{ "id": 5731881, "name": "LINCOLN MANOR, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Lincoln Manor, Inc. v. Department of Public Health", "decision_date": "2005-07-14", "docket_number": "No. 4-04-0544", "first_page": "1116", "last_page": "1121", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 1116" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602819 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" }, { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" }, { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5186771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2614989 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 973", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 937", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3650456 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0937-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1236" }, { "page": "1236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5784041 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 871", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5541634 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871-72" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "872" }, { "page": "874" }, { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0871-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2743762 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 935", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939" }, { "page": "939" }, { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 969", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073712 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0969-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 589, "char_count": 11090, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.695706879633937e-08, "percentile": 0.40693878291745966 }, "sha256": "e81cf2f185a14fa5b434cfc802bcf87c0c0399c6fb9808e8f64661b4926ca005", "simhash": "1:093475d6afc6dcd6", "word_count": 1825 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:37:08.387494+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LINCOLN MANOR, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn February 2004, plaintiff, Lincoln Manor, Inc., filed a complaint for administrative review in the Macon County circuit court, arguing the order of the designee of the Director of the Department of Public Health (Department) upholding the recommended findings of an administrative law judge (ALJ) was void because it was not issued within the time allowed by section 3 \u2014 707 of the Nursing Home Care Act (Act) (210 ILCS 45/3 \u2014 707 (West 2002)). In May 2004, the circuit court agreed and found the order void. The Department appealed. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn September 2001, a resident of Lincoln Manor Nursing Home exited the nursing home without the knowledge of the nursing home staff and fractured her hip in a fall. As a result of the resident\u2019s elopement from the nursing home and subsequent injury, a health facilities surveillance nurse inspected the nursing home for the Department. After the inspection, the Department issued Lincoln Manor a notice of violations of the Act and other Department regulations. The Department later issued a second notice to Lincoln Manor for violation of a federal regulatory provision. Both notices imposed fines on Lincoln Manor.\nLincoln Manor requested an administrative hearing. On September 23, 2002, the hearing concluded. On January 22, 2003, the Deputy Director, as the designee of the Department\u2019s Director, entered a final order adopting the ALJ\u2019s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations. The Deputy Director agreed with the ALJ that Lincoln Manor had committed the alleged state and federal violations.\nOn February 5, 2003, Lincoln Manor filed a complaint for administrative review in circuit court, arguing the Department\u2019s decision was void because it was not entered within the 120-day deadline set by section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act (210 ILCS 45/3 \u2014 707 (West 2002)). The court agreed. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe Department argues the language in section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act (210 ILCS 45/3 \u2014 707 (West 2002)), imposing a 120-day deadline for the Director\u2019s decision, is directory and not mandatory. We disagree.\nA. Standard of Review\nIn cases involving questions of statutory construction, we apply a de novo standard of review. Swavely v. Freeway Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 969, 976, 700 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1998).\nB. Construction of Statute\nSection 3 \u2014 707 of the Act states in part as follows:\n\u201cThe Director or hearing officer shall make findings of fact in such hearing, and the Director shall render his decision within 30 days after the termination of the hearing, unless additional time not to exceed 90 days is required by him for a proper disposition of the matter.\u201d 210 ILCS 45/3 \u2014 707 (West 2002).\nOur supreme court has stated that \u201c[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute.\u201d People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to other aids of statutory construction. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 443. 677 N.E.2d at 939.\n\u201cGenerally, the use of the word \u2018shall\u2019 in a statute is regarded as indicating a mandatory rather than a directory intent. The rule is not, however, an inflexible one; the statute may be interpreted as permissive, depending upon the context of the provision and the intent of the drafters.\u201d Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 445, 677 N.E.2d at 940.\nNormally, if a statute specifies a time for the performance of an official duty, the statute only will be considered directory if the rights of the parties cannot be injuriously affected by failure to act within the time indicated in the statute. Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233, 166 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1960). \u201cHowever, where such statute contains negative words, denying the exercise of the power after the time named, or where a disregard of its provisions would injuriously affect public interests or private rights, it is not directory but mandatory.\u201d Carrigan, 19 Ill. 2d at 233, 166 N.E.2d at 576.\nAccording to Sutherland Statutory Construction:\n\u201cNegative words in a grant of power should never be construed as directory. Where an affirmative direction is followed hy a negative or limiting provision, it becomes mandatory. Negative words do not always compel an imperative construction nor does their absence compel directory construction. However, the absence of negative words may be considered in support of directory construction.\u201d 3 N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction \u00a7 57:9, at 37 (6th ed. 2001).\nIn Foley v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 89 Ill. App. 3d 871, 871-72, 412 N.E.2d 612, 612 (1980), Foley, the petitioner, brought an administrative action after being discharged from his position as a probationary police officer. The trial court affirmed the administrative decision. Foley, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 412 N.E.2d at 612. On appeal, Foley argued the Civil Service Commission and its successor, the Personnel Board, lost jurisdiction by failing to render a decision in his case within the time period established by the rules of the Civil Service Commission. Foley, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 412 N.E.2d at 612. The rule at issue stated:\n\u201c \u2018Notice of Findings-.\nThe Commission will give petitioner written notice of its decision no longer than seven days after the termination of the hearing.\u2019 \u201d Foley, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 412 N.E.2d at 613.\nFoley did not receive notice of the Personnel Board\u2019s decision to affirm the plaintiffs discharge until two months after his Civil Service Commission hearing. Foley, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 412 N.E.2d at 613.\nFoley argued the rule should be given a mandatory construction. Foley, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 412 N.E.2d at 613. The appellate court agreed with Foley that the rule was mandatory and held that the Civil Service Commission and its successor, the Personnel Board, lost jurisdiction. Foley, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 874, 412 N.E.2d at 614. The appellate court stated it believed the decisive factor requiring a mandatory construction was the presence of the negative language \u201c \u2018no longer than\u2019 \u201d in the administrative rule. Foley, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 873, 412 N.E.2d at 614.\nIn Kurr v. Town of Cicero, 235 Ill. App. 3d 528, 601 N.E.2d 1233 (1992), the appellate court had to determine whether a town ordinance was mandatory or directory. The ordinance in question stated:\n\u201c \u2018In the event the property inspected is found to be in full compliance with the Minimum Housing Code, Building Code, Electrical Code, Plumbing Code[,] and Zoning Codes of the Town of Cicero, the Building Commissioner shall then immediately cause a Certificate to issue stating that the said property is in full compliance with said Ordinances. If violations of said ordinances are found to exist, the Building Commissioner shall, as soon as practicable, but in no event later than 30 days following such inspection, provide the applicant with a detailed report of the violations to be corrected. *** Upon correction of all violations specified by the Building Commissioner, the Building Commissioner shall then issue the required Certificate of Compliance.\u2019 (Emphasis added.) Cicero, Ill., Zoning Ordinance vol. I, ch. 40, par. 40 \u2014 4(A)(4) (1977).\u201d Kurr, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 533, 601 N.E.2d at 1236.\nAccording to the appellate court, the \u201cuse of the word \u2018shall\u2019 in the ordinance coupled with the negative words \u2018but in no event later than 30 days\u2019 leads to the conclusion that the notice provision was mandatory rather than directory.\u201d Kurr, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 533, 601 N.E.2d at 1236.\nAlthough not at issue in this case, the Department is correct that two provisions in the Act have been ruled directory by the First District Appellate Court. See Grove School v. Department of Public Health, 160 Ill. App. 3d 937, 513 N.E.2d 973 (1987); Moon Lake Convalescent Center v. Margolis, 180 Ill. App. 3d 245, 535 N.E.2d 956 (1989). However, the provisions at issue in Grove School and Moon Lake Convalescent Center do not include negative words.\nThe Department also relies on this court\u2019s decision in Cooper v. Department of Children & Family Services, 234 Ill. App. 3d 474, 599 N.E.2d 537 (1992). However, the provision at issue in Cooper also does not contain negative language. See Cooper, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 481-83, 599 N.E.2d at 541-43.\nOnly the Third District Appellate Court has considered whether section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act is mandatory or directory. See Frances House, Inc. v. Department of Public Health, 269 Ill. App. 3d 426, 431, 645 N.E.2d 1009, 1013 (1995). According to Frances House:\n\u201cSection 3 \u2014 707 of the *** Act contains negative words in that, in addition to an initial 30-day period, the Director can have \u2018additional time not to exceed 90 days\u2019 for rendering his final decision. (Emphasis added.) [Citation.] Thus, under the rule of statutory construction consistently applied by Illinois courts, the time limitation in section 3 \u2014 707 must be construed as mandatory.\nWe believe that a mandatory interpretation of section 3 \u2014 707 is consistent with the intent and purpose of the Act: to protect the health, welfare[,] and safety of [nursing] home residents. [Citations.] A prompt resolution of complaints is in the best interest of residents. IDPH will have more incentive for timely enforcement of its regulations if the statutory time period for reaching a decision after the hearing is mandatory rather than directory. IDPH lost jurisdiction of this cause when the Deputy Director failed to render a decision within 120 days of the conclusion of the hearing.\u201d Frances House, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 431, 645 N.E.2d at 1013.\nWe agree that the negative language \u201cnot to exceed 90 days\u201d requires a mandatory interpretation of section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act.\nFurther, in the 10 years since the Frances House decision, the General Assembly has not modified the language of section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act. We presume that the General Assembly knows how section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act has been interpreted. See In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 388, 604 N.E.2d 929, 933 (1992).\nBased on both the negative language contained in section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act and the fact the General Assembly has not changed the language of that section since the Frances House decision, we find the General Assembly intended for section 3 \u2014 707 of the Act to be mandatory.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nAPPLETON and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "R. Samuel Postlewait (argued), of Winters, Featherstun, Gaumer, Postlewait, Stocks & Flynn, of Decatur, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LINCOLN MANOR, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140544\nArgued May 25, 2005.\nOpinion filed July 14, 2005.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nR. Samuel Postlewait (argued), of Winters, Featherstun, Gaumer, Postlewait, Stocks & Flynn, of Decatur, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1116-01", "first_page_order": 1134, "last_page_order": 1139 }