{ "id": 3749756, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GINIO MERCADO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mercado", "decision_date": "2005-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 2-04-0817", "first_page": "487", "last_page": "499", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 487" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "606 N.Y.S.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "case_ids": [ 1154118 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/199/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Wis. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11888572 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-78" }, { "page": "711-12" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "712-13", "parenthetical": "noting that victim's motive to falsely accuse the defendant, which was unknown to the trial court when defendant pleaded guilty, corroborated the victim's recantation, and, thus, gave recantation evidence credibility" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/208/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 P.3d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820", "parenthetical": "the defendant could not withdraw his guilty plea based on affidavit from child whom the defendant sexually assaulted because, among other things, the affidavit was submitted nine years after the defendant pleaded guilty and other evidence established the defendant's guilt" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Wash. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1183469 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/141/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 N.E.2d 1319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ohio App. 3d 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1767451 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "755-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-app-3d/99/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "896 P.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Wash. App. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 426367 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/78/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3572157 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3025213 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/107/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2880142 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "trial court cannot disregard uncontradicted facts and unimpeached testimony" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/34/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ariz. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1522406 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "444" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "446" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/157/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2714912 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3269971 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3228287 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259062 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 Ill. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2663119 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/412/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45721 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5100172 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0469-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1134, "char_count": 32455, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.789971398195007e-08, "percentile": 0.4154711336452434 }, "sha256": "a03a5cd181e6d34690e094595e6d3fcb980eba8b0bdd77a781f82bcce873c064", "simhash": "1:ae4a964c53ca93f4", "word_count": 5248 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:02.423948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GINIO MERCADO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn October 2003, Rebeca Guijosa-Vanegas, the pregnant ex-girlfriend of defendant, Ginio Mercado, accused defendant of kidnaping her from her home, chaining her to a bed, and sexually assaulting her. Based on these accusations, defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(4) (West 2002)), two counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 13(a)(1) (West 2002)), three counts of kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10\u2014 1(a)(2) (West 2002)), and two counts of unlawful restraint (720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 3(a) (West 2002)). Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of kidnaping, in exchange for prison sentences totaling 1772 years. Approximately one month after defendant pleaded guilty, he moved to vacate his guilty plea, contending that Rebeca recanted her accusations of sexual assault. Attached to defendant\u2019s motion was a copy of Rebeca\u2019s affidavit, in which Rebeca stated that she and defendant had consensual intercourse and that defendant chained her to a bed to prevent her from attempting to hurt herself. At subsequent hearings on the motion, witnesses to the execution of the affidavit testified, confirming that Rebeca desired to recant her previous accusations. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that the affidavit and the testimony supporting its authenticity were unreliable. This timely appeal followed (see 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). We reverse and remand.\nOn May 3, 2004, the trial court, the State, and defendant\u2019s attorney engaged in a Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) conference. After that meeting, the trial court told defendant what was discussed during the conference, advising defendant that the risks were great for him if he decided to pursue a trial. The trial court also told defendant that it would not accept a sentence within the lower range of possible sentences, indicating that a sentence between 17 and 18 years was more appropriate. When the trial court asked defendant whether he had any questions concerning what was discussed, defendant asked only whether he was the father of the child recently born to Rebeca, advising the trial court that Rebeca had admitted as much to him.\nImmediately thereafter, defendant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of kidnaping in exchange for a 17V2-year sentence. In giving the factual basis for the plea, the State indicated that Rebeca would testify that she had a previous relationship with defendant but ended that relationship well before October 2003. Because defendant continued to give Rebeca attention after she ended their relationship, Rebeca, her child, and her current boyfriend moved.\nOn October 5, 2003, in the early morning, Rebeca, who was six months pregnant, left the home she shared with her boyfriend and her child to go to work. While she was outside her home attempting to get into her car, defendant grabbed her, forced her into his car, and drove her to his home in Vernon Hills. Once at defendant\u2019s home, defendant took Rebeca to his bedroom and tied her wrists to his bed with plastic ties. Rebeca repeatedly asked to be released, and defendant denied her requests. Defendant did cut the plastic ties so that Rebeca could use the bathroom, but he followed her until they returned to his bedroom. Once they returned, defendant locked his bedroom door, and Rebeca fell asleep without restraints on her wrists. Defendant then held Rebeca\u2019s wrists down next to her head and had sexual intercourse with her without her consent.\nThe next day, defendant bought a chain and lock, which he used to chain Rebeca to his bed. According to the State, defendant admitted to the police that he restrained Rebeca in this manner. After securing Rebeca with the chain and lock, defendant again had sexual intercourse with Rebeca against her will. Defendant then left for work, and Rebeca picked the lock on the chain and escaped.\nDefendant stipulated that this testimony would comprise the evidence the State would present at a trial, indicating that such an acknowledgment did not mean that the allegations were true. The trial court accepted the plea, finding it knowingly and voluntarily entered and supported by a factual basis. The trial court also specifically stated that defendant pleaded guilty because he believed that it was in his best interest to accept the plea agreement. Although the trial court accepted the plea, it continued the proceedings for sentencing because no presentence investigation report (PSI) had been prepared and, without such a report, the trial court found that it could not sentence defendant for a felony.\nSoon afterwards, a PSI was prepared. The presentence investigator indicated in the report that he did not talk with Rebeca, as she advised the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office that she wished not to be contacted for purposes of preparing the report. The investigator also stated in the report that, according to defendant, defendant terminated his relationship with Rebeca because she began dating her old boyfriend. Three weeks after the relationship ended, Rebeca called defendant, informing him that she was pregnant with defendant\u2019s child and that she wanted to live with defendant. Defendant told Rebeca that she needed to \u201cstraighten out\u201d her relationship with her boyfriend first. Rebeca continued to come to defendant\u2019s home, and, while at defendant\u2019s home on the day of the incident, she began \u201cacting crazy like she was going to hurt herself.\u201d To prevent Rebeca from harming herself, defendant restrained Rebeca to his bed and attempted to contact Rebeca\u2019s family so that they could help her. Defendant denied sexually assaulting Rebeca.\nWithin four days after the PSI was filed, the State filed a sexual offender treatment program report and a psychological evaluation. In the sexual offender report, Rebeca\u2019s version of events was consistent with the factual basis the State gave when defendant pleaded guilty, while defendant\u2019s rendition was consistent with what he told the presentence investigator. However, defendant advised the sexual offender evaluator that Rebeca consented to having sex with defendant on October 5 and 6 and that Rebeca had prepared an affidavit recanting her accusations. In the psychological report, the evaluator relied on the PSI in reporting Rebeca\u2019s claims. The psychological evaluator indicated that defendant pleaded guilty, despite his innocence, because the trial judge threatened to impose a lengthy sentence if defendant pursued a trial.\nOn June 15, 2004, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Attached to the motion was Rebeca\u2019s affidavit, which provided as follows:\n\u201cI, Rebecca [sic] Guijosa, certify that the following statement is true and correct and that my statement was made by myself under my own free will. I am in my own straight of mind.\nOn October 5, 2003[,] I willingly went with my boyfriend, [defendant], in his car to his townhouse in Vernon Hills, IL. We had consentual [sic] sex that day as we have had many times in the past. He did that next day leave me chained to the bed because during our discussion I had told him about hurting or killing myself because I was pregnant. They were small chains and locks that I was easily able to get out of. I wish to remove all charges from [defendant]. Rebecca [sic] Guijosa\u201d\nThe affidavit was notarized on May 17, 2004, by Bertha Vargas, who indicated that \u201cRebeca Guijosa\u201d proved her identity with a \u201cMexican Matricula I.D.\u201d The affidavit was also witnessed by \u201cM. Ricardia Cornejo.\u201d Both the notary and the witness signed their names, while Rebeca\u2019s name was printed.\nOn July 9, 2004, defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Attached to the amended motion was defendant\u2019s affidavit and a copy of Rebeca\u2019s affidavit. In his affidavit, defendant stated that he pleaded guilty because he believed that Rebeca would testify that she did not consent to sexual intercourse, that defendant kidnaped her, and that defendant held her against her will and without good cause. Defendant also stated that, before he pleaded guilty, his prior and current attorneys sent investigators to speak with Rebeca about the charges. Rebeca refused to speak with any of these investigators.\nAt the hearing on the amended motion to withdraw defendant\u2019s guilty plea, defendant\u2019s sister, Marina Ortiz, testified that on May 16, 2004, at around 12:30 p.m., she and her brother Jose Mercado went to speak with Rebeca at her place of employment. During Marina\u2019s conversation with Rebeca, Marina sat in Rebeca\u2019s car because Rebeca said, \u201c[I]f my boyfriend comes and sees you standing here, then he is going to think something is up.\u201d In the backseat of Rebeca\u2019s car were two small children. Marina learned that defendant was the father of one of those children. While sitting in Rebeca\u2019s car, Rebeca and Marina discussed Rebeca contacting defendant\u2019s attorney. Based on everything that happened that day, Rebeca asked Marina to return the following day.\nOn May 17, 2004, Marina returned with her sister, a notary public, and a witness. Marina testified that her sister, Maria Ortiz, arranged for the presence of the notary and the witness. Marina observed either the notary or the witness speaking with Rebeca, and Marina saw Rebeca, the notary, and the witness sign the affidavit.\nOn cross-examination, Marina testified that she had talked with defendant about where Rebeca worked, but defendant did not ask her to go speak with Rebeca. Rather, Marina wanted to talk to Rebeca because she wanted to know whether defendant was the father of the child recently born to Rebeca. During Rebeca and Marina\u2019s conversation that day, which was in Spanish, Rebeca suggested retaining a notary public and a witness because she wanted to drop the charges against defendant.\nOn May 17, when the affidavit was prepared, Marina did not observe the witness, whom she had seen only once before, speak English, indicating that the witness told her that she did not speak English. Marina was unsure whether the notary or the witness wrote the affidavit because, having met those women only once, she was not sure which woman was the notary and which one was the witness. However, Marina later testified that the notary wrote the affidavit. As Rebeca spoke in Spanish, the notary wrote Rebeca\u2019s statement in English. Marina heard Rebeca state everything that is in the affidavit, and Marina testified that the affidavit truly and accurately reflects what Rebeca said that day. Once the affidavit was completed, the notary read it back to Rebeca in Spanish.\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that the affidavit was unreliable hearsay and not newly discovered evidence because, if Marina could find Rebeca and obtain an affidavit, then that same information was available to defendant long before he pleaded guilty. The trial court also found Marina incredible, noting that Rebeca, who does not speak English, allegedly \u201csigned\u201d her name in English, spelling her name \u201cRebecca.\u201d Further, the trial- court believed that the language used in the affidavit was not \u201csomething someone even in the Spanish language would state so it could be interpreted that way in the English language.\u201d Lastly, the trial court noted that defendant did not call Rebeca, the notary, or the witness to testify.\nSix days later, defendant again moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asking the trial court to consider testimony from Manuelita Cornejo, the witness to the affidavit. Before hearing that testimony, the trial court questioned Officer Andy Jones, whom Rebeca contacted within the last six days after defendant\u2019s attorney sent defendant\u2019s relatives and others to talk with Rebeca at her place of employment. Defendant\u2019s attorney admitted that he sent Cornejo to get an affidavit in Spanish from Rebeca because the trial court had found the English affidavit insufficient. Officer Jones, who was not under oath, told the trial court that Rebeca did not wish to speak with anyone from defendant\u2019s family or his attorney\u2019s office. In his discussions with Rebeca, Rebeca admitted to Officer Jones that the \u201cthree women who *** talked to her during the statement in her parking lot at work\u201d returned to her place of employment. Over the State\u2019s objection, the trial court then allowed defendant to present Cornejo\u2019s testimony.\nManuelita Ricardia Cornejo testified that she does tax work and also works as an interpreter and notary public. Cornejo stated that she knows Maria Ortiz, Marina and defendant\u2019s sister, but she is more familiar with Maria\u2019s husband, having done tax, immigration, and notary work for him. On May 17, 2004, Cornejo and her sister, Bertha Vargas, who is also a notary public, accompanied Maria and Marina to Rebeca\u2019s place of employment.\nOnce at Rebeca\u2019s place of employment, Cornejo met Rebeca, who showed Cornejo identification. Cornejo wrote down in English what Rebeca told her in Spanish. When Rebeca asked Cornejo to read the affidavit to her, Cornejo complied, reading the affidavit out loud in Spanish. Cornejo signed the affidavit, she observed both Vargas and Rebeca sign the affidavit, and she saw Vargas put her notary stamp on the document. Cornejo noticed that, when Rebeca signed her name, she spelled her name with either one less or one more \u201cc\u201d than Cornejo initially believed. Cornejo questioned Rebeca about the discrepancy and looked at Rebeca\u2019s identification. Rebeca told Cornejo that her name was misspelled on her identification card.\nOn cross-examination, Cornejo testified that Maria hired her as an interpreter, but Cornejo also witnessed the making of the affidavit. Maria told Cornejo that she needed someone to assist in translating some information onto paper and notarizing that information, telling Cornejo that her services were wanted for something having to do with defendant. Cornejo was paid $80 for her two hours of service.\nWhen the four women arrived at Rebeca\u2019s work, they remained in their cars for 30 to 45 minutes in a place that was very visible. When Rebeca left work that day, Marina approached her. Cornejo indicated that Rebeca looked as if she was expecting defendant\u2019s family, saying that Rebeca\u2019s encounter with Marina \u201clooked pleasant.\u201d After about 10 minutes, Cornejo joined Marina and Rebeca. When Cornejo spoke with Rebeca, whom she had never met before, they spoke only Spanish. As Rebeca spoke in Spanish, Cornejo wrote the affidavit in English, believing that writing the affidavit in English was the correct procedure. In looking at the affidavit, Cornejo testified that she wrote \u201cI, Rebecca [sic],\u201d that Rebeca signed her name \u201cRebecca [sic],\u201d and that Vargas filled in \u201cRebeca\u201d in her notary signature block.\nThe trial court then posed several questions to Cornejo. During the court\u2019s inquiry, Cornejo testified that, having prepared affidavits previously and knowing what form they should take, she asked Rebeca a series of questions, the answers to which comprised the first paragraph of the affidavit. For example, Cornejo asked Rebeca if she was making the statement of her own free will. Cornejo acknowledged that, when she asked Rebeca if she was \u201cstraight of mind,\u201d she had to ask, in Spanish, whether Rebeca was \u201csane,\u201d as there is no closer translation.\nIn writing the second paragraph of the affidavit, Cornejo testified that Marina asked questions in English that Cornejo immediately translated in Spanish and asked Rebeca. Once Rebeca gave an answer, Cornejo told Rebeca what she was going to write in the affidavit, and Cornejo asked Rebeca whether she wanted that statement in the affidavit. For instance, Marina asked whether Rebeca had consensual sex that day as she had many times in the past, Cornejo translated that question in Spanish to Rebeca, Rebeca said yes, and Cornejo wrote in English Rebeca\u2019s response. As to the last sentence in the affidavit, Cornejo testified that Rebeca said that she \u201cwant[ed] all of this stuff to be taken away from [defendant],\u201d noting that Rebeca appeared frustrated, not pressured, when she made that statement. Cornejo clarified that Rebeca appeared frustrated because it was hot outside and she needed to retrieve her children from day care.\nOnce the affidavit was written, Cornejo read the affidavit in Spanish to Rebeca. Vargas then joined Cornejo, Rebeca, and Marina, read the affidavit, looked at Rebeca\u2019s identification, and had Rebeca sign the affidavit.\nThe trial court again denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that Rebeca was \u201cconfronted\u201d and under duress when the statement was made. The trial court also found Cornejo incredible because she \u201cfirst tried to describe it as that *** is what [Rebeca] said and [Cornejo] wrote it down. And then when [the trial court] tried to clear that up with her, [Cornejo] indicated that [Marina] asked specific questions and [Cornejo] wrote down the answer[s].\u201d The trial court also found that Rebeca\u2019s testimony would be critical, noting that the affidavit is in English and that Rebeca does not speak English. Further, the trial court reiterated that defendant failed to establish that he lacked prior knowledge of the evidence or that he used due diligence in obtaining such evidence. The trial court then imposed the agreed sentence, and this timely appeal followed.\nThe issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. People v. Artale, 244 Ill. App. 3d 469, 475 (1993). Rather, in order to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must establish a recognized basis for such withdrawal. See People v. Wilson, 295 Ill. App. 3d 228, 236 (1998). Specifically, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea \u201c[w]here it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State\u2019s Attorney or someone else in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury.\u201d People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 531-32 (1952). We review a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 163 (2001).\nIt is well settled that a defendant may not withdraw his guilty plea if he has misjudged the strength of the State\u2019s case. People v. Frascella, 81 Ill. App. 3d 794, 797-98 (1980); People v. Jones, 74 Ill. App. 3d 243, 246 (1979); People v. O\u2019Connor, 37 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313 (1976). However, believing that the State has evidence with which to obtain a conviction is diametrically different from misevaluating the strength of the State\u2019s case. We believe that this case falls into the former category, and, thus, we determine that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In reaching this conclusion, we find instructive State v. Fritz, 157 Ariz. 139, 755 P.2d 444 (App. 1988).\nIn Fritz, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual conduct with a minor in the second degree. Fritz, 157 Ariz. at 139, 755 P.2d at 444. A. few months after the defendant was sentenced, he petitioned for postconviction relief, informing the court that the alleged victim recanted his accusations. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the defendant\u2019s petition, and the State appealed. On appeal, the court affirmed, noting:\n\u201cIf the sole basis for the strength of the state\u2019s case is the credibility of the victim, as is usually the case in non-witnessed sexual assaults, and the defendant\u2019s plea is based upon the supposition that the victim will be believed, then it appears in the interest of \u2018manifest justice\u2019 that when the victim\u2019s credibility is called into question by a recantation, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by allowing a plea to be withdrawn in order that the victim\u2019s credibility be tested in the crucible of trial.\u201d Fritz, 157 Ariz. at 141, 755 P.2d at 446.\nHere, as in Fritz, Rebeca would provide the only testimony about what happened on those two days in October 2003. Although the State indicated at one point in presenting its factual basis that a police officer would testify, this testimony was related to defendant admitting that he bought a chain and lock to chain Rebeca to the bed, a fact that defendant has never denied. Moreover, in line with Fritz, defendant claimed that he pleaded guilty because he believed that Rebeca would testify consistently with her accusations. Although we recognize that recantation evidence is inherently unreliable (see People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 253-54 (1991)), we cannot conclude that it may never serve as a basis to withdraw a guilty plea. Rather, when the witness who provides the only evidence against the defendant recants, the defendant should be allowed to test that witness\u2019s credibility at trial. Here, because Rebeca is the linchpin in the State\u2019s case against defendant, her credibility is of the utmost importance, and the affidavit, which raises questions about Rebeca\u2019s credibility, cannot be ignored.\nClearly, the trial court disregarded Rebeca\u2019s affidavit and the evidence supporting it. Although there were discrepancies in the witnesses\u2019 testimony, no evidence contradicted defendant\u2019s evidence, and the trial court erred when it disregarded that uncontroverted evidence. See Urban v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 34 Ill. 2d 159, 163 (1966) (trial court cannot disregard uncontradicted facts and unimpeached testimony); see also People v. Powell, 107 Ill. App. 3d 418, 421 (1982).\nWhen the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, it stressed four main factors on which it relied. Specifically, the trial court (1) doubted that Rebeca was a party to the affidavit or signed it, (2) believed that Rebeca was under duress if she did sign the affidavit, (3) found Cornejo incredible, and (4) determined that defendant was not diligent in obtaining the affidavit. We address each factor in turn.\nFirst, the trial court questioned whether Rebeca \u201csigned\u201d the affidavit, noting that her name was printed and, perhaps, misspelled. However, both Marina and Cornejo testified in great detail about how the document was prepared, and even Officer Jones, whom the State called for an unrelated matter, indicated that Rebeca met with the women and prepared a statement. Marina and Cornejo also stated that they saw Rebeca sign the affidavit, which Vargas notarized and Cornejo signed as a witness. Cornejo explained that Rebeca\u2019s name was misspelled on her identification, which was the spelling that Vargas, who was not present when Rebeca made her statement, used in notarizing the affidavit.\nThe trial court also found that Rebeca was under duress when she signed the affidavit, but nothing in the record supports this conclusion. Marina testified that she never initiated contact with Rebeca because she, defendant, or anyone in defendant\u2019s family wanted Rebeca to recant her accusations. Rather, Marina wished to speak with Rebeca because she wanted to know whether defendant was the father of the child recently born to Rebeca, the answer to which was also important to defendant. Further, Cornejo testified that when she and the other three women went to Rebeca\u2019s place of employment, they parked in a place highly visible to those entering or exiting the building. When Rebeca left the building, she willingly met with Marina, whom she had told to meet her there that day. At one point during the meeting, Cornejo stated that Rebeca appeared frustrated, but Rebeca was acting that way because it was warm outside and she needed to retrieve her children from day care. Certainly, this frustration was not duress that Cornejo, Vargas, or anyone in defendant\u2019s family created.\nMoreover, the trial court found that Cornejo was incredible because she changed her testimony about how the affidavit was prepared. We disagree. Cornejo consistently stated that the affidavit contained Rebeca\u2019s statements. Cornejo testified that she wrote in English what Rebeca told her in Spanish, reading the affidavit in its entirety to Rebeca once the statement was complete. Before the court posed questions to Cornejo, neither attorney asked Cornejo whether, in preparing the affidavit, Rebeca was responding to questions or providing a narrative that Cornejo translated into English. Although a trial court certainly bears the burden of assessing the credibility of witnesses who testify at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea (see, e.g., People v. Petrovic, 146 Ill. App. 3d 857, 861 (1986)), any negative assessments, when premised on discrepancies in a witness\u2019s testimony, must be based on actual inconsistencies.\nLastly, the trial court found that defendant was not diligent in obtaining Rebeca\u2019s affidavit. We again disagree. The uncontradicted testimony revealed that Rebeca would not speak with either one of defendant\u2019s attorneys, who tried to investigate further Rebeca\u2019s claims. Although this evidence, which came from defendant\u2019s affidavit, appears self-serving, it is supported to a certain extent by the fact that Rebeca would not speak with the PSI investigator. If she would not speak with agents of the State, it seems unlikely that she would talk with anyone representing defendant. Once defendant learned that Rebeca recanted, he timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea. This evidence, coupled with the fact that defendant could not have done anything to precipitate Rebeca\u2019s recantation (see State v. D.T.M., 78 Wash. App. 216, 221, 896 P.2d 108, 111 (1995)), leads us to conclude that defendant did act diligently.\nIn reaching our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we stress that not every defendant who wishes to withdraw a guilty plea may do so if affidavits are presented indicating that the victim wishes to recant. See State v. Moore, 99 Ohio App. 3d 748, 755-56, 651 N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (1994) (three identical affidavits, which were signed by the defendant\u2019s relatives, prepared by the same person, and contained hearsay statements about what the defendant\u2019s attorney allegedly said to the defendant, could not contradict court record that revealed that the defendant\u2019s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered); In re Crabtree, 141 Wash. 2d 577, 588, 9 P.3d 814, 820 (2000) (the defendant could not withdraw his guilty plea based on affidavit from child whom the defendant sexually assaulted because, among other things, the affidavit was submitted nine years after the defendant pleaded guilty and other evidence established the defendant\u2019s guilt). Rather, the trial court must still exercise its discretion and determine whether a proper basis exists to withdraw the plea. Although there is no requirement in Illinois, as there is in other states, that a defendant must present evidence corroborating the recantation evidence in a guilty plea case (see, e.g., State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 476-78, 561 N.W.2d 707, 711-12 (1997)), we believe that such corroborating evidence, or lack thereof, may be insightful. Factors that may be pivotal in cases such as this one include, but are not limited to, when the victim recants in relation to when the defendant is convicted and sentenced, whether the affidavit is from the victim or the defendant\u2019s relatives, what motive the victim had to make the initial accusations, and whether the defendant has repeatedly claimed that he is innocent.\nA consideration of these factors lends further strength to our determination that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. First, 14 days after defendant pleaded guilty, and before the sentence was imposed, Rebeca\u2019s affidavit was prepared. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea 29 days later. This is far different from the nine-year delay in Crabtree. Second, the affidavit is from Rebeca, the victim, making this matter a stronger case for reversal than the thr\u00e9e affidavits prepared by the defendant\u2019s family in Moore.\nThird, Rebeca may have had a motive to falsely accuse defendant. See McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 478, 561 N.W.2d at 712-13 (noting that victim\u2019s motive to falsely accuse the defendant, which was unknown to the trial court when defendant pleaded guilty, corroborated the victim\u2019s recantation, and, thus, gave recantation evidence credibility). Here, when Rebeca was at defendant\u2019s home on October 5 and 6, 2003, she was living with an old boyfriend, who apparently would come by Rebeca\u2019s place of employment and would be suspicious if he saw Rebeca talking with one of defendant\u2019s sisters. In October 2003, Rebeca was six months pregnant with a child whose father could be defendant. These facts suggest that Rebeca may have lied about what happened in October 2003 because, at a minimum, she did not want to upset the old boyfriend with whom she then lived. Although the above may be the reason for Rebeca\u2019s actions, we do not suggest that this theory is true. We merely indicate that, based on the evidence presented, Rebeca may have had a basis to falsely accuse defendant of various crimes and later recant those accusations.\nFourth, we find important the fact that defendant repeatedly professed his innocence. See People v. De Jesus, 606 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257, 199 A.D.2d 529, 531 (1993) (determining that the defendant, who pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a child and later moved to withdraw the plea when the child recanted her accusations, should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea based on the recantation evidence and the fact that the defendant repeatedly and adamantly asserted his innocence). For example, here, when defendant pleaded guilty, the trial court took the time to specifically advise defendant that by stipulating to the evidence the State would present at trial, defendant did not thereby agree that the events actually happened as the State claimed. Rather, the trial court explained that defendant pleaded guilty because he believed that taking advantage of the State\u2019s offer was advantageous. Preceding these admonishments was the trial court\u2019s statement to defendant that the risks were great for him if he decided to pursue a trial, which may have given defendant an additional incentive to plead guilty despite his belief that he was innocent. Moreover, when defendant was interviewed for the PSI, the sexual offender treatment program, and the psychological evaluation, he told all three investigators that he did not sexually assault Rebeca, that the sexual intercourse was consensual, and that he restrained Rebeca because he wanted to prevent her from harming herself. This evidence, coupled with Rebeca\u2019s affidavit, convinces us that defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. See De Jesus, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 257, 199 A.D.2d at 531.\nIn conclusion, we hold that the ends of justice are better served by allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and pursue a trial. In reaching this result, we must note that our decision has no bearing on defendant\u2019s success in further proceedings. Rather, by allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, we merely are affording him an opportunity to test at trial the credibility of Rebeca, the State\u2019s only witness. Fritz, 157 Ariz. at 141, 755 P.2d at 446.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nHUTCHINSON and BYRNE, JJ., concur.\nthroughout this disposition, we have spelled the victim\u2019s name Rebeca, as this is the spelling used in the indictments.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael T. Norris, of Law Offices of Michael T. Norris, of Schaumburg, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin E Moltz and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GINIO MERCADO, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201404\u20140817\nOpinion filed March 30, 2005.\nMichael T. Norris, of Law Offices of Michael T. Norris, of Schaumburg, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin E Moltz and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for the People." }, "file_name": "0487-01", "first_page_order": 505, "last_page_order": 517 }