{ "id": 3748602, "name": "BRAD LIEBERMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director, Department of Human Services, Treatment/Detention Facility, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Lieberman v. Budz", "decision_date": "2005-04-08", "docket_number": "No. 3-04-0537", "first_page": "932", "last_page": "940", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 932" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "24 Ill. Reg. 65", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 1054", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208116 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/1054-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 N.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 968", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980644 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0968-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799378 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "815 N.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 1135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/1135-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150159 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/1090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 574, "char_count": 18098, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.11012031975609389 }, "sha256": "f74dfa28ea8cced458c04b47249d8ac7d3dd3d0f33d41951af95903cfeb75838", "simhash": "1:7d81f51c02743d91", "word_count": 2994 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:02.423948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRAD LIEBERMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director, Department of Human Services, Treatment/Detention Facility, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 2000, the Cook County circuit court ordered the petitioner, Brad Lieberman, to be civilly detained (725 ILCS 207/30 (West 2002)) pending trial for commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2002)). Initially, Lieberman was detained at the Sheridan Correctional Center, but later he was transferred to a secure facility in Joliet. In 2003, Lieberman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Will County circuit court, naming Timothy Budz, the facility director for the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS), as the respondent. The trial court granted the respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2002)) and denied Lieberman\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nOn appeal, Lieberman argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to reconsider because (1) the Cook County court violated section 25(c)(1) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/25(c)(l) (West 2002)) by holding a detention hearing without Lieberman being present; (2) the DHS was not authorized by the detention order to transfer him from the Sheridan facility to the Joliet facility; (3) the detention order was improperly based on an \u201cout-dated\u201d mental health evaluation; and (4) his due process rights are being violated because he is currently detained at the Joliet facility with others adjudicated to be sexually violent persons without the court holding either a probable cause hearing or a trial to determine whether he is a sexually violent person. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe record does not contain a copy of the State\u2019s petition seeking Lieberman\u2019s civil commitment as a sexually violent person under the Act. However, the record indicates that such a petition was filed with the Cook County circuit court on January 5, 2000.\nOn January 6, 2000, the Cook County court held a proceeding to consider whether Lieberman should be detained under the Act. Lieberman was not present at that proceeding. During the proceeding, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney said, \u201cI will ask the Court, I know the Court has reviewed this petition. I am asking the Court to find that *** there is cause to \u2014 Brad Lieberman is eligible for petition under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act; and that the Court, today, issue an order for his detention.\u201d The judge stated that the court would issue the detention order.\nOn January 8, 2000, the Cook County court issued its detention order. In the order, the court directed the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) to detain Lieberman and then to \u201ctransfer [Lieberman] to the Sexually Violent Persons Treatment and Detention Center at Sheridan Correctional Center.\u201d\nLieberman filed his habeas petition on December 16, 2003, with the Will County circuit court. In his petition, Lieberman stated that the DHS had transferred him from the Sheridan facility to \u201cthe Joliet Correctional Center-Annex which is the \u2018Secure Residential Facility For Sexually Violent Persons.\u2019 \u201d In the petition, Lieberman made the same arguments that he is making on appeal.\nOn March 15, 2004, the State filed its section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss Lieberman\u2019s petition on Budz\u2019 behalf. The court issued its order granting the dismissal motion on March 21, 2004. Concerning Lieberman\u2019s first argument, the trial court wrote, \u201cMr. Lieberman\u2019s complaint *** is *** directed at *** the initial review by the Court under Subsection 207/30(a). This type of review is not unlike the Court\u2019s initial review of a postconviction petition *** and due process does not require the Petitioner\u2019s presence.\u201d\nThe trial court denied Lieberman\u2019s motion to reconsider. Lieberman appealed.\nANALYSIS\nHabeas corpus relief is available where a person who is in civil custody is entitled to immediate release. Turner v. Campagna, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 667 N.E.2d 683 (1996). A writ of habeas corpus is available to obtain the immediate release of a person (1) who is in custody under a judgment of a court which lacked jurisdiction; or (2) when there has been some occurrence subsequent to the person being taken into custody which entitled him to release. Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 704 N.E.2d 350 (1998).\nIn a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether the allegations of the petition, when viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Morissette v. Briley, 326 Ill. App. 3d 590, 761 N.E.2d 333 (2001).\nWe review a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Stringer v. Packaging Corp. of America, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 815 N.E.2d 476 (2004).\nI. Section 25(c)(1) Violation\nLieberman contends that the Cook County court violated section 25(c)(1) of the Act by holding a detention hearing without Lieberman being present.\nSection 25(c)(1) states that \u201cat any hearing conducted under [the] Act, the person who is the subject of the petition has the right to *** be present,\u201d with exceptions that are not applicable to this case. 725 ILCS 207/25(c)(l) (West 2002). Regarding detention proceedings, the Act states that \u201c[u]pon the filing of a petition ***, the court shall review the petition to determine whether to issue an order for detention of the person who is the subject of the petition. The person shall be detained only if there is cause to believe that the person is eligible for commitment.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/30(a) (West 2002).\nTo decide Lieberman\u2019s issue, we must determine whether a detention proceeding held according to section 30(a) of the Act constitutes a \u201chearing\u201d under the meaning of section 25(c)(1). According to this court\u2019s research, this specific issue is a matter of first impression. The issue involves the statutory construction of provisions in the Act.\nThe initial rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. The best indication of that intent is the statute\u2019s language, which must be given its plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. A court will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the express intent of the legislature. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127 (2003).\nIn the instant case, after the State filed its petition, the Cook County court held a proceeding under section 30(a) of the Act to determine if Lieberman should be detained. The plain language of section 30(a) states that in such a proceeding, the court is to \u201creview\u201d the petition.\nSection 30(a) explicitly uses the term \u201creview\u201d rather than the term \u201chearing.\u201d By contrast, section 30(b) refers to the next stage under the Act as a probable cause \u201chearing.\u201d See 725 ILCS 207/30(b) (West 2002). Then, if the court finds that there is probable cause at that \u201chearing,\u201d the matter proceeds to a \u201ctrial\u201d to determine if the subject of the petition is to be committed as a \u201csexually violent person,\u201d as defined by the Act. See 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 2002).\nLieberman submits that the detention proceeding in this case was a \u201chearing\u201d because (1) the State and the trial court referred to the proceeding as a \u201chearing\u201d in various court documents and at other proceedings; and (2) the State advocated that Lieberman be detained during the detention proceeding.\nWe reject Lieberman\u2019s first subargument that the proceeding was a \u201chearing\u201d because the State and the trial court referred to it as a \u201chearing.\u201d We look to the intent of our legislature by examining the plain language of the statute, rather than by examining language used by the State or the trial court when referring to the proceeding. Our legislature explicitly used the term \u201creview\u201d rather than \u201chearing\u201d in section 30(a). We will not read an exception, limitation, or condition into section 30(a) because of language used by the State or the trial court. See Carver, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127.\nWe also disagree with Lieberman\u2019s second subargument that the proceeding was a \u201chearing,\u201d under the meaning of the term in section 25(c)(1), because during the proceeding the State advocated that he be detained. Nothing in the plain language of the Act or in case law suggests that the State is prohibited from asking the trial judge to order detention under section 30(a) after the court has \u201creviewed\u201d the petition. Again, we will not read such an exception, limitation, or condition into the statute. See Carver, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127.\nThe trial judge in this case drew an analogy between a section 30(a) proceeding and the first-stage review of a postconviction petition (see 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 2002)). At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial court is to \u201cexamine\u201d the petition without input from either the defense or the prosecution. See 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1(a) (West 2002); People v. Patton, 315 Ill. App. 3d 968, 735 N.E.2d 185 (2000).\nHowever, we find a detention proceeding conducted under section 30(a) of the Act (in the civil context) to be more nearly analogous to a proceeding where the State is seeking an arrest warrant (in the criminal context) than to the first stage of a postconviction proceeding. At a first-stage postconviction proceeding, the court is to examine the petition without any input from the State, whereas, at an arrest warrant proceeding, the prosecution is expected to have input. See 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 9 (West 2002).\nThe trial court\u2019s analogy, in this case, was flawed to some extent because the State had input at the detention proceeding, which would be prohibited at the first stage of postconviction proceedings. Nonetheless, we can affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal based on section 2 \u2014 615 for any reason supported by the record, regardless of the trial court\u2019s reasoning. See Aboufariss v. City of De Kalb, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1054, 713 N.E.2d 804 (1999).\nBecause of the nature of an arrest warrant proceeding, an accused is not present when the State asks the court to issue the warrant pending further criminal proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 9 (West 2002). It follows by analogy that a person named in a petition under the Act need not be present in the proceeding in which the State seeks to have the person detained pending a probable cause \u201chearing.\u201d\nFor the reasons articulated above, we hold that the Cook County circuit court did not violate Lieberman\u2019s section 25(c)(1) right to be present at all \u201chearings\u201d even though Lieberman was not present at the detention proceeding held under section 30(a) of the Act.\nII. Transfer Not Authorized by Detention Order\nLieberman argues that DHS was not authorized by the detention order to transfer him from the Sheridan facility to the Joliet facility. He contends that the order only authorized his detention at the Sheridan facility.\nSection 30(a) of the Act states that \u201c[a] person detained under this Section shall be held in a facility approved by the [DHS]. If the person *** is in a [DOC] correctional facility ***, and the court orders detention under this Section, the court shall order that the person be transferred to a detention facility approved by the [DHS].\u201d 725 ILCS 207/30(a) (West 2002).\nIn this case, the trial court followed the plain language of section 30(a) by ordering the DOC to transfer Lieberman to a detention facility approved by the DHS, that is, the Sheridan facility. The plain language of section 30(a) does not say that DHS may only detain the person at the facility listed in the court\u2019s detention order. Section 30(a) also does not state that the DHS is prohibited from transferring a detainee from one DHS-approved facility to another DHS-approved facility. We will not read such exceptions, limitations, or conditions into the statute. See Carver, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127. Section 30(a) only specifies that the person shall be detained in a facility approved by the DHS.\nWe rule, therefore, that the DHS did not violate section 30(a) of the Act by transferring Lieberman from the Sheridan facility to the Joliet facility.\nIII. \u201cOut-dated\u201d Mental Health Evaluation\nLieberman submits that the Cook County court\u2019s 2000 detention order was improperly based on an \u201cout-dated\u201d 1999 mental health evaluation.\nAs we discussed above, the Act authorizes the trial court to order detention of the person who is the subject of the petition, pending a probable cause hearing, after the court has reviewed the petition. See 725 ILCS 207/30(a), (b) (West 2002). The Act does not require that the petition include, or be accompanied by, a mental health evaluation. See 725 ILCS 207/15 (West 2002).\nAfter the court has reviewed the petition, the court may order the person\u2019s detention \u201conly if there is cause to believe that the person is eligible for commitment\u201d under the Act. 725 ILCS 207/30(a) (West 2002). Section 30(a) neither requires the court to consider nor prohibits the court from considering a mental health evaluation in its determination concerning \u201ccause to believe that the person is eligible for commitment.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/30(a) (West 2002).\nBy contrast, other stages in the proceedings under the Act require such an evaluation. For example, if the trial court determines, after a hearing, that there is probable cause that the person is a sexually violent person, \u201cthe court *** shall order the person to be transferred *** to an appropriate facility for an evaluation as to whether the person is a sexually violent person.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/30(c) (West 2002). Such an evaluation, however, is not part of the plain language of section 30(a).\nIn the instant case, nothing in the plain language of section 30(a) required the Cook County court to consider a mental health evaluation in making its detention determination. Also, nothing in section 30(a) prohibited the Cook County court from considering a 1999 mental health evaluation in making its 2000 detention determination. We will not read such exceptions, limitations, or conditions into the statute. See Carver, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 787 N.E.2d 127. Therefore, we hold that the Cook County court did not err by issuing its 2000 detention order after considering a 1999 mental health evaluation.\nIV Detention in a Secure Facility\nLieberman argues that his due process rights are being violated because he is currently detained at the Joliet facility with others adjudicated to be sexually violent persons without the trial court having held either a probable cause hearing or a trial to determine whether he is a sexually violent person. Specifically, he contends that he is being detained in a secure facility that, under section 50 of the Act, is reserved for persons who have been committed as sexually violent persons. Lieberman claims that by contrast, section 30(a) only requires detention in a facility approved by DHS, but not a secure facility under section 50. He also submits that the Illinois Administrative Code (Code) mandates that \u201cdetained persons shall be kept separate from committed persons.\u201d 59 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 299.200, as amended by 24 Ill. Reg. 65-67 (eff. April 5, 2000).\nLieberman is incorrect that a secure facility, under section 50 of the Act, is reserved for persons who have been committed as sexually violent persons. Section 50(c) refers to \u201ca person held in detention in a secure facility or committed as a sexually violent person and held in a secure facility.\u201d 725 ILCS 207/50(c) (West 2002). Under the plain language of the statute, our legislature intended that both detained persons and committed persons would be held in secure facilities.\nLieberman also is incorrect that the Code mandates the separation of detained persons from committed persons at secure facilities. Lieberman\u2019s error becomes apparent when the passage he quoted is placed in context.\nThe Code states that the \u201c[DHS] may utilize a secure residential facility as a detention facility [under the Act]. To the extent possible considering operational, programmatic and security needs, detained persons shall be kept separate from committed persons.\u201d 59 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 299.200, as amended by 24 Ill. Reg. 65-67 (eff. April 5, 2000). When placed in context, the passage quoted by Lieberman is conditional. In other words, the Code permits the DHS not to separate committed persons and detained persons in secure facilities after considering operational, programmatic, or security needs.\nNeither the Act nor the Code requires detainees to be held in DHS facilities other than secure facilities. Therefore, we rule that Lieberman\u2019s due process rights are not being violated because he is being detained at the Joliet facility with persons committed as sexually violent persons.\nCONCLUSION\nLieberman\u2019s habeas corpus petition failed to show that he is entitled to immediate release because (1) the Cook County court lacked jurisdiction to issue the detention order; or (2) there has been some occurrence subsequent to Lieberman\u2019s detention which entitled him to release. See Barney, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 704 N.E.2d 350. When viewed in the light most favorable to Lieberman, his allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action upon which habeas relief can be granted. See Morissette, 326 Ill. App. 3d 590, 761 N.E.2d 333. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lieberman\u2019s motion to reconsider the section 2 \u2014 615 dismissal of his petition. See Stringer, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 815 N.E.2d 476.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Will County circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nLYTTON and SCHMIDT, JJ. concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Brad Lieberman, of Joliet State Prison-Annex, of Joliet, appellant pro se.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and David H. Iskowich and Linda Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRAD LIEBERMAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director, Department of Human Services, Treatment/Detention Facility, Respondent-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201404\u20140537\nOpinion filed April 8, 2005.\nBrad Lieberman, of Joliet State Prison-Annex, of Joliet, appellant pro se.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and David H. Iskowich and Linda Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0932-01", "first_page_order": 950, "last_page_order": 958 }