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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "motion to dismiss" }, { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247-48", "parenthetical": "summary judgment" }, { "page": "247-48" }, { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578240 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491-92", "parenthetical": "summary judgment" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 798", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281430 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802" }, { "page": "803" }, { "page": "803" }, { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0798-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "\"Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant; however, uncontradicted evidence may overcome the prima facie case and defeat jurisdiction\"" }, { "page": "784" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3215554 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710", "parenthetical": "\"Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant; however, uncontradicted evidence may overcome the prima facie case and defeat jurisdiction\"" }, { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0707-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1631, "char_count": 44216, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6083924434156853e-07, "percentile": 0.8880733973293423 }, "sha256": "b5040a1d0ea5b773a2525d1c0a44d17e454d856a9ab20368bf12ebba8385a517", "simhash": "1:3bfbfd1ef643d70a", "word_count": 7093 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:31:24.775353+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAWN G. KOSTAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PINKUS DERMATOPATHOLOGY LABORATORY, P.C., et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, EC. (Pinkus), David A. Mehregan, M.D., and Darius R. Mehregan, M.D. (collectively, defendants), appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying their motion to quash service of summons and to dismiss plaintiff Dawn G. KostaPs fourth amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm and remand.\nBACKGROUND\nIn December 2001, plaintiff, an Illinois resident, visited her physician in Illinois. During that visit, her physician obtained tissue samples and sent them to Pinkus for analysis. Pinkus, a Michigan corporation, is a pathology laboratory that is operated on a national basis. Defendants provide expert diagnostic analysis by mail. Defendants processed and analyzed plaintiffs tissue samples in Michigan, drafted reports in Michigan and sent allegedly inaccurate reports to plaintiffs physician in Illinois.\nPlaintiff filed a medical negligence action alleging that, as a result of defendants\u2019 negligence, her care and treatment were delayed, requiring extensive medical procedures, and causing her severe and permanent physical injury, pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement and the loss of a normal life. Defendants filed a special appearance to quash service of summons and to dismiss plaintiffs fourth amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied defendants\u2019 motion. Defendants now appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(3) (155 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(3)).\nANALYSIS\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the State of Illinois can assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants. Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a valid basis for asserting jurisdiction over defendants. Morecambe Maritime, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, S.A., 354 Ill. App. 3d 707, 710, 821 N.E.2d 780, 784 (2004) (\u201cPlaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant; however, uncontradicted evidence may overcome the prima facie case and defeat jurisdiction\u201d).\nThe standard of review is de novo when a trial court determines jurisdiction solely on the basis of documentary evidence. Morecambe Maritime, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, S.A., 354 Ill. App. 3d at 710, 821 N.E.2d at 784; Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 798, 802, 761 N.E.2d 256, 259 (2001). In the instant case, the trial court heard no courtroom testimony with respect to the issue of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, our review is de novo.\nAs in other de novo reviews, it is the trial court\u2019s judgment that is before us on review, not the trial court\u2019s reasoning. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 491-92, 795 N.E.2d 240, 247-48 (2003) (summary judgment); Pryweller v. Cohen, 282 Ill. App. 3d 899, 907, 668 N.E.2d 1144, 1149 (1996) (motion to dismiss); Makowski v. City of Naperville, 249 Ill. App. 3d 110, 115, 617 N.E.2d 1251, 1255) (1993) (summary judgment). Thus, our function is to determine whether the trial court\u2019s decision was correct, regardless of the reasoning or the grounds for that decision. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d at 492, 795 N.E.2d at 247-48. If the judgment is correct, we may affirm it on any ground present in the record. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d at 492, 795 N.E.2d at 247-48; Pryweller v. Cohen, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 907, 668 N.E.2d at 1149.\nIllinois\u2019 Long-Arm Statute\nThe parties agree that whether Illinois can exercise jurisdiction over defendants rests on the applicability of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209 (West 2002). Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute provides several bases for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and provides, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201c(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:\n(1) The transaction of any business within this State;\n(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;\n\u2756 * *\n(7) The making or performance of any contract or promise substantially connected with this State;\n$\n(b) A court may exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within or without this State against any person who:\n:js\n(4) Is a natural person or corporation doing business within this State.\n(c) A court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209 (West 2002).\nBefore the trial court, plaintiff\u2019s counsel conceded that plaintiff\u2019s bases for the court\u2019s asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants were subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). The trial court expressly based its decision on these two subsections. In addition, the trial court relied on Weiden v. Benveniste, 298 Ill. App. 3d 531, 699 N.E.2d 151 (1998), which in turn relied on subsection (c) of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute. Thus, the trial court also impliedly based its decision on subsection (c). Now, on appeal, plaintiff has relied on subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (c), and has additionally raised subsection (b)(4) of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute as bases for jurisdiction. Defendants contend that Illinois\u2019 assertion of jurisdiction over them is improper under any of these subsections of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute.\nWe shall first briefly address plaintiffs new argument that jurisdiction over defendants is permissible pursuant to section 2 \u2014 209(b)(4) of the long-arm statute. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209(b)(4) (West 2002). Section 2 \u2014 209(b)(4) of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute allows Illinois to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who is \u201cdoing business within\u201d Illinois. Jurisdiction based upon a party\u2019s \u201cdoing business\u201d in Illinois was recognized by Illinois courts before it was codified as section 2 \u2014 209(b)(4). Hendry v. Ornda Health Corp., 318 Ill. App. 3d 851, 853, 742 N.E.2d 746, 748 (2000), citing Gaidar v. Tippecanoe Distribution Service, Inc., 299 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1041, 702 N.E.2d 316, 320 (1998).\nThere is a distinction between the \u201cdoing business\u201d theory now codified in subsection (b)(4) of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute and the \u201ctransaction of business\u201d theory under section (a)(1) of the statute. Under the \u201cdoing business\u201d theory, a corporation becomes subject to the state\u2019s jurisdiction if the corporation \u201cengages in a continuous and systematic course of business in the State,\u201d even if the subject lawsuit has no relationship to that business. Kadala v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 226 Ill. App. 3d 302, 314, 589 N.E.2d 802, 810 (1992). The \u201cdoing business\u201d standard is quite high, but once satisfied, a corporation is considered a resident of Illinois and may be sued on any cause of action, regardless of whether it arose out of the corporation\u2019s contacts with the state. Haubner v. Abercrombie & Kent International, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 112, 119, 812 N.E.2d 704, 711 (2004). This is known as general jurisdiction. Forrester v. Seven Seventeen HB St. Louis Redevelopment Corp., 336 Ill. App. 3d 572, 784 N.E.2d 834 (2002). Alternatively, under the \u201ctransaction of business\u201d theory, the state has jurisdiction \u201cif the corporation transacts any business within the State and a cause of action arises from that transaction.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Kadala v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 226 Ill. App. 3d at 314, 589 N.E.2d at 810. Such jurisdiction is specific. See, e.g., Bombliss v. Cornelsen, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1107, Ill. (2005) (\u201cSpecific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum\u201d).\nAs noted, plaintiffs counsel conceded below that plaintiff was not contending that Illinois could assert general jurisdiction over defendants and that this case involved specific jurisdiction. Thus, the trial court decided that Illinois could exercise specific jurisdiction over defendants. Because we agree with the trial court that there are minimum contacts in this case sufficient to support jurisdiction, we see no need to further discuss plaintiffs newly raised argument that defendants\u2019 affidavits and admissions demonstrate that they are \u201cdoing business\u201d in Illinois. Likewise, we need not address defendants\u2019 contentions that the facts set forth in their affidavits overcome plaintiffs prima facie basis for asserting jurisdiction. The statements in defendants\u2019 affidavits relate to their lack of physical presence and are relevant only to the issue of whether defendants are \u201cdoing business\u201d in Illinois, which would subject them to general jurisdiction. In any event, the instant cause of action is for medical negligence which allegedly arose from, and is specifically related to, defendants\u2019 contacts with Illinois. Thus, a specific jurisdiction analysis applies.\nDefendants, citing the 1996 case of International Business Machines Corp. v. Martin Property & Casualty Insurance Agency, Inc., 281 Ill. App. 3d 854, 666 N.E.2d 866 (1996), contend that a court must employ a two-step analysis to determine whether jurisdiction is proper under Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute. But the two-step analysis described in that case is no longer necessary. That is because the Illinois long-arm statute was amended, effective September 7, 1989, to include a so-called \u201ccatchall provision.\u201d Mors v. Williams, 791 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D. Ill. 1992); see also Adams v. Harrah\u2019s Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill. App. 3d 745, 789 N.E.2d 436 (2003). This catchall provision, which is subsection (c), states that a court \u201cmay also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois constitution and the Constitution of the United States.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209(c) (West 2002).\nIllinois courts now treat subsection (c) as an independent basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See, e.g., Adams, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 747-48, 789 N.E.2d at 439; Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832, 856, 747 N.E.2d 926, 946 (2001); see also Weiden, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 533, 699 N.E.2d at 153 (stating that Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute is now coextensive with the due process requirements of the state and federal constitutions); see also E. Anderson, The Long Reach of Illinois\u2019 Long-Arm Statute: The CatchAll Provision, 84 Ill. B.J. 504 (1996). Thus, if the contacts between a defendant and Illinois are sufficient to satisfy both federal and state due process concerns, the requirements of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute have been met, and no other inquiry is necessary. Zazove v. Pelikan, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 761 N.E.2d 256, 260 (2001); W.R. Grace & Co. v. CSR Ltd., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047, 666 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1996). In other words, the first step, which involves a determination of whether a defendant did any of the acts enumerated in the statute, is \u201cwholly unnecessary.\u201d Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that \u201c[t]he first inquiry is wholly unnecessary in the case of many modern state statutes [including Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute] which include catch-all provisions that grant to state courts jurisdiction over all matters in which the state may constitutionally assert jurisdiction\u201d); see also Adams, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 789 N.E.2d at 439 (\u201cAlthough, at one time, subsection (a) of the long-arm statute listed the only acts that could form the basis for personal jurisdiction, subsection (c) was added in a 1989 amendment and is a catchall provision\u201d); Mors v. Williams, 791 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (\u201cStated differently, if due process is satisfied, jurisdiction is met under Section 2 \u2014 209(c) of Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute irrespective of whether a defendant has done any of the acts set forth under Section 2 \u2014 209(a)(1)\u2014(14)\u201d).\nAlthough the former two-step inquiry is no longer necessary under Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute, it has been noted that a new two-step inquiry may be required pursuant to the Illinois Supreme Court case of Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244, 565 N.E.2d 1302 (1990), which determined \u201cthat jurisdiction in Illinois must be analyzed under the due process guarantees of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Damian Services Corp. v. PLC Services, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 369, 371 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The Rollins court \u201cunequivocally stated that the Illinois Constitution, which contains its own separate and independent guarantee of due process, must also be satisfied.\u201d Mors v. Williams, 791 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D. Ill. 1992), citing Rollins, 141 Ill. 2d at 275, 565 N.E.2d at 1316. As this court has determined, \u201c[a]lthough the legislative intent [in passing the 1989 amendments to Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute] may have been to expand Illinois courts\u2019 jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent permitted by the Federal due process clause,\u201d under Rollins, this court is bound to independently determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants also comports with state due process concerns. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Kennedy, 215 Ill. App. 3d 880 (1991); accord G.M. Signs, Inc. v. Kirn Signs, Inc., 231 Ill. App. 3d 339, 342, 596 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1992).\nWe note that several recent federal court decisions have commented upon the pronounced concerns of the Rollins court. While acknowledging the Rollins court\u2019s concern that the due process standard of the Illinois Constitution and that of the United States Constitution hypothetically might diverge in some cases, these courts have suggested that no operative difference exists between the federal limitations on personal jurisdiction and the limits imposed by the Illinois Constitution. See Hyatt International Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 715 (7th Cir. 2002); RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1997); Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995). Most recently, a federal court stated as follows: \u201cBecause Illinois courts have not elucidated any \u2018operative difference between the limits imposed by the Illinois Constitution and the federal limitations on personal jurisdiction,\u2019 the two constitutional analyses collapse into one.\u201d Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Shores Moving & Storage, Inc., No. 04 C 6900 (N.D. Ill. February 23, 2005), quoting Hyatt, 302 F.3d at 715. We have not found any post -Rollins Illinois case dealing with in personam jurisdiction where the requirements of federal due process were deemed to be met, but Illinois\u2019 due process requirements were not. Nevertheless, our supreme court has reaffirmed the concern of the Rollins court, again noting the possibility that, under certain circumstances, a difference could exist between federal due process guarantees and our own state due process guarantee. See People v. Lindsey, 199 Ill. 2d 460, 468, 771 N.E.2d 399, 406 (2002) (\u201cUnder certain circumstances, we may construe our state provisions more broadly than their federal counterparts\u201d); see also Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 305 Ill. App. 3d 972, 982, 713 N.E.2d 754, 762 (1999) (noting that because our state constitution provides broader rights of due process than the federal constitution, our supreme court has been reluctant to apply the lockstep doctrine in cases involving due process). Pursuant to Rollins, we must consider whether the court\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies both the federal and state due process guarantees.\nFederal Due Process Standards for Personal Jurisdiction\nUnder federal due process standards, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant has had sufficient \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit in the forum does not offend \u201c \u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945); Zazove, 326 Ill. App 3d at 803, 761 N.E.2d at 260. A nonresident defendant can only be subjected to the authority of the forum state if the defendant\u2019s conduct and connections with the forum are such that it is reasonably foreseeable that it would be haled into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). \u201cBy requiring that individuals have \u2018fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign,\u2019 [citation], the Due Process Clause \u2018gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 540, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1985). Where, as here, a state seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not consented to suit there, the \u201cfair warning\u201d requirement is satisfied if the defendant has \u201cpurposefully directed\u201d his activities at residents of the state and the suit involves alleged injuries that \u201carise out of or relate to\u201d those activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 540-41, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (1985).\nIn determining whether a defendant has had \u201cfair warning\u201d or should \u201creasonably anticipate\u201d being haled into an out-of-state court, federal courts have relied upon the following reasoning:\n\u201c \u2018The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\u2019 \u201d Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 542, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1985), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1223, 1239-40, 78 S. Ct. 1283, 1298 (1958).\nAs the Burger King court explained:\n\u201cWe have noted several reasons why a forum legitimately may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who \u2018purposefully directs\u2019 his activities toward forum residents. A State generally has a \u2018manifest interest\u2019 in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. [Citations.] Moreover, where individuals \u2018purposefully derive benefit\u2019 from their interstate activities [citation], it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other States for consequences that arise proximately from such activities; the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed. And because \u2018modern transportation and communications have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity,\u2019 it usually will not be unfair to subject him to the burdens of litigating in another forum for disputes relating to such activity. [Citation.]\u201d Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473-74, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 541, 105 S. Ct. at 2182-83.\nWe keep these principles in mind in deciding whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants comports with federal due process.\nIllinois Due Process Standards for Personal Jurisdiction\nUnder the Illinois Constitution\u2019s due process guarantee, a court may exercise jurisdiction \u201conly when it is fair, just and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.\u201d Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244, 275, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1316 (1990); see also Weiden, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 534, 699 N.E.2d at 153. Thus, our analysis must further consider whether Illinois\u2019 due process concerns are satisfied.\nOut-of-State Doctor Cases\nIn determining whether to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state doctor, special jurisdictional rules have evolved to ensure that jurisdiction is asserted only when that physician has purposefully availed himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the patient\u2019s state. Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir. 1990). Courts have developed these special rules \u201cwhen doctors who have essentially local practices become involved in another state not as a result of their intention to do so but, rather, as a result of the action of their out-of-states [sic] patients.\u201d Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d at 129.\nThe underlying rationale for these special jurisdictional rules is the rejection of the so-called \u201cportable tort\u201d theory as applied to physicians with local practices outside the forum state. This theory had its genesis in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which the Illinois Supreme Court construed the \u201ctortious act\u201d provision of the long-arm statute. In Gray, the plaintiff was injured when a water heater exploded, as a result of an allegedly defective valve produced by the nonresident manufacturer defendant. The Gray court concluded that jurisdiction was proper over the defendant because the \u201clast event\u201d was the exploding of the water heater, without which there would have been no injury to plaintiff and no tortious event. Thus, although the defendant was never present in Illinois, the Gray court held that the tortious act occurred in Illinois because the place of a wrong was where the \u201clast event\u201d took place that was necessary to make the defendant liable. Gray, 22 Ill. 2d at 435.\nAs defendants now correctly note, \u201c[f]or due process purposes, doctors should not be treated like manufacturers of products.\u201d Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 833, 837 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The Illinois Supreme Court declined to apply the Gray rationale to a professional malpractice claim involving an attorney. Yates v. Muir, 112 Ill. 2d 205, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (1986). The Yates court then stated as follows:\n\u201cHaving held that no tortious act occurred in Illinois, we need not consider whether the defendant\u2019s rights under the standards of the due process clause have been violated.\u201d Yates, 112 Ill. 2d at 210, 492 N.E.2d at 1269.\nThis court has noted, however, that Yates was decided before the 1989 amendment to the long-arm statute that extended jurisdiction to the full extent allowed hy state and federal due process. See Zazove, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 807, 761 N.E.2d at 263. Nonetheless, in dicta, the Yates court also stated as follows:\n\u201cWe would, however, observe that the conclusion we reach in favor of the defendant is consistent with decisions under the due process clause that residents of one State who travel to another jurisdiction for medical treatment cannot prosecute a malpractice action in their State of residence for injuries arising out of that treatment. [Citations.]\u201d Yates, 112 Ill. 2d at 210, 492 N.E.2d at 1269.\nIn this appeal, defendants now rely on some of these same decisions cited by Yates, specifically, Veeninga v. Alt, 111 Ill. App. 3d 775, 444 N.E.2d 780 (1982), Ballard v. Rawlins, 101 Ill. App. 3d 601, 420 N.E.2d 532 (1981), and Muffo v. Forsyth, 37 Ill. App. 3d 6, 345 N.E.2d 149 (1976), as well as the federal case of Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Defendants contend that these cases are on point and compel dismissal of this case. We disagree.\nWe first note that, in some of these cases, it is not always clear whether the decisions were based upon the \u201ctortious act\u201d analysis, a due process analysis or both. See, e.g., Lemke, 552 F. Supp. at 837 (noting that Ballard and Muffo do not specify whether jurisdiction was lacking as a matter of local statutory interpretation of the tortious act provision of the long-arm statute or on due process grounds). We also note that plaintiff here has also not directly addressed defendants\u2019 argument that the cases of Ballard and Muffo are dispositive, nor has plaintiff distinguished these cases, other than arguing that the trial court\u2019s reliance on Weiden was correct. Our review of these cases reveals that the underlying rationale is the same as that in Yates v. Muir, 112 Ill. 2d 205, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (1986), and Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1972). Thus, we shall discuss the reasoning of these cases and explain why that reasoning does not apply to the instant case.\nThe seminal case for the proposition that the tortious rendition of medical services outside the forum state is not a portable tort that would subject an out-of-state doctor to jurisdiction in the forum is Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972), which was a medical malpractice action by an Idaho resident against a South Dakota physician. The plaintiff had seen the physician in South Dakota and received a prescription with unlimited refills. The plaintiff then moved to Idaho. Four months after being last treated by the defendant, at the plaintiffs request and without charge, the defendant furnished copies of the original prescription to allow the plaintiff to have the prescription filled in Idaho. The plaintiff filed suit in Idaho alleging that she was injured by use of the drugs. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that no tort was committed within the state of Idaho that would confer jurisdiction under Idaho\u2019s long-arm statute.\nAs the Wright v. Yackley court explained:\n\u201cIn the case of personal services focus must be on the place where the services are rendered, since this is the place of the receiver\u2019s (here the patient\u2019s) need. The need is personal and the services rendered are in response to the dimensions of that personal need. They are directed to no place but to the needy person herself. It is in the very nature of such services that their consequences will be felt wherever the person may choose to go. However, the idea that tortious rendition of such services is a portable tort which can be deemed to have been committed wherever the consequences foreseeably were felt is wholly inconsistent with the public interest in having services of this sort generally available. Medical services in particular should not be proscribed by the doctor\u2019s concerns as to where the patient may carry the consequences of his treatment and in what distant lands he may be called upon to defend it. The traveling public would be ill served were the treatment of local doctors confined to so much aspirin as would get the patient into the next state. The scope of medical treatment should be defined by the patient\u2019s needs, as diagnosed by the doctor, rather than by geography.\u201d Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1972).\nSee also Mosier v. Kinley, 142 N.H. 415, 420-21, 702 A.2d 803, 807 (1997).\nAs one court further explained:\n\u201c \u2018When one seeks out services which are personal in nature, such as those rendered by attorneys, physicians, dentists, hospitals or accountants, and travels to the locality where he knows the services will actually be rendered, he must realize that the services are not directed to impact on any particular place, but are directed to the needy person himself. While it is true that the nature of such services is that if they are negligently done, their consequences will thereafter be felt wherever the client or patient may go, it would be fundamentally unfair to permit a suit in whatever distant jurisdiction the patient may carry the consequences of his treatment, or the client the consequences of the advice received.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Hogan v. Johnson, 39 Wash. App. 96, 101, 692 P.2d 198, 201 (1984), quoting Gelineau v. New York University Hospital, 375 F. Supp. 661, 667 (D.N.J. 1974).\nWe note that the Gelineau court went on to state as follows:\n\u201cUnlike a case involving voluntary interstate or international economic activity, *** which is directed at the forum state\u2019s markets, the residence of a recipient of personal services rendered elsewhere is irrelevant and totally incidental to the benefits provided by the defendant at his own location. It is clear that when a client or a patient travels to receive professional services without having been solicited (which is prohibited by most professional codes of ethics), then the client, who originally traveled to seek services apparently not available at home, ought to expect that he will have to travel again if he thereafter complains that the services sought by him in the foreign jurisdiction were therein rendered improperly.\nAny other rule would seem to be not only fundamentally unfair, but would inflict upon the professions the obligation of traveling to defend suits brought in foreign jurisdictions, sometimes very distant jurisdictions, there brought solely because the patient or client upon his return to his own home decided to sue at home for services sought by himself abroad.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Gelineau, 375 F. Supp. at 667 (cited with approval in Yates v. Muir, 112 Ill. 2d 205, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (1986)).\nThe instant case is distinguishable from the line of cases following Wright v. Yackley, including those cited by defendants. The main difference is that plaintiff here did not travel out of state, visit a doctor with a local practice, receive treatment and carry the consequences of treatment back to the forum. Here, instead, defendants purposefully directed their activities here. The distinction between defendants\u2019 activities and that of the local doctors in the cases cited by defendant is substantial. \u201cFrom the very nature of the average doctor\u2019s localized practice, there is no systematic or continuing effort on the part of the doctor to provide services which are to be felt in the forum state.\u201d Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d at 290. The average local doctor, who treats a patient who has traveled to that doctor\u2019s state, is not thereby engaging in \u201cvoluntary, interstate economic activity.\u201d These defendants, however, by the very nature of their business and practice, operate nationally. This is true for both the physicians and the diagnostic laboratory. Thus, the distinction between product manufacturers and doctors with local practices is not entirely applicable to the present case.\nWe therefore conclude that defendants\u2019 contention that the cases of Veeninga v. Alt, 111 Ill. App. 3d 775, 444 N.E.2d 780 (1982), Ballard v. Rawlins, 101 Ill. App. 3d 601, 420 N.E.2d 532 (1981), Muffo v. Forsyth, 37 Ill. App. 3d 6, 345 N.E.2d 149 (1976), and Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1982), are more analogous to the case at bar is incorrect. Those pre-1989 cases were decided before our legislature amended Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute and added the catchall provision. More importantly, all four cases involved unilateral activity on the part of the plaintiffs seeking treatment who traveled to the nonresident doctor\u2019s home state for services and then returned home to the forum state. This is the typical scenario in the line of cases following Wright v. Yackley that rejects the portable tort theory. By contrast, in the instant case, plaintiff never traveled to Michigan and received no treatment in Michigan. Plaintiff at all times relevant was in Illinois. Defendants erroneously conclude that whether plaintiff physically traveled to Michigan is irrelevant since her tissue traveled there at the unilateral request of her physician and on her behalf. This scenario does not equate with the type of unilateral activity of the patients in the Wright v. Yackley line of cases. We reject defendants\u2019 attempt to characterize their diagnosis and provision of services and treatment via mail to an Illinois resident as identical to mere advertising followed by \u201cunilateral activity\u201d on the part of the plaintiff seeking medical treatment. We also reject defendants\u2019 characterization of plaintiff engaging in such unilateral activity through her \u201cagent\u201d Illinois physician.\nAs the Wright v. Yackley court explained:\n\u201cThe mailing of the prescriptions to Idaho did not constitute new prescription. It was not diagnosis and treatment by mail. It was simply confirmation of the old diagnosis and prescription and was recognized by the druggist as such.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d at 288-89.\nBut as the court additionally explained:\n\u201cThe balance of factors involved in a due process determination might be different if a doctor could be said to have treated an out-of-state patient by mail or to have provided a new prescription or diagnosis in such fashion. In that event, the forum state\u2019s interest in deterring such interstate medical service would surely be great. Here, however, the mailing of the copies was simply reflective of, and indeed a part of, the earlier treatment and prescription.\u201d Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d at 289 n.4.\nThus, it was long ago recognized that even \u201c[t]he bellwether case of Wright v. Yackley [citation] established a distinction between a situation where one ventures into a foreign state, receives medical treatment, returns to his home state and suffers injurious consequences, and a case where the nonresident physician diagnoses and treats a patient by mail.\u201d Hume v. Durwood Medical Clinic, Inc., 282 S.C. 236, 241, 318 S.E.2d 119, 122 (App. 1984).\nPlaintiff cites the case of Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1990). Defendants are correct in noting that Kennedy is a case from a foreign jurisdiction that is not binding upon this court (see, e.g., Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co. v. Heaven\u2019s Little Hands Day Care, 343 Ill. App. 3d 309, 320, 795 N.E.2d 1034, 1044 (2003). Although they are not binding, comparable court decisions of other jurisdictions \u201care persuasive authority and entitled to respect.\u201d In re Marriage of Raski, 64 Ill. App. 3d 629, 633, 381 N.E.2d 744, 748 (1978). When there is Illinois case law directly on point, we need not look to case law from other states for guidance (Graham v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 318 Ill. App. 3d 736, 744, 742 N.E.2d 858, 865 (2000)); however, no Illinois case is directly on point.\nWe agree that the facts of the instant case are more analogous to those in Kennedy. Defendants offer no argument regarding the analysis in that case, but merely note that no Illinois appellate court case has relied on Kennedy in the 14 years since it was decided. This court finds Kennedy to be entirely well reasoned, persuasive and valuable to our analysis.\nKennedy involved an Oklahoma resident who sought treatment from her doctor in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma physician removed a skin lesion and sent it to the defendant, Dr. Freeman in Texas. Dr. Freeman willingly accepted the sample and sent a report back to the plaintiff\u2019s physician in Oklahoma. Dr. Freeman knew of the significance of his diagnosis and that it would be used in treating the plaintiff. The report was inaccurate, and, due to Dr. Freeman\u2019s error, the plaintiff was given no treatment or follow-up care. The plaintiff learned, four years later, that malignant melanoma had spread over her entire body.\nThe plaintiff sued in federal court for negligence. The district court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1990).\nThe Kennedy court applied Oklahoma\u2019s long-arm statute, which, similar to Illinois\u2019 long-arm statute, is coextensive with the due process requirements of the state and federal constitutions. The Kennedy court discussed the general principles of specific jurisdiction, including the purposeful availment requirement. Kennedy, 919 F.2d at 128-29. The court stated that \u201c[wjhether a \u2018party solicited the business interface is irrelevant, so long as defendant then directed its activities to the forum resident.\u2019 \u201d Kennedy, 919 F.2d at 129, quoting Lanier v. American Board of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 102 L. Ed. 2d 329, 109 S. Ct. 310 (1988).\nThe Kennedy court held that Dr. Freeman\u2019s actions were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. In so doing, the court stated as follows:\n\u201cWhile Freeman did not solicit Kennedy\u2019s business in Oklahoma, he did purposefully direct his actions there. He willingly accepted the sample from Oklahoma; he signed a report establishing the thickness of [the] lesion; and he evidently sent his bill there. Freeman rendered his diagnosis to Kennedy in Oklahoma, through the mail, knowing its extreme significance and that it would be the basis of Kennedy\u2019s further treatment there.\u201d Kennedy, 919 F.2d at 129.\nThe same analysis applies here. Defendants purposefully directed their activities at Illinois. It is undisputed that defendants willingly received plaintiffs tissue specimens from Illinois in containers supplied by them free of charge, generated three diagnostic reports that were faxed or mailed to Illinois knowing they would be relied upon by plaintiff s physician and rendered a diagnosis knowing that it would form the basis of plaintiffs further treatment in Illinois. As plaintiff further notes, however, her case here is even stronger and bolstered by defendants\u2019 admission of a prior, ongoing relationship with plaintiffs doctor, sending him blank requisition slips and other biopsy supplies to his Illinois office, combined with the fact that defendants held themselves out via the Internet as \u201cnationwide\u201d service providers.\nIn Kennedy, the plaintiff was being treated in another state, the forum state, at the time that the defendant essentially injected himself into the patient\u2019s treatment and provided the service, and that service directly affected the decisions regarding the patient\u2019s ongoing treatment in the forum state. Likewise, defendants here injected themselves into plaintiff\u2019s treatment in Illinois and, similar to the defendant in Kennedy, in effect rendered a diagnosis by mail and actually provided medical treatment in the forum state.\nWe agree with the court that described Kennedy as a case in which \u201cthe doctor\u2019s services [were] fundamentally interstate in nature from the inception of the relationship.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Prince v. Urban, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1056, 1061, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 184 (1996). The Prince court noted that \u201c[t]he diagnosis \u2014 which was, after all, the critical service provided by the Texas doctor \u2014 was made \u2018through the mail\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Prince v. Urban, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1061, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184. The Prince court distinguished this activity from other forms of communication that would not constitute the prerequisite minimum contacts, such as \u201c[fjollow[-]up consultation ancillary to the examination and treatment made by the out-of-state doctor, telephone calls about the status of an out-of-state patient, or arrangements for a patient to continue with medication prescribed by that doctor.\u201d Prince, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1061, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 184. The Prince court cited Ballard v. Rawlins, 101 Ill. App. 3d 601, 420 N.E.2d 532 (1981), and Muffo v. Forsyth, 37 Ill. App. 3d 6, 345 N.E.2d 149 (1976), as examples of cases where the prerequisite minimum contacts were lacking.\nAs noted earlier, the trial court relied upon Weiden v. Benveniste, 298 Ill. App. 3d 531, 699 N.E.2d 151 (1998). The trial court correctly concluded that the facts in Weiden were distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike the trial court, however, we do not believe that knowledge on the part of the physician that the patient is from another state is a dispositive factor, particularly where the doctor has a localized practice. In Weiden, because there was no contact between the defendant physicians and Illinois, the court did not need to address the sufficiency of any contact and did not really need to apply the jurisdictional standards of due process \u2014 state or federal \u2014 to the facts of that case.\nThe instant case is factually similar to Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1990), and we agree with its analysis and holding. We conclude that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants comports with federal due process standards. Our independent research has revealed several other court decisions that have held the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants to be appropriate under similar facts, i.e., where a defendant accepted a pathology sample of a patient, subsequently sent a diagnostic report to the physician in the forum state, and knew that the report would be the basis of further treatment in the forum state. See, e.g., Sanders v. Ball, No. Civ. A. 98 \u2014 2715 (E.D. La. June 11, 1999); Gonzales v. Chandel, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D.C. Kan. 1998); Urspruch v. Greenblum, 968 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1996); Pomerantz v. Wolfin, 236 A.D.2d 379, 653 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1997); Durette v. International Cancer Screening Laboratories, Inc., 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 604 (1995).\nPursuant to Rollins, we must now turn to the question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants comports with the Illinois due process guaranty. Specifically, we must determine whether it is \u201cfair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.\u201d Rollins v. Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d at 275, 565 N.E.2d at 1316. Defendants\u2019 activities, through their national operation, have affected a significant interest in Illinois \u2014 the health of one of its citizens. Thus, we conclude that it is fair, just and reasonable to require defendants to defend a negligence action against them in Illinois. In the instant case, although mindful of the Robbins court concerns, for the same reasons that Illinois assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants would not offend the federal due process guaranty, we believe that Illinois due process concerns are satisfied.\nCONCLUSION\nIn accordance with the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County denying defendants\u2019 motion to quash service of summons and denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nO\u2019BRIEN and NEVILLE, JJ., concur.\nPlaintiff filed suit against other defendants, all of whom have filed answers to plaintiffs complaint.\nDefendants had also opposed plaintiffs previously filed complaints.\nThe International Business Machines Corp. court and other cases cited by defendants, including Alpert v. Bertsch, 235 Ill. App. 3d 452 (1992), allude to this two-step analysis in reliance on the 1986 Illinois Supreme Court case, R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 489 N.E.2d 1360 (1986).\nPlaintiff has also contended that Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432 (1961), applies to the instant case without discussing the rejection of the portable tort theory as applied to malpractice cases. Plaintiff has also cited, for this proposition, an appellate court decision that was reversed by our supreme court in Yates v. Muir, 112 Ill. 2d 205, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (1986), as mentioned above.\nThe relevant statute provided as follows: \u201cA court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States.\u201d Okla. Stat. Tit. 12, \u00a7 2004(F) (Supp. 1989); Kennedy, 919 F.2d at 128 n.l.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lowis & Gellen, of Chicago (Mark J. Smith, Joan M. Kubalanza, and Jenny Ostrom Blake, of counsel), for appellants.", "Cisar & Mrofka, Ltd., of Oak Brook (Thomas J. Cisar, Robert J. Mrofka, and Kenneth G. Miller, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAWN G. KOSTAL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PINKUS DERMATOPATHOLOGY LABORATORY, P.C., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1-04-1447\nOpinion filed April 15, 2005.\nLowis & Gellen, of Chicago (Mark J. Smith, Joan M. Kubalanza, and Jenny Ostrom Blake, of counsel), for appellants.\nCisar & Mrofka, Ltd., of Oak Brook (Thomas J. Cisar, Robert J. Mrofka, and Kenneth G. Miller, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0381-01", "first_page_order": 397, "last_page_order": 414 }