{ "id": 5596438, "name": "EROL YORULMAZOGLU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKE FOREST HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hospital", "decision_date": "2005-08-05", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20142763", "first_page": "554", "last_page": "566", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 554" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 382", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. App. 3d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3374144 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/48/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469375 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 1031", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033" }, { "page": "1033" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. App. 3d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5072373 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/166/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5154309 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087" }, { "page": "1087" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927647 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "820 N.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3217335 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300", "parenthetical": "\"Res judicata should be applied only as fairness and justice require, and only to facts and conditions as they existed at the time judgment was entered\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832339 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1042", "parenthetical": "\"Res judicata should be applied only as fairness and justice require, and only to facts and conditions as they existed at the time judgment was entered\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 1096", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5479353 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 P.2d 1167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10423809 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/705/1167-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Or. App. 943", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 8698557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "946" }, { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/43/0943-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 F.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10550402 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1175", "parenthetical": "\"A plaintiff cannot be precluded from bringing his own suit because he chose an attorney who participated in a prior suit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/833/1172-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 Or. App. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 499036 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "an attorney is not a party and does not control a legal action for purposes of finding privity" }, { "page": "1052", "parenthetical": "an attorney is not a party and does not control a legal action for purposes of finding privity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/170/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.W.3d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 11444148 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267", "parenthetical": "the mere fact that brokerage firm's officers and management company, which were being sued by investors, enlisted the services of the same attorney who defended the firm in prior suit did not prove privity" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/80/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2654587 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/128/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 F.3d 966", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11808290 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "973" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/162/0966-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1187", "parenthetical": "\"The rule is well established that all persons who are indispensable parties to an action must be joined or an order entered without jurisdiction over an indispensable party is null and void\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604763 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "982", "parenthetical": "\"The rule is well established that all persons who are indispensable parties to an action must be joined or an order entered without jurisdiction over an indispensable party is null and void\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265", "parenthetical": "\"Whenever a party has been omitted whose presence is so indispensable to a decision upon the merits that an order cannot be made without materially affecting his interests, the court should not proceed to a decision on the merits\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3112820 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "\"Whenever a party has been omitted whose presence is so indispensable to a decision upon the merits that an order cannot be made without materially affecting his interests, the court should not proceed to a decision on the merits\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487046 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292030 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 N.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544495 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "820 N.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "94", "parenthetical": "\"With respect to the doctrine of res judicata, there is no generally prevailing definition of 'privity' which can automatically be applied to all cases; that determination requires a careful examination into the circumstances of each case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3215591 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" }, { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473701 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569491 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 1274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1280" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 873", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2436042 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0873-01" ] }, { "cite": "826 N.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" }, { "page": "456", "parenthetical": "\"collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, so that, even where the threshold elements of the doctrine are satisfied, it will not be applied if an injustice would result\"" }, { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600315 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635-36" }, { "page": "636", "parenthetical": "\"collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, so that, even where the threshold elements of the doctrine are satisfied, it will not be applied if an injustice would result\"" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159505 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477544 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140034 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 N.E.2d 997", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5121464 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0297-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1205, "char_count": 28837, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0547355597812406e-07, "percentile": 0.7557732130328834 }, "sha256": "801b740398a6be816d651896921379d6337a0a2a635a86db2a5b551e5e78e764", "simhash": "1:12b87b715d4bded0", "word_count": 4745 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EROL YORULMAZOGLU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKE FOREST HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Erol Yorulmazoglu, appeals from the dismissal by the circuit court of Cook County, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(4) (West 2002)), of his petition seeking to vacate an arbitration award entered in a proceeding between plaintiff, two other claimants, and defendant, Lake Forest Hospital. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nIn August 1999, plaintiff, a physician, became an employee of defendant. Pursuant to a three-year employment agreement, plaintiff was employed as an oncologist in a division of the hospital named Deerpath Medical Associates. At the time, Deerpath Medical Associates (DMA) was staffed by approximately 32 physicians, all of whom had employment agreements with defendant. Pursuant to an arbitration clause in their employment agreements, plaintiff, along with fellow oncologists Rohit Shah (Shah) and Ira Piel (Piel) (collectively, the other two claimants), were claimants in an arbitration against defendant. The other two claimants initiated the arbitration on December 13, 2000. They also filed an action against defendant in the circuit court of Lake County (case No. 01 CH 14) (Lake County action). Plaintiffs attorney, who also represented the other two claimants, then requested that plaintiff be added to the arbitration. Defendant agreed, but requested that plaintiff also file a formal demand for arbitration. Plaintiff did so on March 15, 2001. Thereafter, plaintiff and the other two claimants pursued all of their claims together in the arbitration. The arbitration was pursued through the American Arbitration Association (AAA) as AAA case No. 51 160 00580 00.\nIn the arbitration, plaintiff and the other two claimants asserted breach of contract claims arising out of defendant\u2019s September 2000 unilateral decision to shut down DMA and its subsequent actions implementing that decision, which allegedly included offers of inducements and threats to other DMA physicians and the involuntary termination of those who did not cooperate. The arbitrator bifurcated the action into Phase I and Phase II. Phase I was limited to: (a) whether defendant had the right to terminate the physicians\u2019 employment agreements without cause; and (b) whether defendant breached a duty it owed to the claimants not to engage in an effort to break up DMA or to encourage substantially all other DMA physicians to leave the group and to actually implement such breakup without the consent of these physicians. At the end of the first phase, in a preliminary award, the arbitrator ruled in favor of claimants. All of the Phase I findings were confirmed in the final award at the end of Phase II. The arbitrator\u2019s final award found that defendant had breached its contracts with plaintiff and the other two claimants and that plaintiff was wrongfully discharged. The arbitrator also found, however, that all of the claimants failed to prove: (1) their breach of contract claim regarding billing and collection; (2) their claim that any alleged damages or loss of income was a result of the breach of contract; and (3) numerous other claims. As a result of the pending arbitration and the arbitrator\u2019s findings: (1) the other two claimants retained the value of their employment despite defendant\u2019s efforts to terminate them prior to the expiration of their employment contracts; (2) plaintiff remained employed for a year beyond the time most similarly situated physicians in his medical group were terminated or induced to leave the group; and (3) defendant was required to pay monetary damages to plaintiff and Piel. With respect to Phase I, the arbitrator awarded reasonable attorney fees to all claimants. In addition, the arbitrator awarded attorney fees to plaintiff and one of the other claimants with respect to the individual claims on which they prevailed. With respect to the final award, the arbitrator determined that defendant was the prevailing party on most of the claims. Thus, the arbitrator awarded defendant its reasonable attorney fees, which were determined to be $424,185, with the net amount being $344,283.\nOn April 7, 2004, plaintiff timely filed a \u201cVerified 710 ILCS Section 5/12 Petition to Vacate Certain Arbitration Awards\u201d (Cook County action), seeking to vacate all attorney fee awards granted by the arbitrator to defendant (including those of the other two claimants), and to remand certain issues already decided by the arbitrator for reconsideration. Neither of the other two claimants, however, filed a petition by the deadline for doing so. Instead, the other two claimants, who still had time remaining on their employment contracts with defendant, paid defendant the attorney fees allocable to them before February 8, 2004, which was the due date pursuant to the final arbitration award. Also, plaintiffs counsel, on behalf of the other two claimants, filed a motion to confirm the final arbitration award in the Lake County action. On April 22, 2004, the trial court in the Lake County action, pursuant to section 11 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/11 (West 2002)), entered an order confirming the final arbitration award.\nOn June 22, 2004, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs petition in the Cook County action pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 2002)). The basis for defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 motion was that plaintiff failed to allege any of the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award under section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/12 (West 2002)). The basis for defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion was that, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(4), the confirmation award entered in the Lake County action collaterally estopped plaintiff from seeking to vacate the final award. On August 19, 2004, the trial court in the Cook County action granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(4).\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nOur review of the trial court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiffs petition pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 is de novo. Casanova v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. App. 3d 80, 87, 793 N.E.2d 907, 914 (2003). Pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(4), where a plaintiffs claim is barred by a prior judgment, a defendant may seek an involuntary dismissal on a theory of collateral estoppel or res judicata. Dick v. Peoples Mid-Illinois Corp., 242 Ill. App. 3d 297, 303, 609 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1993). \u201cFor the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the following three requirements must be satisfied: (1) there was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) there is an identity of cause of action; and (3) there is an identity of parties or their privies.\u201d Evans v. General Motors Corp., 314 Ill. App. 3d 609, 617, 732 N.E.2d 79, 86 (2000), citing Downing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 162 Ill. 2d 70, 73-74, 642 N.E.2d 456 (1994). \u201cA party asserting collateral estoppel must show that (1) the issue previously adjudicated is identical to the question presented in the subsequent action; (2) a final judgment on the merits exists in the prior case; and (3) the party against whom estoppel is directed was a party to the prior litigation or is in privity with such a party.\u201d Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 312, 315-16, 668 N.E.2d 82, 86 (1996). Although there are distinctions between the doctrine of res judicata and the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see, e.g., LaSalle Bank National Ass\u2019n v. Village of Bull Valley, 355 Ill. App. 3d 629, 635-36, 826 N.E.2d 449, 455-56 (2005)), these distinctions are not at issue here.\nWhat is relevant to the instant case is that both doctrines only apply to later actions between the same parties or their privies. Board of Trustees of the Addison Fire Protection District No. 1 Pension Fund v. Stamp, 241 Ill. App. 3d 873, 878, 608 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (1993), citing Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill. 2d 491, 496-97, 546 N.E.2d 609 (1989). A nonparty may be bound under privity if his interests are so closely aligned to those of a party that the party is the virtual representative of the nonparty. Purmal v. Robert N. Wadington & Associates, 354 Ill. App. 3d 715, 723, 820 N.E.2d 86, 95 (2004). Defendant maintains that plaintiff was in privity with the other two claimants because plaintiffs claims in the arbitration were the same as the claims asserted by the other two claimants and because plaintiff availed himself of the Lake County action when that action was used to enforce a subpoena related to the arbitration. We agree with plaintiff that merely because persons are once in privity does not necessarily mean that they are always in privity. The relevant time for determining whether privity existed was April 22, 2004, when the order confirming the arbitration award was entered in the Lake County action. At that time, plaintiff argues, he was no longer in privity with the other two claimants because their interests diverged once plaintiff filed his petition to vacate the arbitration award on April 7, 2004.\nThe term \u201cprivity\u201d is not a precise one. Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Boyd, 286 Ill. App. 3d 911, 916, 678 N.E.2d 308, 311 (1997); accord Purmal, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 722, 820 N.E.2d at 94 (\u201cWith respect to the doctrine of res judicata, there is no generally prevailing definition of \u2018privity\u2019 which can automatically be applied to all cases; that determination requires a careful examination into the circumstances of each case\u201d). Certain authorities, including the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982), no longer use the term \u201cprivity.\u201d People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 296, 602 N.E.2d 820, 826 (1992); Diversified Financial, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 916, 678 N.E.2d at 311. Under Illinois law, \u201c[p]rivity is said to exist between \u2018 \u201cparties who adequately represent the same legal interests.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) Burris, 151 Ill. 2d at 296, 602 N.E.2d at 826; accord Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, 333 Ill. App. 3d 711, 718, 776 N.E.2d 730, 736 (2002); Financial, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 916, 678 N.E.2d at 311. Thus, the relevant inquiry here is whether plaintiffs interests were adequately represented in the Lake County action.\nAt the time the order was entered in the Lake County action, the other two claimants and defendant had made all of their required cash payments. At the time that the other two claimants sought the confirmation order, they had already paid their share of the attorney fee award and had passed up the deadline for filing a petition to vacate the award. At the time the Lake County court entered its order, the employment agreements between defendant and the other two claimants were still in effect. Although plaintiff asserts that the only aspect of the award that could benefit from confirmation was the finding that the other two claimants had not breached their employment agreements and that defendant had breached those agreements, nonetheless, the entire award was confirmed with respect to the other two claimants. Thus, plaintiffs contention that the attorney fee issue was not \u201cat stake\u201d is inaccurate. However, it can be said that plaintiffs interests, including the attorney fee payment as it affects plaintiff, were not adequately represented.\nAs this court has explained:\n\u201cThe policy concern here is to avoid a situation where everyone engages in litigation with the expectation that the matter will be finally resolved, but then when the judgment is entered, the loser argues that he is not bound by it, or his opponent is not entitled to its benefits, because he or the opponent was not a party or privy. \u2018[Tjhe party opposing the representative is entitled to assume that the representative participates in a way that will bind those whom he represents unless the circumstances warn the opposing party that there is doubt about the matter.\u2019 Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 42, Comment a, at 406 (1982). The question is whether there was justifiable reliance on the part of the opposing party.\u201d Diversified Financial Systems, Inc. v. Boyd, 286 Ill. App. 3d 911, 916, 678 N.E.2d 308, 311 (1997).\nHere, defendant was aware of plaintiffs pending petition to vacate the award in the Cook County action. While it may have served the interests of judicial economy for plaintiff to have been joined or added as an indispensable or necessary party in the Lake County action, that did not occur. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 97 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636, 423 N.E.2d 264, 265 (1981) (\u201cWhenever a party has been omitted whose presence is so indispensable to a decision upon the merits that an order cannot be made without materially affecting his interests, the court should not proceed to a decision on the merits\u201d); Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer, 213 Ill. App. 3d 957, 982, 572 N.E.2d 1169, 1187 (1991) (\u201cThe rule is well established that all persons who are indispensable parties to an action must be joined or an order entered without jurisdiction over an indispensable party is null and void\u201d). Apparently, section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (West 2004)) was also not raised at any point in either proceeding. Nonetheless, it can be said that while defendant may have justifiably relied on the fact that the other claimants would be bound by the entire award and that defendant is entitled to the benefits of that confirmation, it cannot be said that there was any justifiable reliance with respect to portions of the final award that affect plaintiffs interests alone. Plaintiff was not a named party in the Lake County action and defendant has failed to establish that plaintiff was in privity with the other two claimants in the Lake County action.\nDefendant has raised another argument, however, as to why plaintiff\u2019s interests were adequately represented; namely, that the same attorney who represented plaintiff in the Cook County action represented the other two claimants in the Lake County action. Plaintiff responds to defendant\u2019s argument as follows: \u201cin concluding privity was lacking, [the Seventh Circuit in Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 973 (7th Cir. 1998),] was not persuaded that the fact the parties were represented by the same counsel had any significance.\u201d In Tice, several airline pilots retained the same counsel for their age discrimination action as the one who had been retained by different pilots in a prior action essentially challenging the same policy. The court stated that this was not an improper practice that would support finding the action of those pilots was barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion. In the instant case, without condoning the methods that plaintiff\u2019s attorney selected in maintaining two separate actions on behalf of different clients, one of whom wanted to vacate the award, while the other two wanted to confirm the award, we do not believe that this fact alone means that privity existed between plaintiff and the other two claimants, such that plaintiff should be prevented from having his day in court.\nOur independent research has disclosed additional case law in Illinois, as well as from other jurisdictions, that has addressed the issue of whether employment of the same counsel by two parties establishes privity. In some of those cases, privity was not established from the mere fact of employment of the same counsel, while it has also been indicated that the appearance of the same attorney in both actions bolsters a finding of privity. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments \u00a7 663 (1995).\nIn one Illinois case, Earl v. Thompson, 128 Ill. App. 2d 32, 262 N.E.2d 320 (1970), the court decided that the mere fact that the same attorney represented both the insured in a personal injury action and later represented the insurer in the personal injury plaintiff\u2019s subsequent garnishment action did not make the personal injury action res judicata as to the garnishment proceeding because the issue of insurance coverage was not before the court in the personal injury action and the insurer defended under a reservation of rights; thus, there was no privity between the insured in the personal injury action and the insurer in the garnishment proceeding. There are several other cases from other jurisdictions that have concluded that the mere fact of employment of the same attorney by the two parties does not establish privity. See, e.g., Texas Capital Securities Management, Inc. v. Sandefer, 80 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App. 2002) (the mere fact that brokerage firm\u2019s officers and management company, which were being sued by investors, enlisted the services of the same attorney who defended the firm in prior suit did not prove privity); Steiner v. E.J. Bartells Co., 170 Or. App. 759, 763, 13 P.3d 1050, 1052 (2000) (an attorney is not a party and does not control a legal action for purposes of finding privity); Benson & Ford, Inc. v. Wanda Petroleum Co. 833 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987) (\u201cA plaintiff cannot be precluded from bringing his own suit because he chose an attorney who participated in a prior suit\u201d); Rynearson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 43 Or. App. 943, 946, 607 P.2d 738, 739 (1979) (concluding that, although the plaintiff was a witness in the prior litigation, he had not and could not have controlled the prior litigation, and therefore, he was neither a party nor in privity with a party in the prior case, even where his attorney conducted the other suit because \u201cthe attorney did so in his capacity \u2018as attorney for the plaintiff therein,\u2019 not as attorney for this plaintiff\u2019); accord Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation, 705 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah 1985).\nAn Illinois case in which the existence of privity was bolstered by the fact that the parties in both actions were represented by the same counsel is Johnson v. Nationwide Business Forms, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 631, 431 N.E.2d 1096 (1981), which involved two different creditors filing actions against a corporation alleging it was fraudulently dissolved. In Johnson, however, privity existed primarily because the two creditors had an identity of interest and their actions (one in state court; the other in federal court) were identical. In the instant case, although plaintiff was represented by the same counsel as the other two claimants, as explained earlier, his interests were not closely aligned with them because he was seeking to vacate the same award that they sought to confirm.\nBoth collateral estoppel and res judicata are equitable doctrines; thus, even if the threshold requirements are met, the doctrines should only be applied as fairness and justice require. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank National Ass\u2019n v. Village of Bull Valley, 355 Ill. App. 3d 629, 636, 826 N.E.2d 449, 456 (2005) (\u201ccollateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, so that, even where the threshold elements of the doctrine are satisfied, it will not be applied if an injustice would result\u201d); In re J\u2019America B., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042, 806 N.E.2d 292, 300 (2004) (\u201cRes judicata should be applied only as fairness and justice require, and only to facts and conditions as they existed at the time judgment was entered\u201d). \u201cCourts must balance the need to limit litigation against the right to a fair adversarial proceeding in which a party may fully present its case.\u201d LaSalle Bank National Ass\u2019n, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 643, 826 N.E.2d at 462. Because plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to present his position in the Lake County action, we conclude that fairness and justice require that we not apply collateral estoppel here. We further conclude that the mere fact that plaintiff employed the same counsel as the other two claimants in the Lake County action does not establish privity and should not deprive plaintiff of his day in court, particularly where defendant was aware of plaintiffs Cook County action. With the exception of the very zealous representation by its counsel in attempting to have the Cook County action dismissed, it cannot be said that defendant could have been reasonably justified in believing that the Lake County judgment would bind plaintiff. Thus, we hold that plaintiffs petition should not have been dismissed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.\nWe now address defendant\u2019s next argument, namely, that this court has the authority to dismiss plaintiffs petition pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even if that was not the ground relied upon by the trial court. We agree. Supreme Court Rule 366 provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[i]n all appeals the reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just, *** enter any judgment and make any order that ought to have been given or made, and make any other and further orders and grant any relief *** that the case may require.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5).\n\u201cIt is well settled that a court\u2019s review of an arbitrator\u2019s award is extremely limited [citation], in fact, more limited than appellate review of a trial court\u2019s decision.\u201d Herricane Graphics, Inc. v. Blinderman Construction Co., 354 Ill. App. 3d 151, 155, 820 N.E.2d 619, 623 (2004). \u201cCourts must construe arbitration awards, whenever possible, to uphold their validity.\u201d Perkins Restaurants Operating Co. v. Van Den Bergh Foods Co., 276 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309, 657 N.E.2d 1085, 1087 (1995). Thus, a court will grant a petition to vacate an arbitration award only in extraordinary circumstances. Canteen Corp. v. Former Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. App. 3d 167, 178, 606 N.E.2d 174, 181 (1992). The rationale for this is that \u201c[t]he purpose of arbitration is to foster the final disposition of disputes in an easier, quicker, and more economical manner than by litigation.\u201d Kalish v. Illinois Education Ass\u2019n, 166 Ill. App. 3d 406, 410, 519 N.E.2d 1031, 1033 (1988). When parties agree to submit a dispute to arbitration for a binding and nonappealable decision, they bargain for finality. Kalish, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 410, 519 N.E.2d at 1033. \u201cLimited judicial review fosters the long-accepted and encouraged principle that an arbitration award should be the end, not the beginning of litigation.\u201d Perkins Restaurants, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 309, 657 N.E.2d at 1087.\nUnder section 12(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/12(a) (West 2004)) (the Act), a court can vacate an arbitration award under the following circumstances:\n\u201c(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;\n(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any one of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;\n(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;\n(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5 [of the Act], as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or\n(5) There was no arbitration agreement ***.\u201d 710 ILCS 5/12(a) (West 2004).\nAs defendant correctly notes, plaintiff failed to allege any facts in his petition to vacate the award that would support any of these five prongs. Instead, plaintiff argues that the arbitration award can be vacated because of \u201cgross errors\u201d with respect to the arbitrator\u2019s attorney fee award.\nAs this court has explained:\n\u201cAlthough a court cannot vacate an award due to errors in judgment or mistakes of fact or law, a court can vacate an arbitration award where a gross error of law or fact appears on the award\u2019s face or where the award fails to dispose of all matters properly submitted to the arbitrator. [Citation.] To vacate an award based on a gross error of law, a reviewing court must be able to conclude, from the award\u2019s face, that the arbitrator was so mistaken as to the law that, if apprised of the mistake, he would have ruled differently. [Citation.] The burden is placed on the challenger to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an award was improper. [Citation.]\u201d Herricane Graphics, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 156, 820 N.E.2d at 624.\nSee also Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, 86 Ill. 2d 469, 427 N.E.2d 1199 (1981). Plaintiff has not met this burden.\nIn awarding attorney fees, the arbitrator made a specific finding that defendant \u201cwas the prevailing party with respect to this Final Award on most of the claims and a party need not prevail on all of its claims to be the prevailing party.\u201d Moreover, the arbitrator provided the reasoning behind the attorney fee awards. As the final award states: \u201cIn determining the reasonableness of attorneys\u2019 fees it is appropriate to consider all of the skills and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and the difficulties involved.\u201d The arbitrator also explained that, in determining the reasonableness of the fees awarded to claimants in Phase I, \u201cit [was] appropriate to review the \u2018lengthy manner\u2019 in which the Claimants presented the case.\u201d As the arbitrator explained: \u201cThe length of time in presenting its claims in part results from confusion and redundant testimony. The length of time reflected by [defendant] reflects the need for more than one lawyer present during the hearings given the number of exhibits and testimony of the Claimants\u2019 witnesses.\u201d Finally, the arbitrator explained his decision as follows:\n\u201cIn determining the reasonableness of attorneys\u2019 fees, it is appropriate to consider whether an inordinate amount of time has been spent on \u2018extraneous issues,\u2019 \u2018irrelevant exhibits,\u2019 [and] whether \u2018special circumstances\u2019 existed [sic] under Illinois law justified, denied or limited attorneys\u2019 fees. Spending more time litigating a dispute than is justified should be considered in determining the reasonableness of the attorneys\u2019 fees. The record reflects that the manner in which the case was tried was noted during the hearings.\u201d\nWe conclude that the award\u2019s face does not reveal any gross error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2004)), we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing plaintiffs verified petition to vacate certain arbitration awards. We affirm the confirmation of the final award with respect to plaintiff. Plaintiff shall pay, within 30 days after the date of this opinion, all amounts owed by plaintiff to defendant, plus interest pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1303 (West 2004)).\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN and NEVILLE, JJ., concur.\nAs noted in the final award, testimony in Phase I was completed in seven days on January 11, 2001. Evidentiary hearings in Phase II commenced on September 4, 2002, and ended on February 27, 2003. Additional hearings were held on August 5 and 25, 2003 (the transcript of these proceedings contains approximately 4,700 pages). Numerous preliminary and case management hearings were held and participated in by attorneys on various dates.\nThe petition was incorrectly filed in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County. Subsequently, an agreed order was entered transferring the case to the chancery division.\nWe agree, at least in some respects, with defendant\u2019s statement that plaintiff seeks to \u201chave his cake and eat it too.\u201d As defendant correctly notes, plaintiff has not challenged the facial validity of the confirmation order, but instead contests its applicability to him. Thus, so long as plaintiff is not challenging the validity of the Lake County order, plaintiffs prayer for relief must be limited to relief for himself only and not all claimants.\nWe note that \u201c[t]he rule requiring joinder of indispensable parties is not applied when a party, though not before the court in person, is so represented by others that his interest receives actual and efficient protection. [Citations.] This so-called \u2018doctrine of representation\u2019 applies where persons are before the court who have the same interests, and will be equally certain to bring them forward and protect them, as those of persons not before the court. [Citation.]\u201d Moore v. McDaniel, 48 Ill. App. 3d 152, 158, 362 N.E.2d 382, 387 (1977). We do not believe that the two claimants in the Lake County action who sought to confirm, the award had the same interests as plaintiff, who is seeking to vacate the award.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter M. Kelly, of Evanston (Peter M. Kelly, of counsel), for appellant.", "Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, L.L.E, of Chicago (Patrick S. Casey and Ami N. Wynne, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EROL YORULMAZOGLU, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LAKE FOREST HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20142763\nOpinion filed August 5, 2005.\nPeter M. Kelly, of Evanston (Peter M. Kelly, of counsel), for appellant.\nSidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, L.L.E, of Chicago (Patrick S. Casey and Ami N. Wynne, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0554-01", "first_page_order": 572, "last_page_order": 584 }