{ "id": 3599561, "name": "GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a/s/o Rosalyn Walton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID SMITH, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Government Employees Insurance v. Smith", "decision_date": "2005-02-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201403\u20142438", "first_page": "915", "last_page": "926", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 915" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 687", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637092 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 934", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894563 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570688 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 N.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126392 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "733 N.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980632 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25443 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "808 N.E.2d 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 934", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3949552 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0934-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778083 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 1001", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472627 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637100 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" }, { "page": "936" }, { "page": "933" }, { "page": "933" }, { "page": "933" }, { "page": "934", "parenthetical": "proper Rule 237 notice where plaintiff requested to bring the \" 'adjuster with the entire claim file' \"" }, { "page": "933" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "934" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0930-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 804, "char_count": 25119, "ocr_confidence": 0.698, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.36563946392241403 }, "sha256": "4f7c9b6bc14f87ba16c723b6f5712bdfa8c16a594b36ade9742f0bb5283b91f4", "simhash": "1:a22a07d82fc0adb9", "word_count": 4203 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:57:27.413698+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a/s/o Rosalyn Walton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID SMITH, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nOn February 18, 2002, the plaintiff, Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), filed a subrogation action against the defendant, David Smith, for property damage related to a traffic accident with Rosalyn Walton, GEICO\u2019s subroger.\nOn August 19, 2002, a mandatory arbitration hearing took place and the arbitrators entered an award in favor of GEICO. However, the arbitrators\u2019 order noted \u201cbad faith participation by [GEICO] in that [GEICO] failed to produce, pursuant to [a] Rule 237 Notice To Produce [166 Ill. 2d R. 237(b)] \u2018GEICO estimator John Ciullo\u2019 as to the issue of amount of damages.\u201d\nBoth parties rejected the arbitration award. Smith subsequently filed a motion to bar GEICO from presenting evidence at trial for failure to comply with Rule 237. 166 Ill. 2d R. 237. On October 10, 2002, Judge Francis Dolan granted Smith\u2019s motion. Subsequently, Smith filed a motion for summary judgment which was also granted.\nGEICO appeals arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) barring GEICO from presenting evidence at trial, and (2) entering summary judgment.\nBACKGROUND\nIn its subrogation action against Smith, GEICO sought to recover damages in the amount of $3,867.33 for property damage to its insured\u2019s vehicle, rental expenses incurred by its insured, and its insured\u2019s deductible.\nOn April 16, 2002, Smith served GEICO with a notice to produce, pursuant to Rule 237 (166 Ill. 2d R. 237(b)) and section 2 \u2014 1102 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1102 (West 2000)), demanding that, inter alia, GEICO produce\n\u201c11. *** the claim\u2019s [sic] adjuster named on the [sic] estimate of plaintiffs vehicle with the entire claims filed [sic] and with the NADA book or any other source used to evaluate the value of the vehicle on the date of loss.\u201d\nOn June 24, 2002, Smith served GEICO with a supplemental notice to produce, again pursuant to Rule 237 and section 2 \u2014 1102. The supplemental notice to produce demanded GEICO produce:\n\u201c11. *** the claim\u2019s [sic] adjuster named on the [sic] estimate of plaintiffs vehicle with the entire claims filed [sic] and with the NADA book or any other source used to evaluate the value of the vehicle on the date of loss.\n12. JOHN CIULLO \u2014 GEICO ESTIMATOR.\u201d\nOn August 19, 2002, a mandatory arbitration hearing took place. At the arbitration hearing GEICO produced neither its claims adjuster nor John Chillo. The arbitrators\u2019 unanimous written order was entered in favor of GEICO. However, the arbitrators also indicated that GEICO had acted in \u201cbad faith.\u201d The arbitrators\u2019 order specifically stated as follows:\n\u201cAward in favor of [GEICO] *** in the amount of $2,489.29, plus costs of $138.73 based on a copy of clerk\u2019s receipt for same, the panel finding bad faith participation by plaintiff in that plaintiff failed to produce, pursuant to a Rule 237 notice to produce \u2018GEICO estimator John Ciullo\u2019 as to the issue of [the] amount of damages.\u201d\nThe record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the arbitration proceeding. Each party filed a notice rejecting the arbitration award.\nOn September 5, 2002, Smith filed a motion to bar GEICO from producing evidence at trial on the grounds that (1) GEICO failed to produce its employee to testify at the arbitration hearing pursuant to Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice to produce, and (2) the arbitrators found GEICO\u2019s failure to produce John Ciullo, misidentified as GEICO\u2019s estimator, indicated that GEICO did not participate in good faith during the arbitration proceedings.\nOn September 19, 2002, GEICO filed a response to Smith\u2019s motion to bar. GEICO stated that \u201c[t]he initial repair estimate was written by John Ciullo, an employee of C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc., located at 5710 S. Western Avenue, in Chicago, Illinois.\u201d GEICO further stated that \u201cMr. [John] Ciullo was employed by that company on all relevant dates, not GEICO.\u201d GEICO further argued that because John Ciullo was not its employee, Rule 237 could not be used to compel his appearance. Instead of a Rule 237 notice to appear, GEICO argued, Smith should have issued a subpoena directly to John Ciullo.\nOn October 10, 2002, Judge Francis Dolan granted Smith\u2019s motion to bar GEICO from presenting evidence at trial. The record does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the matter, nor does Judge Dolan\u2019s order contain his reasoning.\nIn October 2002, GEICO filed a petition for rehearing. Judge James E McCarthy struck that petition.\nIn March 2003, GEICO filed a motion to vacate Judge Dolan\u2019s barring order of October 10, 2002. In April 2003, Judge Shelli D. Williams-Hayes struck GEICO\u2019s motion to vacate following oral argument by both parties. The record does not contain a transcript of this argument. However, Judge Williams-Hayes\u2019 order states, \u201cElaintiff\u2019s [GEICO\u2019s] motion is stricken by the court. The court heard oral argument from both parties\u2019 counsel and instructed plaintiffs counsel to bring the motion before Judge Dolan.\u201d\nIn May 2003, GEICO filed a motion with Judge Dolan to reconsider the order he entered on October 10, 2002. GEICO filed a written argument, the arbitrators\u2019 award, Judge Dolan\u2019s October 10, 2002, order, a repair bill from C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc., and an affidavit from John Ciullo. The repair bill from C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc., was entitled \u201cESTIMATE OF RECORD,\u201d denoted that it was \u201cWritten by: John Ciullo #01/09/2001 12:19 EM,\u201d and listed the \u201cAdjuster: FRANK CIRILLO.\u201d John Ciullo\u2019s affidavit, dated April 15, 2003, stated that he was employed by C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc. John Ciullo\u2019s affidavit also stated that although he created an estimate of damages for GEICO on January 9, 2001, he was not an employee of GEICO.\nOn June 24, 2003, Judge Dolan began the hearing on GEICO\u2019s motion to reconsider by clarifying GEICO\u2019s position:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Do I understand that your argument is that there was a mistake in the 237 because they named somebody who wasn\u2019t an employee?\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: That\u2019s correct, Your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Is that the thrust of where we\u2019re going?\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: The mistake was that the arbitrators assumed that a person was an employee of GEICO, when the document, namely the paid repair bill, clearly stated that the person was an employee of an independent body shop. CDE Body Shop II, Inc.\u201d\nSmith\u2019s attorney argued that he sent GEICO two Rule 237 notices to produce. Smith\u2019s attorney contended that both notices to produce contained language seeking \u201cthe claim\u2019s [sic] adjuster named on the [sic] estimate of plaintiffs vehicle.\u201d Additionally, the June 21, 2002, notice to produce asked that \u201cJOHN CIULLO \u2014 GEICO ESTIMATOR\u201d be produced. Smith\u2019s attorney argued that at no time did GEICO object to either of the notices to produce or alert Smith that John Ciullo was not a GEICO employee. Smith\u2019s attorney stated that, instead, GEICO took part in the arbitration without producing anyone, either GEICO\u2019s claims adjuster, Frank Cirillo, or John Ciullo.\nGEICO acknowledged receiving Smith\u2019s supplemental notice to produce but argued that the repair bill clearly indicated that John Ciullo was an employee of C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc. GEICO argued that Smith\u2019s attorney assumed that John Ciullo was an employee of GEICO. GEICO also argued that if Smith truly needed John Ciullo to testify, Smith needed to subpoena him. Moreover, GEICO\u2019s attorney admitted before Judge Dolan that Frank Cirillo, listed on the repair bill from C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc., as a claims adjuster, was an employee of GEICO.\nThe following discussion then took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Well, what about the obligation of counsel when he receives a notice to produce where there is clear error on its face, to advise defense counsel in this case of that error so that there can be a full and complete hearing of the matter?\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: That\u2019s\u2014\nTHE COURT: I mean otherwise, what we\u2019ve done is we get out of the sunlight where we \u2014 where I think discovery rules are meant to put us, and we are back to gamesmenship and we are in shadows, and we are in places that I don\u2019t believe the Supreme Court wants us to go.\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: There\u2019s no gamesmanship going on here.\nTHE COURT: Well, then why didn\u2019t you tell them that they had made a mistake?\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: Because, Your Honor, we tendered a copy of the paid repair bill which made it clear on its face, which was included in the 90(c) packet [166 Ill. 2d R. 90(c)] they had long before this hearing was conducted.\n* * *\n[Smith\u2019s Attorney]: If the order had said \u2014 let\u2019s say that [GEICO\u2019s] Counsel had advised us that it was actually \u2014 I assume that they are relying that it\u2019s Frank [Cirillo] is actually the real employee of GEICO.\nTHE COURT: I don\u2019t know. Are you?\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: Your Honor, the\u2014\nTHE COURT: [How] did they err?\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: I mean the error was naming John Ciullo, GEICO estimator, because John Ciullo has never been a GEICO estimator, or worked in any capacity for GEICO.\n[Smith\u2019s Attorney]: I\u2019m just asking Counsel. Is Frank [Cirillo] the employee that they \u2014 because you keep saying that it\u2019s clear on its face of who the GEICO employee is, and I don\u2019t see that. .\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: Frank [Cirillo] was never named in the 237 notice. He is\u2014\nTHE COURT: Is he the employee?\n[GEICO\u2019s Attorney]: He is an employee of the company. He was never named in the 237 notice.\n[Smith\u2019s Attorney]: Judge, I would ask that \u2014 the Court could just as easily interpret this award to say they didn\u2019t bring anybody pursuant to 237. It doesn\u2019t matter who we put \u2014 does it matter if we would have put John Ciullo or Frank [Cirillo]? It doesn\u2019t matter, because at the end as to the issue of amount of damages, that\u2019s the issue there. They didn\u2019t bring a person, that\u2019s bad faith participation. That\u2019s what [the arbitrators] found.\n* * t'fi\nTHE COURT: Thank you. Now then, I am loath to put myself in the position of second-guessing the arbitrators who had the benefit of the hearing, and I don\u2019t. I have their award, but it seems to me on my understanding of 237 as well as any of the other discovery rules, is that the accommodation is to the effective and efficient administration of justice. And it seems to me we can only have that when we \u2014 when we have the kind of practice where if somebody asks for a certain \u2014 in this case a certain individual or a certain proof, here an estimator, based upon the estimate, and that\u2019s what it is, estimate of record, who it\u2019s written by, and adjuster, there\u2019s two different names, there\u2019s nothing really clear on [the repair bill\u2019s] face as to the employment that those two people enjoyed, but I think that the \u2014 I think that the rules are meant to go beyond the surface on this to the understanding of the parties as to what the other side is requesting, so that we can have purposeful hearings, be they arbitration hearings, be they full blown hearings here before a jury, and so I have listened to your arguments, I have had the benefit of reviewing your motion to reconsider here, but I\u2019m not persuaded *** either that the award of the arbitrators should be set aside, or that my order of the 10th of October, 2002, should be vacated.\u201d\nOn June 24, 2003, following Judge Dolan\u2019s denial of GEICO\u2019s motion to reconsider, Smith filed a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted over GEICO\u2019s objection and this appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nGEICO argues in its reply brief that \u201c[t]he main issue in this appeal is whether or not the trial court improperly expanded Rule 237(b) to apply to a witness who is not a party nor an officer, director, or employee of a party.\u201d GEICO\u2019s argument relates to its noncompliance with Smith\u2019s Rule 237 request for GEICO to produce John Ciullo. GEICO contends it could not be compelled to produce John Ciullo as he was not \u201can officer, director, or employee\u201d of GEICO. 166 Ill. 2d R. 237(b). We emphasize that although Smith\u2019s supplemental Rule 237 notice to produce asked that \u201cJohn Ciullo \u2014 GEICO estimator\u201d be produced at the arbitration hearing, both Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice and supplemental notice to produce also sought GEICO\u2019s \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster.\u201d\nThe record clearly establishes that John Ciullo created a repair estimate for GEICO but was not a GEICO employee. However, and more importantly to our resolution of this case, the record also, demonstrates, as admitted by GEICO\u2019s attorney, that Frank Cirillo, GEICO\u2019s \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster,\u201d was a GEICO employee, was listed in paragraph 11 of each of Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notices, and was not produced by GEICO at the arbitration hearing. In light of the foregoing facts, we find the issue to be whether Judge Dolan\u2019s October 10, 2002, sanction, which barred GEICO from presenting evidence at trial due to GEICO\u2019s failure to comply with Rule 237, was an abuse of discretion, where Smith had requested GEICO produce its \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster,\u201d an admitted GEICO employee, and GEICO failed to do so.\nWe begin by noting that Judge Dolan did not specifically designate under which supreme court rule he was granting Smith\u2019s motion to bar GEICO from presenting any evidence or witnesses at trial. However, Smith\u2019s motion to bar GEICO from presenting evidence makes only one allegation: GEICO failed to comply with Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice and supplemental notice to produce. See Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d 930, 936, 781 N.E.2d 639 (2002). Therefore, Judge Dolan granted Smith\u2019s motion as a sanction for GEICO\u2019s violation of Rule 237. See Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 936.\nSupreme Court Rule 237(b) states in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe appearance at the trial of a party or a person who at the time of trial is an officer, director, or employee of a party may be required by serving the party with a notice designating the person who is required to appear. *** Upon a failure to comply with the notice, the court may enter any order that is just, including any order provided for in Rule 219(c) that may be appropriate.\u201d 166 Ill. 2d R. 237(b).\nSupreme Court Rule 90(g) provides that Rule 237 is equally applicable to arbitration hearings and trials. 166 Ill. 2d R. 90(g); Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 933. \u201cThe supreme court rules regarding mandatory arbitration are designed to prevent abuse in, and to uphold the integrity of, the arbitration process.\u201d State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Koscelnik, 342 Ill. App. 3d 808, 810, 795 N.E.2d 1001 (2003). \u201cRule 91(b) provides that parties to an arbitration must participate in the proceedings in good faith and in a meaningful manner.\u201d State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Santiago, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1013, 801 N.E.2d 142 (2003), citing 145 Ill. 2d R. 91(b). Supreme Court Rule 219(c) states that failure to comply with a Rule 237(b) notice may include an order barring the offending party from presenting any evidence or witnesses. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c); Santiago, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.\nWe note that the parties do not agree upon our standard of review. GEICO contends that \u201cthis appeal presents a question of law, not a question of fact, and concerns the construction of a Supreme Court Rule.\u201d GEICO also argues that we should review this matter de novo as \u201cSmith presented no evidence to the trial court to rebut the evidence tendered by the plaintiff, GEICO, which showed that John Ciullo was not a GEICO employee.\u201d In opposition, Smith contends that the trial court\u2019s decision to impose sanctions due to GEICO\u2019s conduct during the arbitration hearing should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. We agree with Smith.\n\u201cSanctions for failing to comply with a Rule 237 notice are to be imposed when failure to comply is determined to be unreasonable.\u201d Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 933. \u201cA circuit court\u2019s decision barring a party from presenting evidence at trial and imposing sanctions is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.\u201d Santiago, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when the court\u2019s ruling is arbitrary or exceeds the bounds of reason.\u201d Santiago, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. \u201c[T]he burden is on the offending party to show that its noncompliance with a Rule 237 notice was reasonable or the result of extenuating circumstances.\u201d Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 933.\nIn the instant case, Smith\u2019s Rule 237 supplemental notice to produce requested that GEICO produce two individuals, GEICO\u2019s claims adjuster, as listed in pafSgraph 11, and John Ciullo, as named in paragraph 12 as GEICO\u2019s estimator. The arbitrators made a unanimous finding that GEICO failed to participate in the arbitration hearing in good faith due to GEICO\u2019s failure to produce John Ciullo as requested by Smith\u2019s Rule 237 supplemental notice to produce. However, before Judge Dolan, GEICO argued that it could not be compelled by Rule 237 to produce John Ciullo as he was not employed by GEICO but was instead employed by C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc. Also at the hearing before Judge Dolan, GEICO admitted that the \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster\u201d named on the C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc., repair bill, Frank Cirillo, was a GEICO employee. Although Smith requested GEICO produce its \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster,\u201d GEICO failed to present Frank Cirillo at the arbitration hearing.\n\u201cParties to an arbitration must subject the case to the same type of adversarial testing expected at trial.\u201d Santiago, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. Bad-faith participation in an arbitration hearing \u201c \u2018may consist of \u201cinept preparation or intentional disregard for the process.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Givens v. Renteria, 347 Ill. App. 3d 934, 942, 808 N.E.2d 1009 (2003) quoting Anderson v. Mercy, 338 Ill. App. 3d 685, 689, 788 N.E.2d 765 (2003), quoting Schmidt v. Joseph, 315 Ill. App. 3d 77, 83, 733 N.E.2d 694 (2000).\nIn this case, although the arbitrators unanimously found that GEICO acted in bad faith by failing to produce John Ciullo, it is clear that John Ciullo was not an employee of GEICO. As such, Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice to produce John Ciullo, and GEICO\u2019s noncompliance with the Rule 237 notice concerning John Ciullo, could not be subject to a bad-faith finding by the arbitrators under Rule 91(b). 145 Ill. 2d R. 91(b). However, the absence of a basis for a bad-faith finding by the arbitrators regarding GEICO\u2019s failure to produce its claims adjuster, Frank Cirillo, does not support GEICO\u2019s position on appeal. State Farm Insurance Co. v. Jacquez, 322 Ill. App. 3d 652, 656, 749 N.E.2d 462 (2001).\nImplicit in the arbitrators\u2019 unanimous award is its finding that GEICO failed to participate in the arbitration proceedings \u201cin good faith and in a meaningful manner\u201d (145 Ill. 2d R. 91(b)), because GEICO violated Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice to produce. As Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice and supplemental notice to produce both requested GEICO\u2019s \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster named on the [sic] estimate,\u201d and the claims adjuster was an employee of GEICO, and GEICO failed to produce its claims adjuster, a finding that GEICO violated Rule 237 has been established. See Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 934 (proper Rule 237 notice where plaintiff requested to bring the \u201c \u2018adjuster with the entire claim file\u2019 \u201d). The trial court has the discretion to impose sanctions when it finds that a party has failed to participate in arbitration hearings in good faith and in a meaningful manner. Smith v. Gleash, 325 Ill. App. 3d 79, 83, 757 N.E.2d 101 (2001).\nIn this case, Judge Dolan specifically commented:\n\u201cIf somebody asks for a certain \u2014 in this case a certain individual or a certain proof, here an estimator, based upon the estimate, and that\u2019s what it is, estimate of record, who it\u2019s written by, and adjuster, there\u2019s two different names, there\u2019s nothing really clear on [the repair bill\u2019s] face as to the employment that those two people enjoyed, but I think that the \u2014 I think that the rules are meant to go beyond the surface on this to the understanding of the parties as to what the other side is requesting.\u201d\nSmith specifically issued a Rule 237 notice to produce and a supplemental notice to produce, requesting GEICO produce both John Ciullo and the \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster,\u201d now identified as Frank Cirillo. GEICO produced neither. Even though Smith should have subpoenaed John Ciullo, as he was not an employee of GEICO, the claims adjuster, Frank Cirillo, was admittedly an employee of GEICO and should have been produced pursuant to Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notices to produce. Clearly, the burden was on GEICO to demonstrate why its noncompliance with Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice to produce its \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster,\u201d Frank Cirillo, was \u201creasonable or the result of extenuating circumstances\u201d (Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 933). Indeed, GEICO produced no evidence with regard to its noncompliance in producing Frank Cirillo either before Judge Dolan, or before this court.\nThat Smith\u2019s Rule 237 notice to produce requested \u201cthe claim\u2019s [sic] adjuster named on the estimate of plaintiffs vehicle,\u201d and that the claims adjuster, Frank Cirillo, was admittedly an employee of GEICO, make this case distinguishable from State Farm Mutual Insur ance Co. v. Nasser, 337 Ill. App. 3d 362, 785 N.E.2d 934 (2003). In Nasser, the defendant\u2019s notice to produce \u201cwas defective in that it only requested !plaintiff(s)\u2019 and did not designate a specific employee to appear.\u201d Nasser, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 368. Moreover, the fact that Smith requested the claims adjuster in a Rule 237 notice to produce, and the fact that Judge Dolan\u2019s denial of GEICO\u2019s motion for reconsideration was based on GEICO\u2019s noncompliance, also makes the case at bar distinguishable from State Farm Insurance Co. v. Harmon, 335 Ill. App. 3d 687, 781 N.E.2d 335 (2002). In Harmon, \u201c[t]he [trial] court did not base the imposition of sanctions on Rule 237(b).\u201d Harmon, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 689.\nInstead, we find the case sub judice similar to Campbell. In Campbell, the \u201cdefendant filed a proper Rule 237 notice that included, among other things, that plaintiff bring the \u2018adjuster with the entire claim file\u2019 to the arbitration hearing.\u201d Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 934. The plaintiff did not do so and attempted to make light of its noncompliance by referring to it as a \u201cmere failure\u201d and characterizing it as \u201can oversight.\u201d Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 934.\nSimilarly, in this case, Smith issued two Rule 237 notices to GEICO. In paragraph 11 of Smith\u2019s notice to produce, he requested GEICO produce its \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster.\u201d Further, in paragraph 11 of Smith\u2019s supplemental notice to produce, he again requested GEICO produce its \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster.\u201d In its argument before Judge Dolan, GEICO admitted receiving Smith\u2019s supplemental notice to produce and admitted that the claims adjuster named on its insured\u2019s repair bill, Frank Cirillo, was a GEICO employee. As Smith sent GEICO a Rule 237 notice and supplemental notice to produce requesting its \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster,\u201d and as that individual, Frank Cirillo, was a GEICO employee, GEICO had an obligation to produce him before the arbitration panel. Judge Dolan found GEICO\u2019s argument that it was unnecessary for it to produce anyone other than its insured was without merit because \u201cthere was a notice to produce put upon you.\u201d\nWe note that we can affirm Judge Dolan on any ground. Although GEICO could not be compelled by Rule 237 to produce John Ciullo, GEICO had an obligation to produce Frank Cirillo as Smith issued GEICO two notices to produce requesting, in paragraph 11, the \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster.\u201d See Campbell, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 934. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in Judge Dolan\u2019s order barring GEICO from presenting testimony or evidence at trial.\nWe also find no error in the circuit court\u2019s grant of summary judgment. Based on our own findings, GEICO violated Supreme Court Rule 237 by not producing its \u201cclaim\u2019s [sic] adjuster,\u201d Frank Cirillo. As GEICO violated Rule 237, the sanction debarring GEICO from presenting any testimony or evidence at trial was within the trial court\u2019s discretion and a grant of summary judgment necessarily followed.\nCONCLUSION\nBased on the foregoing, we find that Judge Dolan did not abuse his discretion in barring GEICO from presenting evidence or witnesses at trial. Hence, the trial court\u2019s award of summary judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBURKE, EJ., and WOLFSON, J., concur.\nNADA is an acronym for the \u201cNational Automobile Dealers Association.\u201d \u201cThe National Automobile Dealers Association, founded in 1917, represents more than 20,000 new car and truck dealers, with more than 43,000 franchises nationwide, both domestic and international.\u201d NADA online at http:// www.nada.org.\nWe note that although the repair bill from C.D.E. Body Shop II, Inc., names the \u201cAdjuster: FRANK CIRILLO,\u201d the transcript repeatedly refers to \u201cFrank Ciullo.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kevin J. Kawa, of Chicago (Kevin M. Gross, of counsel), for appellant.", "Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago (Keeley Truax, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, a/s/o Rosalyn Walton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID SMITH, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20142438\nOpinion filed February 8, 2005, nunc pro tunc January 11, 2005.\nRehearing denied February 3, 2005.\nKevin J. Kawa, of Chicago (Kevin M. Gross, of counsel), for appellant.\nParrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago (Keeley Truax, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0915-01", "first_page_order": 933, "last_page_order": 944 }