{ "id": 4135712, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF STELLA SPROAT, Petitioner-Appellant, and HOWARD E. SPROAT, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Sproat", "decision_date": "2005-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 2-04-1080", "first_page": "880", "last_page": "884", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 880" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 485777 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3113757 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 861", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126410 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0861-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096558 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0789-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 474, "char_count": 9101, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.081294667916414e-08, "percentile": 0.3754411936757703 }, "sha256": "a60a32eab25cea9ae7c8d20bd8438f01fe461b1138d3f0669f502159aa198ab6", "simhash": "1:d0edbdde01465421", "word_count": 1525 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:31:24.775353+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF STELLA SPROAT, Petitioner-Appellant, and HOWARD E. SPROAT, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAPALA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Stella Sproat, appeals from the September 28, 2004, order of the circuit court of Du Page County awarding sole custody of the parties\u2019 two minor children to respondent, Howard E. Sproat. However, because the order reserved the issues of property distribution, classification of nonmarital and marital property, maintenance, child support, and attorney fees, it was not a final and appealable order. Petitioner also appeals from the order entered on October 22, 2004, denying her motion to reconsider the custody decision, but the record is clear that the reserved issues had not yet been tried at the time this order was entered. Although the parties have not raised the question, we have a duty to consider sua sponte our jurisdiction in this case (In re Adoption of Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d 789, 790 (2000)), and we find it lacking.\nAt issue is the interpretation of Supreme Court Rule 306A (210 Ill. 2d R. 306A), which provides for expedited appeals in child custody cases. Petitioner\u2019s statement of jurisdiction submits that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301) and Rule 306A. Rule 301 governs appeals from cases in which the final order has disposed of the entire controversy. Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 791. Clearly, the trial court\u2019s order reserving all issues except that of custody did not dispose of the entire controversy. Therefore, the question is whether Rule 306A bestows jurisdiction on this court in the absence of a final order. We hold that it does not. Rule 306A is titled \u201cExpedited Appeals in Child Custody Cases,\u201d and paragraph (a) provides in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) The expedited procedures in this rule shall apply in the following child custody cases: (1) initial final child custody orders, (2) orders modifying child custody where a change of custody has been granted, (3) final orders of adoption and (4) final orders terminating parental rights.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 306A.\n\u201cThe same construction rules that apply to statutes apply to supreme court rules.\u201d Irwin v. McMillan, 322 Ill. App. 3d 861, 868 (2001). \u201cWhen interpreting the supreme court rules, we must ascertain and give effect to the supreme court\u2019s intent.\u201d Irwin, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 869. \u201cIn determining the supreme court\u2019s intent, the reviewing court should first look to the language of the rule and consider each part of the rule in relation to the rest of the rule.\u201d Irwin, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 869. \u201cThe courts should also consider the reason and necessity for the rule, the evil to be remedied, and the purpose of the rule.\u201d Irwin, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 869. Before delving into the language of Rule 306A, we review the state of the law as it preceded the rule, with an eye to determining whether Rule 306A mandates a departure from prior case law.\nOur supreme court in In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114, 119 (1983), held that an order dissolving the parties\u2019 marriage in which permanent custody was awarded to the defendant was not appealable, because it reserved for future consideration the issues of maintenance, property division, and attorney fees. \u201cFor a number of reasons, we do not believe that a custody order constitutes a final judgment as to a separate claim in a dissolution proceeding.\u201d Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 118. The court held that a petition for dissolution advances a single claim, that is, a request for an order dissolving the parties\u2019 marriage. Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119. The numerous other issues involved, such as custody, property disposition, and support, are matters that are ancillary to the cause of action. Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119. \u201cThey do not represent separate, unrelated claims; rather, they are separate issues relating to the same claim.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 119. For these reasons, as well as a policy decision to discourage piecemeal appeals, our supreme court held that Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) could not be utilized to appeal a custody order where the remaining issues in the dissolution proceeding lingered unresolved. Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 120. Leopando dictated that appeals of interlocutory custody orders be brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(l)(v) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(l)(v)). Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 120.\nIn Shermach v. Brunory, 333 Ill. App. 3d 313, 317 (2002), the appellate court found that it lacked jurisdiction where the order modifying custody did not adjudicate all of the claims raised by the petitioner. The petitioner asked the court to award temporary and permanent custody, order the respondent to pay child support, and set a visitation schedule. Shermach, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 317. The order appealed resolved the issues of permanent custody and visitation but not child support. Shermach, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 317. While the order set child support at 20% of the respondent\u2019s net income from all sources, it reserved the dollar amount for a future determination. Shermach, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 317. The appellate court held that the determination of a noncustodial parent\u2019s support obligation is integrally related to the determination of custody. Shermach, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 319. \u201cWe see no compelling reason for allowing piecemeal appeals when the matter of child support has only been partially determined by the trial court.\u201d Shermach, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 320. The court dismissed the appeal. Shermach, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 320.\nIn re Marriage of Sassano, 337 Ill. App. 3d 186 (2003), also supports our view that the custody order in our case is not appealable. In Sassano, this court held that the judgment of dissolution was final and appealable precisely because \u201cit did not reserve any issues for later determination.\u201d Sassano, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 192. In the case at bar, paragraph D of the judgment order provided: \u201cThe remaining issues of property distribution, classification of non-marital and marital property, maintenance, child support and attorneys fees are reserved.\u201d This reservation, especially of child support, brings this case squarely within the rule in Shermach.\nTurning now to the language of Rule 306A, our case falls into the first enumerated category in paragraph (a), namely, \u201cinitial final custody orders.\u201d The question is whether the word \u201cfinal\u201d inserted into that paragraph is an expression that Leopando, which stated that a custody order is interlocutory (Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 118), is no longer viable. For the following reasons, we believe that it is not. First, the rule addresses only new procedures that are to be followed by the appellate court and the trial courts in ensuring an expedient review of child custody cases. Paragraphs (b) through (i) prescribe matters of procedure at length. We believe that our supreme court\u2019s intent in promulgating the rule was to alleviate the effect of uncertainty on the parties, and particularly the children who are the subjects of the orders, during the pendency of the review by shortening the period of review, and to promote stability for these families insofar as possible by mandating swift rulings. Second, nowhere in the language of the rule does our supreme court evince an intent to undo its policy of discouraging piecemeal appeals. Third, if our supreme court intended to overrule Leopando\u2019s holding that the separate aspects of a dissolution proceeding are all one claim and, therefore, not subject to a Rule 304(a) finding, which would allow an appeal of the custody order only, the court would have amended Supreme Court Rule 304(b) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)) to make a custody order appealable without a special finding. Fourth, Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)), which allows an appellant to seek leave to appeal from interlocutory custody orders, provides a remedy for a party who believes that an interlocutory custody order should be appealed before the resolution of the entire marriage dissolution case. We note that petitioner did not file a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5) nor did she follow any of the procedures for doing so as prescribed in Supreme Court Rule 306(b) (210 Ill. 2d R. 306(b)). Fifth, nothing in the clear language of Rule 306A indicates to us that the supreme court intended to create new or expanded categories of appealable orders.\nIn her notice of appeal, petitioner has also designated the October 22, 2004, order denying her motion for stay pending appeal. Because we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, we have no occasion to consider the ruling on the motion for stay.\nAppeal dismissed.\nBOWMAN and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KAPALA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Aldo E. Botti and Carla Labunski, both of Botti, Marinaccio & DeLongis, Ltd., of Oak Brook, for appellant.", "Robert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, and Linda E. Davenport, of Fortunato, Farrell, Davenport & Arnold, Ltd., of Westmont, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF STELLA SPROAT, Petitioner-Appellant, and HOWARD E. SPROAT, Respondent-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-04-1080\nOpinion filed June 10, 2005.\nAldo E. Botti and Carla Labunski, both of Botti, Marinaccio & DeLongis, Ltd., of Oak Brook, for appellant.\nRobert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, and Linda E. Davenport, of Fortunato, Farrell, Davenport & Arnold, Ltd., of Westmont, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0880-01", "first_page_order": 896, "last_page_order": 900 }