{ "id": 3749835, "name": "RICHARD L. GIRARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Girard v. White", "decision_date": "2005-03-14", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-3587", "first_page": "11", "last_page": "21", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 11" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4021926 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "an administrative agency has only such authority as conferred by statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034201 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2679576 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809-10" }, { "page": "808-09" }, { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3588371 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274-75" }, { "page": "274-75" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2692027 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.W.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11458832 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/607/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801347 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725359 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498195 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0147-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 865, "char_count": 26450, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.03672346545972e-07, "percentile": 0.7472717521369007 }, "sha256": "9d38ad587dcd7b95b870f1cf07473c29f0b9321a04d562fdcdbc01e0048923d9", "simhash": "1:b2c7b0b31d51abb9", "word_count": 4361 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:02.423948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RICHARD L. GIRARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Richard L. Girard, filed an application for an Illinois driver\u2019s license with defendant, the Secretary of State. The Secretary denied Girard\u2019s application based on the revocation of Girard\u2019s Florida driver\u2019s license for four driving under the influence (DUI) convictions. Girard sought administrative review in the circuit court, and the court ordered the Secretary to conduct a hearing to determine if Girard is entitled to a driver\u2019s license under section 6 \u2014 704(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 704(2) (West 1998)). Following this proceeding, the hearing officer classified Girard as a \u201chigh risk\u201d alcoholic and held that Girard presented insufficient evidence to warrant his entitlement of the issuance of an Illinois driver\u2019s license. The hearing officer recommended the denial of Girard\u2019s petition for a driver\u2019s license, but found that he had shown that he was responsibly addressing his alcoholism and issued Girard an Illinois restricted driving permit (RDP) as a probationary device. Girard again sought review in the circuit court. The circuit court determined that the Secretary was without authority to issue a RDP to someone whose driver\u2019s license has not been suspended by the Secretary and reversed the hearing officer\u2019s finding that Girard was not entitled to full driving privileges.\nThe Secretary appealed, originally arguing that (1) the Code does not allow driving privileges to an applicant whose license was revoked by another state following four DUI convictions, and (2) even if Girard were permitted to apply for driving privileges, the Secretary has the authority to issue Girard a probationary RDP Just before oral arguments, the Secretary advised this court that he was withdrawing his first argument. Girard, however, still contends that the Secretary has no authority to issue him a RDR but must issue him a driver\u2019s license, as the circuit court found.\nGirard was issued a Florida driver\u2019s license on February 15, 1988. Between 1988 and 1996, Girard was convicted of DUI four times. Following his September 1996 DUI conviction, Girard was sentenced to 24 months in the Florida Department of Corrections and his Florida driver\u2019s license was permanently revoked. Girard served 201/2 months of his sentence. Following his release in June 1998, Girard moved to Illinois.\nUpon establishing his Illinois residency, Girard applied for an Illinois driver\u2019s license with the Secretary. The Secretary denied Girard\u2019s application because his Florida driver\u2019s license was revoked. In August 1999, Girard requested an administrative hearing on his application. Girard claimed that he was entitled to Illinois driving privileges pursuant to section 6 \u2014 704(2) of the Code. The hearing officer denied Girard\u2019s petition and relied on sections 6 \u2014 704(2) and 6 \u2014 103(3) in his determination that Girard was not entitled to driving privileges. Plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. In August 2000, the circuit court remanded Girard\u2019s case to the Secretary and held that the Secretary has the authority to issue a driver\u2019s license to Girard if the Secretary deems it appropriate under section 6 \u2014 704(2) of the Code.\nIn July 2001, the hearing officer issued her findings. In her findings, the hearing officer noted that Girard was administered the Mortimer-Filkins Test and was scored as a \u201cproblem drinker.\u201d Girard\u2019s alcoholism was classified as \u201chigh risk, dependent, in remission.\u201d The hearing officer went on to find that Girard had established an ongoing support system and was \u201cworking a good recovery program\u201d through Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings and his family. The hearing officer determined that Girard \u201cprovided insufficient evidence to warrant his entitlement of the issuance of an Illinois driver\u2019s license,\u201d but Girard \u201chas carried his burden of proving that he is responsibly addressing his alcoholism, as he has completed treatment, maintained abstinence for a sufficient period of time, and is participating in a self-help or other appropriate program to support his continued abstinence.\u201d Although the hearing officer found Girard \u201cprovided insufficient evidence to warrant\u201d a license and recommended the denial of Girard\u2019s petition for an Illinois driver\u2019s license, she nonetheless recommended the granting of the issuance of a RDP for employment purposes and to attend AA meetings because he was \u201cresponsibly addressing his alcoholism\u201d and \u201ccould safely operate a motor vehicle.\u201d Girard filed a new complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. In October 2003, the circuit court reversed the Secretary\u2019s decision to deny full driving privileges to Girard and remanded to the Secretary to issue Girard a driver\u2019s license. The court found that the statutory language of section 6 \u2014 704(2) \u201ccontrasts sharply with the discretion granted the Secretary when determining to restore driving privileges to an Illinois driver whose privileges were suspended or revoked. According to the circuit court, in such instances, the Secretary may issue a RDP to address undue hardship resulting from the continued revocation or suspension of a pre-existing license to drive in Illinois. As the new resident had no pre-existing privilege in this State, there is no hardship imposed as there is no right to a license to drive.\u201d The court went on to say that from a public safety and policy perspective, it would be advantageous to allow the Secretary the ability to issue probationary licenses to new residents, such as Girard, but the legislature has not granted such authority.\nThis appeal followed.\nEven though the Secretary has withdrawn his argument that the Code does not permit driving privileges to applicants, like Girard, whose license has been revoked following four DUI convictions, we conclude that the threshold issue before us is whether Girard may make an application for a driver\u2019s license under Illinois law. For the reasons that follow, we find that he cannot.\nIllinois is a party state to the Driver License Compact (Compact). The policy behind the Compact is to promote compliance with the laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles by their operators in each of the jurisdictions where such operators drive motor vehicles. The policy also seeks to make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 701(b) (West 2000). Section 6 \u2014 704 of the Compact outlines the application procedures for new driver\u2019s licenses. Subsection 2 of section 6 \u2014 704 provides as follows:\n\u201cUpon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:\n***\n2. The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 704(2) (West 2000).\nIn order to decide the question of whether Girard can apply for an Illinois driver\u2019s license, we need to interpret what the language \u201cif permitted by law\u201d in section 6 \u2014 704 means and what authority that language and section 6 \u2014 704 grant the Secretary in the application process of new residents; specifically, a new resident whose license has been revoked in another state.\nSection 6 \u2014 704 is a discretionary grant of authority to provide relief to new residents by allowing the issuance of a driver\u2019s license when the application is consistent with relevant Illinois law. We interpret the phrase \u201cif permitted by law\u201d in section 6 \u2014 704(2) to mean a license may be issued if such an application would be permitted under Illinois law and the Secretary determines that it will be safe to grant \u201csuch person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 704(2) (West 2000). We conclude Illinois law does not permit the application for or the issuance of a license to an applicant whose license or permit or privilege to drive upon the highway has been revoked because of four DUI convictions. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 208(b) (West 2000).\nSection 6 \u2014 208 outlines the procedure for application following a revocation and states, in relevant part:\n\u201cAny person whose license, permit or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the highways has been revoked shall not be entitled to have such license, permit or privilege renewed or restored. However, such person may, except as provided under subsection (d) of Section 6 \u2014 205, make application for a license pursuant to Section 6 \u2014 106 (i) if the revocation was for a cause which has been removed or (ii) as provided in the following subparagraphs:\n* * *\n4. The person may not make application for a license if the person is convicted of committing a fourth or subsequent violation of Section 11 \u2014 501 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance, paragraph (b) of Section 11 \u2014 401 of this Code, Section 9 \u2014 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961, or a combination of these offenses or similar provisions of local ordinances or similar out-of-state offenses ***.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 208(b)(4) (West 2000).\nGirard maintains that section 6 \u2014 704(2) governs his application, and under section 6 \u2014 704(2), the Secretary can deny an application if (1) Illinois law otherwise prohibits the issuance of such license, or (2) the Secretary determines after an investigation \u201cthat it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 704(2) (West 2000). Girard claims that Illinois allows this application and since the hearing officer concluded he was a safe driver, he is therefore entitled to an Illinois driver\u2019s license. Girard further claims that section 6 \u2014 208(b)(4) is not applicable to him for two reasons: section 6 \u2014 208 does not apply to drivers whose privileges were not revoked under Illinois law and all of Girard\u2019s offenses occurred before the enactment of section 6 \u2014 208(b)(4). Girard also asserts that section 6 \u2014 103 does not apply in this case, but we find that consideration of section 6 \u2014 103 is unnecessary because we conclude section 6 \u2014 208 governs any applications after revocation, such as Girard\u2019s. As we discuss below, we also find Girard is \u201cany person\u201d whose \u201cprivilege to drive\u201d has been revoked and comes within the confines of section 6 \u2014 208.\nBefore that discussion, we note that Girard has failed to cite any authority for his assertion that section 6 \u2014 208(b)(4) is inapplicable because Girard\u2019s DUI offenses occurred prior to its enactment. Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) requires an appellant to include in its brief an \u201c[ajrgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.\u201d 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). It is well settled that a contention supported by some argument but which does not cite any authority does not satisfy the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7), and bare contentions that fail to cite any authority do not merit consideration on appeal. Wasleff v. Dever, 194 Ill. App. 3d 147, 155-56 (1990). Therefore, any claim in this regard is waived.\nThe cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001). In determining the legislature\u2019s intent, a court should first consider the statutory language; this is the best means of determining the legislative intent. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348. A court must consider the entire statute and interpret each of its relevant parts together. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). If legislative intent can be ascertained from the statute\u2019s plain language, that intent must prevail without resort to other interpretive aids. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177.\nSection 6 \u2014 704, as well as being within the Compact, operates as part of the Code and does not create a right to a driver\u2019s license outside of the statutes detailing the Secretary\u2019s authority. Under the doctrine of in pari materia, two legislative acts that address the same subject are considered with reference to one another, so that they may be given harmonious effect. Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). The supreme court has held that sections of the same statute should also be considered in pari materia and that each section should be construed with every other part or section of the statute to produce a harmonious whole. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. The doctrine is consistent with our acknowledgment that one of the fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. Words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but interpreted in light of other relevant portions of the statute so that, if possible, no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. Further, we presume that the legislature, when it enacted the statute, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. Sections 6 \u2014 704 must be read with the other sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and not considered in a vacuum, in order to promote a whole and harmonious interpretation.\nSection 6 \u2014 704(2) allows for a new resident with a revoked license of a party state to make an application after one year for a license if permitted by law. We find \u201cif permitted by law\u201d means if the application is permitted under Illinois law. The Iowa Supreme Court also interpreted \u201cif permitted by law\u201d under Iowa\u2019s reciprocal provision of the Compact to mean if permitted by Iowa law. State v. Vargason, 607 N.W.2d 691, 697 (Iowa 2000). Therefore, we consider whether section 6 \u2014 208(b) excludes Girard\u2019s application as a new resident whose license has been revoked in Florida for four DUI convictions because such an application is not permitted by Illinois law.\nOur interpretation of the first sentence of section 6 \u2014 208(b) is determinative. This sentence provides that \u201cAny person whose license, permit or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the highways has been revoked shall not be entitled to have such license, permit or privilege renewed or restored.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 208(b) (West 2000). Girard claims this sentence shows that the statute does not apply to new residents because \u201clicense\u201d means an Illinois driver\u2019s license as defined in the Code (see 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 116.1 (West 2000)). Girard further contends that this interpretation is correct because the Secretary cannot \u201crenew\u201d or \u201crestore\u201d a license it did not issue. Girard maintains that the legislature inadvertently created a loophole in section 6 \u2014 208(b) where a new resident is not subject to the same restrictions as an Illinois resident whose license has been revoked.\nWe disagree and do not view section 6 \u2014 208(b) as creating a loophole. The first sentence of section 6 \u2014 208(b) applies to \u201c[a]ny person whose license, permit or privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the highways has been revoked.\u201d Privilege is not specifically defined in the Code. The Code does define a \u201cnonresident\u2019s driving privilege\u201d as \u201cThe privilege conferred upon a nonresident by the laws of this State pertaining to the operation by such person of a motor vehicle, or the use of a vehicle owned by such person, in this State.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 150 (West 2000). Also, the Code defines \u201clicense to drive\u201d as\n\u201cAny driver\u2019s license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under the laws of this State including:\n1. Any temporary license or instruction permit;\n2. The privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license or permit.\n3. Any nonresident\u2019s driving privilege as defined herein.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 138 (West 2000).\nIn People v. Odumuyiwa, 188 Ill. App. 3d 40 (1989), the Second District considered whether the Secretary was able to suspend the defendant\u2019s driving privilege after he had already cancelled the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. The court observed that the term \u201clicense to drive\u201d covers two distinct meanings: (1) the physical document itself, and (2) the abstract intangible privilege of driving. Odumuyiwa, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 44. Since nothing in the record explained why the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was cancelled or why his driving privileges were suspended, the reviewing court saw \u201cno reason why these two actions by the Secretary should be considered mutually exclusive or logically inconsistent.\u201d Odumuyiwa, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 45.\nThe court\u2019s distinction in Odumuyiwa that the privilege to drive encompasses an abstract or intangible ability that may be suspended separate from a course of action against the physical driver\u2019s license is instructive. The privilege to drive, in contrast to a driver\u2019s license or permit, does not directly correlate to a grant of authority by the Secretary in the form of a physical document. We believe that the privilege to drive under section 6 \u2014 208(b) is meant to include individuals, such as Girard, whose privilege to drive has been revoked and wish to have such privilege restored.\nThis interpretation of \u201cprivilege to drive\u201d avoids an absurd result. Under this interpretation, new residents of Illinois with revoked foreign driver\u2019s licenses are subject to the same restrictions as Illinois drivers who have had their licenses revoked in Illinois. We presume that the legislature did not intend absurdity. Land, 202 Ill. 2d at 422. Additionally, this construction is consistent with the strong public policy in Illinois to keep repeat drunk drivers off the roads. Illinois has an interest in preventing individuals with four DUI convictions from obtaining driving privileges.\nUnder this application, Girard lost his privilege to drive when his Florida driver\u2019s license was revoked. Girard is now seeking to have his privilege to drive restored, but is barred by sections 6 \u2014 208(b) and 6 \u2014 208(b)(4). Girard has four DUI convictions from Florida. Under section 6 \u2014 208, any person whose license, permit or privilege to drive on the highways has been revoked and who has four or more DUI convictions from this state or similar out-of-state offenses may not make application for a license. Girard is clearly excluded from making an application under section 6 \u2014 208.\nMoreover, Girard\u2019s argument that section 6 \u2014 208 applies only to Illinois granted driving privileges adds restrictive language to the statutes that is not part of the plain language. Girard relies on People v. Weakley, 176 Ill. App. 3d 274 (1988), and People v. Shaw, 189 Ill. App. 3d 808 (1989), as support for his argument. In Weakley, the court considered whether an out-of-state resident could be charged with driving on a revoked license under section 6 \u2014 303(a). Weakley, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 274-75. Specifically, the State wanted to charge an Iowa resident whose driver\u2019s license was revoked by Iowa with the offense of driving with a revoked license under Illinois law. Weakley, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 274-75. The Weakley court concluded that the language of section 6 \u2014 303(a), which stated that \u201cAny person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person\u2019s driver\u2019s license *** is revoked or suspended as provided by this Code or any other law ***\u201d (emphasis added) (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 6 \u2014 303(a)), did not reveal the legislature\u2019s intent to broaden its application to foreign jurisdictions because the statute referred to the Code. Weakley, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 276. Similarly, in Shaw, the reviewing court held that section 6 \u2014 303(d) did not specifically include the consideration of foreign DUI convictions in order to elevate the classification of an Illinois conviction and instead refers to sections of the Code. Shaw, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10. The State in Shaw attempted to use the defendant\u2019s prior DUI conviction from Iowa to charge him with a Class 4 felony after a second violation of driving with a revoked driver\u2019s license under the Code. Shaw, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 808-09. Because section 6 \u2014 303(d) is penal in nature, the Shaw court strictly construed the language against the drafter and declined to use an out-of-state conviction to charge the defendant with a felony when the statutory language did not state that foreign convictions could be considered. Shaw, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 810.\nUnlike the statutes at issue in Weakley and Shaw, sections 6 \u2014 208(b) and (b)(4) do not restrict applications to revocations under the Code. Girard is asking this court to read in language that the legislature has not included. Section 6 \u2014 208(b) does not restrict its application to persons whose Illinois driving privileges have been revoked. If the legislature had wanted to restrict section 6 \u2014 208 to revocations under the Illinois Code, it could have done so. One may presume that the legislature, when drafting the language of the section, was aware of the construction and use of a term in another section. Divane v. Smith, 332 Ill. App. 3d 548, 553 (2002). Legislative intent as to the meaning of words can be ascertained from the history of the legislation or from the use of the term in other sections of the same or other Illinois statutes. Accordingly, where the legislature uses certain words in one instance and different words in another, it intends different results. Divane, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 553. Sections 6 \u2014 208(b) and (b)(4) specifically include any person whose driving privileges have been revoked upon the highways and has had four or more DUI convictions including out-of-state convictions from making an application. Although Girard does not hold an Illinois driver\u2019s license, his \u201cprivilege to drive upon the highways\u201d has been permanently revoked in Florida and he is attempting to have that privilege to drive restored in Illinois. This he cannot do.\nWeakley and Shaw are distinguishable because the statutes at issue contained language that indicated application only to actions within the Code, and such language is not present in section 6 \u2014 208(b)(4). Those statutes dealt with whether someone could be charged with an offense in contrast to the statutes at issue concerning whether a new resident, with four DUI convictions may make application for a driver\u2019s license. Additionally, both cases involved penal statutes which must be strictly construed against the drafter and in favor of the accused (People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 444 (1997)), whereas in the instant case, the statute is procedural in nature.\nMoreover, Girard\u2019s interpretation of section 6 \u2014 704(2) fails to consider what \u201cif permitted by law\u201d means. Section 6 \u2014 704 does not give the Secretary more power to issue new residents driver\u2019s licenses than he possesses to issue licenses to Illinois residents. See Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. Department of Central Management Services, 348 Ill. App. 3d 72, 76 (2004) (an administrative agency has only such authority as conferred by statute); 625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 104(b) (West 2000). We do not read section 6 \u2014 704 in such a way that its application trumps all other provisions of the Code in which the Secretary\u2019s power is limited. Under sections 6 \u2014 208(b) and (b)(4), the legislature restricted the Secretary from permitting applications for individuals with four or more DUI convictions. Section 6 \u2014 704 must be read in part with the limitations imposed by the legislature on the Secretary, and clearly, the legislature has directed that an individual like Girard cannot make an application for an Illinois driver\u2019s license. We cannot adopt an interpretation which circumvents the Illinois public policy to prohibit repeat DUI offenders from obtaining driving privileges. Section 6 \u2014 704(2) specifically states that a new resident with a revoked license may make an application if permitted by law, and in Girard\u2019s case, his application is not permitted by law. Girard also claims that section 6 \u2014 208(b) does not apply to him because he is not seeking to have Illinois driving privileges renewed or restored. As pointed out above, we construe section 6 \u2014 208(b) to mean that any person whose privilege to drive was revoked in another state and is now seeking driving privileges as a new resident of Illinois is applying to have his driving privileges restored.\nBecause we have found that Girard is not eligible to make an application, the Secretary cannot grant any relief to Girard.\nBased on the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the order of the Secretary of State denying Girard\u2019s application for an Illinois driver\u2019s license is reinstated; the order of the Secretary of State granting Girard a restricted driving permit is vacated.\nJudgment reversed; order of the Secretary of State reinstated in part and vacated in part.\nCAHILL, EJ. and GORDON, J., concur.\nSection 6 \u2014 103 is the general provision outlining the persons to whom the Secretary may not issue a driver\u2019s license.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Larry A. Davis, of Larry A. Davis, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICHARD L. GIRARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20143587\nOpinion filed March 14, 2005.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nLarry A. Davis, of Larry A. Davis, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0011-01", "first_page_order": 29, "last_page_order": 39 }