{ "id": 4136715, "name": "MORRIS D. HUNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Hunt v. Farmers Insurance Exchange", "decision_date": "2005-05-11", "docket_number": "No. 5-04-0298", "first_page": "1076", "last_page": "1080", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 1076" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536", "parenthetical": "\"An undefined [contract] term *** is given its plain and ordinary meaning, which can be obtained from a dictionary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833821 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "\"An undefined [contract] term *** is given its plain and ordinary meaning, which can be obtained from a dictionary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.E.2d 1251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625266 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141899 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198897 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083776 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083920 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5246057 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 7242, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.505231075280644e-08, "percentile": 0.4001127092737839 }, "sha256": "af4b1cbf8dcc7be6abe32af88499e5751c90365b4eafe75acba699ebb8ae4013", "simhash": "1:aee2dda82fe0fd56", "word_count": 1160 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:31:24.775353+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MORRIS D. HUNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Morris D. Hunt (Hunt), was an independent insurance agent for the insurance defendants from 1988 until he was terminated in July 1999, after a jury found him guilty of money laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and \u201ccrack\u201d cocaine base. Hunt then brought suit against the defendants for breach of contract, arguing that under the \u201cAgent Appointment Agreement,\u201d he should not have been officially terminated until 10 months later, when he was sentenced and a formal judgment of conviction was entered on the court record in May 2000. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of when Hunt was \u201cconvicted\u201d under the terms of the contract. After applying the \u201cplain, ordinary, popular, and natural meaning\u201d to the term \u201cconviction,\u201d the trial judge found that Hunt was \u201cconvicted\u201d under the terms of the contract when the jury returned its guilty verdict. Accordingly, the trial court denied Hunt\u2019s motion for a summary judgment, granted the defendants\u2019 motion for a summary judgment, and entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. Hunt now appeals.\nIn determining the appropriateness of a summary judgment, the trial judge strictly construes all the evidence in the record against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1986). The court must consider all the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file to decide if there is any genuine issue of material fact. Myers v. Health Specialists, S.C., 225 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72, 587 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1992). On appeal, we review summary judgment orders de novo. Myers, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 72, 587 N.E.2d at 497.\nAs stated above, the parties\u2019 relationship was governed by an \u201cAgent Appointment Agreement.\u201d Under paragraph C of this agreement, the contract could be \u201cterminated immediately by mutual consent or by [the defendants]\u201d for the following reasons:\n\u201c1. Embezzlement of monies belonging to [the defendants].\n2. Switching insurance from [the defendants] to another carrier.\n3. Abandonment of the Agency.\n4. Conviction of a felony.\n5. Willfull [sic] misrepresentation that is material to the operation of the Agency.\u201d\nOn June 22, 1999, a federal jury found Hunt guilty of money laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and \u201ccrack\u201d cocaine base. On July 19, 1999, the defendants sent a letter to Hunt advising him as follows: \u201cYour Agency Appointment Agreement with [the defendants] is being terminated immediately, effective July 23, 1999[,] per Paragraph C of [the Agreement].\u201d The defendants also paid Hunt $37,959.44, which, after deductions for outstanding loans and overpayments, represented the \u201ccontract value\u201d pursuant to another provision in the \u201cAgency Appointment Agreement.\u201d By granting the defendants\u2019 motion for a summary judgment, the trial court upheld the defendants\u2019 interpretation of the contract \u2014 that Hunt could be terminated when the jury returned its verdict finding Hunt guilty of a felony.\nOn appeal, Hunt argues that the term \u201cconviction\u201d as found in the contract is ambiguous and should be construed against the defendants, the drafters of the contract. Thus, Hunt asserts we should find that he was not \u201cconvicted\u201d under the terms of the contract until he was formally sentenced \u2014 10 months after the jury returned its guilty verdict. We disagree.\nIt has long been held by Illinois courts that words used in a contract must be given their \u201cplain and ordinary meaning.\u201d Young v. Allstate Insurance Co., 351 Ill. App. 3d 151, 158, 812 N.E.2d 741, 749 (2004). A contract term is not ambiguous merely because it is undefined in the contract, nor does an ambiguity arise \u201c \u2018because the parties can suggest creative possibilities for its meaning.\u2019 \u201d Chatham Corp. v. Dann Insurance, 351 Ill. App. 3d 353, 358, 812 N.E.2d 483, 488 (2004), quoting Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520, 529, 655 N.E.2d 842, 846 (1995). For that matter, if an undefined term has a \u201c \u2018plain, ordinary, and popular meaning,\u2019 \u201d there is no ambiguity and the term should be enforced as written. Chatham Corp., 351 Ill. App. 3d at 358, 812 N.E.2d at 488, quoting Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu, 105 Ill. 2d 486, 495, 475 N.E.2d 872, 876 (1985).\n\u201cIt is widely acknowledged that the meaning of the term \u2018convicted\u2019 or \u2018conviction\u2019 varies according to the context in which it appears and the purpose to which it relates. [Citations.] The popular meaning of conviction relates to a determination of guilt, even absent entry of a record judgment. [Citation.] The more technical definition requires a final judgment entered on such a determination. The final judgment in a criminal case is the imposition of a sentence. [Citations.]\u201d People ex rel. Grogan v. Lisinski, 113 Ill. App. 3d 276, 279, 446 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (1983).\nThis popular and ordinary definition is confirmed by the standard dictionary definition of the words \u201cconvict\u201d and \u201cconviction\u201d:\n\u201ccon*vict', v.t.; convicted, pt., pp.; convicting, ppr. ***\n1. to prove (a person) guilty, as, the evidence convicts him of theft.\n2. to find or declare (a person) guilty of an offense charged; as, the jury convicted him of theft.\u201d (Emphasis added and omitted.) Webster\u2019s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 400 (2d ed. 1983). \u201cc\u00f3nwic'tion, n. 1. the act of proving, finding, or determining to be guilty of an offense-, specifically, in law, the act of finding or the state of being found guilty of crime by a law court.\u201d (Emphasis added and omitted.) Webster\u2019s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 400 (2d ed. 1983).\nSee El Rincon Supportive Services Organization, Inc. v. First Nonprofit Mutual Insurance Co., 346 Ill. App. 3d 96, 102, 803 N.E.2d 532, 536 (2004) (\u201cAn undefined [contract] term *** is given its plain and ordinary meaning, which can be obtained from a dictionary\u201d).\nHunt\u2019s reliance on the definitions of \u201cconviction\u201d found in the Illinois criminal code is misplaced. First, as held above, these definitions are not the \u201cplain, ordinary, and popular\u201d meaning of the term \u201cconviction.\u201d Second, Hunt was not convicted under Illinois law. He was convicted under federal law, which considers the sentencing of a defendant who has been found guilty by a jury to be a part of \u201cPOST-CONVICTION PROCEDURES.\u201d See Fed. R. Crim. P art. VII & R. 32.\nGiven this court\u2019s determination of the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the term \u201cconviction,\u201d we find no error in Judge Aguirre\u2019s interpretation of the contract at issue. Under the contract terms, the defendants were entitled to terminate Hunt at the time the jury found him guilty of a felony. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOPKINS and CHAPMAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jennifer L. Barbieri and Stephen R. Clark, both of Courtney, Clark & Associates, EC., of Belleville, for appellant.", "William E Hardy, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, L.L.E, of Springfield, and James F. Clayborne, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, L.L.E, of Belleville, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MORRIS D. HUNT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 5-04-0298\nOpinion filed May 11, 2005.\nJennifer L. Barbieri and Stephen R. Clark, both of Courtney, Clark & Associates, EC., of Belleville, for appellant.\nWilliam E Hardy, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, L.L.E, of Springfield, and James F. Clayborne, of Hinshaw & Culbertson, L.L.E, of Belleville, for appellees." }, "file_name": "1076-01", "first_page_order": 1092, "last_page_order": 1096 }