. To hold otherwise would allow havoc to be wreaked upon the administration of justice. On a case of public interest such as this where delay of the resolution may create a very real injury to the public and the effective administration of government, the majority\u2019s ruling presents an open invitation to mischief. There are approximately 1,000 trial judges in the State of Illinois. If a committed plaintiff attracted 1,001 fellow litigants and each was entitled to a change of judge, the administration of justice would become an endless game of roulette where the wheel forever spins with no winner established.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON," }, { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree with the part of the majority opinion which holds that under section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2)(i) of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1001(a)(2)(i) (West 2002)), each plaintiff in a multiple-plaintiff civil case is entitled to one motion for substitution of judge as of right. Contrary to the argument made by Justice Appleton, the payment of one filing fee is not made because \u201cthe plaintiffs \u2014 no matter how many individuals \u2014 are one party.\u201d 355 Ill. App. 3d at 503 (Appleton, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, the statutes pertaining to filing fees either base the fee on the nature of the action itself or recognize that each individual plaintiff in a lawsuit is a \u201cparty\u201d and exempt payment by more than one party. For example, the fees of the clerk of the circuit court are based on the population of the county in which the action is filed and on the nature of the action. See 705 ILCS 105/27.1, 27.1a, 27.2, 27.2a (West 2002). Further, numerous statutes require the payment of a fee by \u201ceach party\u201d upon filing with the exception that \u201cno additional fee shall be required if more than one party is represented in a single pleading, paper[,] or other appearance.\u201d 55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1103 (West 2002) (court-security fee); 705 ILCS 105/27.3a (court-automation fee), 27.3c (document-storage fee) (West 2002). Clearly, joined plaintiffs are not viewed as one party, and therefore each party is entitled to one substitution of judge without cause under the plain language of section 2 \u2014 1001(a)(2)(i) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1001 (a)(2)(i) (West 2002)).\nSuch interpretation will not wreak havoc on the administration of justice. Justice Appleton points to the situation where 1,001 litigants would be entitled to a change of judge. 355 Ill. App. 3d at 504 (Appleton, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, the class action statutes (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 801 through 2 \u2014 806 (West 2002)) provide the means for a party to sue as a representative of a class where, among other requirements, the \u201cclass is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 801(1) (West 2002). In such cases, only the named representative(s) would be considered a \u201cparty\u201d entitled to a substitution of judge as a matter of right.\nI dissent, however, from the majority\u2019s holding affirming the dismissal of the complaints of each of the remaining 16 plaintiffs. The majority argues that the trial court\u2019s orders entered after the improper denial of Zimmer\u2019s motion for substitution of judge are null and void only as to Zimmer and not the remaining 16 plaintiffs. I disagree.\nOnce a proper motion for substitution of judge is brought, any and all orders entered after the motion for substitution should have been granted are a nullity. In re Dominique F., 145 Ill. 2d 311, 324, 583 N.E.2d 555, 561 (1991); Rodisch v. Commacho-Esparza, 309 Ill. App. 3d 346, 351-52, 722 N.E.2d 326, 330 (1999) (granting a new trial after the judge improperly denied the plaintiffs motion for substitution of judge); see also, e.g., In re Petition of C.M.A., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1067, 715 N.E.2d 674, 679 (1999) (holding that \u201conce a motion for substitution of judge for cause is brought, the judge loses all power and authority over the case\u201d). As such, any orders entered after the improper denial of Zimmer\u2019s motion for substitution of judge were null and void. The majority\u2019s result leads to a separation of Zimmer\u2019s case from that of his coplaintiffs, contrary to the wishes of the plaintiffs who brought suit together and which does not further the administration of justice.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "John L. Morel (argued), of John L. Morel, PC., of Bloomington, for appellants.", "J. Todd Greenburg (argued), Corporation Counsel, of Bloomington, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES A. AUSSIEKER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140540\nArgued December 8, 2004.\nOpinion filed January 27, 2005.\nAPPLETON, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nMYERSCOUGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJohn L. Morel (argued), of John L. Morel, PC., of Bloomington, for appellants.\nJ. Todd Greenburg (argued), Corporation Counsel, of Bloomington, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0498-01", "first_page_order": 516, "last_page_order": 524 }