{ "id": 3749818, "name": "CONNECTICUT SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOOP PAPER RECYCLING, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Anjanette Howard et al., Indiv. and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Connecticut Specialty Insurance v. Loop Paper Recycling, Inc.", "decision_date": "2005-02-17", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-2988", "first_page": "67", "last_page": "83", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 67" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "917 F.2d 297", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10527 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/917/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 F. Supp. 792", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3997933 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "coverage excluded for damages resulting from rupture of oil tanks at textile mill and subsequent contamination of a river" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/688/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 F.3d 596", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9214487 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/378/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 N.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding, as the first Illinois court to construe an absolute pollution exclusion, that the exclusion barred coverage when the minor son of the insured spilled mercury in the home of a neighbor" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906768 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870-71", "parenthetical": "finding, as the first Illinois court to construe an absolute pollution exclusion, that the exclusion barred coverage when the minor son of the insured spilled mercury in the home of a neighbor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411728 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" }, { "page": "772-73" }, { "page": "775" }, { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720126 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" }, { "page": "700" }, { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521555 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "325" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 N.J. Super. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 361730 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "953" }, { "page": "525" }, { "page": "953" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/251/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 A.2d 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" }, { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.H. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 2290771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" }, { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/140/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "854 P.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Wash. 2d 869", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1365846 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/121/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "976 F.2d 1037", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11291771 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1043", "parenthetical": "refusing to adopt a \"colloquial definition\" for the term \" 'waste' \" because the policy \"expressly gives the term a more refined, technical meaning\" of \"materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed\" (emphasis omitted)" }, { "page": "1043" }, { "page": "1043", "parenthetical": "rejecting argument that the scrap metal which burned was not \"waste\" because it was a \"saleable and useful product\"" }, { "page": "1043" }, { "page": "1044", "parenthetical": "finding that \"one could not characterize the discharge onto land of 80 gallons of PCB-laden oil as anything but pollution\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "1044" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/976/1037-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S.W.3d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 11520862 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "423-24" }, { "page": "424-26", "parenthetical": "Gray, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "424-26", "parenthetical": "Gray, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/16/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083920 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157-58" }, { "page": "157-58", "parenthetical": "stating that unambiguous clauses within insurance contracts must be enforced according to their terms and courts should refrain from adopting interpretations resulting in distortions and creating ambiguities where none exist" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472494 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259023 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 N.E.2d 1224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980702 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2600531 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79391 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317117 ], "weight": 23, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "483-84" }, { "page": "483-84" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "485" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489-93" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "finding that an accidental leak of carbon monoxide from a faulty furnace that was contained within the insured's building did not \"constitute the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the clause\"" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 736", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3474459 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" }, { "page": "171" }, { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083776 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0353-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1251, "char_count": 38951, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.505772585336181e-07, "percentile": 0.6665035297424676 }, "sha256": "2d8e8b9f7ca98405112242e2b34210ce23d3f2c067d0c71abce8f6592c1c9388", "simhash": "1:3b4e453133c7f41f", "word_count": 5973 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:02.423948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CONNECTICUT SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOOP PAPER RECYCLING, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Anjanette Howard et al., Indiv. and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nLoop Paper Recycling, Inc. (Loop Paper Recycling), appeals from the judgment of the circuit court which found that Connecticut Specialty Insurance Company (Connecticut) owed no duty to defend it in a lawsuit arising out of a fire at its facility in Riverdale, Illinois. Connecticut had issued a general commercial liability policy under which Loop Paper Recycling was a named insured. Specifically, the court determined that (1) the policy\u2019s \u201ctotal pollution exclusion\u201d barred coverage for bodily injury claims because the Riverdale facility was engaged in the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste; (2) the underlying complaint did not allege \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as defined by the policy; and (3) even if the underlying complaint had alleged \u201cpersonal injury,\u201d the policy\u2019s \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion\u201d barred coverage. On appeal, Loop Paper Recycling argues that the circuit court erred in finding no duty on the part of Connecticut to defend.\nBACKGROUND\nOn or about July 16, 2000, vandals set fire to an unknown amount of cardboard that was located at Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s Riverdale facility. The resulting fire burned for several days, sending clouds of smoke and toxic substances into the surrounding neighborhood. On August 17, 2001, residents of that neighborhood (underlying plaintiffs) filed suit against Loop Paper Recycling, asserting claims for strict liability and negligence.\nIn their complaint, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that \u201cLoop Paper Recycling owns, operates, and manages various paper recycling facilities.\u201d One of Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s facilities, known as the Suburban Warehouse, was located at 13050 State Street in the City of Riverdale, Cook County, Illinois. Per the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s business operations at the River-dale facility allegedly consisted of \u201cgathering, holding, storing, handling, baling, packaging, shipping and transporting cardboard.\u201d According to their complaint, \u201ccardboard commonly utilized and obtained for recycling contains additives, adhesives, bonding material, and/or other fixatives as well as vinyl chloride, urea, melamine, phenol formaldehyde, urethanes, and acrylics and other substances and on information and belief, the cardboard present at the Defendant, Loop Paper [Recycling\u2019s] facility did contain such materials.\u201d\nThe underlying plaintiffs alleged that when the cardboard containing these materials was ignited, the resulting smoke released \u201cinto the air the fixatives and substances so as to cause highly toxic and hazardous\u201d pollution. Thus, as a direct and proximate result of the fire at Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s Riverdale facility, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that they were exposed to the hazardous and toxic substances. They sought damages for \u201cmedical diagnosis, testing, and monitoring to determine the impact of the toxic substances that they were exposed to as a result of the aforementioned release.\u201d\nOn January 15, 2001, Loop Paper Recycling tendered its defense in the underlying lawsuit to Connecticut. On May 21, 2001, Connecticut agreed to defend Loop Paper Recycling, but reserved its right to deny coverage.\nThe policy provided for three types of coverage: (1) \u201cCoverage A\u201d for bodily injury and property damage liability; (2) \u201cCoverage B\u201d for personal and advertising injury liability; and (3) \u201cCoverage C\u201d for medical payment claims. Under Coverage A, the policy stated, in relevant part:\n\u201c[Bodily Injury and Property Damage]\n1. Insuring Agreement\na. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any \u2018suit\u2019 seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any \u2018suit\u2019 seeking damages for \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 to which this insurance does not apply.\n$ $ ^\nb. This insurance applies to \u2018bodily injury\u2019 and \u2018property damage\u2019 only if:\nA. The \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 is caused by an \u2018occurrence\u2019 that takes place in the \u2018coverage territory\u2019; and\nB. The \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 occurs during the policy period.\u201d\nWithin Coverage A, the policy contained a \u201ctotal pollution exclusion,\u201d which stated that the insurance did not apply to the following:\n\u201c[Total Pollution Exclusion to Coverage A]\nf. Pollution\n(1) \u2018Bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 which would not have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants at any time. This exclusion does not apply to \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 arising out of heat, smoke or fumes from a hostile fire unless that hostile fire occurred or originated:\n(a) At any premises, site or location which is or was at any time used by or for any insured or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste; or\n(b) At any premises, site or location on which any insured or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on any insured\u2019s behalf are performing operations to test for, monitor, clean-up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, neutralize or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of, pollutants.\n^ ^\nAs used in this exclusion, a hostile fire means one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks out from where it was intended to be. \u2756 *\nPollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes material to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.\u201d\nCoverage B stated, in pertinent part:\n\u201c[Personal and Advertising Injury]\nInsuring Agreement\na. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of \u2018personal injury\u2019 or \u2018advertising injury\u2019 to which this insurance applies.\nb. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any \u2018suit\u2019 seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any \u2018suit\u2019 seeking damages for \u2018personal injury\u2019 or \u2018advertising injury\u2019 to which this insurance does not apply.\u201d\nCoverage B contained an \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion,\u201d which stated:\n\u201c[Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Coverage B]\n2. Exclusions\nThis insurance does not apply to:\na. \u2018Personal injury\u2019 or \u2018advertising injury;\u2019\n(5) Arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants at any time.\n\u2756 * *\nPollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.\u201d\nOn September 28, 2001, Connecticut filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that, under the terms of the policy, it owed no duty to defend or provide coverage to Loop Paper Recycling in the lawsuit filed by the underlying plaintiffs. The circuit court granted Connecticut\u2019s motion for summary judgment, finding that while the underlying plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that they suffered \u201cbodily injury\u201d as defined in the policy, there was no coverage under the policy\u2019s \u201ctotal pollution exclusion.\u201d The court also found that the underlying plaintiffs failed to allege \u201cpersonal injury\u201d and that, even if they did, the \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion\u201d barred coverage. Loop Paper Recycling filed a timely notice of appeal.\nANALYSIS\nSummary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Chatham Corp. v. Dann Insurance, 351 Ill. App. 3d 353, 358, 812 N.E.2d 483, 488 (2004). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we must construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Acceptance Insurance Co., 342 Ill. App. 3d 167, 171, 793 N.E.2d 736 (2003). We review a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment de novo. Sears, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 171.\nThe duty of an insurer to defend its insured is much broader than its duty to indemnify. Sears, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 171. When determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured, the court must compare the allegations contained in the underlying complaint to the relevant provisions of the insurance policy. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997).\nIn determining whether an insurer owes a duty to defend an action brought against its insured, the court must consider only the allegations in the underlying complaint and the relevant policy provisions. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Transportation Insurance Co., 327 Ill. App. 3d 128, 136, 761 N.E.2d 1214 (2001), quoting Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Fulkerson, 212 Ill. App. 3d 556, 562, 571 N.E.2d 256 (1991). \u201c[Wjhere summary judgment is sought in the context of a declaratory judgment action to determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, the use of extrinsic evidence is inappropriate.\u201d Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill. App. 3d 552, 567, 734 N.E.2d 50 (2000).\nIf the court determines that the allegations fall within, or potentially within, coverage under the policy, the insurer has a duty to defend the insured against the underlying complaint. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 347 Ill. App. 3d 411, 414, 806 N.E.2d 1224 (2004). Insurance policies are to be liberally construed in favor of coverage, and where an ambiguity exists in the terms of the contract, the ambiguity will be resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Traveler\u2019s Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 293, 757 N.E.2d 481 (2001). The insurer bears the burden of establishing that a claim falls within a provision that limits or excludes coverage. Progressive Universal, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 414.\nWhen construing an insurance policy, the primary function of the court is to ascertain and enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in the agreement. Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 342 Ill. App. 3d 940, 950-51, 795 N.E.2d 412 (2003). A court must construe the policy as a whole and take into account the type of insurance purchased, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. If the words of a policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be afforded their plain, ordinary and popular meaning. Traveler\u2019s Insurance Co., 197 Ill. 2d at 292, quoting Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1993). Unambiguous clauses within insurance contracts must be enforced according to their terms and courts should refrain from adopting interpretations resulting in distortions and creating ambiguities where none exist. Young v. Allstate Insurance Co., 351 Ill. App. 3d 151, 157-58, 812 N.E.2d 741 (2004).\nI. COVERAGE A: BODILY INJURY LIABILITY\nThough the policy here contains a maze of provisions that must be navigated in order to determine whether coverage for bodily injury resulting from a fire exists, in the end, the determination hinges upon the kind of business Loop Paper Recycling was running at its River-dale facility. The policy in this case begins by stating that Connecticut will provide coverage for \u201cthose sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 to which this insurance applies.\u201d \u201cBodily injury\u201d is defined in the policy as an \u201cinjury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any time.\u201d\nUnder the policy\u2019s \u201ctotal pollution exclusion,\u201d however, no coverage exists if the \u201cbodily injury *** would not have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants at any time.\u201d The \u201ctotal pollution exclusion\u201d contains an exception, which reinstates coverage if the \u201cbodily injury\u201d arises \u201cout of heat, smoke or fumes from a hostile fire.\u201d This exception does not apply, however, if \u201cthat hostile fire occurred or originated\u201d at a site or location where the insured \u201chandled, stored, disposed, processed or treated waste.\u201d The policy states that \u201cwaste\u201d includes \u201cmaterial to be recycled, reconditioned, or reclaimed.\u201d\nThe issue here is whether, based upon the allegations contained in the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, the exception to the total pollution exclusion applies, i.e., whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that Loop Paper Recycling was \u201chandling, storing, disposing, processing or treating waste\u201d at its Riverdale facility when the fire occurred. (Emphasis added.) Put another way, if the cardboard that the vandals set fire to qualified as \u201cwaste,\u201d i.e., \u201cmaterial to be recycled, reconditioned, or reclaimed,\u201d under the policy, and if Loop Paper Recycling was involved in handling, storing, disposing, processing or treating that cardboard at its Riverdale facility, the policy\u2019s total pollution exclusion would bar coverage. Loop Paper Recycling argues that the allegations in the complaint did not sufficiently state as much and that the circuit court erred in finding that the total pollution exclusion barred coverage. We disagree.\nFirst, the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged that Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s Riverdale facility was a \u201cpaper recycling facility.\u201d Specifically, the complaint alleged:\n\u201cLoop Paper *** owns, operates, and manages various paper recycling facilities and does business in Cook County, Illinois, including in the City of Riverdale. A fire from burning cardboard that continued for at least three (3) days on said Defendant\u2019s Riverdale facility causing the release of toxic substances into the environment.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe underlying plaintiffs averred that Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s business is owning, operating, and managing various paper recycling \u201cfacilities.\u201d In describing Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s presence in River-dale, the underlying plaintiffs utilized the same noun that they employed in describing Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s general operations: facility. Moreover, the underlying plaintiffs did not distinguish what Loop Paper Recycling did at its Riverdale facility in any way from its general operations.\nSecond, the underlying plaintiffs alleged that Loop Paper Recycling \u201cconducted its operations and business of gathering, holding, storing, handling, baling, packaging, shipping, and transporting cardboard\u201d at its Riverdale facility. They further alleged that \u201ccardboard commonly utilized and obtained for recycling contains additives, adhesives, bonding material, and/or other fixatives as well as vinyl chloride, urea, melamine, phenol formaldehyde, urethanes and acrylics and other substances and on information and belief, the cardboard present at the Defendant, Loop Paper [Recycling\u2019s] facility did contain such materials.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This latter allegation equates cardboard that is \u201ccommonly utilized and obtained for recycling\u201d with the cardboard that was present at Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s Riverdale facility. If the underlying plaintiffs did not intend to equate the two, this allegation would serve no purpose; why would it be relevant to allege what substances are normally found in \u201ccardboard commonly utilized and obtained for recycling\u201d if the cardboard at Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s Riverdale facility was not used and obtained for the same purpose?\nThird, of course, is its name: Loop Paper Recycling, Inc. Though the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint did not explicitly state that Loop Paper\u2019s Riverdale facility was a \u201crecycling\u201d facility, the allegations, when read together, certainly point to that conclusion. Under the terms of the policy, therefore, because Loop Paper Recycling was involved in the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste at its Riverdale facility, the circuit court properly found that the total pollution exclusion barred coverage.\nLoop Paper Recycling relies upon Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 418 (Tex. App. 2000), to support its argument that the policy\u2019s total pollution exclusion does not bar coverage for the fire at its Riverdale facility. In Mid-Continent, an \u201cunintended\u201d fire at a factory that processed scrap tires began in a wire pile and spread to some rubber chips, which produced \u201chuge volumes of thick, black smoke\u201d that permeated the surrounding area. Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420. Residents of the area around the facility filed suit, alleging \u201cdamage and injury that was proximately caused by the inhalation and proximity to the smoke from Defendants\u2019 [factory] fire.\u201d Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420.\nAt the time of the fire, the factory was covered under a general commercial liability policy, which provided coverage for \u201cbodily injury\u201d or \u201cproperty damage\u201d that resulted from a fire. Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420. The policy contained a pollution exclusion, stating that coverage was not provided for \u201c 1 \u201cbodily injury\u201d or \u201cproperty damage\u201d arising out of the *** release or escape of pollutants\u2019 \u201d \u201c \u2018at or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time used by or for any insured or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste.\u2019 \u201d Mid-Continent, 16 S.W3d at 420. The policy also included a \u201chostile fire\u201d exception to the pollution exclusion, which reinstated coverage unless the fire originated from any premises used by the insured for \u201c \u2018the handling, storage, disposal, processing, or treatment of waste.\u2019 \u201d Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 420. Under the policy, the term \u201cwaste\u201d included \u201c \u2018materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.\u2019 \u201d Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424.\nThe court found that the term \u201cwaste,\u201d as defined in Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary, encompassed only unwanted byproducts and, because \u201c[t]he rubber chips and wire from which the fire in this case originated are the desired products of the tire-recycling process\u201d and did \u201cnot constitute \u2018waste\u2019 under the policy,\u201d held that the factory was covered under the insurance policy. Mid-Continent, 16 S.W3d at 424. We recognize that the policy in Mid-Continent contained nearly the same language as the policy in this case. However, we disagree with both the holding and rationale in Mid-Continent for three reasons.\nFirst, the court in Mid-Continent ignored the policy\u2019s definition of the term \u201cwaste,\u201d i.e., \u201c \u2018includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed\u2019 \u201d (Mid-Continent, 16 S.W3d at 421), and, instead, resorted to a dictionary to define it. See Mid-Continent, 16 S.W3d at 423-24. It is a basic and fundamental tenet of contract law, however, that even if a contract offers only a limited definition of a term, it must be applied as written. See Young, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 157-58 (stating that unambiguous clauses within insurance contracts must be enforced according to their terms and courts should refrain from adopting interpretations resulting in distortions and creating ambiguities where none exist); Central Illinois Light Co., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 950-51 (when construing an insurance policy, the primary function of the court is to ascertain and enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in the agreement).\nLike the policy in Mid-Continent, the policy here stated that \u201cwaste\u201d included materials \u201cto be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.\u201d Though this definition could have been more detailed, it is a definition nonetheless. We cannot simply ignore the express language of the policy. See Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., 976 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to adopt a \u201ccolloquial definition\u201d for the term \u201c \u2018waste\u2019 \u201d because the policy \u201cexpressly gives the term a more refined, technical meaning\u201d of \u201cmaterials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed\u201d (emphasis omitted)); Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424-26 (Gray, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority\u2019s interpretation of the term \u201cwaste\u201d because \u201cthe policy contains a \u2018definition\u2019 of \u2018waste\u2019 by reference to what is included within the meaning of the term\u201d). Because the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged that the cardboard set afire at Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s Riverdale facility was cardboard \u201cto be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed,\u201d it qualified under the policy\u2019s \u201cmore refined, technical\u201d definition of \u201cwaste.\u201d Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043; Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424-26 (Gray, J., dissenting).\nSecond, the basis for the majority opinion in Mid-Continent was that \u201c[t]he rubber chips and wire from which the fire in this case originated [were] the desired products of the tire-recycling process\u201d and, therefore, did not \u201cconstitute \u2018waste\u2019 under the policy.\u201d Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424. Because the fodder was not \u201cwaste\u201d as defined in the policy, the pollution exclusion did not apply.\nHere, the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged that what caught fire was \u201ccardboard commonly utilized and obtained for recycling.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Unlike the fodder in Mid-Continent, it was not \u201cend-product\u201d material which caught fire at Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s Riverdale facility. It was not bundles of newly recycled cardboard that the vandals set fire to, but rather cardboard that was to be used during, and specifically obtained for the purpose of, recycling. See Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043 (rejecting argument that the scrap metal which burned was not \u201cwaste\u201d because it was a \u201csaleable and useful product\u201d).\nThird, what drove the court\u2019s holding in Mid-Continent was the fear that applying the insurer\u2019s definition of \u201cwaste\u201d would \u201crender the hostile fire exception *** meaningless.\u201d Mid-Continent, 16 S.W.3d at 424, citing American Star Insurance Co. v. Grice, 121 Wash. 2d 869, 877-78, 854 P.2d 622, 627 (1993). In this same vein, Loop Paper Recycling argues:\n\u201cIf the term \u2018waste\u2019 includes useful and valuable products, then liability arising out of the release of pollutants from a hostile fire which breaks out at an insured\u2019s premises which manufactures and therefore \u2018handles\u2019 aluminum cans, newspapers, magazines, books, batteries, glass, plastic, or clothing, will never be covered because those materials can be recycled. For example, losses arising out of chemical fumes released during a hostile fire at a newspaper\u2019s printing press facility would be excluded, because even if the newspaper company does not recycle the newspaper at the printing facility, its sells the newspapers to readers who do.\u201d\nAny fear that the hostile fire exception might be rendered \u201cmeaningless,\u201d however, comes from a basic misunderstanding as to how that exception is applied.\nThe crux of the determination into whether the hostile fire exception applies is the nature of the insured\u2019s activity at the premises where the hostile fire occurs. Under the terms of the policy, any bodily injury or property damage that results from pollution caused by a hostile fire is covered so long as the premises where the fire occurred was not (1) \u201cused by or for any insured or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste\u201d or (2) a location \u201con which any insured or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on any insured\u2019s behalf are performing operations to test for, monitor, clean-up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, neutralize or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of, pollutants.\u201d It is only when the insured is involved in some sort of waste storage, treatment, processing, or cleanup business at its premises that the hostile fire exception does not apply.\nFor instance, this policy would have provided coverage for bodily injury caused by toxic smoke emitted during a building fire, so long as that building was not used in the handling, treatment, storage, etc., of waste. Additionally, in Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s example recounted above, the newspaper printing press would be covered because, regardless of the nature of what is produced there, the premises where the fire occurred was neither \u201cused by or for any insured or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste\u201d nor a location \u201con which any insured or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on any insured\u2019s behalf are performing operations to test for, monitor, clean-up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, neutralize or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of, pollutants.\u201d That newspapers can be and are recycled is irrelevant because the \u201crefined, technical\u201d definition of \u201cwaste\u201d under the policy is \u201cmaterial to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) It is what the insured actually does with the material at the site, and not what one could do with the material, that makes it \u201cwaste\u201d under the policy.\nIn summary, Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s policy sets forth a clear and unambiguous, though limited, definition of the term \u201cwaste.\u201d Because that term includes \u201cmaterials to be recycled,\u201d because the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint sufficiently alleged that Loop Paper Recycling was involved in the business of recycling cardboard at its Riverdale facility, and because the effects from the burning of that cardboard were the basis for the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 lawsuit against Loop Paper Recycling, the circuit court properly found that the policy\u2019s total pollution exclusion barred coverage for the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 bodily injuries.\nII. COVERAGE B: PERSONAL INJURY LIABILITY\nLoop Paper Recycling next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the underlying complaint failed to allege a \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as defined in the policy and that, even if a \u201cpersonal injury\u201d was alleged, the \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion\u201d barred coverage.\nUnder Coverage B, the policy provided that Connecticut would pay sums that Loop Paper Recycling became legally obligated to pay as \u201cdamages because of \u2018personal injury.\u2019 \u201d The policy defined \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as an \u201cinjury, other than \u2018bodily injury,\u2019 arising out of *** [t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor.\u201d Coverage B\u2019s \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion,\u201d however, bars coverage for a \u201cpersonal injury\u201d which arises \u201cout of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants at any time.\u201d The policy defines \u201cpollutants\u201d as \u201cany solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.\u201d Even assuming, arguendo, that the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint sufficiently alleged a \u201cpersonal injury\u201d as defined in the policy, the absolute pollution exclusion bars any coverage.\nIn American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 476, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997), our supreme court wrestled with the seemingly limitless scope of what is commonly known as an \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion.\u201d In Koloms, carbon monoxide was released from a faulty furnace located in a two-story commercial building, saturating the air inside the building. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 476. As a result, those present on the premises became ill and filed suit. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 476. The insurer of the building denied the insured\u2019s tendered defense, arguing that, because carbon monoxide was a pollutant, there was no coverage under the policy\u2019s absolute pollution exclusion. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 476.\nOn appeal, the insured argued that the insurer\u2019s proffered interpretation of the \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion\u201d was too broad. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 483-84. Specifically, the insured contended that, based upon the \u201chistorical purpose of the exclusion,\u201d the scope of the clause was limited to \u201clarge scale, environmental contamination\u201d and that it was \u201cintended solely to protect insurers from having to defend and indemnify insureds in connection with governmental clean-up costs.\u201d Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 483-84. The insured argued that \u201cbecause this case involves personal injuries caused by exposure to materials which do not constitute \u2018pollution\u2019 in the traditional sense of the word, the exclusion does not apply.\u201d Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 484.\nThe Koloms court first noted widespread criticism of the insurance industry\u2019s attempt to broadly define what constitutes a \u201cpollutant.\u201d See Koloms, 111 Ill. 2d at 484. The court cited two examples where a broad reading of that term would lead to the \u201cabsurd\u201d result of noncoverage: (1) \u201c \u2018bodily injuries suffered by one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of Draino\u2019 \u201d and (2) \u201c \u2018bodily injury caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in a public pool.\u2019 \u201d Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 484, quoting Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1043.\nAfter recognizing that, \u201cdespite the abundance of opinions construing the exclusion, courts have not reached a clear consensus as to its proper interpretation\u201d (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 485) and stating that it was \u201ctroubled\u201d by \u201can overbreadth in the language of the exclusion as well as the manifestation of an ambiguity which results when the exclusion is applied to cases which have nothing to do with \u2018pollution\u2019 in the conventional, or ordinary, sense of the word\u201d (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 488), the court \u201crestricted the exclusion\u2019s otherwise potentially limitless application to only those hazards traditionally associated with environmental pollution\u201d (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 489).\nAfter extensively recounting the \u201c \u2018well-documented and relatively uncontroverted [citation]\u2019 \u201d (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 489) historical events leading up to the insurance industry\u2019s adoption of the absolute pollution exclusion (see Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 489-93), the court determined that the \u201cpredominate motivation in drafting an exclusion for pollution-related injuries was the avoidance of the \u2018enormous expense and exposure resulting from the \u201cexplosion\u201d of environmental litigation\u2019 \u201d (emphasis in original) (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 492, quoting Weaver v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 140 N.H. 780, 783, 674 A.2d 975, 977 (1996), quoting Vantage Development Corp. v. American Environmental Technologies Corp., 251 N.J. Super. 516, 525, 598 A.2d 948, 953 (1991)). In other words, the \u201cpollution exclusion has been, and should continue to be, the appropriate means of avoiding 1 \u201cthe yawning extent of potential liability arising from the gradual or repeated discharge of hazardous substances into the environment.\u201d \u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 493, quoting West American Insurance Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 312, 323, 409 S.E.2d 692, 699 (1991), quoting Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Insurance Co., 315 N.C. 688, 698, 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1986).\nThus, the Koloms court found that in order for the absolute pollution exclusion to apply, there must be \u201ctraditional environmental pollution\u201d (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 493), which includes \u201c \u2018any \u201cdischarge, dispersal, release, or escape\u201d of a pollutant *** into the environment\u2019 \u201d (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494, quoting Tufco, 104 N.C. App. at 325, 409 S.E.2d at 700). Applying this rule to the facts before it, the court found that, because the exclusion \u201capplies only to those injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution,\u201d and because the accidental release of carbon monoxide that is contained inside a building is not a release of pollutants into the environment, the exclusion did not apply to bar coverage. See Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494.\nAfter Koloms, this court\u2019s first foray into the applicability of an absolute pollution exclusion occurred in Kim v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 770, 776, 728 N.E.2d 530 (2000), where a cleaning company argued that its insurer had breached its duty to defend and indemnify after the company settled a lawsuit brought by the company\u2019s landlord for damages resulting from a pollutant which had seeped through the floor into the soil underneath the building. Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 772-73. After recounting the rule delineated in Koloms, the Kim court held the absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage because, unlike in Koloms, the \u201chazardous material was not confined within the cleaning company\u2019s building, *** but was discharged into the soil underneath its dry cleaning and laundry store.\u201d Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 775. Because the hazardous material had escaped beyond the walls of the insured\u2019s building and into the soil below, the court found that \u201ctraditional environmental pollution\u201d had occurred. Kim, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 775.\nThough not explicitly stated in either Koloms or Kim, a primary factor to consider in determining if an occurrence constitutes \u201ctraditional environmental pollution\u201d and, thus, is not covered under an absolute pollution exclusion, rests upon whether the injurious \u201chazardous material\u201d is confined within the insured\u2019s premises or, instead, escapes into \u201cthe land, atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water.\u201d Compare Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 494 (finding that an accidental leak of carbon monoxide from a faulty furnace that was contained within the insured\u2019s building did not \u201cconstitute the type of environmental pollution contemplated by the clause\u201d), with Kim, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 775 (determining that the insured\u2019s \u201cdischarge of a hazardous material into the soil [met] the definition of traditional environmental pollution\u201d (emphasis added)).\nOther cases dealing with the absolute pollution exclusion would seem to support this distinction. See Economy Preferred Insurance Co. v. Grandadam, 275 Ill. App. 3d 866, 870-71, 656 N.E.2d 787 (1995) (finding, as the first Illinois court to construe an absolute pollution exclusion, that the exclusion barred coverage when the minor son of the insured spilled mercury in the home of a neighbor); Housing Authority Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority, 378 F.3d 596, 606 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage for injuries resulting from \u201chazardous materials that were \u2018introduced, released and allowed to remain in the environment in Altgeld Gardens by the surrounding industrial plants, abandoned factories, toxic waste dumps, landfills and a Metropolitan Sanitary District plant\u2019 [citation], and by PCBs and PAHs that CHA introduced, released, and allowed to remain in the environment of Altgeld Gardens\u201d); Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1044 (finding that \u201cone could not characterize the discharge onto land of 80 gallons of PCB-laden oil as anything but pollution\u201d (emphasis added)); Guilford Industries Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 688 F. Supp. 792 (D. Me. 1988) (coverage excluded for damages resulting from rupture of oil tanks at textile mill and subsequent contamination of a river).\nThis distinction becomes even more reasonable when the purpose behind an absolute pollution exclusion is taken into account: \u201c \u2018to exclude governmental clean up costs\u2019 \u201d (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 492, quoting Tufco, 104 N.C. App. at 324, 409 S.E.2d at 699), and avoid \u201cthe \u2018enormous expense and exposure resulting from the \u201cexplosion\u201d of environmental litigation\u2019 \u201d (emphasis in original) (Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 492, quoting Weaver, 140 N.H. at 783, 674 A.2d at 977, quoting Vantage Development Corp., 251 N.J. Super. at 525, 598 A.2d at 953). A pollutant contained within the premises of the insured, while certainly harmful to those that come in contact with it, does not pose the same threat, both to the public at large and the pocketbooks of insurance companies, that a pollutant released on or into \u201cthe land, atmosphere, or any watercourse or body of water\u201d poses. The above-cited cases support the proposition that, for there to be traditional environmental pollution, triggering the absolute pollution exclusion, the pollutant must actually spill beyond the insured\u2019s premises and into the environment.\nHere, the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleged that the fire burned \u201cfor several days sending clouds of smoke into the air and sending highly toxic substances into the air throughout the surrounding neighborhoods.\u201d Because the underlying complaint alleged that the hazardous material (toxic smoke containing chemicals emitted from the burning cardboard) was not confined to the Riverdale facility, but, instead, spread to the \u201csurrounding neighborhoods,\u201d we find that traditional environmental pollution occurred, i.e., hazardous material discharged into the atmosphere, and that the policy\u2019s absolute pollution exclusion barred coverage.\nWe note that \u201c[the distinction we draw here] *** is by no means scientific, but one must remember that insurance contract interpretation \u2018is at bottom a practical art.\u2019 \u201d Pipefitters, 976 F.2d at 1044, quoting Continental Casualty Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 917 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, we draw this distinction because we are not satisfied, nor is it helpful, to have a \u201cWe-know-it-when-we-see-it\u201d standard for what constitutes traditional environmental pollution.\nFurthermore, we do not say that the release of a pollutant that is contained within an insured\u2019s property cannot constitute traditional environmental pollution. We only hold that, in this case, the release of toxins by the burning cardboard into the neighborhoods surrounding the Riverdale facility constituted traditional environmental pollution. Thus, the circuit court correctly found that the \u201cabsolute pollution exclusion\u201d in Coverage B barred coverage\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN and THEIS, JJ., concur.\nThis exclusion applies only to \u201cthose sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.\u201d Thus, it would not bar coverage for Loop Paper Recycling\u2019s own damages from a fire on its own property, i.e., building damage, lost inventory, etc.\nHere, rather than obtaining its own policy, Loop Paper Recycling joined with nine other companies to split the $31,221.34 in premiums paid to Connecticut through Corporate Coverage Company, the entity that initially obtained the policy.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Leahy, Eisenberg & Fraenkel, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas J. Finn and Shannon F. O\u2019Shea, of counsel), for appellant.", "Williams, Montgomery & John, Ltd., of Chicago (Mary A. Sliwinski, Alyssa M. Campbell, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CONNECTICUT SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOOP PAPER RECYCLING, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Anjanette Howard et al., Indiv. and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Defendants).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20142988\nOpinion filed February 17, 2005.\nLeahy, Eisenberg & Fraenkel, Ltd., of Chicago (Thomas J. Finn and Shannon F. O\u2019Shea, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliams, Montgomery & John, Ltd., of Chicago (Mary A. Sliwinski, Alyssa M. Campbell, and Lloyd E. Williams, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0067-01", "first_page_order": 85, "last_page_order": 101 }