{ "id": 5731371, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLINTON JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jackson", "decision_date": "2005-06-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-03-1489", "first_page": "927", "last_page": "944", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 927" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "431 U.S. 767", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 2125 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding constitutionality of Illinois's obscenity statute in light of Miller" }, { "parenthetical": "upholding constitutionality of Illinois's obscenity statute in light of Miller" }, { "parenthetical": "upholding constitutionality of Illinois's obscenity statute in light of Miller" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 235.20", "category": "laws:leg_act", "reporter": "N.Y.", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 484", "category": "laws:leg_act", "reporter": "N.Y.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "468-69", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he primary rule in the construction of stipulations is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties\" to the stipulation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520940 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263027 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 828", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3948781 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083942 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463", "parenthetical": "\" 'After our supreme court has declared the law with respect to an issue, this court must follow that law, as only the supreme court has authority to overrule or modify its own decisions' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499566 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5667057 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2855718 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "rejecting contentions that section 26 - 1(a) and 31 - 1 of the Criminal Code were vague and overbroad" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/40/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782877 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110" }, { "page": "228-29" }, { "page": "2300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2958695 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371-72" }, { "page": "371-72" }, { "page": "367-68" }, { "page": "371-72", "parenthetical": "finding that the statutory definition of obscenity in section 11 - 20, which contained the phrases \" 'appeal to the prurient interest,' \" \" 'shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion,' \" and \" 'redeeming social value,' \" was not unconstitutionally vague" }, { "page": "371", "parenthetical": "discussing Illinois's obscenity statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3948921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 U.S. 747", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 636693 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "employing the \"substantial overbreadth\" test and upholding a child pornography statute" }, { "parenthetical": "employing the \"substantial overbreadth\" test and upholding a child pornography statute" }, { "parenthetical": "employing the \"substantial overbreadth\" test and upholding a child pornography statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/458/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 205", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9566 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213-14" }, { "page": "133" }, { "page": "2274-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 726", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769229 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "upholding Federal Communications Commission regulation of indecent but nonobscene speech aired on the radio during a time period when the audience would likely include children, in order to protect them from what was otherwise protected expression" }, { "parenthetical": "upholding Federal Communications Commission regulation of indecent but nonobscene speech aired on the radio during a time period when the audience would likely include children, in order to protect them from what was otherwise protected expression" }, { "parenthetical": "upholding Federal Communications Commission regulation of indecent but nonobscene speech aired on the radio during a time period when the audience would likely include children, in order to protect them from what was otherwise protected expression" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 676", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176491 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 3d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3327444 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "\"In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for selling to a minor a magazine which was admittedly not obscene if shown to adults\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/65/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501468 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "noting that \"a State or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youth than on those available to adults\"" }, { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5481198 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "\"That the State has a legitimate interest in protecting its children is a matter not open to dispute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477614 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515652 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3637825 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "\"In [Ginsberg], the court affirmed the defendant's conviction for selling sexually oriented but nonobscene material to minors\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 N.E.2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.Y.S.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 N.Y.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 6795294 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/18/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 767", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183638 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 629", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176239 ], "weight": 27, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "1276" }, { "page": "631" }, { "page": "199" }, { "page": "1275-76" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "1277" }, { "page": "635" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "1278" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "1278-79" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1279-80" }, { "page": "633" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "1277" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "1276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 U.S. 413", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171859 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/383/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 U.S. 476", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6160660 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/354/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 229", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782954 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963706 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832765 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "331-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131037 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29960 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609691 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 15", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338628 ], "weight": 30, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "2612" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "430" }, { "page": "2614" }, { "page": "23-24" }, { "page": "430" }, { "page": "2614" }, { "page": "20" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "2612-13" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "430" }, { "page": "2614-15" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "2615" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "2615" }, { "page": "24" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "2615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476993 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801354 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 799384 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/203/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461780 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474695 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3948921 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0446-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1614, "char_count": 42427, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.745826375742398e-08, "percentile": 0.3596862210885654 }, "sha256": "23cfa7ec0d0ec3bed3564e6f2367661c491638b01aae1811d342b4dc1fcbe551", "simhash": "1:79bf17e86e0c4ee3", "word_count": 7030 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:37:08.387494+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLINTON JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Clinton Jackson was convicted of distributing harmful materials to a minor in violation of section 11 \u2014 21 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21 (West 2000)) and sentenced to six months in the Cook County Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant challenges the constitutionality of section 11 \u2014 21 and argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe following evidence was adduced at trial. In August 2001, defendant was a staff member at Maryville Academy\u2019s Scott Nolan Center (Center) in Des Plaines, Illinois. The Center is part of Illinois\u2019s Juvenile Justice Program (JJP). Sixteen-year-old G.B. was one of the Center\u2019s youth-residents whom defendant supervised. On the evening of August 4, 2001, as G.B., other youth-residents, and staff members were watching television in a dayroom at the Center, defendant inserted a videotape labeled \u201c1998 Bulls/Jazz Game 3&4\u201d in the videocassette recorder (VCR) and pressed the play button. Though he watched the tape for only a couple of seconds, G.B. saw a girl, a couch, and defendant on the tape.\nSometime thereafter, G.B. watched defendant\u2019s tape a second time, though he was unsure of the exact date. During this second viewing, both he and defendant were in the dayroom. When G.B. asked defendant what was on the tape, defendant replied, \u201cCheck.\u201d After pressing the play button on the VCR, G.B. observed defendant and an unknown woman engaged in various sexual acts. The genitalia of both defendant and the woman were clearly visible on the tape. According to G.B., the television audio was kept muted because defendant did not want anyone to know about the tape. G.B. testified that he enjoyed watching the tape.\nAfter watching the tape, G.B. went to his room. On the way, he met staff member Hector Escalera in the hallway. G.B. told Escalera that he had just watched a good movie.\nG.B. testified that two or three weeks later, he spoke to Mike Schoenwald, a supervisor at the Center. Brian King, a floor manager at the Center, was also present during this conversation. G.B. told Schoenwald and King that he had seen a sexually explicit videotape and identified defendant as a participant in the sexual activity depicted on that videotape. G.B. also spoke with James Spruyt, the individual who \u201cruns the Center,\u201d about having viewed the sexually explicit videotape. G.B. was later taken to the police station, where he told Detective Matt Kulak what he had seen on the tape.\nEscalera testified that on August 4, 2001, he was watching a football game while monitoring activity in the hallway at the Center. After hearing \u201ca lot\u201d of excessive noise emanating from the dayroom, Escalera went to investigate, beheving that the youth-residents might be arguing or fighting. Instead, he found a group of youth-residents watching television. On several occasions that night, Escalera checked in on the group in the dayroom, but each time he approached the room, someone turned off the television. On the last occasion, Escalera saw G.B. and other youth-residents coming out of the room. When he asked what the commotion was about, a staff member identified as \u201cChristopher\u201d showed Escalera about 30 seconds of the videotape. Escalera did not remember seeing defendant in the day-room at any point that evening, nor did he discuss the videotape with defendant.\nInstead, on August 6, 2001, Escalera reported the incident to Schoenwald. Later that day, as defendant showed the videotape to a group of adult staff members in the dayroom, Spruyt entered the room, confiscated the tape, and called the police and the child abuse hot line at the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). A DCFS investigator subsequently interviewed G.B.\nSchoenwald testified that when he confronted defendant about the tape, defendant denied showing it to the youth-residents. However, defendant apologized to Schoenwald for having brought the videotape into the Center.\nSpruyt testified that he confiscated the tape once he learned of it. Spruyt stated that defendant was standing next to the videocassette recorder when he confiscated the tape. Defendant told Spruyt he had not shown the tape to any of the youth-residents.\nDetective Kulak testified that after speaking to G.B., he called defendant and asked him to come to the police station. Defendant went to the station, but declined to give a statement in the absence of counsel. After Detective Kulak spoke to Spruyt and watched the videotape, he arrested defendant.\nAt trial, the State played portions of the three-hour videotape for the circuit court, including one scene in which defendant asked the woman to say \u201cThis is for my boys at the JJE\u201d The record does not indicate which segments of the tape were shown to the court or whether the portions of the tape that the court observed were the same segments that G.B. had seen while in the dayroom.\nDefendant failed to object to the fact that the State did not show the entire tape to the circuit court. Instead, the parties stipulated to the following:\n\u201cThis particular incident goes on for a while. And then after this scene, there is a scene in a garage in reference to what [G.B.] had said as well, where a girl is put into handcuffs, [and] another girl is displayed. And there is intercourse with that woman as well.\u201d\nAfter the State rested and after the circuit court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a directed finding, defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that he had brought the tape, along with several others, to the Center believing it contained the basketball games labeled on the tapes. Defendant explained that after he began to play the tape, he realized, \u201cin 2 or 3 seconds\u201d that he had brought in the wrong tape. Realizing his mistake, defendant took the tape out of the machine, placed it in his bag, and put the bag in his office. Defendant testified that he never authorized anyone to show the tape to the youth-residents.\nDefendant testified that he did not know that any of the youth-residents had seen the videotape until learning it during the course of the trial. He admitted to showing the tape to his adult coworkers, but testified that no one under 18 years old was present. Defendant also testified that he told the woman to say \u201cThis is for my boys at the JJP\u201d because she had teased him earlier about accepting a job at the Center. At the time he made the videotape, defendant claimed he had not yet begun to work at the Center. Defendant also testified that he did not believe that the material on the videotape was any more harmful than the regular nightly programming on cable television.\nThe circuit court found that G.B.\u2019s testimony was credible and that defendant\u2019s was not. In discussing the videotape, which the court stated it had viewed for \u201csome period of time,\u201d the court noted that the tape contained \u201csex in all ways, all types of sex, oral, regular, hidden from the back, legs up, giving each other head, the whole nine yards.\u201d The court further stated:\n\u201c[I] really saw nothing socially redeeming about [the tape] in the context of the way it would be viewed in this community. *** [W]e did not see anything that redeemed it, anything other than the prurient interest of the watcher and possibly the maker as well.\u201d\nThe circuit court then found defendant guilty of exhibiting harmful material to a minor and sentenced him to six months in the Cook County Department of Corrections.\nIn his posttrial motions for a new trial and for a reduction in the sentence, defendant did not object to the State\u2019s piecemeal presentation of the videotape to the trial court or argue that the tape did not qualify as \u201charmful\u201d material under the statute. The circuit court denied both of defendant\u2019s motions. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nANALYSIS\nA. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE\nDefendant first levies a constitutional challenge to section 11 \u2014 21 (hereinafter Harmful Materials statute), arguing that the statute (1) does not conform with the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), which set forth guidelines that a state must meet when it seeks to regulate \u201cobscene\u201d material, and (2) is unconstitutionally vague.\nWe begin our analysis by recognizing the well-established rule that \u201c[a]ll statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the validity of the statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation.\u201d People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406 (2003), citing People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). This presumption means that, if possible, we must construe the statute \u201cso as to affirm its constitutionality and validity.\u201d Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 406, citing People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1999).\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 324 (2005). The best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language of the statute, which should be given its plain or ordinary and popularly understood meaning. See People v. Ward, 346 Ill. App. 3d 482, 484 (2004). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).\nThe Harmful Materials statute states:\n\u201cA person who, with knowledge that a person is a child, that is a person under 18 years of age, or who fails to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the true age of a child, knowingly distributes to or sends or causes to be sent to, or exhibits to, or offers to distribute or exhibit any harmful material to a child, is guilty of a misdemeanor.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(a) (West 2002).\nThe statute defines \u201charmful material\u201d as follows:\n\u201cMaterial is harmful if, to the average person, applying contemporary standards, its predominant appeal, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, that is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters, and is material the redeeming social importance of which is substantially less than its prurient interest.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(b)(1) (West 2002).\nIn a section entitled \u201cInterpretation of Evidence,\u201d the legislature provided further guidance as to how prosecutions under this statute should proceed:\n\u201cThe predominant appeal to prurient interest of the material shall be judged with reference to average children of the same general age of the child to whom such material was offered, distributed, sent or exhibited, unless it appears from the nature of the matter or the circumstances of its dissemination, distribution or exhibition that it is designed for specially susceptible groups, in which case the predominant appeal of the material shall be judged with reference to its intended or probable recipient group.\nIn prosecutions under this section, where circumstances of production, presentation, sale, dissemination, distribution, or publicity indicate the material is being commercially exploited for the sake of its prurient appeal, such evidence is probative with respect to the nature of the material and can justify the conclusion that the redeeming social importance of the material is in fact substantially less than its prurient appeal.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(c) (West 2000).\n1. Miller\u2019s \u201cObscenity\u201d Test\nDefendant argues that the language of the Harmful Materials statute does not conform with the guidelines, set forth under Miller, that a state must meet when it attempts to regulate obscene material. In Miller, the Supreme Court was \u201ccalled on to define the standards which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may regulate without infringing on the First Amendment.\u201d Miller, 413 U.S. at 19-20, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 428, 93 S. Ct. at 2612. Even though it had been \u201ccategorically settled\u201d that \u201cobscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment (Miller, 413 U.S. at 23, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 430, 93 S. Ct. at 2614, citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 33 L. Ed. 2d 312, 92 S. Ct. 2245 (1972)), the Miller Court \u201cacknowledge!)!] *** the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression\u201d and cautioned that \u201c[s]tate statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited.\u201d Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 430, 93 S. Ct. at 2614.\nAfter recounting both Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957), and A Book Named \u201cJohn Cleland\u2019s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure\u201d v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1, 86 S. Ct. 975 (1966), decisions which it characterized as \u201clandmark *** in the somewhat tortured history of the Court\u2019s obscenity decisions\u201d (Miller, 413 U.S. at 20, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 428, 93 S. Ct. at 2612-13), the Court retooled the \u201cobscenity\u201d standard of both Roth and Memoirs, confining the \u201cpermissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct\u201d (Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 430, 93 S. Ct. at 2614-15), and laying out three \u201cbasic guidelines\u201d that a state law must meet to protect \u201cthe First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment\u201d (Miller, 413 U.S. at 25, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 431, 93 S. Ct. at 2615):\n\u201c(a) [W]hether \u2018the average person, applying contemporary community standards\u2019 would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [citations]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.\u201d Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 431, 93 S. Ct. at 2615.\nDefendant argues that the Harmful Materials statute violates guidelines (b) and (c) listed above.\nCiting guideline (b)\u2019s mandate that the proscribed depictions of sexual conduct must be \u201cspecifically defined by the applicable state law,\u201d defendant argues that the Harmful Materials statute fails guideline (b) because the statute \u201chas never been interpreted by the courts, let alone construed so as to provide the definitional boundaries required under Miller.\u201d Defendant also argues that the \u201cstatute, as written, fails to define or describe what constitutes a proscribed depiction of sexual conduct.\u201d\nDefendant further argues that guideline (b)\u2019s \u201cspecific definition\u201d requirement is also violated by the section of the Harmful Materials statute that requires the trier of fact to determine whether the \u201cpredominant appeal\u201d of the material at issue is to the \u201cprurient interest\u201d of both an average person and average children of the same general age as the child to whom the material was distributed. See 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(b)(1), (c) (West 2002).\nAdditionally, defendant argues that guideline (c) is violated because instead of limiting the inquiry into whether the material at issue, \u201ctaken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value\u201d (Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 431, 93 S. Ct. at 2615), the Harmful Materials statute criminalizes the distribution of material \u201cthe redeeming social importance of which is substantially less than its prurient appeal\u201d (720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(b)(1) (West 2000)). The unconstitutional impact of this deviation, defendant argues, is that \u201c[a] work that is socially important, and that would be protected under Miller, could nevertheless be found to be \u2018harmful\u2019 under the Illinois statute.\u201d\nThe State argues that the guidelines set forth in Miller do not apply here because the Harmful Materials statute does not simply target and criminalize the distribution of \u201cobscene\u201d material to children; it seeks to criminalize the distribution of any material deemed \u201charmful\u201d to them, even if that material would be constitutionally protected under the first amendment if distributed to adults. Relying on Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195, 88 S. Ct. 1274 (1968), the State maintains that it has the power to regulate and criminalize the distribution of harmful, yet protected, material to minors. We agree.\nIn Ginsberg, two proprietors of a Long Island lunch counter were prosecuted under section 484 \u2014 h of the New York Penal Law after they sold \u201csome so-called \u2018girlie\u2019 magazines\u201d to a 16-year-old boy. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 199, 88 S. Ct. at 1276. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court took up \u201cthe question of the constitutionality on its face of a New York criminal obscenity statute which prohibit[ed] the sale to minors under 17 years of age of material defined to be obscene on the basis of its appeal to them whether or not it would be obscene to adults.\u201d Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 199, 88 S. Ct. at 1275-76.\nAfter noting that \u201c[t]he \u2018girlie\u2019 picture magazines involved in the sales here [were] not obscene for adults\u201d (Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 201, 88 S. Ct. at 1277, citing Redrup v. State of New York, 386 U.S. 767, 18 L. Ed. 2d 515, 87 S. Ct. 1414 (1967)), the Court framed the defendant\u2019s argument as follows:\n\u201cAppellant\u2019s primary attack upon [section] 484 \u2014 h is leveled at the power of the State to adapt [the] Memoirs [obscenity] formulation to define the material\u2019s obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors, and thus exclude material so defined from the area of protected expression. He makes no argument that the magazines are not \u2018harmful to minors\u2019 within the definition in subsection 1(f). Thus \u2018[n]o issue is presented ... concerning the obscenity of the material involved.\u2019 Roth, supra, at 481 n.8.\u201d Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 201, 88 S. Ct. at 1278.\nCiting the New York Court of Appeals, the Court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that a State may not \u201c \u2018employ variable concepts of obscenity\u2019 \u201d depending upon the reader\u2019s age:\n\u201c \u2018[M]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children. In other words, the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from whom it is quarantined. Because of the State\u2019s exigent interest in preventing distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for adults.\u2019 \u201d Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 202, 88 S. Ct. at 1278-79, quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1966).\nThough section 484 \u2014 h criminalized the distribution of nonobscene, and, therefore, constitutionally protected, material, the Court upheld the statutory scheme and affirmed the defendant\u2019s conviction:\n\u201cWe do not regard New York\u2019s regulation in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 as involving an invasion of such minors\u2019 constitutionally protected freedoms. Rather [section] 484 \u2014 h simply adjusts the definition of obscenity \u2018to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests ...\u2019 of minors. [Citations.] That the State has power to make that adjustment seems clear, for we have recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms \u2018the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults. ...\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 88 S. Ct. at 1279-80.\nWe have previously interpreted Ginsberg as allowing a state to regulate and criminalize the distribution to children of material that it could not if distributed to adults. See People v. Lerch, 134 Ill. App. 3d 643, 656 (1985) (\u201cIn [Ginsberg], the court affirmed the defendant\u2019s conviction for selling sexually oriented but nonobscene material to minors\u201d), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized by People v. Hebel, 174 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17-21 (1988), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 11 \u2014 20.1(a)(l)(vii), (a)(5), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 222-25 (1994); People v. Spargo, 103 Ill. App. 3d 280, 285 (1982) (\u201cThat the State has a legitimate interest in protecting its children is a matter not open to dispute\u201d); People ex rel. Carey v. Starview Drive-In Theatre, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 3d 624, 637 (1981) (noting that \u201ca State or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youth than on those available to adults\u201d); Motion Picture Appeal Board of the City of Chicago v. S.K. Films, 65 Ill. App. 3d 217, 225 (1978) (\u201cIn Ginsberg, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for selling to a minor a magazine which was admittedly not obscene if shown to adults\u201d).\nMore importantly, Miller, upon which defendant\u2019s first tilt at the Harmful Materials statute relies, recognizes this principle:\n\u201c \u2018We have indicated ... that because of its strong and abiding interest in youth, a State may regulate the dissemination to juveniles of, and their access to, material objectionable as to them, but which a State clearly could not regulate as to adults. Ginsberg v. New York, ... [390 U.S. 629 (1968)].\u2019 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968) (footnote omitted).\u201d Miller, 413 U.S. at 36 n.17, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 438 n.17, 93 S. Ct. at 2621 n.17.\nSee also Federal Communications Comm\u2019n v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073, 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978) (upholding Federal Communications Commission regulation of indecent but nonobscene speech aired on the radio during a time period when the audience would likely include children, in order to protect them from what was otherwise protected expression).\nOf course, there are limits to this principle. A state, seeking to keep nonobscene, yet \u201charmful\u201d material from its minors, can impermissibly create a statute that is overbroad in scope:\n\u201c \u2018Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, supra. Nor can such a broad restriction be justified by any other governmental interest pertaining to minors. Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.\u2019 \u201d Carey, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 637, quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125, 133, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 2274-75 (1975).\nHowever, defendant has not asked us to consider those limits or whether the Harmful Materials statute itself is overbroad. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982) (employing the \u201csubstantial overbreadth\u201d test and upholding a child pornography statute). Nor has he questioned whether the Harmful Materials statute conforms with Ginsberg (in fact, defendant did not cite Ginsberg at all in his opening brief and only mentioned it in his reply brief in response to the State\u2019s brief).\nInstead, in arguing that the Harmful Materials statute is unconstitutional, he relies solely upon Miller\u2019s guidelines. Our legislature, in fashioning the reach of the Harmful Materials statute, was not confined to criminalizing the distribution of only \u201cobscene\u201d material to minors; it could regulate any material it deemed \u201charmful\u201d to them even if that material was constitutionally protected if distributed to adults. Because the legislature was not so limited, defendant\u2019s reliance upon Miller\u2019s three-part \u201cobscenity\u201d guidelines is misplaced. We express no opinion, however, as to whether the Harmful Materials statute is overbroad or in conformance with the principle announced in Ginsberg and its progeny.\n2. Vagueness Challenge\nDefendant next argues that the Harmful Materials statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to both \u201cprovide ordinary people adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed\u201d and \u201cdefine the offense in a manner that prevents arbitrary and standardless enforcement.\u201d Specifically, defendant contends that the statute\u2019s \u201cbroad and antiquated\u201d terms, i.e., \u201cprurient interest,\u201d \u201cshameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion,\u201d \u201csubstantially beyond customary limits of candor,\u201d and \u201credeeming social importance,\u201d provide \u201cvirtually no guidance as to the statute\u2019s reach.\u201d Defendant also argues that because these terms \u201cfail to explain the statute\u2019s scope,\u201d the statute is amenable to a \u201cstandardless application of its requirements\u201d which \u201cmay vary from courtroom to courtroom, and judge to judge.\u201d\nDue process requires that a statute must (1) not be so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning or application and (2) provide sufficiently definite standards for law-enforcement officers and triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions. See People v. Smith, 347 Ill. App. 3d 446, 450 (2004), citing People v. Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d 444, 453 (1980). If the statute implicates first amendment expressive rights, it must not be so vague as to chill free exercise. See Smith, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 450, citing Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d at 453.\nThough defendant\u2019s first amendment rights are potentially implicated by the Harmful Materials statute (for the statute\u2019s reach stretches beyond solely \u201cobscene\u201d material and criminalizes the distribution of material that, though protected under the first amendment, is deemed harmful to minors), we reject defendant\u2019s vagueness challenge.\nBoth the United States Supreme Court and our supreme court have found that the language defendant claims here to be \u201cbroad and antiquated\u201d is not unconstitutionally vague. See Ward, 431 U.S. at 771-73, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 744-45, 97 S. Ct. at 2088-89; People v. Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d 362, 371-72 (1974). In both Ward and Ridens, the defendants argued, inter alia, that Illinois\u2019s obscenity statute was unconstitutionally vague. See Ward, 431 U.S. at 771-73, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 744-45, 97 S. Ct. at 2088-89; Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d at 371-72. As defendant noted in his reply brief, at the time those cases were decided, the language of Illinois\u2019s obscenity statute \u201cmimic[ked]\u201d that of the Harmful Materials statute:\n\u201c \u2018A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominate appeal is to prurient interest, that is a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nSee Ward, 431 U.S. at 770, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 743-44, 97 S. Ct. at 2087-88, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 20(b); Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d at 367-68, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 11 \u2014 20.\nIn both cases, the defendants\u2019 vagueness challenges were rejected. See Ward, 431 U.S. at 772-73, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 745, 97 S. Ct. at 2089 (characterizing as \u201cwholly without merit\u201d the defendant\u2019s claim that Illinois\u2019s obscenity statute was vague and gave him no notice that the statute banned the kind of materials he sold); Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d at 371-72 (finding that the statutory definition of obscenity in section 11 \u2014 20, which contained the phrases \u201c \u2018appeal to the prurient interest,\u2019 \u201d \u201c \u2018shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion,\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018redeeming social value,\u2019 \u201d was not unconstitutionally vague).\nOf course, the phrases defendant complains of here are not part of the everyday vernacular. It is unlikely, for instance, that the phrase \u201cprurient interest\u201d is ever used during causal conversation to describe purveyors of child pornography. Nor is one likely to hear a purchaser of obscene pornography publicly scolded for exhibiting a \u201cshameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion,\u201d or a disapproving parent complain to a newspaper-stand vendor that his \u201cgirlie\u201d magazines lack any \u201credeeming social value.\u201d Yet, that does not mean the statute is vague.\n\u201cA statute or ordinance designed to regulate many types of activities must frequently be couched in general terms.\u201d Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d at 371 (discussing Illinois\u2019s obscenity statute). \u201cCondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.\u201d Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 228-29, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (1972). Though the Harmful Materials statute does not \u201cattempt to particularize all of the myriad kinds of conduct that may fall within the statute,\u201d we believe that the \u201clegislature deliberately chose to frame the provision in general terms, prompted by the futility of an effort to anticipate and enumerate all of the methods of disrupting public order that fertile minds might devise.\u201d People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392, 396 (1968) (rejecting contentions that section 26 \u2014 1(a) and 31 \u2014 1 of the Criminal Code were vague and overbroad).\nMoreover, we find that defendant\u2019s vagueness challenge to the Harmful Materials statute is forestalled by both Ward and Ridens, which, in upholding Illinois\u2019s obscenity statute, found that the very language that defendant claims here to be unconstitutionally vague was, in fact, not so. See People v. Hall, 143 Ill. App. 3d 766, 780 (1986) (\u201c \u2018[Sjince the Illinois Supreme Court has declared the Illinois obscenity statute to be constitutional, the defendant is in the wrong forum for the relief he seeks. When the supreme court of this State has declared the law [on] any point, only it can overrule and modify its opinion, and an appellate court is bound by its decision\u2019 \u201d), quoting People v. Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d 726, 736 (1985); see also People v. Rosinski, 351 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463 (2004) (\u201c \u2018After our supreme court has declared the law with respect to an issue, this court must follow that law, as only the supreme court has authority to overrule or modify its own decisions\u2019 \u201d), quoting Mekertichian v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., L.L.C., 347 Ill. App. 3d 828, 836 (2004). Therefore, we find that defendant has not met his burden in clearly demonstrating that the Harmful Materials statute is unconstitutional. See Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 406.\nB. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE\nDefendant next argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of this court to retry him on appeal. See People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 209 (2004). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d at 322.\nIn a bench trial, the trial court, as the trier of fact, observes the witnesses and, thus, is responsible for judging their credibility, resolving any inconsistencies, determining the weight to give their testimony, and drawing reasonable inferences from all the evidence presented. See People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1991). \u201cWe will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactoiy that it raises a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209.\nDefendant first argues that \u201c[t]he State failed to prove [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the only evidence that [he] was even present during the minor\u2019s viewing of the material was the uncorroborated and unreliable testimony of\u201d G.B. Specifically, defendant characterizes G.B.\u2019s testimony as vague and inconsistent because he could not recall the exact date of his second, more extended, viewing of defendant\u2019s tape and he wavered as to who actually pressed the play button during this second viewing. He also argues that the State failed to prove that he \u201cexhibited\u201d or \u201cdistributed\u201d the tape to any minor as required under the Harmful Materials statute, and that his mere presence in the dayroom when the tape was shown was insufficient.\nInitially, we note that the circuit court, as the trier of fact, specifically found that, despite any inconsistency or discrepancy, G.B.\u2019s testimony was credible and that defendant\u2019s testimony was not. Due to the court\u2019s superior position to make this credibility determination, we decline to second-guess it.\nMoreover, it is irrelevant under the Harmful Materials statute whether defendant, as the purveyor of the harmful material, was actually present in the dayroom or whether he actually pressed the play button. All that the statute requires is that he \u201cknowingly distribute[d] to or sen[t] or cause[d] to be sent to, or exhibit[ed] to, or offer[ed] to distribute or exhibit\u201d the tape to G.B. (720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(a) (West 2002)), and there was sufficient evidence that defendant did just that (tellingly, defendant does not contend that the tape was not \u201charmful\u201d under the statute).\nNot only did defendant knowingly make the tape and bring it into the Center (though he claimed by mistake), he also urged the woman shown on the tape to say: \u201cThis is for my boys at the JJP.\u201d Based upon this evidence, the circuit court could have rationally found that defendant knowingly exhibited the tape to minors. See Ward, 215 Ill. 2d at 331-32 (finding that the defendant, who left a sealed envelope containing naked pictures of herself on a weight bench in the garage of the minor\u2019s father, had knowingly distributed harmful material to that minor even though she never told the minor to open the envelope and was not present when the minor did so).\nFinally, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that the tape, taken as a whole, appealed to prurient interest because the circuit court only viewed selected portions of the tape. Defendant argues that, without a complete viewing of the tape, the circuit court could not rationally find an essential element of the Harmful Materials statute, i.e., that the predominant appeal of the videotape, \u201ctaken as a whole,\u201d appeals to prurient interest.\nNot only did defendant fail to object to the manner in which the tape was shown to the circuit court or include this issue in his post-trial motion, but after the prosecutor stated that the tape would not be shown in its entirety (the ideal moment for defendant to raise an objection to the State\u2019s presentation of the tape), he entered into the following stipulation regarding the material on the tape:\n\u201cThis particular incident goes on for a while. And then after this scene, there is a scene in a garage in reference to what [G.B.] had said as well, where a girl is put into handcuffs, [and] another girl is displayed. And there is intercourse with that woman as well.\u201d\nGenerally speaking, a defendant is precluded from attacking or otherwise contradicting any facts to which he or she stipulated. See People v. Jennings, 364 Ill. App. 3d 473, 479 (2005), citing People v. Gibson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 878, 880 (1997). As our supreme court recently stated:\n\u201c \u2018A stipulation is conclusive as to all matters necessarily included in it\u2019 (34 Ill. L. & Prac. Stipulations \u00a7 8 (2001)) and \u2018[n]o proof of stipulated facts is necessary, since the stipulation is substituted for proof and dispenses with the need for evidence\u2019 (34 Ill. L. & Prac. Stipulations \u00a7 9 (2001)).\u201d People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 469 (2005).\nBy stipulating that \u201cthis particular incident goes on for a while\u201d (or, in other words, the tape is \u201cmore of the same\u201d), defendant agreed that there was no need for the circuit court to view the entire tape. See Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 468-69 (stating that \u201c[t]he primary rule in the construction of stipulations is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties\u201d to the stipulation). Thus, not only did defendant fail to object, he acquiesced to the presentation of the tape, and he cannot now be heard to complain.\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN, J., concurs.\nSection 484 \u2014 h of the New York Penal Law made it a crime to \u201c \u2018knowingly *** sell ... to a minor\u2019 under 17 of \u2018(a) any picture ... which depicts nudity ... and which is harmful to minors,\u2019 and \u2018(b) any ... magazine ... which contains ... [such pictures] ... and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.\u2019 \u201d Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 200, 88 S. Ct. at 1277, quoting N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 484 \u2014 h (1909) (see N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 235.20 (1965)). Material was considered \u201c \u2018harmful to minors\u2019 \u201d if it \u201c \u2018(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.\u2019 \u201d Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 632-33, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 200, 88 S. Ct. at 1276, quoting N.Y. Penal Law 1909 \u00a7 484 \u2014 h(l)(f) (1909) (see N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 235.20 (1965)).\nThis is apparently what the legislature did, for, in 1961, it also enacted an \u201cobscenity\u201d statute (now see 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 20 (West 2002)), which, after amendment in 1973, explicitly adopted the Miller guidelines. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 52 L. Ed. 2d 738, 97 S. Ct. 2085 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of Illinois\u2019s obscenity statute in light of Miller). Both the obscenity statute and the Harmful Materials statute carry the same penalty: Class A misdemeanor for the first offense and Class 4 felony for subsequent offenses. Compare 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 20(d) (West 2002), with 720 ILCS 5/11\u2014 21(d) (West 2002). Thus, the legislature\u2019s enactment of both statutes only makes sense if the Harmful Materials statute is read as reaching both \u201cobscene\u201d and nonobscene, yet \u201charmful,\u201d material.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUINN" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REID,\ndissenting:\nI dissent. While I agree with the majority in many respects, I find impermissible vagueness in part of the Harmful Materials statute. As the majority explains, section (c) of the Harmful Materials statute is designed by the legislature to \u201cprovide[ ] further guidance as to how prosecutions under this statute should proceed.\u201d 358 Ill. App. 3d at 933. In pertinent part, that section reads:\n\u201cThe predominant appeal to prurient interest of the material shall be judged with reference to average children of the same general age of the child to whom such material was offered, distributed, sent or exhibited, unless it appears from the nature of the matter or the circumstances of its dissemination, distribution or exhibition that it is designed for specially susceptible groups, in which case the predominant appeal of the material shall be judged with reference to its intended or probable recipient group.\u201d (Emphasis added). 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 21(c) (West 2000).\nI find that section is vague. There is no indication as to precisely how a trier of fact, whether that be a judge or jury, could reference the age of similar children. How is a trier of fact to determine what the average child would find prurient? How is a defendant to defend against an allegation that, as in this case, the average 16-year-old would have found the videotape prurient? No mechanism has yet been invented to allow a trier of fact to view the evidence filtered through the eyes of a child similarly situated with the victim.\n\u201cThe due process vagueness standard is comprised of three elements. First, the statute must not be so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning or application. [Citation.] Second, the statute must provide sufficiently definite standards for law-enforcement officers and triers of fact that its application does not depend merely on their private conceptions. [Citation.] Finally, if the statute implicates first amendment expressive rights, it must not be so vague as to chill their free exercise.\u201d People v. Smith, 347 Ill. App. 3d 446, 450 (2004), citing People v. Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d 444, 453 (1980).\nUnder both Smith and Garrison, there is no way for adult jurors or law-enforcement officers to apply the law, as drafted, without the taint of their private conceptions of right and wrong, moral and immoral, sexy and prurient. This is, at least in part, due to the fact that, unlike adult obscenity, the Harmful Materials statute does not limit itself to those materials that \u201ctaken as a whole, *** lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 20(b) (West 2000). An adult can determine whether something is obscene based on those criteria, because no childlike prism is required. This is where the Illinois Harmful Materials statute is unconstitutionally vague. \u201cA statute violates due process \u2018on the basis of vagueness \u201c \u2018only if its terms are so ill-defined that the ultimate decision as to its meaning rests on the opinions and whims of the trier of fact rather than any objective criteria or facts.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 \u201d People v. Einoder, 209 Ill. 2d 443, 451 (2004), quoting People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 291 (2003), quoting Stern v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 179 Ill. 2d 160, 168 (1997), quoting People v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66 (1995). That is the precise problem with our Harmful Materials statute; there is no way for an adult to truly put himself or herself in the mind of a child. Therefore, the mechanism of enforcement is vague because it rests on little more than whims. The reality is that each trier of fact may perceive the prurient interests and sexual desires of minors differently. In the case of Jackson showing his homemade pornography to G.B., the ultimate call under the statute may be easier to make than in other cases that could present themselves in the future. Nevertheless, the inherent problem in the mechanism created by the legislature persists. I, therefore, find section 11 \u2014 21(c) unconstitutionally vague and would reverse on that basis.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE REID," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Henrik Essunger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Colleen M. Nevin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLINTON JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20141489\nOpinion filed June 30, 2005.\nREID, EJ., dissenting.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Henrik Essunger, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Colleen M. Nevin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0927-01", "first_page_order": 945, "last_page_order": 962 }