{ "id": 5730700, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES J. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Anderson", "decision_date": "2005-07-19", "docket_number": "No. 4-04-0175", "first_page": "1108", "last_page": "1116", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 1108" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2960564 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12052726 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recipient had no right to welfare payments but was entitled to a hearing prior to termination of those payments" }, { "parenthetical": "recipient had no right to welfare payments but was entitled to a hearing prior to termination of those payments" }, { "parenthetical": "recipient had no right to welfare payments but was entitled to a hearing prior to termination of those payments" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 L. Ed. 817", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "852" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 U.S. 123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1148059 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" }, { "page": "646-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/341/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 U.S. 490", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 333784 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492-93" }, { "page": "1568-69" }, { "page": "819" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/295/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 778", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10343 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" }, { "page": "661-62" }, { "page": "1759-60" }, { "page": "782" }, { "page": "661-62" }, { "page": "1759-60" }, { "page": "785" }, { "page": "663-64" }, { "page": "1761" }, { "page": "786" }, { "page": "664" }, { "page": "1761-62", "parenthetical": "setting forth the minimum requirements of due process" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782797 ], "weight": 24, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "2599" }, { "page": "480" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "2600" }, { "page": "480" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "2600" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "2600" }, { "page": "486-87" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "2603" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "2601" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "2602", "parenthetical": "both parties' interests require an informal hearing that is structured to assure that the finding of a violation will be based on verified facts and accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0471-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 816, "char_count": 18133, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2288211106019038e-07, "percentile": 0.7787573715687671 }, "sha256": "1f8704c7d249265feba6e22d78b0bc72ef682fc9a0774a13552f664f2d6cd714", "simhash": "1:e0ef831cf3ee1cc7", "word_count": 2995 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:37:08.387494+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES J. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Charles J. Anderson, appeals from the trial court\u2019s judgment convicting him of burglary and sentencing him to 14 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant claims his due-process rights were violated when his participation in the previously imposed drug-court program was revoked without a hearing or explanation. Defendant further claims that during his bench trial, the court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)). We reverse and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn March 23, 2001, defendant was charged with one count of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 2000)), and the public defender was appointed to represent him. After numerous continuances, on February 27, 2002, defendant filed a pro se motion for placement in the drug-court program. The trial court denied his request.\nOn March 5, 2002, defendant waived his right to a jury trial and on March 15, 2002, pleaded guilty in exchange for a five-year sentencing cap. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and scheduled a sentencing hearing.\nOn April 30, 2002, defendant\u2019s counsel informed the trial court after defendant\u2019s plea he had discovered that defendant \u201cmay be eligible\u201d for Class X sentencing. The State agreed to (1) allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and (2) refer him to the drug-court program. The court vacated defendant\u2019s guilty plea and reinstated the cause.\nOn May 10, 2002, the trial court ordered defendant to participate in the drug-court program pursuant to the Drug Court Treatment Act (Drug Court Act) (730 ILCS 166/1 through 35 (West 2002)). On May 17, 2002, defendant signed a drug-court-participation agreement, indicating that the burglary charge would be held in abeyance for 24 months pending his successful completion of the program, at which time his burglary charge would be dismissed. According to the agreement, defendant waived his right to a jury trial and his \u201cright to confront and cross[-]examine the witnesses against [him].\u201d\nThe agreement further revealed that defendant executed a stipulation of evidence wherein he agreed that he did in fact commit a burglary. By signing the agreement, defendant understood that he could be terminated from the program (1) if he failed to comply with any conditions of the program, (2) if he committed any criminal offense, or (3) upon his request. Another paragraph of the agreement set forth as follows:\n\u201cI understand that upon unsuccessful termination from the [d]rug[-c]ourt [p]rogram this cause will proceed to immediate trial by the [c]ourt. I understand that the aforementioned [stipulation of [e]vidence will constitute the evidence received by the court at trial.\u201d\nPrior to defendant signing the agreement, the trial court explained to him its provisions in open court. The court admonished defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)). Defendant indicated he understood and agreed. The court accepted and entered defendant\u2019s agreement and stipulation of evidence.\nOn January 24, 2003, the trial court\u2019s docket entry revealed, without further explanation, that the cause was reallotted for a January 31, 2003, bench trial. As a supplement to the record on appeal, defendant provided a letter dated April 5, 2005, from Judge Little as a substitute for a bystander\u2019s report of the January 24, 2003, hearing. Judge Little had \u201cno independent recollection of what occurred in this case on January 24, 2003,\u201d but after reviewing the docket entry, he concluded only that the parties convened and scheduled the case for a bench trial. The court summarily dismissed defendant from the drug-court program.\nOn January 31, 2003, the trial court indicated it had two files on defendant. Referring to this case as the one \u201csubject of drug court,\u201d the court reviewed the May 17, 2002, stipulation and indicated it contained a sufficient factual basis to support a conviction for burglary. The court entered the conviction and scheduled the sentencing hearing for March 14, 2003.\nOn July 21, 2003, defendant filed a pro se motion requesting a hearing for the alleged violation of the drug-court program. Defendant\u2019s motion indicated he had engaged in criminal conduct; however, he had not been convicted of \u201csaid charges.\u201d\nOn September 11, 2003, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. Kent Bangart and Sharon Bangart testified that their home was burglarized on January 9, 2003. Kemper Willcut testified that his business and his home were burglarized on January 13, 2003. Based upon his familiarity with defendant, Willcut believed defendant was responsible. Property from all three burglaries was found in defendant\u2019s home. In closing argument, defendant\u2019s counsel said, \u201cIt is true my client was doing well in the [d]rug[-c]ourt program, and it is also true that my client was violated from [sic] the [d]rug[-c]ourt program.\u201d Counsel urged the court not to consider the evidence of the January 2003 burglaries because defendant had not been tried for those crimes.\nAfter considering (1) the witnesses\u2019 testimony as evidence in aggravation, (2) defendant\u2019s statement in allocution wherein he denied committing any burglaries, and (3) arguments of counsel, the court sentenced defendant to 14 years in prison on the original reinstated burglary charge.\nOn February 26, 2004, defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence, alleging his sentence should be vacated because (1) he was found not guilty in Macon County case No. 03 \u2014 CF\u201453, \u201cthe offense that violated him [sic] from the Macon County [d]rug[-c]ourt [p]rogram\u201d; (2) the State moved to dismiss Macon County case No. 03 \u2014 CF\u2014130, \u201cthe offense that violated [sic] him from the [d]rug [-c]ourt [p]rogram; (3) he complied with the conditions of the drug-court program for nine months before being arrested for residential burglary on January 13, 2003; (4) a charge was erroneously included in his presentence investigation report; and (5) the trial court considered evidence in aggravation related to two new cases against him, unrelated to the sentencing offense.\nAlso on February 26, 2004, defendant filed a motion to proceed as a poor person and requested the appointment of counsel. The trial court reviewed defendant\u2019s motion to vacate, construed it as defendant\u2019s intent to appeal, instructed the circuit clerk to file a notice of appeal on defendant\u2019s behalf, and appointed the office of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant appeals, claiming (1) his rights to due process were violated when he was not afforded a hearing prior to being dismissed from the drug-court program and (2) the trial court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to the dictates of Supreme Court Rule 402(a) prior to entering a judgment of conviction on the underlying burglary charge. We reverse and remand.\nA. Due Process\nThe purpose of the Drug Court Act is to provide the trial courts with an alternative to a criminal disposition or sentence by, under certain conditions, permitting a defendant to participate in a program addressing a defendant\u2019s admitted drug use or drug addiction with the hope of reducing the number of incidents of drug-related crimes in the State of Illinois. See 730 ILCS 166/5 (West 2002).\nThe legislature afforded each judicial circuit the opportunity to implement and operate, under its own established guidelines, a drug-court program pursuant to the Drug Court Act. See 730 ILCS 166/15 (West 2002). The imposition of a program may be preadjudicatory, as the case here, or postadjudicatory. A \u201cpre[ ]adjudicatory drug[-]court program\u201d is a program that allows the defendant, with the consent of the State, to expedite the defendant\u2019s criminal case prior to a conviction or before the filing of a criminal case and requires successful completion of the program as part of the agreement. See 730 ILCS 166/10 (West 2002). The defendant\u2019s criminal charges are held in abeyance until the program is completed either successfully or unsuccessfully. If the defendant is successful, the charges are dismissed or nol-prossed. If the defendant is unsuccessful, the charges may then be reinstated and prosecution of the case may proceed. See 730 ILCS 166/25 (West 2002).\nThe Sixth Judicial Circuit implemented a drug-court program setting forth various policies and procedures for an individual\u2019s eligibility and participation in the program. To be eligible, a defendant must sign an agreement that he understood he could be unsuccessfully terminated from the program if he (1) failed to comply with any conditions of the program, (2) committed any criminal offense, or (3) requested unsuccessful termination of the program.\nSection 35 of the Drug Court Act (730 ILCS 166/35 (West 2002)) governs the violation, termination, and discharge of a defendant from the drug-court program. It states in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) If the court finds from the evidence presented including but not limited to the reports or proffers of proof from the drug court professionals that:\n\u2756 \u2756 *\n(3) the defendant has engaged in criminal conduct rendering him or her unsuitable for the program; or\n(4) the defendant has otherwise violated the terms and conditions of the program or his or her sentence or is for any reason unable to participate;\nthe court may impose reasonable sanctions under prior written agreement of the defendant, including but not limited to imprisonment or dismissal of the defendant from the program and the court may reinstate criminal proceedings against him or her or proceed under [s]ection 5 \u2014 6\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections [(730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144 (West 2002))] for a violation of probation, conditional discharge, or supervision hearing.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 166/35 (West 2002).\nNeither the Drug Court Act nor the Sixth Judicial Circuit\u2019s policies and guidelines specify the procedures to be taken upon an alleged violation of the program. However, the language in section 35 of the Drug Court Act indicates the trial court should consider evidence, presumably presented at a hearing, of the defendant\u2019s conduct that could result in a dismissal from the program. According to section 35, the court\u2019s finding of a violation was a prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions, which include dismissal from the program. See 730 ILCS 166/35 (West 2000).\nOur interpretation of the above-referenced statutory language, in light of the United State\u2019s Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973), indicates that to comply with due process, a defendant is entitled to a hearing before he is dismissed from the drug-court program.\nOur analysis begins with a comparison between the purposes of the drug-court program and those of probation, supervision, and parole. The main distinction between defendant\u2019s drug-court program and the imposition of supervision, probation, or parole is the timing of the programs\u2019 implementation in relation to the criminal disposition. Unlike the drug-court program at issue here, supervision, probation, and parole are imposed after a finding of guilt. However, we find the distinction is of no consequence and is not outweighed by the similarities.\n\u201cProbation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose.\u201d Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93, 79 L. Ed. 1566, 1568-69, 55 S. Ct. 818, 819 (1935). Likewise, a \u201cparolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of his parole.\u201d Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 493, 92 S. Ct. at 2599.\nProbation revocation, like parole revocation, is not part of a criminal prosecution, and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 92 S. Ct. at 2600; Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 661-62, 93 S. Ct. at 1759-60. \u201cRevocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, hut only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.\u201d Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 92 S. Ct. at 2600. \u201cWhether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be \u2018condemned to suffer grievous loss.\u2019 \u201d Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 92 S. Ct. at 2600, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 95 L. Ed. 817, 852, 71 S. Ct. 624, 646-47 (1951).\nIn Morrissey, the Court held that upon an alleged parole violation, the parolee was entitled to a hearing akin to a preliminary hearing wherein the parolee would be notified of when the hearing would take place and that its purpose was to determine whether there was probable cause to believe he had committed a parole violation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486-87, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 497, 92 S. Ct. at 2603. In Gagnon, the Court applied its Morrissey holding to the revocation of probation. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 661-62, 93 S. Ct. at 1759-60.\n\u201cBoth the probationer or parolee and the State have interests in the accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion \u2014 the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the State to make certain that it is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community.\u201d Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 785, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 663-64, 93 S. Ct. at 1761.\nApplying the Supreme Court\u2019s analyses to the Drug Court Act, we find both the interests of a defendant and the State are better protected only if the minimum requirements of due process are met, in the form of a hearing, prior to the revocation of or dismissal from participation in the drug-court program. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 664, 93 S. Ct. at 1761-62 (setting forth the minimum requirements of due process).\nThe drug-court program is a form of conditional liberty like supervision, probation, or parole. Each program requires the participant to comply with certain conditions or face the loss of the privilege. Revocation of that privilege may not be accomplished without inquiry.\nDefendant was not the only one who had a stake in his \u201cconditional liberty.\u201d Society also had an interest in seeing defendant, who admittedly needed the drug-treatment program, successfully complete the program with the hope of restoring him to a drug-free lifestyle within the law. Like defendant, society had an interest in not having him dismissed from the program based on erroneous information. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 496, 92 S. Ct. at 2601. The interests of both the State and defendant are furthered by a hearing\u2014 regardless of formality. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 496, 92 S. Ct. at 2602 (both parties\u2019 interests require an informal hearing that is structured to assure that the finding of a violation will be based on verified facts and accurate knowledge of the parolee\u2019s behavior).\nEven though defendant did not have the right to participate in the drug-court program, as it was a matter of legislative and judicial grace, due process should circumscribe summary dismissal from that program. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970) (recipient had no right to welfare payments but was entitled to a hearing prior to termination of those payments). Defendant should have (1) been informed of the nature of the alleged violation, (2) been informed of the nature of the evidence against him, and (3) had the right to appear and be heard before he was dismissed from the program. Likewise, the court should have taken the opportunity to determine (1) whether defendant in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of the program and, if so, (2) whether defendant should be tried on the original offense or if some other step, in accordance with the program guidelines, should be taken to improve his chances of rehabilitation. We find the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal was improper.\nB. Admonishments at Trial\nOur decision reversing this case and remanding for a hearing on defendant\u2019s termination from the drug-court program obviates the need to address the sufficiency of the trial court\u2019s admonishments at defendant\u2019s bench trial. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we choose to do so.\nIn the event defendant\u2019s case proceeds to a bench trial, the trial court is under no obligation to further admonish defendant pursuant to the dictates of Rule 402(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)). Defendant entered into the drug-court-participation agreement and stipulation of evidence on May 17, 2002. The agreement and the stipulation both indicate defendant agreed not only to the substance of the evidence but to its sufficiency as well. Because a stipulation to the sufficiency of the evidence is tantamount to a guilty plea, the trial court was required to admonish defendant pursuant to Rule 402(a) prior to accepting his stipulation. See People v. Smith, 59 Ill. 2d 236, 242, 319 N.E.2d 760, 764 (1974). The court sufficiently did so on May 17, 2002, and there is no need to repeat the admonitions at a subsequent bench trial.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand this cause for a hearing consistent with our decision herein.\nReversed and remanded.\nCOOK, EJ., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Jack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES J. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140175\nOpinion filed July 19, 2005.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1108-01", "first_page_order": 1126, "last_page_order": 1134 }