{ "id": 5595169, "name": "ANDRE CARNEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Carney v. Paul Revere Life Insurance", "decision_date": "2005-06-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201403\u20141852", "first_page": "67", "last_page": "83", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 67" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "132 N.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5150413 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544-45" }, { "page": "553-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/8/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2785749 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "948 F.2d 1050", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1859580 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/948/1050-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.W.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Mich. App. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2269922 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/140/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.W.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48-50" }, { "page": "49" }, { "page": "51" }, { "page": "51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "454 Mich. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 265404 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111-16" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/454/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5576143 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" }, { "page": "790" }, { "page": "791" }, { "page": "791-92" }, { "page": "792-93" }, { "page": "793" }, { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.W.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Mich. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1949296 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/409/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2682181 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "811 N.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435844 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "410-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 U.S. 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5698490 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1889, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/131/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 1343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609054 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ga. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 656352 ], "weight": 18, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "147-48" }, { "page": "851" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "851" }, { "page": "148" }, { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/276/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188258 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "45" }, { "page": "46" }, { "page": "45" }, { "page": "47" }, { "page": "46" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 F. Supp. 2d 1059", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1392435 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064", "parenthetical": "where the court found that decedent suffered from \"cardiac disease\" as testified to by insurance company's expert where the plaintiff failed to provide the court \"with any evidence to the contrary\"" }, { "page": "1060" }, { "page": "1059" }, { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1063" }, { "page": "1063-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/35/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "813 N.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083970 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317117 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448460 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "153-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2833508 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/183/0050-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1334, "char_count": 38867, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.480243508190431e-08, "percentile": 0.48572407117171695 }, "sha256": "c65201223f98da4e9274a91c04370e7c055cd34ced64db9260407827ae4b21a3", "simhash": "1:031e58e22721c740", "word_count": 6273 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANDRE CARNEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe defendant insurer, The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company (Paul Revere), paid benefits to the plaintiff, Andrew L. Carney, M.D., under a disability insurance policy, after Dr. Carney filed a claim stating that he was disabled by \u201csickness.\u201d The policy provided a maximum benefit period until age 65 for a total disability due to \u201csickness,\u201d and a lifetime benefit for a total disability due to \u201cinjury.\u201d Shortly before the policy\u2019s \u201csickness\u201d benefits were to expire, Dr. Carney sought to recharacterize his disability as an \u201cinjury.\u201d Paul Revere refused the reclassification, and in March 1998, Dr. Carney filed a complaint against Paul Revere alleging that Paul Revere refused to act in accordance with the policy.\nSubsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking judgment as a matter of law regarding whether Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was the result of a \u201csickness\u201d or an \u201cinjury.\u201d In June 2003, the circuit court classified Dr. Carney\u2019s disability as the result of an \u201cinjury\u201d and granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Carney. Paul Revere appeals, arguing Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was a \u201csickness,\u201d rather than an \u201cinjury,\u201d and its obligation to pay under the terms of the policy expired upon Dr. Carney\u2019s sixty-fifth birthday.\nBACKGROUND\nOn February 5, 1981, Dr. Carney, a cardiovascular and neurovascular surgeon, purchased a disability insurance policy from Paul Revere. The policy provides a maximum benefit period to age 65 for a total disability due to \u201csickness,\u201d and a lifetime benefit for a total disability due to \u201cinjury.\u201d Under the \u201cdefinitions\u201d section of the policy, several terms are defined, including, inter alia-.\n\u201c \u2018Injury\u2019 means accidental bodily injury sustained while this policy is in force.\n\u2018Sickness\u2019 means sickness or disease which first manifests itself while this policy is in force.\n\u2018Total Disability\u2019 means that as a result of such injury or sickness the Insured is unable to perform the duties of his regular occupation and is not engaged in any other gainful occupation.\u201d\nThe policy did not define \u201caccidental bodily injury.\u201d The \u201cbenefit provisions\u201d portion of the policy provided for either total disability by \u201cAccident\u201d (Provision A) or by \u201cSickness\u201d (Provision B). The language in each provision was identical except for the use of \u201cinjury\u201d or \u201csickness,\u201d and Provision B stated that \u201csickness\u201d must occur \u201cwhile the policy is in force\u201d:\n\u201cIf such injury [sickness] results in continuous total disability [while this policy is in force] and requires the regular and personal attendance of a licensed physician, the Company will pay periodically the Monthly Indemnity for Total Disability from Accident [Sickness] at the rate set forth in the Policy Schedule, beginning with the standard commencement date for accident [sickness] and during the continuance of such total disability for a period not exceeding the Maximum Benefit Period for *** Total Disability from Accident [Sickness] specified in the Policy Schedule ***.\u201d\nThe policy schedule contains a table of benefits:\nTOTAL COMMENCEMENT RATE OF MAXIMUM DISABILITY DATE MONTHLY BENEFIT\nINDEMNITY PERIOD FROM 91st DAY OF $3,500.00 LIFETIME ACCIDENT DISABILITY\nFROM 91st DAY OF $3,500.00 TO AGE 65 SICKNESS DISABILITY\nOn August 18, 1986, Paul Revere received a disability proof of claim form signed by Dr. Carney and his attending physician, Dr. John Dwyer. The form claimed total disability due to \u201csickness\u201d that began on March 22, 1986, the last day Dr. Carney performed surgery. The details of the \u201csickness\u201d were described as, \u201c[p]ain in both forearms as well as paresthesias of the ulnar distribution of both hands\u2014 progressive now cannot sustain grip when operating.\u201d Dr. Carney was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from pronator teres syndrome.\nIn his deposition, Dr. Carney testified that on November 25, 1985, he had \u201can acute onset of pain and numbness that extended from [his] elbow, the medial aspect of [his] elbow, to [his] hand.\u201d Dr. Carney also testified that besides numbness, he had a great deal of pain. Dr. Carney testified that he sought medical care because \u201c[t]here was a mass on the medial aspect of my arm, that distribution, the distribution of the median nerve.\u201d Dr. Carney testified that pronator teres syndrome is the compression of the median nerve at the elbow. Dr. Carney testified that prior to his diagnosis he had experienced symptoms of pronator teres syndrome, specifically, he had difficulty with alternating mechanical motions. Dr. Carney testified that he tried but failed to tighten a shackle with a wrench, he experienced edema and muscular tremors, and he had spasms throughout his right hand and into his fingers. Dr. Carney testified that he did not attach any significance to these problems until he began reading about pronator teres syndrome. Dr. Carney performed surgery until the latter part of March 1986.\nDr. Carney\u2019s treating physician, Dr. Dwyer, was also deposed and testified he first saw Dr. Carney in May 1986. Dr. Dwyer testified that he was an orthopedic surgeon and that Dr. Carney had asked him for a consultation, as he was having difficulty with his upper extremities. Dr. Dwyer testified that he diagnosed Dr. Carney as having\n\u201ccompression neuropathy about the elbow primarily on the side with some evidence on the right side, and it was such that the nerves to the \u2014 extending through the elbow were compressed. And there was neuropathy which manifests itself with pain, weakness, numbness, loss of strength and loss of endurance.\u201d\nDr. Dwyer testified that as a cardiovascular surgeon, Dr. Carney would be required to use both hands, have dexterity, control of his movements, modulated strength, endurance, and the ability to feel what his other hand was doing. Dr. Dwyer testified that in August 1986, he came to the conclusion that Dr. Carney could not continue his occupational duties. Dr. Dwyer testified that he saw Dr. Carney as a patient for more than 10 years, and at no time was he able to return to work as a surgeon.\nDr. Dwyer testified that Dr. Carney\u2019s condition could not be linked to any \u201csingle or sentinel\u201d trauma. Instead, repetitive trauma brought Dr. Carney\u2019s symptoms to a head. Dr. Carney\u2019s attorney then asked a question to Dr. Dwyer regarding repetitive trauma:\n\u201c[Dr. Carney\u2019s Attorney]: With respect to the repetitive trauma, is that something that was caused by some kind of sickness or illness in Dr. Carney?\n[Dr. Dwyer]: No, not that I was aware of. He has no constitutional or systemic disease that would explain the symptomatology and findings.\n[Dr. Carney\u2019s Attorney]: There was no bacterial or viral infection that caused it?\n[Dr. Dwyer]: Nor any diabetic or circulatory disruption, no, there was none.\n[Dr. Carney\u2019s Attorney]: So the sole cause of the repetitive trauma would have just been the actual use or overuse of his arm or hand?\n[Paul Revere\u2019s Attorney]: Objection, foundation, speculation.\n[Dr. Dwyer]: Yes, use and overuse in that holding an instrument or a piece of human tissue for a prolonged period of time does require constant muscle contraction, control, and can cause both circulatory and neurological problems.\u201d\nDr. Dwyer opined that Dr. Carney\u2019s condition was permanent and that he recommended surgical intervention. Dr. Dwyer testified that Dr. Carney did not elect to have surgery due to the risks involved. Dr. Dwyer\u2019s notes indicated he saw Dr. Carney until 1996, but there were no specific notes regarding what occurred at each of those visits.\nPursuant to Dr. Carney\u2019s claim, in October 1986, Paul Revere began paying total disability benefits under the \u201csickness\u201d provision of the policy. From October 1986 until June 1994, Dr. Carney submitted monthly medical progress reports to Paul Revere in which his disability was classified as a \u201csickness.\u201d\nOn July 26, 1994, Dr. Carney attempted to reclassify his disability as an \u201cinjury.\u201d\nPaul Revere continued to pay Dr. Carney total disability benefits through January 17, 1997, the day prior to Dr. Carney\u2019s sixty-fifth birthday and the maximum benefit period under the policy for total disability due to \u201csickness.\u201d Paul Revere paid Dr. Carney a total of $550,000 in disability under the \u201csickness\u201d provision of the policy.\nIn March 1998, Dr. Carney instituted the instant action. In September 1999, Dr. Carney filed a second-amended complaint alleging that he \u201cdeveloped an accidental total disability in both forearms\u201d and that Paul Revere had failed to continue payment in accordance with the policy. Following discovery, the parties presented cross-motions for summary judgement. The respective motions focused on whether Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was the result of a \u201csickness\u201d or an \u201cinjury.\u201d Both motions sought judgment as a matter of law classifying Dr. Carney\u2019s pronator teres syndrome as either one or the other. The trial court granted Dr. Carney\u2019s summary judgment motion, finding that his disability was the result of an \u201caccidental bodily injury.\u201d This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nPaul Revere asserts three arguments for our review: (1) that the circuit court erred in classifying Dr. Carney\u2019s disability as an \u201caccidental bodily injury,\u201d (2) that Dr. Carney recognized his disability was a sickness as supported by his indication on the first forms submitted in seeking the recovery of policy benefits, and (3) the circuit court erroneously applied workers\u2019 compensation law in determining Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was an \u201caccidental bodily injury.\u201d\nClassification of Dr. Carney\u2019s Disability\nThe question presented is whether pronator teres syndrome, from which Dr. Carney suffers, was caused by \u201csickness,\u201d in which case Dr. Carney has received the policy\u2019s full benefit, or alternatively, whether it was caused by an \u201caccidental bodily injury,\u201d in which case Dr. Carney is entitled to receive a lifetime benefit pursuant to the policy schedule. See Strehlow v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 183 Ill. App. 50, 52 (1913). Whether to classify Dr. Carney\u2019s disability as an \u201cinjury\u201d or as a \u201csickness\u201d is determined by the parties\u2019 insurance contract. \u201cWhen construing the language of an insurance policy, a court\u2019s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed by the words of the policy.\u201d Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 153, 821 N.E.2d 206 (2004), citing Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391, 620 N.E.2d 1073 (1993).\nWe begin by noting our standard of review. The circuit court\u2019s entry of summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153. The construction of an insurance policy is also reviewed de novo, as it is a question of law. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479-80, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997). An insurance contract is to be construed as a whole, giving effect to every provision because it must be assumed that every provision was intended to serve a purpose. Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153. If the words used are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning; however, if the words used are reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, the words are considered ambiguous and will be strictly construed against the drafter. Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153, citing Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108-09, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). Further, \u201can ambiguity will be found if the language of the contract is \u2018obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression.\u2019 \u201d Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153, quoting Platt v. Gateway International Motorsports Corp., 351 Ill. App. 3d 326, 330, 813 N.E.2d 279 (2004). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law which we review de novo. Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 154.\nPaul Revere first argues that the circuit court erred in classifying Dr. Carney\u2019s pronator teres syndrome as an \u201cinjury.\u201d Paul Revere argues, \u201cDr. Carney did not sustain any discrete trauma that resulted in his neuropathy, nor did an unusual event or cataclysmic occurrence trigger Dr. Carney\u2019s condition. To the contrary, Dr. Carney\u2019s neuropathy developed and progressed over Dr. Carney\u2019s lifetime as a result of his normal everyday activities.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nDr. Carney maintains that his treating physician, Dr. Dwyer, testified that pronator teres syndrome was caused by repeated trauma, in effect, a series of injuries. Dr. Dwyer also testified that Dr. Carney had no systemic disease, bacterial or viral infection, or diabetic or circulatory problems that would explain his injury. Dr. Carney argues that as Dr. Dwyer\u2019s testimony was unrebutted, it must be found that Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was the result of an \u201cinjury.\u201d\nKeeping the principles of insurance contract construction in mind, we begin by noting that \u201cinjury\u201d is defined in the policy as \u201caccidental bodily injury.\u201d \u201cSickness\u201d is defined as \u201csickness or disease.\u201d Both parties\u2019 briefs to this court are filled with definitions from other sources for the terms \u201caccident,\u201d \u201caccidental,\u201d \u201csickness,\u201d \u201cdisease,\u201d and \u201cbodily injury.\u201d Dr. Carney maintains that \u201cthe term \u2018accidental bodily injury\u2019 as used in the policy is ambiguous as a matter of Illinois law.\u201d We note that a contract is not rendered ambiguous merely because the parties disagree on the meaning of its terms; however, a contract is not necessarily unambiguous when each party insists that the language unambiguously supports its position. Central Illinois Light Co., 213 Ill. 2d at 153-54.\n1. Sickness vs. Injury\nPaul Revere maintains that \u201c[m]any individuals, like Dr. Carney, develop sickness and disease as a result of routine daily activities, simply because the body\u2019s physiology naturally deteriorates over time from the stress and strain of normal living.\u201d Paul Revere offers as an example the development of a dermal melanoma due to normal exposure to the sun\u2019s ultraviolet rays. Paul Revere further posits that Dr. Carney\u2019s pronator teres syndrome followed \u201cthe pathology of a sickness\u201d in that his condition developed over time and as a result of his own body\u2019s weakness and the everyday environment in which he worked. Paul Revere maintains that sickness and disease develop and progress; accidents do not. Accordingly, Paul Revere\u2019s brief states \u201c[a]n insured, therefore, who goes about the normal everyday activities of life in the usual and ordinary way, and as a result thereof, develops a condition of ill health, is considered under Illinois law to have developed a [sjickness rather than sustained an [alccidental Modify [ijnjury.\u201d\nDr. Carney contends that his expert, Dr. Dwyer, was specifically asked whether Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was the result of a sickness or disease, and he answered in the negative. Dr. Dwyer attributed Dr. Carney\u2019s disability to repetitive trauma and the use or overuse of his hands, specifically, holding surgical instruments. We take note, as previously observed, that Dr. Dwyer\u2019s testimony stood unrebutted; Paul Revere failed to present any evidence to challenge Dr. Dwyer\u2019s expert opinion that Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was not caused by sickness or disease. See Kolowski v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (where the court found that decedent suffered from \u201ccardiac disease\u201d as testified to by insurance company\u2019s expert where the plaintiff failed to provide the court \u201cwith any evidence to the contrary\u201d).\nBoth parties cite to Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987), in support of their case. In that case, our supreme court examined the duty of insurance companies to defend their client, a manufacturer of asbestos, from claims involving personal injury and wrongful death from exposure to asbestos. The parties\u2019 insurance contract stated, \u201c \u2018[t]he company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of Coverage A. bodily injury.\u2019 \u201d Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 33. The policy in Zurich defined \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201c \u2018bodily injury, sickness or disease.\u2019 \u201d Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 33. These terms were found to be unambiguous. Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 47.\nIn order to determine whether the insurance company had an obligation to defend, our supreme court first determined whether the inhalation of asbestos qualified as a \u201cbodily injury.\u201d Our supreme court found that the record supported the circuit court\u2019s determination that a \u201c \u2018bodily injury\u2019 occurs when asbestos fibers are inhaled and retained in the lung.\u201d Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 45. Our supreme court noted, too, the circuit court\u2019s definition of \u201c \u2018sickness\u2019 \u201d as \u201c \u2018ill health, a disordered, weakened or unsound condition\u2019 \u201d (Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 46), and that \u201cthe plain meaning of the term \u2018disease\u2019 is \u2018a condition of the living animal *** or one of its parts that impairs the performance of a vital function\u2019 \u201d (Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 45). Our supreme court further explained, \u201cunder the plain and unambiguous language of the policies at issue, the insurer must provide coverage of asbestos-related claims if the claimant in the underlying action suffered \u2018bodily injury,\u2019 \u2018sickness\u2019 or \u2018disease\u2019 during the policy period.\u201d Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 47.\nWe find Zurich instructive. As in Zurich, where each inhalation of asbestos was found to constitute a \u201cbodily injury,\u201d here, we find that each repetitive trauma experienced by Dr. Carney was a \u201cbodily injury.\u201d See Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Hallum, 276 Ga. 147, 147, 576 S.E.2d 849, 849 (2003) (where an identical provision was found to support a finding of bodily injury, \u201ca person who unexpectedly suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome brought on by years of voluntary repetitive hand movements that renders him disabled has suffered an \u2018injury,\u2019 as that term is defined in *** [the] insurance policy\u201d). As Dr. Dwyer\u2019s testimony explained, each time Dr. Carney operated, he used his wrists in such a way that a repetitive trauma occurred. As a result, he developed and was diagnosed as suffering from pronator teres syndrome. Dr. Carney\u2019s disability and inability to move his wrists as required for his job were not caused by sickness, \u201c \u2018ill health, a disordered, weakened or unsound condition\u2019 \u201d (Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 46), or \u201c \u2018disease,\u2019 \u201d \u201c \u2018a condition of the living animal *** or one of its parts that impairs the performance of a vital function\u2019 \u201d (Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 45). Dr. Dwyer specifically testified that Dr. Carney\u2019s pronator teres syndrome resulted from repetitive trauma and that \u201cthere was no constitutional or systemic disease that would explain the symptomatology and findings.\u201d\nAccordingly, we determine that Dr. Carney\u2019s .disability was the result of repetitive trauma, each of which may be classified as an \u201cinjury.\u201d We must now determine whether this \u201cinjury\u201d constitutes an \u201caccidental bodily injury\u201d as set out in the parties\u2019 disability insurance policy.\n2. Accidental Bodily Injury\nOur research has uncovered no Illinois cases construing the phrase \u201caccidental bodily injury\u201d in the context of a disability insurance policy. However, a case determining an insurance company\u2019s duty to defend found \u201c[t]he concept of accidental bodily injury presupposes that the injury naturally and probably followed from the acts of the insured.\u201d Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Preston, 153 Ill. App. 3d 644, 648, 505 N.E.2d 1343 (1987). Generally, in determining whether an event qualifies as an accident, Illinois adheres to the rule of law promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in United States Mutual Accident Ass\u2019n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 33 L. Ed. 60, 9 S. Ct. 755 (1889). See Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 404, 811 N.E.2d 718 (2004).\nIn Barry, three physicians jumped to the ground from a platform that was several feet high. Two of the men landed safely; however, Dr. Barry landed awkwardly, immediately became ill, and died a few days later from a twisted duodenum caused by the landing. Dr. Barry\u2019s insurer claimed that the death was not accidental within the meaning of the policy. The Supreme Court in Barry reasoned that while Dr. Barry intended to jump, he believed he would, and intended to, land safely, and the fact that he did not land as expected constituted the accident. Barry, 131 U.S. at 121, 33 L. Ed. at 60, 9 S. Ct. at 762; Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 409.\nLater, in Yates v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 415 Ill. 16, 19, 111 N.E.2d 516 (1953), our supreme court commented that \u201cif an act is performed with the intention of accomplishing a certain result, and if, in the attempt to accomplish that result, another result, unintended and unexpected, and not the rational and probable consequence of the intended act, in fact, occurs, such unintended result is deemed to he caused by accidental means.\u201d\nIn Lyons, a homeowner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that his insurance company had a duty to defend him under his homeowner\u2019s policy against a neighbor\u2019s lawsuit. Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 405. The homeowner\u2019s policy at issue in Lyons provided coverage for \u201c \u2018damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence.\u2019 \u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 407. The homeowner\u2019s policy defined \u201coccurrence\u201d as \u201c \u2018an accident, including exposure to conditions, which result in: a. bodily injury; or b. property damage.\u2019 \u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 407. The Lyons court stated that \u201c[t]he focus of the inquiry in determining whether an occurrence is an accident is whether the injury is expected or intended by the insured, not whether the acts were performed intentionally.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 409.\nIn Lyons, the homeowner had built levees that intruded upon his neighbor\u2019s property. Although the homeowner had intentionally built the levees, \u201c[tjhe question determining policy coverage is whether he intended to build part of the levees over the property line onto the [neighbor\u2019s] property.\u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 409. As there was no evidence or even an allegation suggesting that the homeowner had intentionally built the levees so as to extend onto his neighbor\u2019s property, the insurance company had a duty to defend. Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 410-12.\nIn some states, the law distinguishes between insurance coverage for accidental injuries and coverage for injuries caused by accidental means. See Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Hallum, 276 Ga. 147, 576 S.E.2d 849 (2003); Collins v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 409 Mich. 271, 294 N.W.2d 194 (1980). \u201cAn accidental injury is an injury that is unexpected but may arise from a conscious voluntary act. In contrast, an injury from accidental means is one that is the unexpected result of an unforseen or unexpected act that was involuntary or unintentionally done.\u201d Hallum, 276 Ga. at 147-48, 576 S.E.2d at 851. Although Illinois does not distinguish between accidental means and accidental results (Marsh v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 790, 793, 388 N.E.2d 1121 (1979)), Georgia and Michigan do. The scenario present in the case sub judice has been handled in both those states with differing results.\nIn Hallum, a gynecologist suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome and was unable to continue practicing. Hallum, 276 Ga. at 147, 576 S.E.2d at 850. Dr. Hallum had a disability insurance policy with a schedule similar to the one in this case: if Dr. Hallum\u2019s disability was due to an injury, he received lifetime benefits; however, if the disability was due to sickness, then benefits ceased at age 65. Hallum, 276 Ga. at 147, 576 S.E.2d at 850. \u201cThe policy defines injuries to mean \u2018accidental bodily injuries occurring while your policy is in force.\u2019 Sickness is defined as \u2018sickness or disease which is first manifested while your policy is in force.\u2019 \u201d Hallum, 276 Ga. at 147, 576 S.E.2d at 850. Dr. Hallum had no disease associated with carpal tunnel syndrome; \u201cthe record shows that his condition was caused by thirty years of performing the hand motions required by his obstetrics/ gynecological practice.\u201d Hallum, 276 Ga. at 147, 576 S.E.2d at 850. The supreme court of Georgia held:\n\u201cThe insurance contract here uses the words \u2018accidental bodily injuries,\u2019 which, in the context of this policy, means a bodily injury that was unexpected, but could have arisen from a conscious or voluntary act. By using \u2018accidental\u2019 to modify \u2018bodily injuries,\u2019 as opposed to modifying the cause or means of any injuries, the Provident Life policy places the focus of the coverage on the injuries, not the means that caused the injury. Accordingly, an unexpected physical injury that disables the insured is covered as an \u2018injury\u2019 under this policy.\u201d Hallum, 276 Ga. at 148, 576 S.E.2d at 851.\nRegarding the insurance company\u2019s argument that Dr. Hallum\u2019s bodily injury had to be traceable to a discreet event, the Georgia Supreme Court found that argument was unsupported by the parties\u2019 contract and by Georgia law. Hallum, 276 Ga. at 148, 576 S.E.2d at 851.\nTwo Michigan cases have also been decided with similar facts: Nehra v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 454 Mich. 110, 559 N.W.2d 48 (1997), and Pearson v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., No. 204889 (Mich. App. January 22, 1999).\nIn Nehra, a dentist developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work and claimed disability benefits under a disability insurance policy that had the same schedule of benefits as the policy schedule in the case before us and similarly hinged those benefits on whether the disability was defined as an injury or a sickness. Nehra, 454 Mich. at 111-16, 559 N.W.2d at 48-50. The policy in Nehra defined \u201cinjury\u201d and \u201csickness\u201d as they are defined in the case sub judice. Nehra, 454 Mich. at 112, 559 N.W.2d at 49. A critical factor in Nehra, however, was that under Michigan no-fault insurance, \u201cno-fault benefits \u2018are not recoverable where the plaintiffs condition results from a series of events.\u2019 \u201d Nehra, 454 Mich. at 114 n.6, 559 N.W.2d at 49 n.6, quoting Mollitor v. Associated Truck Lines, 140 Mich. App. 431, 437, 364 N.W.2d 344, 346 (1985). Thus, the Nehra court held that the dentist was not entitled to the lifetime benefits for an \u201cinjury\u201d because (1) he suffered no discreet injury as \u201ccarpal tunnel syndrome is the product of prolonged repetition of hand movements\u201d (Nehra, 454 Mich. at 117, 559 N.W.2d at 51), and, as an aside, (2) he \u201crecognized the true nature of his disability when he initially identified it as a \u2018sickness,\u2019 not an \u2018accidental bodily injury\u2019 \u201d (Nehra, 454 Mich. at 118, 559 N.W.2d at 51).\nIn Pearson, a medical doctor experienced pain in his left shoulder, was treated using nonsurgieal measures, and continued working. Several years later, Dr. Pearson lifted a gas can and felt his shoulder pop. Following arthroscopic surgery, Dr. Pearson was unable to return to work. Dr. Pearson had a disability insurance policy that provided for lifetime benefits if a total disability was the result of injury, but benefits to age 65 if total disability was due to sickness. The Pearson policy defined \u201cinjury\u201d as \u201c \u2018accidental bodily injuries occurring while your [policy] is in force,\u2019 \u201d and \u201csickness\u201d as \u201c \u2018sickness or disease which is first manifested while your policy is in force.\u2019 \u201d Pearson, slip op at_. The Pearson court stated:\n\u201c[W]here the language of a policy requires only an accidental injury, it would be incongruous to enable an insurance company to refuse payment simply because a plaintiffs injuries were caused by a plaintiffs voluntary act. *** [W]e conclude that the distinction between accidental and non-accidental injuries lies between injuries that are caused by a discrete event and that are not intended or expected \u2014 whether they are the result of a voluntary triggering action or not \u2014 and injuries that either (1) are intended or expected or (2) are the result of a relatively gradual and prolonged process.\u201d Pearson, slip op. at_.\nThe Pearson court noted that Dr. Pearson\u2019s inability to work was directly related to his injury from picking up the gas can. The Pearson court distinguished Nehra by emphasizing that \u201cthe plaintiff in Nehra was unable to show that his injury was caused by a single, discrete event.\u201d Pearson, slip op. at_.\nHallum, Nehra, and Pearson agree that the voluntariness of an action is not determinative as to whether the resulting injury may be classified as an \u201caccidental bodily injury.\u201d Illinois courts have taken a similar stance when deciding what constitutes \u201caccidental\u201d for purposes of accidental death policies. Paul Revere argues that \u201c[a]ccidental death and dismemberment policies provide an instructive parallel\u201d to the case sub judice. We agree.\nPaul Revere cites to Kolowski for the proposition that \u201can impairment which develops as a consequence of normal activity is a \u2018sickness\u2019 \u2014 not an \u2018accidental injury\u2019 \u2014 even though the impairment was neither foreseeable nor expected.\u201d In Kolowski, a decedent\u2019s life was protected by a life insurance policy that provided death benefits but stipulated, \u201c \u2018[n]o Accidental Death and Dismemberment benefit is provided for loss caused by or resulting from,\u2019 among other things, \u2018sickness or disease.\u2019 \u201d Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1060. The decedent suffered from a heart condition and died of a heart attack while at work. Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.\nThe Kolowski court first determined that the decedent\u2019s heart attack was not accidental. The Kolowski court noted that the decedent\u2019s policy did not define \u201caccidental,\u201d but did define \u201caccident\u201d as \u201can unforseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrous character, or an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character.\u201d Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. The Kolowski court reasoned, \u201c \u2018[djeath is almost always accidental in the sense of unintended by the deceased, so if an accidental result sufficed, coverage would be assured regardless of the cause of death\u2019 \u201d (Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1062, quoting Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1052 (7th Cir. 1991)). Thus, a \u201cfatal heart attack, absent an unexpected or unforeseen triggering event, cannot be considered an accidental injury.\u201d Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. \u201cAs a general rule, in the absence of any unexpected or unforseen trauma, external force or event which causes or triggers a heart attack, it is presumed that the death is a death by natural causes, not by an accident.\u201d Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.\nThe Kolowski court examined whether the decedent\u2019s heart attack was triggered by an unexpected or unforseen trauma. Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. The Kolowski court determined that the decedent had not done anything other than carry out the normal responsibilities of his job in the days leading up to his heart attack and that, therefore, no triggering event had occurred. Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. Moreover, the court relied on testimony from a doctor that the decedent had suffered from cardiac disease, which the plaintiff failed to rebut and which would have exempted the decedent\u2019s beneficiary from benefitting under the policy. Kolowski, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1063-64.\nIn contrast, Dr. Carney cites to Marsh for the proposition that \u201cit recognizes that under Illinois law recovery is permitted under a policy if the result is accidental even though the means is intentional.\u201d In Marsh, recovery was sought for the death of a decedent resulting from an overdose of heroin. Marsh, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 790. The decedent\u2019s insurance policy insured against death by \u201c \u2018[accidental means *** independently of all other causes.\u2019 \u201d Marsh, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 791. The Marsh court found that \u201c[u]nder the Illinois cases recovery is permitted for a death if that result is accidental even though the means of destruction, here the injection of heroin, is intentional. \u2018 \u201cAccidental means\u201d has been held to be synonymous with \u201caccidental result\u201d and defined as something which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.\u2019 \u201d Marsh, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 791-92, quoting Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 230, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957).\nThe Marsh court compared the conduct of the decedent to conduct that was found to have caused death by \u201caccidental means\u201d in other Illinois cases involving similar insurance policy terms. Marsh, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 792-93. In Taylor, the decedent and others deliberately spilled 10 gallons of gasoline in a residence, intending to commit arson and collect from a fire insurance policy. However, the decedent was burned to death when he returned to the house to retrieve some articles and the furnace gas pilot light caused the gasoline to ignite. In Taylor, the decedent\u2019s death was found to have been caused by accidental means. Similarly, in Yates v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 415 Ill. 16, 111 N.E.2d 516 (1953), the decedent lost his balance and struck his head when he was pushed backwards, out of his home\u2019s front door and onto a porch that was lower than the floor of the house. Our supreme court held that the result was not so foreseeable to render the mishap a nonaccident for insurance purposes. Finally, in Rodgers v. Reserve Life Insurance Co., 8 Ill. App. 2d 542, 544-45, 132 N.E.2d 692 (1956), a decedent driver evidenced recklessness when driving 100 miles per hour on a country road at night, with warning of an approaching curve. However, although decedent driver \u201cclearly failed to exercise judgment, was careless, reckless, perhaps foolhardy, but it does not follow that he intended to destroy himself or imperil the lives of his guest passengers. His death was not the rational, natural and probable result of his intentional act and, upon the facts as they appear in this record, plaintiff is entitled to recover.\u201d Rodgers, 8 Ill. App. 2d at 553-54.\nThe Marsh court reasoned, \u201cIt appears that the danger of the insured\u2019s death from an unintended overdose was not more foreseeable than the conduct held to be accountable in Taylor, Rodgers and [Yates.]\u201d Marsh, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 793. The Marsh court concluded by emphasizing that Illinois courts do not distinguish between accidental means and accidental results; \u201c[t]hus, despite the fact that the means of destruction in the instant case, the act of self-injection, was intentionally caused by the decedent, the mishap must be regarded as an accident since the result of the intentional act, the death, was unintended.\u201d Marsh, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 797.\nThus, in Illinois \u201caccidental\u201d may mean either (1) an injury that is unexpected but may arise from a conscious voluntary act (accidental result) or (2) an injury that is the unexpected result of an unforseen or unexpected act that was involuntary or unintentionally done (accidental means). Therefore, Dr. Carney\u2019s voluntary acts, which resulted in his development of pronator teres syndrome, do not automatically exclude his receipt of benefits under the \u201caccidental bodily injury\u201d provision of the policy. Accordingly, we reject the analysis in Nehra and find Kolowski distinguishable.\nThe disability insurance policy in this case defines \u201cinjury\u201d to mean \u201caccidental bodily injury,\u201d and defines \u201csickness\u201d to mean \u201csickness or disease which first manifests itself while this policy is in force.\u201d The evidence in the record, specifically, the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Dwyer, shows that Dr. Carney did not have any disease or sickness associated with pronator teres syndrome. Rather, the record indicates that Dr. Carney\u2019s condition was caused by performing the hand motions required by his profession as a cardiovascular surgeon.\nAs stated, the policy here defines \u201cinjury\u201d as \u201caccidental bodily injury,\u201d which, in the context of this policy and under Illinois law, means a bodily injury that was unexpected but that could have arisen from a conscious or voluntary act. By using \u201caccidental\u201d to modify the phrase \u201cbodily injuries,\u201d the policy places the focus of the coverage on the injury and not the means that caused the injury. Accordingly, an unexpected physical injury that disables the insured and cannot be identified as a \u201csickness or disease\u201d is covered as an \u201cinjury\u201d under this policy. As Dr. Dwyer presented unrebutted testimony that Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was not the result of either \u201csickness or disease,\u201d under the policy and pursuant to Illinois law, Dr. Carney\u2019s injury may be classified as an \u201caccidental bodily injury,\u201d specifically, an \u201caccidental result\u201d and a consequence of his chosen profession.\nWe also briefly address Paul Revere\u2019s argument that Dr. Carney\u2019s classification of his disability as a \u201csickness\u201d for eight years demonstrated that he recognized his disability as such. Paul Revere points to no provision in the policy that states that once the insured terms his disability a sickness, he is barred from coverage under the injury provisions of the policy. The fact is the way in which Dr. Carney classified his disability in order to recoup benefits under the policy made no difference until he turned 65, eight years after he began filing claims for benefits. The benefits Dr. Carney was entitled to receive were the same until he reached age 65 whether classified as \u201ctotal disability \u2014 accident,\u201d or \u201ctotal disability \u2014 sickness.\u201d Therefore, we find unpersuasive Paul Revere\u2019s arguments that it relied on the claim forms filed by Dr. Carney prior to seeking a reclassification of his disability.\nWe find that the circuit court was correct in granting Dr. Carney\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Because the circuit court\u2019s decision is supported by the record, we need not address Paul Revere\u2019s remaining argument that the circuit court erred in applying workers\u2019 compensation law to determine Dr. Carney\u2019s disability was an \u201caccidental bodily injury.\u201d\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWOLFSON and HALL, JJ., concur.\nThe testimony of Dr. Carney and Dr. Dwyer stated that pronator teres syndrome was similar to carpal tunnel syndrome.\n\u201cDuodenum\u201d is defined as \u201cthe first part of the small intestine, extending from the pylorus to the jejunum.\u201d Webster\u2019s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 389 (1990).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Smith & Associates, of Chicago (Michael J. Smith and Warren Von Schleicher, of counsel), for appellant.", "Anthony G. Barone & Associates, EC., of Oak Brook (Anthony G. Barone, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANDRE CARNEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PAUL REVERE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20141852\nOpinion filed June 21, 2005.\nMichael J. Smith & Associates, of Chicago (Michael J. Smith and Warren Von Schleicher, of counsel), for appellant.\nAnthony G. Barone & Associates, EC., of Oak Brook (Anthony G. Barone, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0067-01", "first_page_order": 85, "last_page_order": 101 }