{ "id": 3748877, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL MOSER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Moser", "decision_date": "2005-05-18", "docket_number": "No. 2-04-0477", "first_page": "900", "last_page": "915", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 900" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596989 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2823060 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5451395 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "906" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186558 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894516 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110-11" }, { "page": "110-11" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222792 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3240285 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515728 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487", "parenthetical": "search was reasonable where 15 seconds elapsed between the time police announced themselves and entered" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283326 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567358 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2881082 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "search was reasonable where 10 seconds elapsed between the time police announced themselves and entered" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075987 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2881637 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872584 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257162 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152076 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221511 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3076744 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105961 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146993 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0463-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1283, "char_count": 35689, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2748299780614727e-07, "percentile": 0.6155860824318329 }, "sha256": "a661b167b7bb26054ce98fa3dfbccb4d3a6a2c09d1d4521c87ece01666fa8615", "simhash": "1:baaab22e13cfc735", "word_count": 5860 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:02.423948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL MOSER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, the defendant, Paul Moser, was convicted of unlawful possession of, with the intent to deliver, between 400 and 900 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(C) (West 2002)) and sentenced to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment. The defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) he was not convicted beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the cumulative effect of various trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.\nOn July 25, 2002, the defendant was charged by indictment with unlawful possession of between 400 and 900 grams of cocaine and unlawful possession of, with the intent to deliver, between 400 and 900 grams of cocaine. The indictment was based on an incident where police recovered from the defendant\u2019s residence, upon execution of a search warrant, two bags of a substance containing cocaine.\nOn January 3, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant and that the police improperly executed the search warrant. The trial court held a two-part hearing, first considering the question of probable cause to issue the search warrant. The trial court considered the complaint for the search warrant, which is not part of the instant record, and the accompanying affidavits. The first affidavit was signed by a confidential informant, \u201cJohn Doe,\u201d who was later divulged to be Charles Petty. In his affidavit, Petty stated that on June 28, 2002, at approximately 4 p.m., he was inside the defendant\u2019s home located at 371 Cornell Drive in Algonquin. While inside the home, Petty purchased 3Vs ounces of cocaine from the defendant. Petty observed a large quantity of cocaine in a purple bag, under a desk in the master bedroom of the home. Petty recognized the substance in the bag as cocaine because he had purchased and used cocaine on at least 20 occasions. Petty had purchased cocaine from the defendant on at least 15 occasions. Petty stated that he had never been convicted of any narcotics-related offenses. However, he was granted a personal recognizance bond on a pending narcotics charge in exchange for information concerning the defendant.\nThe second affidavit was signed by Inspector Rodney Penrod of the North Central Narcotics Task Force. In his affidavit, Inspector Penrod stated that he met Petty at the Algonquin Roadhouse in February 2002, while working undercover. He asked Petty if he had any cocaine for sale. Petty did not have any cocaine that evening but indicated that he could possibly get some at a later date. Inspector Penrod gave Petty his pager number and asked Petty to call him when he obtained some cocaine. On June 27, 2002, Inspector Penrod received a page from an unfamiliar number. Inspector Penrod called the number and spoke with Petty, who offered to sell him a few ounces of cocaine for $2,600.\nOn June 28, 2002, Inspector Penrod met with Petty in the parking lot of Home Depot on Randall Road in Algonquin. Petty delivered to him a brown paper bag containing three clear plastic bags of a white powdery substance, which later field tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Inspector Penrod placed Petty under arrest and then questioned him. Petty told Inspector Penrod that he had obtained the cocaine from the defendant earlier that day. Petty told Inspector Pen-rod that when he was at the defendant\u2019s residence, he observed two large chunks of cocaine. Petty also told Inspector Penrod that he had purchased cocaine from the defendant about 15 to 20 times. Inspector Penrod offered Petty a personal recognizance bond in exchange for information regarding the defendant.\nAfter considering the above-described affidavits and the complaint for search warrant, the trial court determined that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant. The trial court noted that the confidential informant\u2019s affidavit was specific in detail and based on personal knowledge. The trial court also noted that the confidential informant was available to the issuing judge for questioning. The trial court therefore denied the first portion of the motion to suppress.\nThe trial court next considered the question of whether the search warrant was executed properly. Inspector Ken Stoves, with the North Central Narcotics Task Force, testified that on June 29, 2002, he assisted in a search of the defendant\u2019s residence pursuant to a search warrant that had been obtained by police the day prior. Inspector Stoves performed three to four hours of surveillance on the residence before executing the search warrant. During this time, Inspector Stoves observed numerous cars come and go. It appeared to Inspector Stoves that people were in the home.\nJust after midnight, Inspector Stoves, along with Inspector Penrod and other task force officers, approached the front door of the residence. There were some lights on inside, but Inspector Stoves was unaware if anyone was awake. Inspector Stoves looked through a window next to the front door and did not see anybody. Inspector Stoves did not hear any noise from within the home. Inspector Stoves wiggled the front doorknob to determine if the front door was locked.\nAfter determining that the door was locked, Inspector Stoves pounded on the door with his fist and yelled in a clear, loud voice, \u201cPolice, search warrant.\u201d Inspector Stoves paused for about three seconds to listen for movement, but did not hear anything. He again pounded on the door and yelled, \u201cPolice, search warrant.\u201d Inspector Stoves stood there for between 3 to 10 seconds and still did not hear any movement. Inspector Penrod then rammed the door down.\nInspector Stoves, Inspector Penrod, and the other officers entered the house and secured the various rooms. Inspector Stoves found the defendant\u2019s wife in the bedroom, in bed. The defendant was not home. During the search, the officers found a substance suspected to be cocaine. Prior to entering the home, Inspector Stoves was unaware of any concerns regarding the presence of weapons or the possible destruction of evidence.\nInspector Penrod testified that he was the lead officer in the investigation. Before he and the other officers executed the search warrant, Inspector Stoves knocked on the front door with his fist and announced \u201cPolice.\u201d Inspector Penrod, Inspector Stoves, and the other officers then listened for movement for about three to four seconds. They did not hear anything. Inspector Stoves knocked on the door and announced \u201cPolice\u201d a second time. After the second knock, they again listened for movement for about six to eight seconds but still did not hear anything. Inspector Penrod then broke open the door. After he broke open the door, Inspector Penrod proceeded to the upstairs bedroom, where the defendant\u2019s wife was located. Inspector Penrod recovered from a nightstand in the bedroom approximately 900 grams of cocaine and a scale.\nInspectors Laura Virgils and Phil Barrille of the North Central Narcotics Task Force testified consistently with Inspectors Stoves and Penrod. According to Inspector Virgils, there were about five seconds between the first two knocks and three to five seconds between the second knock and the ramming of the door. According to Inspector Barrille, there were approximately 10 seconds between the first two knocks and approximately 3 seconds between the second knock and the ramming of the door.\nOn June 4, 2003, the trial court denied the second portion of the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The trial court found that the police had properly complied with the knock-and-announce rule.\nOn February 17, 2004, the trial court conducted a jury trial. At the trial, Inspector Penrod testified that he met Petty in February 2002 at the Algonquin Roadhouse. Inspector Penrod was working undercover, posing as a drug dealer. As Inspector Penrod was getting ready to leave the bar, Petty approached him and asked him if he wanted to buy any cocaine. Inspector Penrod said yes, but Petty was unable to obtain any that night. Inspector Penrod gave Petty his pager number.\nIn June 2002, Inspector Penrod received a page from an unknown number. Inspector Penrod called the number and spoke with Petty. He negotiated to buy from Petty 3Vs ounces of cocaine for $2,760. On June 29, 2002, Inspector Penrod met Petty in the parking lot of the Algonquin Home Depot. Petty entered Inspector Penrod\u2019s undercover vehicle and set down a brown paper bag on the passenger-side floorboard. Petty pulled out a small plastic bag and stated that it contained an \u201ceight ball\u201d of cocaine. Petty started to explain to Inspector Penrod how to test the quality of the cocaine. Inspector Penrod gave a signal to his team, who then placed Petty under arrest. He seized the brown paper bag, which contained three separate bags of a white powder-like substance that field tested positive for cocaine.\nInspector Penrod spoke with Petty at the Algonquin police station later that evening. Petty provided Inspector Penrod with information regarding his supplier. Inspector Penrod obtained a search warrant for the defendant\u2019s residence, based on the information Petty supplied. The North Central Narcotics Task Force executed the search warrant on June 29, 2002. Police officers found cocaine and a scale in the master bedroom of the defendant\u2019s home. Inspector Penrod testified that Petty remained in jail while the warrant was executed.\nMaster Sergeant Mark Rasmussen of the North Central Narcotics Task Force testified that he participated in the execution of the search warrant on the defendant\u2019s house. When he entered the master bedroom, he noticed a strong odor of cocaine. The master bedroom appeared as if it were undergoing construction. Police officers searched the room and found 610 grams of cocaine in the left-side drawer of a makeup table and 180 grams of cocaine in the right-side drawer of the table. Police officers found another 110 grams of cocaine under the bed, packaged in 12 separate plastic baggies. Police officers also recovered a plastic scale. Sergeant Rasmussen testified that the amount of cocaine recovered was not an amount typical for personal use.\nThe State next called Petty to the stand and concurrently filed a motion in limine to preclude the defendant from questioning Petty regarding a 1994 indictment for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which was ultimately dismissed in 2001. The trial court granted the motion in limine.\nThe defendant then requested a continuance to further prepare. The defendant explained that he was under the impression that Petty was asserting his constitutional right to remain silent and would not testify. The trial court denied a continuance but recessed for an extended lunch to allow the defendant to interview Petty and prepare for his testimony.\nPetty testified he had been using cocaine since before the year 2000. Petty described himself as a \u201crecreational user\u201d who used cocaine only on weekends. He met the defendant playing pool at the Algonquin Roadhouse. Petty purchased cocaine from the defendant approximately 15 times. According to Petty, his relationship with the defendant was purely social. He never worked for the defendant in any capacity.\nPetty also met Inspector Penrod at the Algonquin Roadhouse. Inspector Penrod gave Petty a pager number. Petty began having financial problems so he called Inspector Penrod and agreed to sell him some cocaine. Petty contacted the defendant and told him that he had a customer and needed three ounces. Petty and the defendant discussed a price and agreed on $2,700.\nAt 1:30 p.m. on June 28, 2002, Petty drove to the defendant\u2019s truck shop and picked the defendant up. Petty and the defendant then drove to the defendant\u2019s home. The defendant brought him upstairs into the master bedroom. The defendant pulled out a big block of cocaine and cut off the amount Petty needed. The defendant gave Petty two \u201ceight balls\u201d and three one-ounce packages of cocaine. Petty agreed to pay the defendant after he got the money from his customer.\nAfterwards, Petty dropped the defendant off at the defendant\u2019s truck shop and went to meet Inspector Penrod. Petty arrived at the Home Depot in Algonquin at about 4:15 p.m. He entered Inspector Penrod\u2019s vehicle and pulled out an \u201ceight ball.\u201d Petty was arrested. According to Petty, it was the first time he had ever delivered narcotics to anyone.\nAfter Petty was arrested he was brought to the police station and questioned. Petty swore out an affidavit in the name of \u201cJohn Doe\u201d and was brought before a judge. He was then given a personal recognizance bond. Petty admitted that the State had agreed to dismiss a pending charge against him in exchange for his testimony.\nFinally, Petty identified the affidavit that he signed, which resulted in the search warrant. Petty testified that he verified to a judge that the contents of the affidavit were true. Petty also identified his signature.\nRonald Nanstiel testified on behalf of the defendant that Petty was his roommate from May 2002 through June 2002. Nanstiel charged Petty $100 per week for rent. After Petty moved in, Nanstiel learned that Petty had a cocaine problem. Petty would frequently bring big rocks of cocaine into the apartment. Petty used cocaine in the apartment on a daily basis. On one occasion when Petty did not have enough money for rent, Petty tried to pay Nanstiel with cocaine. Petty displayed bizarre behavior while he was under the influence of cocaine. Nanstiel never saw the defendant and Petty together. Nanstiel evicted Petty from the apartment after Petty told him that he set the defendant up with cocaine. On cross-examination, Nanstiel clarified that Petty never said that he planted the cocaine.\nGeoff Knoezer testified on behalf of the defendant that the defendant and Petty are acquaintances of his. He knows the defendant from playing pool at bars. He also knows Petty from playing pool at bars. Knoezer has in the past done computer work for the defendant. In 2002, Knoezer installed track lighting in the master bedroom of the defendant\u2019s house. Knoezer could not recall the exact days he worked on the track lighting. He worked on two different days. He worked 20 minutes the first day and 3 hours the next day. On one of the days that Knoezer was working, he saw Petty at the defendant\u2019s house. Petty was painting the master bathroom. Knoezer admitted on cross-examination that he has used cannabis in the past and at one point in time had his driving privileges suspended.\nThe defendant testified that the master bedroom in his house was being remodeled in June 2002. The defendant had hired various workmen to assist in the project. The defendant hired Petty to finish the master bathroom. He had met Petty three months prior at a bar called the Algonquin Roadhouse. Petty was doing some paint and drywall work at the bar. Prior to the defendant hiring Petty to work on his bathroom, Petty had come to the defendant\u2019s trucking company on at least three occasions seeking employment as a driver. Petty did not have the requisite driver\u2019s license so the defendant did not hire him.\nThe defendant testified that on the morning of June 28, 2002, he packed his boat in preparation for an afternoon on the Fox River. The defendant left for work about 7:30 a.m. He worked until 3 or 4 p.m. He and his wife then took the boat out and had dinner at one of the restaurants on the river. He returned home at approximately 8:30 p.m. but had to leave again around 11 p.m. because he received a call from one of his drivers regarding a truck that needed to be towed. When he returned home, his house was in shambles and he discovered that police had charged him with drug possession. According to the defendant, the cocaine found in his bedroom was Petty\u2019s.\nOn cross-examination, the State questioned the defendant regarding whether he contacted the towing company that had towed his truck about testifying as to his whereabouts on June 29, 2002. The defendant replied that he had not.\nAfter considering the above testimony, the jury found the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of cocaine and unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The trial court entered convictions consistent with the jury\u2019s verdict. The trial court sentenced the defendant to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment and fined the defendant $52,800 on the unlawful possession with intent to deliver conviction. Following the denial of his posttrial motions, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nThe defendant\u2019s first contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues that the trial court lacked probable cause to issue the search warrant because the warrant was based solely on information provided by Charles Petty. He additionally argues that police improperly executed the search warrant by not complying with the knock-and-announce rule.\nWe first address the issue regarding probable cause to issue the search warrant. For a search warrant to be valid, the complaint and supporting affidavit are not required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the warrant should be issued; rather, they need only establish probable cause. People v. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 476-77 (1984). A showing of probable cause means that the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the affiant are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has occurred and that evidence of it is at the place to be searched. People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 400 (1983); People v. Bauer, 102 Ill. App. 3d 31, 37 (1981). The judge asked to issue the search warrant may draw reasonable inferences from the material supplied in support of the complaint for search warrant. People v. Cooke, 299 Ill. App. 3d 273, 278 (1998). In judging probable cause, the issuing magistrate is not to be confined by narrow limitations or by restrictions on the use of his or her common sense; the magistrate\u2019s determination of probable cause should be paid great deference. People v. Gacy, 103 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1984).\nIn this case, we believe that the affidavits provided probable cause to issue the search warrant. In his affidavit, Petty recounted specific events that he personally observed. He recounted having purchased cocaine from the defendant in the defendant\u2019s house and having observed a large quantity of cocaine under a desk in the defendant\u2019s master bedroom. Inspector Penrod\u2019s affidavit corroborated many aspects of Petty\u2019s affidavit. As such, there was probable cause to issue the search warrant.\nThe defendant argues that probable cause should be found to be lacking where a confidential informant has no proven record of reliability. We disagree. Where the informant has appeared before the issuing judge, the informant is under oath, and the judge has had the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of the informant and assess the informant\u2019s credibility, additional evidence relating to informant reliability is not necessary. People v. Hancock, 301 Ill. App. 3d 786, 792 (1998); People v. Phillips, 265 Ill. App. 3d 438, 448 (1994).\nWe next address whether the search warrant was executed properly. The knock-and-announce rule provides that in executing a search warrant, police should knock and announce their authority so to allow a person sufficient opportunity to respond before a forcible entry is made. People v. Riddle, 258 Ill. App. 3d 253, 258 (1994). The knock-and-announce rule is intended to promote privacy and safeguard both residents and officers during the execution of arrest and search warrants. People v. Ouellette, 78 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1979). There are no rigid rules for determining whether officers have allowed a sufficient period of time to elapse before entering a building to execute a search warrant. People v. Kelver, 258 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156 (1994).\nIllinois has no statutory requirement that officers must knock and announce their authority, and the failure of police to do so is not a constitutional violation per se. People v. Saechao, 129 Ill. 2d 522, 531 (1989). However, compliance with the knock-and-announce rule is an important consideration in determining the reasonableness of police entry into a private dwelling to make an arrest or to conduct a search. Saechao, 129 Ill. 2d at 531. In certain instances, such as where there exist exigent circumstances or where compliance with the rule would be useless, police need not knock and announce their authority. People v. Condon, 148 Ill. 2d 96, 102 (1992).\nIn this case, approximately 10 seconds elapsed between when the police announced themselves and when they broke open the defendant\u2019s door. We believe that 10 seconds was sufficient here, given that a large amount of cocaine was possibly located inside the home and one or more residents were possibly present. We note that several other reviewing courts have upheld searches where a similar amount of time was at issue. See Kelver, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 156 (search was reasonable where 10 seconds elapsed between the time police announced themselves and entered); see also People v. Cobb, 97 Ill. 2d 465, 487 (1983) (search was reasonable where 15 seconds elapsed between the time police announced themselves and entered); People v. Mathes, 69 Ill. App. 3d 275, 279 (1979) (same).\nThe defendant\u2019s next contention on appeal is that he was not convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that Petty\u2019s testimony was incredible and inconsistent, and the State offered no evidence to corroborate Petty\u2019s version of events.\nIt is not the function of the reviewing court to retry a defendant when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). A criminal conviction will not be set aside on the grounds of insufficient evidence unless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1990). The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261. The determination of the weight to be given to the witnesses\u2019 testimony, their credibility, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are the responsibility of the fact finder. People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1991); Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261.\nThe crime of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver is defined as follows:\n\u201c\u00a7401. Except as authorized by this Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly to: (i) manufacture or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled or counterfeit substance ***.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2002).\nTo support a charge of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, the State must prove that (1) the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the narcotics; (2) the narcotics were in the defendant\u2019s immediate and exclusive control; and (3) the defendant intended to sell or deliver the narcotics. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 407 (1995); People v. Cooper, 337 Ill. App. 3d 106, 110-11 (2003). The elements of knowledge, possession, and intent are questions of fact that are rarely susceptible to direct proof. Cooper, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 110-11.\nThe accused\u2019s knowledge may be shown by evidence of his acts, declarations, or conduct from which the inference may be fairly drawn that he knew of the existence of the controlled substance at the place where it was found. Cooper, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 110. Possession may be either actual or constructive. Cooper, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 110. Constructive possession exists where there is an intent and a capability to maintain control and dominion over the narcotics and may be proved by showing that the defendant controlled the premises where the narcotics were found. Cooper, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 110. Intent to deliver a controlled substance may be inferred from the amount of the substance possessed, where the amount could not reasonably be viewed as designed for personal consumption. People v. Gonzalez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 607, 616 (2000).\nIn this case, the State showed the requisite knowledge, possession, and intent. Police testified to finding a large quantity of cocaine in the defendant\u2019s bedroom, under the bed and in a vanity. Some of the cocaine was uncut and some had been divided into plastic baggies. Police also found a scale. Police were able to smell the cocaine upon entering the defendant\u2019s bedroom. Petty testified that he had observed the defendant\u2019s cocaine and had purchased some the day before the search warrant was executed. Petty explained that he tipped police off to the defendant\u2019s cocaine after he got caught selling cocaine to the police. Finally, Petty remained in custody until after the search warrant was executed. Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant unlawfully possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver.\nAlthough the defendant\u2019s and his witnesses\u2019 version of events was much different from that of Petty, it was the prerogative of the jury to conclude that Petty\u2019s version was more credible. See Tye, 141 Ill. 2d at 13. A verdict may not be lightly set aside merely because the trier of fact chose to believe the testimony presented by the State. People v. Abrams, 109 Ill. App. 3d 901, 906 (1982). Indeed, a conviction will not be reversed simply because the defendant tells the reviewing court that a witness was not credible. People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 299 (1995). In this case, the jury\u2019s acceptance of Petty\u2019s version of events was not so unreasonable. The record reveals that the street value of the cocaine found in the defendant\u2019s house was $52,800. It would be remarkable for Petty, who struggled to pay his $100-per-week rent, to obtain such a large quantity of cocaine and for such a large quantity of cocaine to go unnoticed in the defendant\u2019s bedroom.\nFinally, the defendant contends that several trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. The defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in not granting him a continuance to prepare for Petty\u2019s testimony; (2) the trial court erred in precluding him from questioning Petty regarding a 1994 indictment for delivery of a controlled substance that was dismissed; (3) Petty\u2019s testimony that the defendant had sold him cocaine on 15 occasions was inadmissable other-crimes evidence; (4) the State erred in questioning Petty, and in commenting during closing argument, on the affidavit Petty signed; (5) the State improperly questioned him regarding why he did not assert an alibi; and (6) the State improperly vouched for the credibility of Petty during its rebuttal argument.\nWe address each of these arguments in turn, starting with the trial court\u2019s refusal to grant a continuance. The basic principle involved on the issue of a request for a continuance is whether the attorney in a criminal case was given sufficient time to prepare for trial. People v. Canaday, 49 Ill. 2d 416, 427 (1971). What is a reasonable time for the preparation of a case and what time should be granted counsel for that purpose must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. People v. Gore, 6 Ill. App. 3d 51, 55-56 (1972). The period of time allowed need not be lengthy as long as it is sufficient to give an accused and his counsel an opportunity to prepare. Gore, 6 Ill. App. 3d at 56. The question of whether the defendant\u2019s attorney was afforded ample time to prepare for trial rests within the discretion of the trial judge and the determinations of such trial judge should be upheld unless there is evidence of an abuse of such discretion. People v. Thomas, 176 Ill. App. 3d 514, 519 (1988).\nIn this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The record reveals that both the State and the defendant believed that Petty would be unavailable to testify as a witness at the trial, due to Petty asserting his constitutional right to remain silent. However, on the second day of the trial, the State and Petty finalized a negotiated plea, which allowed Petty to testify. When the State announced that Petty was to testify, the defendant objected, claiming that he needed more time to prepare and was unaware of what Petty might say on the stand. The trial court declined to continue the case, but did recess for an extended lunch to allow the defendant to interview Petty.\nWe believe that the time granted by the trial court was sufficient. The defendant had known for some time that Petty was the confidential informant and had known Petty\u2019s version of the events from the affidavit that Petty had signed. The extended lunch break allowed the defendant an opportunity to interview Petty and determine if his story had changed. The defendant even had the foresight to call Ronald Nanstiel and Geoff Knoezer as witnesses to counter Petty\u2019s testimony. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting a continuance.\nWe next address whether the trial court erred in precluding the defendant from questioning Petty about a 1994 indictment for delivery of cocaine that was dismissed. The law on this issue is well settled. A defendant may impeach a witness by attacking the witness\u2019s character with proof of a conviction of a crime that is punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more or that involves dishonesty or false statements. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 309 (1997). However, only actual convictions may be used for this purpose. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d at 309. Proof of arrests, indictments, charges, or the actual commission of a crime is not admissible. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d at 309. As such, the trial court did not err in precluding the defendant from questioning Petty about the indictment.\nNext, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly permitted Petty to testify that the defendant had sold him cocaine on 15 occasions. The defendant has waived this contention because he did not contemporaneously object during trial. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Even absent the waiver, there was no error. The defendant\u2019s objection likely would have been overruled.\nThe general rule is that evidence of crimes other than those charged is inadmissible. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). This general rule is premised on the belief that such evidence overpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he or she is a bad person deserving of punishment. People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137 (1980). However, evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate anything other than a propensity to commit crime, including:\n\u201c[A]mong other things, modus operandi, motive, knowledge, intent, absence of mistake or accident, defendant\u2019s state of mind, absence of an innocent mind frame or the presence of criminal intent, circumstances or context of defendant\u2019s arrest, placement of defendant in proximity to the time and place of the crime, identification of the weapon used in a crime, consciousness of guilt, to show a common design, scheme or plan, circumstances of a crime charged that would otherwise be unclear, whether a crime charged was actually committed, opportunity or preparation, a defendant\u2019s dislike or attitude toward the victim, to explain an otherwise implausible fact relating to the crime charged, to contradict on rebuttal a defendant\u2019s denials, to disprove a defense of entrapment and to disprove an alibi defense.\u201d People v. Millighan, 265 Ill. App. 3d 967, 972-73 (1994).\nPetty\u2019s testimony here was relevant to show that the defendant knowingly possessed the drugs inside his house. We note that in People v. Cole, 29 Ill. 2d 501, 504 (1963), the supreme court upheld similar evidence concerning a defendant\u2019s prior narcotics transactions, reasoning that it was relevant to show the defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge.\nThe defendant next argues that the State erred in questioning Petty about and in commenting on the affidavit. He argues that the affidavit constituted an inadmissable prior consistent statement. Again, the defendant has waived this argument because he did not object at the trial. See Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. Nonetheless, we disagree with defendant. Generally, prior consistent statements are permitted solely for rehabilitative purposes and not as substantive evidence. People v. Lambert, 288 Ill. App. 3d 450, 457 (1997). In this case, we do not believe that a prior consistent statement was allowed.\nDuring the questioning of Petty, the following colloquy took place regarding the affidavit:\n\u201cASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY BEADERSTADT: I\u2019m going to show you People\u2019s exhibit 13. Do you recognize what that is?\nPETTY: Yes, I do.\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY BEADERSTADT: What is it?\nPETTY: That\u2019s the affidavit I signed in front of the judge.\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY BEADERSTADT: Okay. Is it a fair and accurate copy of that affidavit you certified in front of the court?\nPETTY: Yes, I did.\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY BEADERSTADT: Is that your signature on the signature line?\nPETTY: The John Doe?\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY BEADERSTADT: Yes.\nPETTY: Yes.\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY BEADERSTADT: You signed that?\nPETTY: Yes, I did.\u201d\nDuring closing argument, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Beaderstadt stated as follows:\n\u201c[Petty] told Judge Condon in this case what he believed the facts were. And he told him in that sworn statement, in that sworn affidavit that he received those drugs from [the defendant] at the house of 371 Cornell Drive in Algonquin.\u201d\nAs is clear, there was no prior consistent statement admitted. The affidavit itself was not admitted. Petty was merely questioned about it, without objection from the defendant, and the State made only brief mention of it during its closing statement.\nLast, we address the defendant\u2019s final arguments concerning prosecutorial misconduct. The defendant contends that the State improperly questioned him regarding why he did not have an alibi the night that the search of his house was conducted. Although we believe that the State\u2019s line of questioning was improper, we do not believe that the defendant was prejudiced. Alibi was not a defense to the crime for which the defendant was charged. The defendant\u2019s whereabouts the night the warrant was executed were inconsequential in this case.\nThe defendant also contends that the State improperly vouched for the credibility of Petty. The defendant cites to the following passage from the State\u2019s rebuttal argument:\n\u201cWhy would we want to go through the expense of having a trial, putting police officers on who have years of experience, years of dedication, years of a career to flush all that down the toilet to prosecute two innocent people[?]\u201d\nNothing in this passage resembles vouching for the credibility of a witness. In sum, we find the defendant\u2019s claims of prosecutorial misconduct to be meritless.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY, EJ., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas C. Brandstrader, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Louis A. Bianchi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL MOSER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201404\u20140477\nOpinion filed May 18, 2005.\nRehearing denied May 20, 2005.\nThomas C. Brandstrader, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLouis A. Bianchi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0900-01", "first_page_order": 918, "last_page_order": 933 }