{ "id": 3749401, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN J. O'MALLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. O'Malley", "decision_date": "2005-05-06", "docket_number": "No. 2-04-0329", "first_page": "1038", "last_page": "1048", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 1038" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461527 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172429 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490485 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333148 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2500307 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E. 2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3075981 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 1008", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2970081 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/1008-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8449012 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "to avoid waiver, a party must raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "to avoid waiver, a party must raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "to avoid waiver, a party must raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5434916 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the court's function is to enforce the statute as enacted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132341 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569711 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58928 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477662 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536114 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0091-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 999, "char_count": 25935, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.506811487563692e-08, "percentile": 0.4001418615525461 }, "sha256": "9573ff40e82e1aaaa5554a485dc64cc141606b70e278f3423fca1c6bf382b1d0", "simhash": "1:9b89a1ec4a4953cc", "word_count": 4361 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:18:02.423948+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN J. O\u2019MALLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAPALA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial before the circuit court of Lake County, defendant, John J. O\u2019Malley, was found guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2002)) and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204(a) (West 2002)), as well as two other traffic offenses. Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer; (2) that he was wrongfully convicted of resisting or obstructing a peace officer; and (3) that the sentence of probation for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer should be vacated. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. However, we vacate the sentences imposed for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and we remand for resentencing.\nI. FACTS\nDefendant was charged with unlawful possession of not more than 2.5 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 2002)), resisting or obstructing a peace officer by failing to place his hands on his vehicle (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2002)), resisting or obstructing a peace officer by failing to move his feet into position to facilitate a pat-down search (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2002)), speeding (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 601(b) (West 2002)); fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204(a) (West 2002)), failing to carry and exhibit his driver\u2019s license (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112 (West 2002)), and driving under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014 501(a)(4) (West 2002)). Defendant, who is licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois, pleaded not guilty to all charges, waived his right to trial by jury, and elected to represent himself during the bench trial.\nLieutenant John Jansky of the Lake County sheriffs department testified that at about 10:15 a.m. on September 11, 2003, he was in a marked squad car headed east on Belvidere Road (IL Route 120), on his way to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office in Waukegan. Jansky was traveling in the left lane of Belvidere Road at a speed of approximately 50 to 54 miles per hour when a black Mercedes traveling in the right lane passed his squad car. Jansky \u201cpaced\u201d the speed of the Mercedes at 70 miles per hour by traveling behind the Mercedes at a constant distance for several hundred feet and observing his squad car\u2019s speedometer. The posted speed limit on Belvidere Road at that location was 50 miles per hour. After determining the speed of the Mercedes, Jansky activated the squad car\u2019s rotating red lights, flashing headlights, blue and red strobe lights, and in-car video system. At that point, the Mercedes moved from the right lane to the left lane such that it was traveling directly in front of the squad car. Jansky indicated that the squad car\u2019s lights were activated near the Lakehurst Road intersection. When asked if he activated the squad car\u2019s siren, Jansky said, \u201c[a]t that point no.\u201d\nThe driver of the Mercedes did not respond to the squad car\u2019s lights. Next, Jansky observed the Mercedes\u2019 brake lights activate and the Mercedes slow to about 60 miles per hour, only to accelerate again. The Mercedes repeated this pattern several times. Jansky said that they then passed under the Route 41 or Route 43 overpass and entered an \u201cS\u201d curve. Jansky noticed the Mercedes drive on top of the outside lane marker and then move to the right, driving on top of the lines dividing the right and left lanes. Jansky said that there was no indication that the driver of the Mercedes intended to pull over. When the Mercedes reached a red light at the Knight Avenue intersection, Jan-sky was able to maneuver his squad car around the left side of the Mercedes and put his squad car in front of the Mercedes at an angle that prevented the Mercedes from continuing any further.\nAlthough not included in the record on appeal, a videotape from Jansky\u2019s squad car\u2019s video system was played at trial. Jansky indicated that the video depicts about one minute of footage of the Mercedes driving on Belvidere Road between Lakehurst Road and Knight Avenue.\nJansky testified further that, after stopping the Mercedes, he approached its driver\u2019s-side window and told defendant to exit the vehicle. Defendant did not comply. Jansky said that he told defendant to exit the vehicle a second time, and defendant did not comply. With Jansky\u2019s third command to exit the vehicle, defendant looked at Jan-sky, sat there for 10 seconds, then started to exit in a dazed condition and stumbled as he did so. Jansky said that defendant started to fall over, so he and Commander Vandergriff of the Lake Zurich police department held defendant up. Jansky explained that Vandergriff was also on his way to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office that morning, but was traveling in a separate vehicle. Jansky told defendant to place his hands on the front left fender of the Mercedes, and defendant did not comply. When ordered again, defendant again failed to comply. As Jan-sky and Vandergriff moved toward defendant, defendant turned around and placed his hands on the Mercedes. Jansky said that he told defendant to move his feet backward so that defendant could be patted down, and defendant did not comply. Jansky said that he had to physically move defendant\u2019s feet back. After further investigation, including field sobriety testing and the discovery of suspected cannabis seeds and leaves on the Mercedes\u2019 front seats and driver\u2019s-door map pocket, Jansky placed defendant under arrest for driving under the influence of drugs. Thereafter, defendant refused to submit to a blood or urine test.\nOn cross-examination, Jansky agreed that the squad car he was driving on the morning in question was equipped with a working siren and that he did not activate it while behind the Mercedes. Jansky admitted that defendant ultimately did get out of the Mercedes and that Jansky did not have to pull defendant out. Jansky admitted further that defendant ultimately obeyed all his commands and did nothing physically to harm him or any other officer at the scene.\nA plastic bag containing the substance recovered from defendant\u2019s Mercedes was admitted into evidence at trial along with a report prepared at the Northern Illinois Crime Laboratory indicating that the substance weighed 0.09 grams and contained cannabis. Defendant stipulated that the substance was found in his vehicle and to the chain of custody, and he had no objection to the admission of the substance into evidence. Defendant also stipulated to the authenticity and admission into evidence of the lab report.\nDuring his case, defendant testified that he was driving on Belvidere Road on the morning in question on his way to the Lake County courthouse. Defendant said that he was late for court. Defendant admitted that he exceeded the speed limit, but he denied being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Defendant said that he never saw the marijuana that was recovered from his Mercedes until Jansky showed it to him at the courthouse. Defendant testified that he passed all the field sobriety tests that were administered and that his physical agility was not impaired.\nOn cross-examination, defendant admitted that he did not have his driver\u2019s license on his person on the morning in question. Defendant said that he did not see the squad car\u2019s lights until he stopped at the red light and the squad car pulled around in front of his vehicle. Defendant added that he did not have his rearview mirror properly adjusted and that he would have realized that Jansky was attempting to pull him over had Jansky utilized the siren. Defendant said that he only hesitated when Jansky told him to put his hands on the Mercedes and that there was no undue delay. Defendant said that it was possible that Jansky had to tell him more than once to put his hands on the vehicle. Defendant said that he moved slowly when Jan-sky asked him to move his feet back. Defendant admitted that Jansky may have touched him to move his feet back.\nAfter hearing the foregoing evidence and closing arguments, the trial court found defendant not guilty of unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 2002)), resisting or obstructing a peace officer (failure to place his hands on the vehicle) (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2002)), and driving under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(4) (West 2002)). The trial court found defendant guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer (failure to move his feet to facilitate a pat-down search) (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2002)); speeding (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 601(b) (West 2002)); fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204(a) (West 2002)); and failing to carry and exhibit a driver\u2019s license (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112 (West 2002)). On the same date, the trial court placed defendant on 18 months of court supervision on the resisting or obstructing a peace officer charge and on 18 months of probation on the fleeing or attempting to elude charge, and the court entered convictions, with court costs assessed, on the speeding and failure to carry and exhibit a driver\u2019s license charges. Thereafter, defendant\u2019s posttrial motion was denied. Defendant has filed a timely notice of appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police Officer\nFirst, defendant asks us to reverse his conviction of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer because, he contends, the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense when it failed to show that the police officer activated his horn or siren while driving behind defendant\u2019s Mercedes. In response, the State argues that activation of a siren or horn is unnecessary to sustain a conviction of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. We agree with the State.\nThe determination of the essential elements of a criminal offense presents an issue of statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 97 (1999). The best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language of the statute itself. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 97. There is no rule of construction that allows a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997). Thus, \u201c[wjhere the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction.\u201d People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 261 (1994). Questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002).\nThe relevant version of section 11 \u2014 204(a) provided:\n\u201c(a) Any driver or operator of a motor vehicle who, having been given a visual or audible signal by a peace officer directing such driver or operator to bring his vehicle to a stop, wilfully fails or refuses to obey such direction, increases his speed, extinguishes his lights, or otherwise flees or attempts to elude the officer, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The signal given by the peace officer may be by hand, voice, siren, red or blue light. Provided, the officer giving such signal shall be in police uniform, and, if driving a vehicle, such vehicle shall display illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights which when used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate the vehicle to be an official police vehicle. Such requirement shall not preclude the use of amber or white oscillating, rotating or flashing lights in conjunction with red or blue oscillating, rotating or flashing lights as required in Section 12 \u2014 215 of Chapter 12.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204(a) (West 2002).\nDefendant highlights the phrase, \u201cwhich when used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren,\u201d and argues that the statute thereby expressly and unequivocally mandates that the flashing lights be used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren so that the motorist will realize that the vehicle behind his is an official police vehicle. We disagree because the statute contains no such mandate.\nThe statute contemplates a police officer giving a motorist either an audible or visual signal to bring the motorist\u2019s vehicle to a stop. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204(a) (West 2002). However, in the special circumstance where the officer giving the motorist the signal to stop is in a vehicle, the statute requires that the signal be in the visual form of \u201cilluminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 204(a) (West 2002). The word \u201cshall\u201d is generally construed as mandatory language. People v. Felella, 131 Ill. 2d 525, 539 (1989). As such, the signal to stop in this situation must, at minimum, be in the form of \u201cilluminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights.\u201d The sentence following the description of the lights explains that the illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights must be such that \u201cwhen used in conjunction with an audible horn or siren would indicate the vehicle to be an official police vehicle.\u201d Thus, the language regarding the horn or siren merely describes the type of lights that must be used to effectuate a stop. The legislature did not use the word \u201cshall\u201d or other mandatory language requiring that the horn or siren be used in conjunction with the illuminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights. As we wrote in People v. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d 175, 177 (2001): \u201cWe are not free to rewrite the language of the legislature, which speaks for itself. See People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d 366, 369 (1976) (where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the court\u2019s function is to enforce the statute as enacted).\u201d Consequently, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that the State failed to prove an essential element of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s finding of guilty of that charge.\nDefendant also argues that this court\u2019s decision in Murdock is directly on point. We disagree. In Murdock, we held that proof that the pursuing officer was wearing a uniform is an essential element of the offense and that it was lacking. Murdock, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 177. We did not decide whether an officer who is driving a vehicle and giving a motorist a signal to stop must use a horn or siren in addition to utilizing \u201cilluminated oscillating, rotating or flashing red or blue lights.\u201d We do note, however, that the legislature used the word \u201cshall\u201d when it referenced the police uniform requirement but not in its reference to the horn or siren.\nB. Resisting or Obstructing a Peace Officer\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is in two parts. First, he contends that he was \u201cwrongfully convicted of resisting arrest where the trial court\u2019s judgment was at odds with its own stated findings of fact.\u201d Second, he contends that he was wrongfully convicted of resisting arrest where the trial court\u2019s judgment was \u201clogically inconsistent with its not guilty finding on a second count of resisting arrest.\u201d After stating this two-part contention in the heading to the second part of his appellate brief, defendant quotes a portion of Lieutenant Jansky\u2019s trial testimony regarding his interaction with defendant at the scene. He also quotes a portion of the assistant State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s closing argument during which the trial court interjected, \u201c[fit\u2019s one of the weakest obstructing a police officer charge[s] that I\u2019ve ever seen, other than giving a false name, and that\u2019s probably more obstructive.\u201d Next, apparently in support of the first part of this contention, defendant writes, \u201c[r]emarkably, after stating that this is one of the weakest cases he had ever seen and suggesting that it may have been overcharged, the Trial Judge found the Defendant guilty of the resisting charge related to not moving his feet when asked to do so by the officer.\u201d Remarkable or not, defendant does not identify the trial court\u2019s specific finding of fact that he believes is inconsistent with a finding of guilty, and he does not cite pertinent legal authority to support this contention. Consequently, it is waived. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. Davis, 213 Ill. 2d 459, 470 (2004) (to avoid waiver, a party must raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority).\nIn support of the second part of this appellate contention, defendant points out that the trial court found him not guilty of the other charge of resisting a peace officer, which alleged that defendant refused to comply with Jansky\u2019s order to place his hands on the vehicle. Defendant points out further that the two instances of alleged resisting, refusing to place his hands on the vehicle and refusing to move his feet backward to facilitate a pat-down search, occurred in immediate chronological and physical proximity to each other. Defendant does not explain, however, why these circumstances make a finding of guilty as to one charge of resisting a peace officer inconsistent with a finding of not guilty as to the other, and he does not cite pertinent legal authority in support of this contention. Consequently, it is waived. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Davis, 213 Ill. 2d at 470 (to avoid waiver, a party must raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority).\nNear the end of the section of his appellate brief dealing with his second contention, defendant adds the argument that his inability to quickly move his feet backward when ordered to do so was obviously the result of his dazed and confused condition and, therefore, not resisting arrest. In order to sustain a conviction of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly. 720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 1 (West 2002). \u201cConduct performed knowingly or with knowledge is performed wilfully, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 5(b) (West 2002). Although not identified as such in his brief, defendant is arguing that he did not knowingly resist or obstruct the officer and that, therefore, the State failed to prove an essential element of the offense. This argument is also waived, for the same reasons the previous contentions are waived.\nWaiver aside, we believe that this argument, even if made adequately, lacks merit. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Although there was evidence suggesting that defendant was in a dazed condition when he exited the Mercedes, there was other evidence, like defendant\u2019s successful completion of the one-leg-stand field sobriety test, that suggests that defendant was not in such a mental state that he could not timely comply with the officer\u2019s orders. As such, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we believe that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that defendant acted knowingly in refusing to move his feet backward to facilitate the pat-down search.\nDefendant also adds the generic argument that his conviction of resisting or obstructing a peace officer should be reversed because the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The sum total of this argument is as follows:\n\u201cWhile great deference is given to a Trial Judge\u2019s findings at a bench trial, there are special situations and circumstances that can warrant a reversal on reasonable doubt grounds. People v. Warren, 40 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 353 N.E.[2d] 625 (First Dist., 1976), People v. McCarthy, 102 Ill. App. 3d 519, 430 N.E. 2d 135 (First Dist., 1981), People v. Griffin, 29 Ill. App. 3d 581, 331 N.E.[2d] 131 (First Dist., 1975)[.]\nThe case at bar is one of those rare cases where the Bench Trial finding cannot stand the scrutiny of Appellate Review.\u201d\nDefendant does not identify the element of the offense that he claims was not sufficiently proven, nor does he in any manner explain how the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of this offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We deem this contention waived, as it is devoid of argument or citation to legal authority in contravention of the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)). See Davis, 213 Ill. 2d at 470 (to avoid waiver, a party must raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority). The appellate court is not a depository into which a party may dump the burden of research. People v. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d 82, 86 (1994). It is well settled that we are entitled to a well-reasoned argument, along with authority for such argument. Williams, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 86.\nC. Sentencing\nDefendant\u2019s final appellate contention is that his sentence of probation for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer should be vacated because the trial court committed plain error at the time of sentencing, where it erroneously believed that court supervision was not an authorized disposition for the offense and, consequently, sentenced defendant to a period of probation rather than court supervision. The State concedes that court supervision is an authorized disposition for a charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer but argues that the trial court\u2019s comments in imposing sentence on that charge do not show that the trial judge was clearly mistaken as to the available sentencing range. The State argues that the trial judge\u2019s comments could just as easily have been a statement finding that court supervision was not appropriate in this case. We disagree.\nWhen it imposed sentence on defendant for the fleeing or attempting to elude charge, the trial court said:\n\u201cI understood when the Court entered the finding of guilty on the fleeing charge that it would be non-probationable. It is not subject to Court supervision, I should say.\nAnd I\u2019m going to place the Defendant on a period of 18 months concurrent probation for that offense.\u201d\nClearly, the trial court was expressing its belief that the disposition of court supervision was not authorized by law when it said that the charge was not \u201csubject to\u201d it. The trial court clearly was not saying that, in its discretion, defendant was not entitled to court supervision. A trial court\u2019s misapprehension of a minimum sentence necessitates a new sentencing hearing when it appears that the trial court\u2019s misunderstanding arguably influenced the sentencing decision. People v. Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d 41, 48 (1979); People v. Hurley, 277 Ill. App. 3d 684, 687 (1996). In light of the fact that the trial court imposed a sentence of court supervision on the resisting or obstructing a peace officer charge, it is arguable that it would have done so with respect to the fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer charge had it not been laboring under the misconception that such disposition was unavailable. Therefore, we vacate defendant\u2019s sentence of probation on the fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer charge. We of course do not know whether the trial court would have granted court supervision on this charge and, in fact, some of the trial court\u2019s comments suggest that defendant\u2019s conduct in committing this offense was too serious to grant him court supervision. As such, we decline defendant\u2019s invitation to use our power under Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(4)) and impose a disposition of court supervision in place of the sentence of probation without remanding to the trial court.\nAs a final matter, although not raised by the State, we would be remiss in our duties were we to ignore the unauthorized disposition of court supervision imposed on the finding of guilt of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. A disposition of court supervision is not applicable to a defendant found guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer in violation of section 31 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code of 1961. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20141(c) (West 2002). A sentence that does not conform to a statutory requirement is void. People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d 19, 24 (2004). Reviewing courts have an independent duty to vacate void orders and may sua sponte declare orders void. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d at 27. Consequently, we also vacate the disposition of court supervision imposed on the finding of guilt of resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and we remand for resentencing.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County but vacate the sentence of probation imposed on the finding that defendant is guilty of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer. We also vacate the disposition of court supervision imposed on the finding that defendant is guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. We remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing on those findings of guilt.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.\nO\u2019MALLEY, EJ., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.\nIn his notice of appeal, defendant lists Lake County case Nos. 03 \u2014 TR\u2014 133806 (speeding) and 03 \u2014 TR\u2014133810 (failure to carry and exhibit a driver\u2019s license) but does not argue on appeal that the convictions or sentences imposed for these offenses were erroneous. These convictions and sentences are therefore affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KAPALA" } ], "attorneys": [ "John J. O\u2019Malley, of Chicago, appellant pro se.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Sabrina S. Henry, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN J. O\u2019MALLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201404\u20140329\nOpinion filed May 6, 2005.\nJohn J. O\u2019Malley, of Chicago, appellant pro se.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Lawrence M. Bauer and Sabrina S. Henry, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1038-01", "first_page_order": 1056, "last_page_order": 1066 }