{ "id": 5732168, "name": "PATRICK A. TUITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL CORBITT et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Tuite v. Corbitt", "decision_date": "2005-06-07", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-3768", "first_page": "889", "last_page": "902", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 889" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578240 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463121 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 929", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5872961 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "935" }, { "page": "936" }, { "page": "936" }, { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0929-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 N.E.2d 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reasonable to construe a statement that plaintiff was implicated in a corruption scandal to mean he was intimately involved, not that he was incriminated" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5275263 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62", "parenthetical": "reasonable to construe a statement that plaintiff was implicated in a corruption scandal to mean he was intimately involved, not that he was incriminated" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 1296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "comments that plaintiff could not get along with coworkers and did not follow up on assignments could be innocently constructed to mean that the plaintiff did not fit in with the organization of the employer making the assessment and failed to perform well in that particular job setting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55991 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5573962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" }, { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 1086", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 837", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950337 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840-41" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "844" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "insinuation that the plaintiff, a judge, was involved in payoffs and judicial corruption not reasonably subject to an innocent construction" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467335 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "insinuation that the plaintiff, a judge, was involved in payoffs and judicial corruption not reasonably subject to an innocent construction" }, { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "letter by defendant that implied plaintiff stole its software could not reasonably be innocently construed to imply plaintiff lacked rigor in following company policy but, rather, was intended to accuse plaintiff of criminal actions" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140243 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "letter by defendant that implied plaintiff stole its software could not reasonably be innocently construed to imply plaintiff lacked rigor in following company policy but, rather, was intended to accuse plaintiff of criminal actions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statements that plaintiff was involved in bid-rigging for a multimillion-dollar project were not subject to an innocent construction where a defamatory meaning was conveyed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 1014", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256355 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025-26", "parenthetical": "statements that plaintiff was involved in bid-rigging for a multimillion-dollar project were not subject to an innocent construction where a defamatory meaning was conveyed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/1014-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097134 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477031 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223609 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86-87" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" }, { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "92-93" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2930827 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "noxxlawyer plaintiff was \" 'working a scam' by filing numerous lawsuits to extract monetary settlements on a full-time basis\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980618 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "\"plaintiff [psychologist] 'readily admitted that she sees her job as doing whatever the natural parents instructed her to do' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467335 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 1014", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256355 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025", "parenthetical": "Mr. Parker has violated \" 'his own specifications in rigging this bid' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/1014-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223609 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "94" }, { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0077-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1249, "char_count": 32197, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.408139515647521e-08, "percentile": 0.39647176341168927 }, "sha256": "0455ac32ff0c727908b12605d14e65940566e2532d8dd0fe739b746e432401e3", "simhash": "1:d9f071f6568234ee", "word_count": 5343 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:37:08.387494+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PATRICK A. TUITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL CORBITT et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn May 2003, the plaintiff, Patrick Tuite, filed a complaint for defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendants, Michael Corbitt, Sam Giancana, and Harper Collins Publishers, for statements made in their book, Double Deal. In August 2003, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2002)). In November 2003, the trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motion finding that the statements at issue were not defamatory per se under the innocent construction rule, the plaintiff failed to allege special damages for his false light claim, and the statements were not so extreme and outrageous to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) when read in context, the statements are not reasonably capable of an innocent construction and the trial court erred in dismissing his defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims, and (2) his complaint adequately alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nI. BACKGROUND\nCorbitt and Giancana co-authored the book Double Deal, which was published by Harper Collins. The plaintiffs complaint alleges that Corbitt is a self-admitted professional criminal, whose life of crime was in the service of the Chicago mafia, also known as the Outfit, while Giancana is the godson and namesake of Chicago mafioso Sam \u201cMomo\u201d Giancana. Double Deal is a nonfiction book that chronicles the criminal activities of Corbitt and others within organized crime in the Chicago area. The book was touted as \u201cThe Inside Story of Murder, Unbridled Corruption, and the Cop Who Was a Mobster,\u201d and the title referred to the fact that Corbitt, who was both a police officer and a trusted mafia insider, \u201cplayed both ends\u201d making him the \u201cconsummate double dealer.\u201d\nThe plaintiff alleges that the following statements from the book concerning the 1985 trial of alleged Chicago mob boss Joey Aiuppa are false and defamatory per se in that they impute criminal wrongdoing to the plaintiff, want of integrity as an officer of the court and in the performance of his ethical duties as an attorney, and an inability to perform his professional duties as a criminal defense attorney.\n\u201cUnfortunately for the Outfit, during Strawman, the FBI had uncovered tons of evidence connecting the Chicago bosses to the guys in Kansas City. When the FBI started calling this new case against Chicago\u2019s top bosses Strawman II, it was pretty clear they were on a roll.\nAlthough Strawman II put a crimp in Chicago\u2019s top guys, particularly Joey Aiuppa, at first they figured they could beat the charges. But then when witnesses starting [sic] lining up against them, they began to get worried. *** From what I understood, they knew enough to bury just about everybody who was anybody in the Outfit.\nAnd it was no use trying to take them out, either. *** [T]hey were virtually untouchable.\n*** [B]y the time the trial got under way in 1985, there were guys flipping left and right. It was pretty clear that the Chicago Outfit was going to take a major hit. Sal told me Joey Aiuppa figured he was going away for sure if he didn\u2019t get some better representation. At seventy-seven, Joey Aiuppa was an old man, and he didn\u2019t want to die in prison. He was desperate to walk away from those charges and wanted to bring in Pat Tuite, an attorney who\u2019d represented mob cases in the past. But Sal said that Aiuppa had run into a wall with Tuite. Supposedly, the big-shot lawyer told Aiuppa that he\u2019d need a million-dollar retainer before he\u2019d even walk in the door.\nIt might seem crazy, playing hardball with an Outfit boss like that, but Tuite had his reasons; he was far from stupid. He knew that Outfit guys had a reputation for not paying their attorneys. They\u2019d get off and then leave the lawyer holding the bag. If the guy made any noise about his bill, it was \u2018take me to court,\u2019 which, of course, no one ever had the balls to do.\nSo now Aiuppa and his pals had a dilemma. They didn\u2019t want to go on their kick, take their defense money out of their own pockets. So what did they do? They decided to go to Las Vegas \u2014 the now crime-free town \u2014 and let their skim pay Tuite.\n[In the next paragraphs, Corbitt describes how he and others traveled to Utah to pick up duffle bags containing $1 million in one-hundred-dollar bills and delivering it to another individual in Chicago. After they returned to Chicago, Corbitt states, T understand Tuite got his retainer later that night.\u2019]\nAfter Tuite was on the case, all the guys were sort of semijubilant [sic]. Everybody figured Tuite had it all handled. To Aiuppa and his codefendants, it was like it was a done deal, like they were all going to be acquitted. So you can imagine their reaction when they were all found guilty the following January \u2014 1986. *** And what about Tuite? What kind of explanation could he possibly have given for this result? I can\u2019t think of one that would\u2019ve satisfied me \u2014 not after advancing him a million bucks for his legal fees. And I guess that\u2019s why, for the life of me, I\u2019ve never understood why Pat Tuite didn\u2019t get whacked. Go figure.\u201d\nThe plaintiff asserts that these statements are false because (1) he only served as a consultant to Aiuppa\u2019s attorneys and he was not retained by Aiuppa, was not the attorney of record, and did not participate in and did not represent Aiuppa at the trial; and (2) he did not demand or receive a retainer of $1 million cash and did not knowingly receive any payment for his consulting services that was comprised of illegally obtained funds. Additionally, he claims the statements falsely imply the plaintiff would use all or a portion of the $1 million cash retainer to commit bribery or other criminal conduct so as to ensure that he \u201chad it all handled\u201d and that the acquittal of Aiuppa and his codefendants was \u201ca done deal.\u201d\nThe plaintiff also alleges that statements in the author\u2019s note in the book, Corbitt\u2019s statements on the \u201cToday Show,\u201d and Corbitt\u2019s comments that he was surprised that Tuite had not been \u201cwhacked\u201d were extreme and outrageous and caused him severe emotional distress. Corbitt writes in the author\u2019s note, \u201cthere\u2019s a good chance somebody\u2019s gonna get whacked over this book. But hey, if they do, well ... f\u2014 em. Those are the people I don\u2019t give two s\u2014 about. That\u2019s right. I don\u2019t care. Far as I\u2019m concerned, they had it cornin\u2019.\u201d On the \u201cToday Show\u201d he stated that the book had \u201cput [others] in jeopardy\u201d and that someone might get \u201cwhacked\u201d as a result. The plaintiff alleges that he suffered anxiety and feared for his safety and the safety of those around him as a result of the statements.\nIn May 2003, the plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In August 2003, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint and attached a full copy of Double Deal as an exhibit. The trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, explaining that it read Double Deal, \u201ccover to cover, as the court is required to do when assessing the innocent construction rule.\u201d The court then found that \u201cthe words themselves permit an innocent construction whether that construction is more reasonable than any other construction, is something that the court does not engage in as long as there is a reasonable construction.\u201d Additionally, the court found that because the plaintiff did not plead special damages the false light claim also failed. Further, \u201cthe marketing statement at the front of the book and the other allegations are too vague and express opinions and don\u2019t rise to the level of outrageousness that this court requires when looked at in a reasonable person\u2019s standard.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nOn appeal, the plaintiff argues (1) when read in context, the statements are not reasonably capable of an innocent construction and (2) his complaint adequately alleged a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nA. Standard of Review\nA motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code attacks the legal sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86, 672 N.E.2d 1207 (1996). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and interpret the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86. A court will not dismiss a cause of action unless it appears that no set of facts could be proved which would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86-87. \u201cThe question to be determined is whether sufficient facts are contained in the pleadings which, if established, may entitle the plaintiff to relief.\u201d Stroger v. Regional Transportation Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 516, 778 N.E.2d 683 (2002). The applicable standard of review for a section 2 \u2014 615 motion is de novo. Stroger, 201 Ill. 2d at 516.\nB. Defamation Per Se\nIn his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the statements in Double Deal concerning his alleged representation of Aiuppa are false and defamatory per se in that they imputed (1) criminal wrongdoing, (2) want of integrity as an officer of the court, (3) want of integrity in the performance of his ethical duties as an attorney, and (4) an inability to perform his professional duties as a criminal defense lawyer. He argues that the trial court erred in finding that the innocent construction offered by the defendants was reasonable within the context of the book.\nA statement is defamatory if it \u201ctends to cause such harm to the reputation of another that it lowers that person in the eyes of the community or deters third persons from associating with [him].\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87. Where a plaintiff alleges that a statement is defamatory per se, he need not plead or prove actual damages to his reputation. This is because statements that are defamatory per se \u201care thought to be so obviously and materially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to [his] reputation may be presumed.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87. Illinois courts have recognized five categories of statements that are defamatory per se: (1) those imputing the commission of a criminal offense; (2) those imputing infection with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) those imputing an inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment; (4) those that prejudice a party or impute lack of ability in the party\u2019s trade, profession or business; and (5) those imputing adultery or fornication. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 88-89. The plaintiff alleges the statements in Double Deal fall within categories (1), (3), and (4).\nEven where a statement falls into one, or three, of these categories, it will not be found defamatory per se if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90. The rule of innocent construction requires a court to determine whether the statement can reasonably be innocently interpreted. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90. A court is required to consider the statement in context and to give its words and implications their \u201cnatural and obvious meaning.\u201d Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982). \u201cWhether a statement is reasonably susceptible to an innocent interpretation is a question of law for the court to decide.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90.\nThe innocent construction rule does not, however, require a court to \u201cstrain to find an unnatural but possibly innocent meaning for words where the defamatory meaning is far more reasonable.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 94. The court will interpret the words of the statement as they appear to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93. \u201cWhen a defamatory meaning was clearly intended and conveyed, [a] court will not strain to interpret allegedly defamatory words in their mildest and most inoffensive sense in order to hold them nonlibellous under the innocent construction rule.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93.\nIn Bryson, the plaintiff sued the author and publisher of a fictitious article in which the plaintiff is called a \u201cslut.\u201d The defendants claimed that the statement was not defamatory per se because the word \u201cslut\u201d could be innocently construed to describe the plaintiff as a bully. The defendants pointed to a number of nondefamatory definitions of \u201cslut\u201d found in the dictionary, including \u201c \u2018a bold, brazen girl.\u2019 \u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 92-93, quoting American Heritage Dictionary 1153 (2nd Coll. ed. 1985). The supreme court refused to find an innocent construction of the statement because it found that in the context of the article the word \u201cslut\u201d was used to describe the plaintiffs sexual proclivities. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 94; see also Parker v. House O\u2019Lite Corp., 324 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1025-26, 756 N.E.2d 286 (2001) (statements that plaintiff was involved in bid-rigging for a multimillion-dollar project were not subject to an innocent construction where a defamatory meaning was conveyed); Gardner v. Senior Living Systems, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 114, 119, 731 N.E.2d 350 (2000) (letter by defendant that implied plaintiff stole its software could not reasonably be innocently construed to imply plaintiff lacked rigor in following company policy but, rather, was intended to acc\u00fase plaintiff of criminal actions); Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 488, 515 N.E.2d 668 (1987) (insinuation that the plaintiff, a judge, was involved in payoffs and judicial corruption not reasonably subject to an innocent construction).\nHowever, the court in Salamone v. Hollinger International, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 3d 837, 840-41, 807 N.E.2d 1086 (2004), found that a newspaper article entitled \u201cMob links hurt Rosemont casino bid\u201d that stated that the plaintiff was a \u201c \u2018reputed organized crime figure\u2019 \u201d could be innocently construed. \u201cReading the headline in conjunction with the full text of the article, we believe that defendants characterized plaintiff, not as a mobster, but as a person who is believed to be, possibly erroneously, an organized crime figure.\u201d Salamone, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 841. Additionally, the court in Harrison v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 555, 571, 793 N.E.2d 760 (2003), held that statements that the plaintiff kidnaped her daughter were capable of innocent construction. The court held that kidnaping does not necessarily denote a criminal offense because it is also used in custody contexts to describe the wrongful taking of a child. In the context of the newspaper article, the court held that an innocent construction was reasonable. Harrison, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 571; see also Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 413, 667 N.E.2d 1296 (1996) (comments that plaintiff could not get along with coworkers and did not follow up on assignments could be innocently constructed to mean that the plaintiff did not fit in with the organization of the employer making the assessment and failed to perform well in that particular job setting); Harte v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 220 Ill. App. 3d 255, 261-62, 581 N.E.2d 275 (1991) (reasonable to construe a statement that plaintiff was implicated in a corruption scandal to mean he was intimately involved, not that he was incriminated).\nIn this case, the plaintiff contends that the defendants\u2019 statements that after the plaintiff received a $1 million retainer in cash he \u201chad it all handled\u201d and that Aiuppa viewed his acquittal as a \u201cdone deal\u201d were euphemisms for bribery and corruption. He argues that in the context of a book that described the illegal dealings of the Chicago mafia, including its bribing and corrupting of officials, witnesses, and judges, these comments imputed that the plaintiff knowingly received $1 million in illegally obtained funds for the purpose of doling out bribes and payoffs to transform an otherwise unwinnable case into one in which acquittal was a \u201cdone deal.\u201d\nCorbitt wrote that Aiuppa was concerned that he would be convicted unless he got better representation; he wanted the plaintiff to serve as his attorney. When requesting a $1 million retainer fee, Corbitt wrote, the plaintiff \u201cwas far from stupid,\u201d because people like Aiuppa \u201chad a reputation for not paying their attorneys.\u201d The plaintiff was then allegedly paid on the night that Corbitt returned from Utah with $1 million in illegally obtained funds.\nAfter the plaintiff was on the case, Aiuppa figured the plaintiff \u201chad it all handled.\u201d \u201cTo Aiuppa and his codefendants, it was like it was a done deal, like they were all going to be acquitted.\u201d Instead, Aiuppa and his codefendants were convicted; regarding which Corbitt wrote:\n\u201cAnd what about Tuite? What kind of explanation could he possibly have given for this result? I can\u2019t think of one that would\u2019ve satisfied me \u2014 not after advancing him a million bucks for his legal fees. And I guess that\u2019s why, for the life of me, I\u2019ve never understood why Pat Tuite didn\u2019t get whacked. Go figure.\u201d\nAlthough statements made in the form of insinuation, allusion, irony, or question may be defamatory (Berkos, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 487), in the context of the specific chapter and in the book as a whole, these statements are reasonably subject to an innocent construction. The statements can be reasonably read to indicate that Aiuppa wanted \u201cbetter representation\u201d to beat the criminal charges as \u201cguys [were] flipping left and right\u201d and the plaintiff had \u201crepresented mob cases in the past\u201d and that better representation came at a price. A substantial retainer was reasonable because people like Aiuppa had a reputation for not paying their legal bills and \u201cTuite *** was far from stupid.\u201d Additionally, the fact that Corbitt wrote that the plaintiff played \u201chardball\u201d when demanding the retainer further suggests that the funds were for the plaintiff and were not intended for bribes. If the plaintiff was involved in bribery and corruption on behalf of Aiuppa, it is unlikely he would have had to play hardball to get those funds. Further, Corbitt\u2019s statement that he understood the plaintiff was paid the night he (Corbitt) returned from Utah does not necessarily insinuate that the plaintiff knew the funds were illegally obtained.\nAiuppa\u2019s belief that the case was a done deal could reasonably be construed to mean that Aiuppa had complete faith in the plaintiff, a high-priced and experienced attorney. Aiuppa and his codefendants, perhaps as many a defendant facing overwhelming evidence of his own guilt, reacted \u201csemijubilant\u201d at the thought of being represented by the best lawyer money could hire; a clear and unequivocal compliment to the plaintiffs well-acknowledged trial skills. Perhaps the use of the word \u201csemijubilant\u201d was most apt because the prospect of facing overwhelming evidence remained (and ultimately carried the day for the government).\nCorbitt\u2019s reaction to the plaintiffs alleged failure to secure an acquittal could be construed as a likely reaction by Chicago mob bosses to their guilty verdict after Aiuppa paid the plaintiff a $1 million retainer. Of course, with the benefit of some 20 years after the event, there is no need to \u201cgo figure.\u201d The answer is clear: the plaintiff was retained for the \u201cbetter representation\u201d he could provide, he was paid his retainer before the trial because he was not \u201cstupid,\u201d he carried out his lawyerly responsibilities, whatever they were (we accept as true the plaintiffs claim that he served merely as a consultant), and the evidence won out as it generally does. The dissent focuses on the possible reading of the passage as suggesting that \u201ccorrupt methods\u201d were imputed to Tuite. The trial judge did not read this passage in this way; neither do we. That specter might have been raised had the verdict been one of \u201cnot guilty\u201d in the face of overwhelming evidence, but that was not the case here. The legal system worked as it was meant to work \u2014 the verdict apparently rested on the evidence. The book does not suggest that \u201ccorrupt methods\u201d were necessary to obtain a guilty verdict. There is no defamation per se as we read this passage.\nThe plaintiff further argues that in the context of a book about the criminal activities of those involved in organized crime in the Chicago area, including corrupt public officials, these statements cannot be innocently construed. We disagree. In the context of the entire book, it is clear that the statements are reasonably subject to this innocent construction. Throughout Double Deal, Corbitt explicitly recounts instances of bribery and corruption. He identifies those who were involved in illegal actions and describes their crimes. Corbitt explicitly identifies what public officials were working with the Chicago mafia, including the \u201cmobbed-up attorney Alan Masters,\u201d and the schemes in which they were involved. The plaintiff and his activities are not described in this manner. The innocent construction of these statements is neither strained nor unnatural. See Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 94.\nC. False Light Invasion of Privacy\nThe plaintiff also argues that the statements in Double Deal support a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy. To sustain this cause of action, a plaintiff must plead: (1) he was placed in a false light before the public by the defendant; (2) the false light would be offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with actual malice. Salamone, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 844. However, because the plaintiffs defamation per se claim fails, his false light invasion of privacy claim fails as well. See Harte, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 263.\nD. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress\nThe plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff contends that Corbitt\u2019s comment that he was surprised that the plaintiff did not get \u201cwhacked,\u201d along with his statement in the author\u2019s note that \u201cthere\u2019s a good chance somebody\u2019s gonna get whacked over this book. *** Far as I\u2019m concerned, they had it cornin\u2019,\u201d provoke and advocate murder. Specifically, the individuals named in Double Deal who are neither dead nor incarcerated, including the plaintiff, faced \u201ca good chance\u201d of being \u201cwhacked\u201d and that such individuals \u201chad it cornin\u2019.\u201d\nTo state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that his conduct would do so; and (3) the defendant\u2019s conduct actually caused severe emotional distress. Thomas v. Fuerst, 345 Ill. App. 3d 929, 935, 803 N.E.2d 619 (2004). Whether the defendant\u2019s conduct is extreme and outrageous is determined by the facts and the circumstances of each case and is evaluated on an objective standard. Thomas, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 936. Liability attaches only in circumstances where the defendant\u2019s conduct is so outrageous and extreme that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency. It does not, however, extend to \u201c \u2018mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or trivialities.\u2019 \u201d Thomas, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 936, quoting Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90, 360 N.E.2d 765 (1976). \u201cThe distress inflicted must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.\u201d Thomas, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 936.\nIn this case, we agree with the trial court that the comments in Double Deal and that Corbitt made on the \u201cToday Show\u201d express opinions and are too vague to rise to the level of outrageous and extreme conduct. This finding does not ignore the context in which the statements were made. Corbitt did state that he was surprised that after Aiuppa was convicted the plaintiff was not killed; however, all this happened almost 20 years before Double Deal was published. Corbitt\u2019s comments about something that did not happen, over an event that occurred nearly 20 years ago, does not rise to the level of outrageous and extreme conduct so as to make those comments actionable now.\nFurther, although Corbitt admits he wrote Double Deal for revenge, the book makes it clear that he wanted revenge against those in the Chicago mafia that wanted to have him killed and indicated that his son could be killed as well. In the context of Double Deal, the complained-of comments are vague and are not so outrageous as to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs amended complaint.\nAffirmed.\nHALL, J., concurs.\nWe note that in granting the defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, the trial court stated that \u201cthe words themselves permit an innocent construction whether that construction is more reasonable than any other construction, is something that the court does not engage in as long as there is a reasonable construction.\u201d The plaintiff contends that the court used the wrong standard by not considering the context in which the words were used when determining whether the statement could be innocently construed. Under the plaintiffs contention, the court misspoke when it made this statement. However, it is clear from the record that the court considered the statement in the context of the entire book after reading it \u201ccover to cover.\u201d It is also clear that the court was aware that Bryson required it to determine whether the allegedly defamatory statements were capable of a reasonable, innocent construction by interpreting the words of the statement as they appear to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d 93. Even if the court\u2019s statement was in error, this court can affirm a trial court\u2019s judgment on any grounds that are called for by the record. City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 492, 795 N.E.2d 240 (2003).\nAlthough it played no role in our decision, we learned at oral argument that the paperback edition of Double Deal does not include the passage concerning the plaintiff. Consequently, it is of no moment whether this was the result of confirmation of the plaintiffs limited role as a consultant or as the more prudent action in light of the possible misinterpretation of this passage.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" }, { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in part:\nWhat could Corbitt and Giancana have had in mind when they wrote about Tuite? What did they intend their readers to understand? Could they merely have been praising Tuite\u2019s formidable talents as a defense lawyer? I believe they intended to and did write about hoodlums who thought they had hired a lawyer who would and could do whatever was illegally necessary to fix their pending federal prosecution, including bribes and payoffs. I do not believe a reasonable reader would understand the words about Tuite to be a paean about the joys and satisfaction of hiring an expensive lawyer.\nThe authors claimed to have written a book about \u201cunbridled corruption.\u201d In that context they described a million dollar payment to Tuite, in hundred dollar bills, under the cover of darkness. That made the \u201cguys *** sort of semijubilant.\u201d \u201cEverybody figured Tuite had it all handled.\u201d \u201cTo Aiuppa and his codefendants, it was like a done deal, like they were all going to be acquitted.\u201d\nThe reasonable reader would not take those words merely as an expression of confidence in a lawyer by his clients. That would not be very interesting. This was a case that admittedly could not be won on its merits. How else could victory he acheived? By the corrupt methods imputed to Tuite by the authors. That is libel per se.\nThe majority takes the innocent construction rule too far. It does not apply \u201csimply because allegedly defamatory words are \u2018capable\u2019 of an innocent construction.\u201d Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 93 (1996). In applying the rale, we must give the alleged defamatory words \u201ctheir natural and obvious meaning.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93. We must interpret the allegedly defamatory words \u201cas they appeared to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93. When a defamatory meaning is clearly intended and conveyed:\n\u201cthis court will not strain to interpret allegedly defamatory words in their mildest and most inoffensive sense in order to hold them nonlibellous under the innocent construction rale.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93.\nTrue, the authors used a kind of code, apparently recognizing there are legal limits to what can be said about a lawyer. But the code is transparent. The clear message is that Tuite was ready and able to fix the case, that he was paid to fix it, and that he did not deliver, something that should have caused a premature end to his life. It takes more than a \u201cstrain\u201d to apply an innocent meaning to the offending words. It takes a gyration of Olympian proportion.\nCalling the plaintiff a \u201cslut\u201d in Bryson was defamatory because it was intended to describe her sexual proclivities, alternative innocent dictionary definitions aside. The court observed that the innocent construction rule does not require courts to strain to find an unnatural but possibly innocent meaning for the words where the defamatory meaning is far more reasonable. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 94. Moreover, said the court: \u201cNor does it require this court to espouse a naivet unwarranted under the circumstances.\u201d Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 94.\nWe have rejected application of the innocent construction rule where the defamatory words used were less offensive than the words written about Tuite. See Parker v. House O\u2019Lite Corp., 324 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1025 (2001) (Mr. Parker has violated \u201c \u2018his own specifications in rigging this bid\u2019 \u201d); Moriarty v. Greene, 315 Ill. App. 3d 225, 232 (2000) (\u201cplaintiff [psychologist] \u2018readily admitted that she sees her job as doing whatever the natural parents instructed her to do\u2019 \u201d); Kumaran v. Brotman, 247 Ill. App. 3d 216, 225 (1993) (noxxlawyer plaintiff was \u201c \u2018working a scam\u2019 by filing numerous lawsuits to extract monetary settlements on a full-time basis\u201d).\nThe analysis conducted in Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476 (1987), should be used here. In Berkos, NBC broadcasted a story about an investigation into judicial corruption. While Berkos was not directly said to have accepted a bribe or to be a corrupt judge, his name was placed in the story about other judges taking bribes. In the overall context, said the court, \u201creferences to Berkos *** [could] be reasonably interpreted by an ordinary viewer of normal intelligence as imputing criminal involvement to Berkos.\u201d Berkos, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 487. Otherwise, asked the court, why refer to Berkos? Here, why refer to Tuite in terms of a late-night million dollar payment, having it \u201call handled,\u201d and a \u201cdone deal\u201d?\nI would reverse the trial court\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 dismissal of Tuite\u2019s libel and false light counts and send them back for further proceedings. I agree with the majority that Tuite did not allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Deutsch, Levy & Engel, Chtrd., of Chicago (Paul M. Levy, Phillip J. Zisook, and Brian D. Saucier, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jenner & Block, of Chicago (David P. Sanders, of counsel), and Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., of New York, New York (Slade R. Metcalf and Jeffrey O. Grossman, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PATRICK A. TUITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL CORBITT et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20143768\nOpinion filed June 7, 2005.\nWOLFSON, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nDeutsch, Levy & Engel, Chtrd., of Chicago (Paul M. Levy, Phillip J. Zisook, and Brian D. Saucier, of counsel), for appellant.\nJenner & Block, of Chicago (David P. Sanders, of counsel), and Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., of New York, New York (Slade R. Metcalf and Jeffrey O. Grossman, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0889-01", "first_page_order": 907, "last_page_order": 920 }