{ "id": 4136642, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF NORTH AURORA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM L. ANKER, JR., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Village of North Aurora v. Anker", "decision_date": "2005-06-17", "docket_number": "No. 2-04-1032", "first_page": "1049", "last_page": "1057", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 1049" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461402 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472752 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 3d 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3202802 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/84/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 796", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182755 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5300597 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/61/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499401 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5164130 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444628 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1025949 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450970 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450902 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281388 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229713 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469493 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319, 321" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0316-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 834, "char_count": 22792, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.655061776838136e-08, "percentile": 0.2919610371106578 }, "sha256": "d295933caf3fbe9918f4f69ea3a21e7fe78a74cc878872357732568554a71921", "simhash": "1:ca89bca06439f1f0", "word_count": 3728 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:31:24.775353+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF NORTH AURORA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM L. ANKER, JR., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, the Village of North Aurora (Village), charged defendant, William L. Anker, Jr., with violating the Village\u2019s vehicle-weight ordinance, which adopts section 15 \u2014 111(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(b) (West 2002)). Relying on City of Decatur v. Page, 339 Ill. App. 3d 316 (2003), the trial court ruled that the ordinance was unenforceable because, in violation of several sections of the Code, the Village did not post notice of it. Without deciding whether defendant violated the ordinance, the court acquitted him.\nThe Village appeals, contending that, because the ordinance merely adopts existing state law, the Village may enforce it without posting notice. The Illinois Municipal League (League), as amicus curiae, has filed a brief supporting the Village. We agree with the Village and the League that the ordinance is enforceable without further notice, and, insofar as Page compels a different result, we decline to follow that opinion. We reverse the judgment and remand the cause so that the trial court may resolve the remaining issues and enter a judgment on the merits.\nThe facts, as gleaned from the common-law record and the certified bystander\u2019s report, are as follows. On June 25, 2004, defendant was driving his tractor west on Oak Street near Acorn Drive. Oak Street near Acorn Drive is a nondesignated highway (see 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 126.1(d) (West 2002)). Officer Dan Cyko cited defendant for violating \u201cI.VC. 625 ILCS 5/: *** 15 \u2014 111(b).\u201d At trial, Cyko testified for the Village that he was responsible for \u201ctruck enforcement\u201d and had not issued a permit for defendant\u2019s vehicle. Using portable scales, Cyko found that the tractor\u2019s gross weight was 160,950 pounds. Under the ordinance, as under section 15 \u2014 111(b) of the Code, a truck the length of defendant\u2019s, when driven on a nondesignated highway, may weigh no more than 73,280 pounds. No weight-limit signs were posted on westbound Oak Street at Acorn Drive.\nDefendant presented no evidence. He argued that, under Page, the ordinance was unenforceable against him because he had received no notice of it. The trial court agreed and found defendant not guilty. The court declined to decide any other issues that defendant raised, i.e., whether the scales that Cyko used were properly certified and whether defendant\u2019s vehicle had pneumatic tires. The Village appealed, and the League filed an amicus brief in its support. For convenience, we attribute to the Village any arguments raised by either the Village or the League.\nThe Village argues that it may enforce the ordinance even without posting notice of it. The Village observes that, if an ordinance\u2019s restrictions and penalties are already in force under the Code, and thus matters of public record, then people necessarily already have fair warning of the obligations that they have under the ordinance. The Village contends generally that requiring municipalities to post notice of ordinances that merely adopt existing statewide laws serves no public purpose while severely burdening local governments, an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. Recognizing that the trial court relied on Page, the Village asserts that Page erred in concluding that sections 11 \u2014 207, 11 \u2014 208(b), and 15 \u2014 316(c) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 207, 11 \u2014 208(b), 15 \u2014 316(b) (West 2002)) apply to municipal ordinances that merely adopt provisions of the Code. Also, the Village contends that section 15 \u2014 316(c) does not apply here because it governs only designated highways, such as the one in Page.\nTo help frame the issues, we summarize Page. There, the defendant was charged with violating a vehicle-weight ordinance that adopted section 15 \u2014 111(f) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(f) (West 2000)). Section 15 \u2014 111(f) applied (as it does now) to designated highways but not nondesignated highways. 625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(f) (West 2000). The defendant had been driving on a designated highway where no signs provided notice of the ordinance. The trial court convicted him, but the appellate court reversed. It relied on sections 11 \u2014 207, 11 \u2014 208(b) (in conjunction with section 11 \u2014 208(a)(7) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 208(a)(7) (West 2000))), and 15 \u2014 316(c) of the Code.\nSection 11 \u2014 207 provided (as it does now):\n\u201cThe provisions of this Chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this State and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance[,] rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may, however, adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter, but such regulations shall not be effective until signs giving reasonable notice thereof are posted.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 207 (West 2000).\nSection 15 \u2014 316(c) provided (as it does now):\n\u201cLocal authorities and road district highway commissioners with respect to highways under their jurisdiction may ***, by ordinance or resolution, prohibit the operation of trucks or other commercial vehicles, or may impose limitations as [sic] the weight thereof, on designated highways, which prohibitions and limitations shall be designated by appropriate signs placed on such highways.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 316(c) (West 2000).\nSections 11 \u2014 208(a)(7) and 11 \u2014 208(b) provided (as they do now):\n\u201c(a) The provisions of this Code shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power from:\n(7) Restricting the use of highways as authorized in Chapter 15;\n$\n(b) No ordinance or regulation enacted under subsections 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 or 13 of paragraph (a) shall be effective until signs giving reasonable notice of such local traffic regulations are posted.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 208(a)(7), (b) (West 2000).\nPage held that these provisions required the city to post notice of the ordinance. The court summarily rejected the contention that, because the ordinance merely adopted weight limits already in force under the Code, it imposed no \u201cadditional *** regulations\u201d (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 207, 11 \u2014 208(a) (West 2000)) or \u201climitations\u201d (625 ILCS 5/15\u2014 316(c) (West 2000)). Page, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 319, 321.\nHere, the Village contends that sections 11 \u2014 207, 11 \u2014 208(b), and 15 \u2014 316(c) of the Code do not require the Village to post notice of its truck-weight ordinance. The Village relies not only on its construction of these provisions but on section 20 \u2014 204 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/20 \u2014 204 (West 2002)). (Section 20 \u2014 204, we note, was not mentioned in Page.) It states, \u201cThe corporate authorities of a municipality may adopt all or any portion of this Illinois Vehicle Code by reference.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/20 \u2014 204 (West 2002). The Village notes that section 20 \u2014 204 empowers it to adopt section 15 \u2014 111(b) of the Code but does not require it to post notice before doing so. According to the Village, no other Code provision imposes such an obligation.\nTo resolve this appeal, we must construe several portions of the Code. Statutory construction raises issues of law that we review de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000). Our overriding goal is to ascertain the legislature\u2019s intent. Garcia v. Nelson, 326 Ill. App. 3d 33, 38 (2001). Ordinarily, the statutory language itself is the best indicator of intent, and, if the language is unambiguous, we must follow it. Garcia, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 38. To resolve ambiguities, we may consider the statute\u2019s purposes. Garcia, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 38. A statute must be construed as a whole. People ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 222, 228 (2005). Thus, we interpret words and phrases not in isolation but in light of other relevant provisions. In re Application of County Treasurer, 214 Ill. 2d 253, 258 (2005). We presume that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Application of County Treasurer, 214 Ill. 2d at 259.\nThe principle that statutory provisions must not be construed in isolation is particularly pertinent here, as we consider separate yet interrelated sections of the Code, a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of motor vehicles and motor vehicle traffic. The Code is a \u201cmighty maze, but [perhaps] not without a plan.\u201d A. Pope, An Essay on Man, Epistle 1, 1.1 (1733-34), in Bartlett\u2019s Familiar Quotations 301 (J. Kaplan, ed., 16th ed. 1992). The same may be said of the Code\u2019s provisions allocating the power to regulate vehicle weights. We agree with the Village that the place to start exploring the legislative labyrinth is section 20 \u2014 204 of the Code, which broadly grants localities the authority to \u201cadopt all or any portion of this *** Code by reference.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/20 \u2014 204 (West 2002). This grant is unqualified by any requirement that municipalities provide notice when they adopt some or all of the Code by reference. While this consideration is not conclusive by itself, the legislature could easily have imposed such a requirement. Therefore, we believe that the onus is on those challenging the enforcement of ordinances that adopt part or all of the Code to point us to provisions of the Code that clearly require the posting of notice.\nRelying on Page, defendant contends that several provisions of the Code do impose such an obligation on the Village. The first is section 15 \u2014 316(c). Defendant maintains that its plain language requires the Village to post reasonable notice of the ordinance. However, as the Village notes, this section applies only when municipalities \u201cprohibit the operation of trucks or other commercial vehicles, or *** impose limitations as [sic] the weight thereof, on designated highways.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 316(c) (West 2002). This notice requirement is unambiguously limited to designated highways. While section 15\u2014 316(c) arguably applied in Page, it is irrelevant here.\nThe Village asserts that section 15 \u2014 316(c) is inapplicable here not only because defendant was driving on a nondesignated highway but also because an ordinance that merely adopts vehicle-weight limitations already in force statewide under the Code does not \u201cimpose limitations as [sic] the weight thereof\u2019 (emphasis added) (625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 316(c) (West 2002)). Because this case involves a nondesignated highway, to which section 15 \u2014 316(c) plainly does not apply, we need not decide whether the Village\u2019s construction of the quoted language is correct.\nWe turn next to section 11 \u2014 207 of the Code, which states that the provisions of \u201cthis Chapter\u201d shall be uniform statewide and that \u201c[l]ocal authorities may *** adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter, but such regulations shall not be effective until signs giving reasonable notice thereof are posted.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 207 (West 2002). With essentially no explanation, Page held that this language required the city there to post notice of an ordinance that adopted the vehicle-weight limits of section 15 \u2014 111(f) of the Code. Page, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 321. The Village contends that Page erred in relying on this section. We agree.\nChapter 11 is separate from Chapter 20, which contains section 20 \u2014 204\u2019s broad grant of power allowing local authorities to adopt any or all of the Code, and Chapter 15, which is specifically concerned with vehicle weight and size limits. Section 11 \u2014 207 speaks specifically of \u201cthis Chapter,\u201d i.e., Chapter 11 of the Code. See Village of Mundelein v. Franco, 317 Ill. App. 3d 512, 520 (2000). Absent a clear indication otherwise, we are reluctant to conclude that the legislature intended a general provision in Chapter 11 to restrict local authorities\u2019 ability to enforce ordinances that are authorized by section 20 \u2014 204 and relate to the subject matter of Chapter 15.\nWe recognize that Chapter 11 conceivably could be read to pack such an unexpected wallop. It states broadly that local authorities may adopt \u201cadditional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this Chapter\u201d (emphasis added) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 207 (West 2002)), as long as they post reasonable notice of such regulations. However, to hold that this general language requires the posting of notice anytime a municipality adopts a provision of Chapter 15 simply does not follow. An ordinance that merely adopts an existing statewide regulation, with no new obligations or penalties, is not an additional traffic regulation. Also, a broad reading of section 11 \u2014 207 would require a local authority to post notice of an ordinance that involves matters that are wholly outside the scope of Chapter 11. Such an ordinance is almost surely \u201cnot in conflict\u201d with anything in Chapter 11. Yet a broad reading of section 11 \u2014 207 would require posting notice in order to enforce the ordinance. We doubt that the legislature intended such an odd result. Therefore, we conclude that, at most, section 11 \u2014 207 alerts us to the possibility that other provisions in Chapter 11 do apply to ordinances that adopt part or all of the Code.\nThe only such provision in Chapter 11 is section 11 \u2014 208(b), on which Page relied in part. Section 11 \u2014 208(b) qualifies section 11\u2014 208(a), which, as pertinent here, states that the Code shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities from \u201c[restricting the use of highways as authorized in Chapter 15.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 208(a)(7) (West 2002). However, under section 11 \u2014 208(b), any regulation enacted under section 11 \u2014 208(a)(7) is not effective until the local authority posts signs giving reasonable notice of the regulation. The Village contends that section 11 \u2014 208(b) does not apply to its ordinance adopting section 15 \u2014 111(b) of the Code. For the following reasons, we agree.\nFirst, we observe that section 11 \u2014 208(a)(7) allows local authorities to \u201c\\r\\estrict{ ] the use of highways as authorized in Chapter 15.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 208(a)(7) (West 2002). We agree with the Village that its ordinance does not restrict the use of the highways, but merely adopts the restrictions already in force statewide under section 15 \u2014 111(b) of the Code. Also, because Chapter 15 itself does not authorize the Village to impose the restriction here, the Village\u2019s authority to pass the ordinance derives from section 20\u2014 204 of the Code, not from Chapter 15 itself. By way of contrast, an ordinance that, because of \u201cdeterioration, rain, snow, or other climate conditions,\u201d bars vehicles of certain weights from local highways (625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 316(a) (West 2000)) is clearly an example of a regulation that restricts the use of the highways as authorized in Chapter 15. Such an ordinance may impose vehicle-weight limits more severe than those that are already in place statewide, and the local authorities\u2019 power to do so plainly derives from Chapter 15 and not at all from section 20 \u2014 204.\nSecond, we observe (as does the Village) that section 15 \u2014 111(b) itself does not require a local authority to post any notice in order to enforce section 15 \u2014 lll(b)\u2019s restrictions via ordinance. The significance of this omission appears when we examine section 15 \u2014 111(f), which states that local authorities may \u201callow the weight limitations of this subsection *** on designated highways when appropriate regulatory signs giving notice are erected upon the street or highway or portion of any street or highway affected.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(f) (West 2000). The legislature decided to require the posting of notice of ordinances that adopt section 15 \u2014 111(f), which limits vehicle weights on designated highways and those highways in the national highway system, but not to impose any such requirement for ordinances adopting section 15 \u2014 111(b), which applies only to nondesignated highways. We cannot sensibly conclude that the legislature crafted this clear distinction between types of ordinances yet elected to have this differential standard obliterated by more general provisions elsewhere in the Code. Not only would such a construction render parts of section 15 \u2014 111 superfluous, but it would disregard the principle of construction that, when a specific statutory provision and a more general one address the same subject, the specific provision controls. Mattis v. State Universities Retirement System, 212 Ill. 2d 58, 77 (2004).\nThird, we agree with the Village that imposing a general notice requirement for ordinances that merely adopt section 15 \u2014 111(b) would lead to a result that, if not absurd, is at least bound to produce considerable inconvenience (see Application of County Treasurer, 214 Ill. 2d at 259). The legislature\u2019s decision to include a specific notice requirement in section 15 \u2014 111(f), but not in section 15 \u2014 111(b), appears to recognize this problem, albeit implicitly. Section 15 \u2014 111(f) applies to designated highways and those in the national system. Designated highways include interstate highways (see 625 ILCS 5/1\u2014 126.1(a) (West 2002)), \u201cmajor arterials not built to interstate highway standards that have at least 11 feet lane widths\u201d (625 ILCS 5/1\u2014 126.1(b) (West 2002)), and \u201cState highways that have lane widths of less than 11 feet\u201d (625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 126.1(c) (West 2002)). Nondesignated highways are primarily a residual category consisting of local highways and state highways that do not qualify as designated highways (625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 126.1(d) (West 2002)).\nBecause designated highways are relatively few but also relatively substantial, they are likely to absorb the bulk of truck traffic, especially in interstate commerce. We can understand why, for those highways, the legislature would require special notice of local vehicle-weight regulations, even if these regulations merely duplicate those already in the Code. On the other hand, nondesignated highways are relatively small, relatively limited in the type of traffic that they absorb, and far more numerous. We agree with the Village that to require local authorities to post notice of ordinances that merely duplicate existing statewide vehicle-weight regulations applying to nondesignated highways could saddle localities with a considerable practical and financial burden. In return, the public would receive only the benefit of knowing that localities, as opposed to the State, may enforce obligations of which the Code already provides notice. Such a legislative scheme is not inconceivable. However, we decline to tease one out of the Code when the legislature could have created such a regime quite plainly but conspicuously refused to do so.\nDefendant contends last that, even if we reject the trial court\u2019s construction of the Code, we may affirm the judgment on other grounds. He maintains that the Village failed to prove (1) that his truck had pneumatic tires (see 625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(a), (b) (West 2002)) or (2) that the scales that Officer Cyko used to weigh defendant\u2019s vehicle were properly tested and certified. We believe that defendant is mistaken in asserting that proof that the scales were properly tested and certified is necessary for the Village to prevail, at least where the vehicle\u2019s weight exceeds the statutory limit by as much as appears to have been the case here. See Village of Kildeer v. LaRocco, 237 Ill. App. 3d 208, 212-13 (1992); People v. Jackson, 98 Ill. App. 3d 418, 422 (1981); People v. Fair, 61 Ill. App. 2d 360, 367-68 (1965). Equally important, resolving factual disputes is the prerogative of the trial court, not this court. People v. Thompson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 796, 802-03 (1996); Shaw v. Lund, 84 Ill. App. 3d 771, 774 (1980). It is the duty of the trial court to weigh the evidence. American Food Management, Inc. v. Henson, 105 Ill. App. 3d 141, 147 (1982). Even with a more complete record of the trial evidence, we would not usurp the trial court\u2019s prerogative. Instead of deciding the disputed factual issues and entering judgment accordingly, we remand the cause for the trial court to do so.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed, and the cause is remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nO\u2019MALLEY, EJ., and BYRNE, J., concur.\nIn Page, which did involve a designated highway, the court held that an ordinance that adopted section 15 \u2014 111(f) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(f) (West 2000)) did \u201cimpose limitations\u201d (625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 316(c) (West 2000)) on vehicle weights and thus required the posting of notice. While we need not decide whether Page\u2019s construction of \u201cimpose limitations\u201d is correct, we note that Page\u2019s reliance on section 15 \u2014 316(c) appears to have been unnecessary. Section 15 \u2014 111(f) itself specifically provided (and does now) that local authorities \u201cmay also by ordinance or resolution allow the weight limitations of this subsection *** on designated highways when appropriate regulatory signs giving notice are erected upon the street or highway or portion of any street or highway affected by the ordinance or resolution.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(f) (West 2002). Thus, the notice requirement that the Page court discerned in section 15 \u2014 316(c) already existed in section 15 \u2014 111(f). If anything, this shows that the legislature did not intend section 15 \u2014 316(c) to apply to an ordinance that merely adopts section 15 \u2014 111(f). Otherwise, the notice requirement in section 15 \u2014 111(f) would be needless, and, ordinarily, we presume that the legislature did not intend part of a statute to be superfluous. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove, 209 Ill. 2d 248, 256 (2004).\nConceivably, by permitting local authorities to \u201callow the weight limitations\u201d (625 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 111(f) (West 2002)) of section 15 \u2014 111(f), the legislature intended to enable localities to allow vehicles to exceed the weight limitations of section 15 \u2014 111(f). Although this would seem an odd choice of words, it is unusual to speak of a municipality ever \u201callowing\u201d a restriction, as opposed to \u201cenforcing\u201d or \u201cimposing\u201d one. Perhaps the legislature will clarify the intent behind its curious syntax.\nAgain, because section 15 \u2014 -111(f) already required a local authority to post notice of an ordinance that \u201callows\u201d that section\u2019s weight limitations, it appears that Page did not need to rely on the more general language of section 11 \u2014 207 to impose such a requirement.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" } ], "attorneys": [ "Carolyn D. Jansons, of Drendel & Drendel, of Batavia, for appellant.", "Louis A. Berns, of Favil David Berns & Associates, L.L.C., of Northlake, for appellee.", "Roger Huebner, of Illinois Municipal League, of Springfield, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF NORTH AURORA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM L. ANKER, JR., Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-04-1032\nOpinion filed June 17, 2005.\nCarolyn D. Jansons, of Drendel & Drendel, of Batavia, for appellant.\nLouis A. Berns, of Favil David Berns & Associates, L.L.C., of Northlake, for appellee.\nRoger Huebner, of Illinois Municipal League, of Springfield, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "1049-01", "first_page_order": 1065, "last_page_order": 1073 }