{ "id": 5596198, "name": "KECK AND ASSOCIATES, P.C., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN J. VASEY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Keck & Associates, P.C. v. Vasey", "decision_date": "2005-08-05", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20141717", "first_page": "566", "last_page": "571", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 566" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2852328 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910280 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3503397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "28-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780279 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.W.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Wis. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8677811 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/6/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828056 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" }, { "page": "75" }, { "page": "84" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073586 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448055 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0019-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 569, "char_count": 11031, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.273565774773492e-08, "percentile": 0.3869273845695251 }, "sha256": "b55f419417511d014aee6bb312e2af8f32f15cdf46c5b19b1e4c09942fbfc1f0", "simhash": "1:bbf297686b0ea1e8", "word_count": 1825 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KECK AND ASSOCIATES, P.C., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN J. VASEY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJohn Vasey decided, contrary to his attorney\u2019s advice, not to appeal from a final judgment the trial court entered against him in a case he brought against an insurance company. The attorney, who had agreed to accept a contingent fee for representing Vasey, sued Vasey to recover the reasonable value of the services he had provided. The trial court dismissed the attorney\u2019s complaint. The attorney now appeals. We find that a client\u2019s rejection of his attorney\u2019s advice to appeal from an adverse decision does not entitle the attorney to recover in quantum meruit.\nBACKGROUND\nIn 1999 State Farm Insurance Companies sent a letter to a number of the clients of Vasey, an insurance agent. Vasey thought that the letter libeled him. Vasey contacted Keck & Associates, a law firm, for help with litigation against State Farm. Keck sent Vasey a letter dated April 13, 2000, stating:\n\u201c[W]e propose to handle the *** case on the following terms:\n1. You will pay within 10 days of receipt, all our bills for legal time spent at our regular hourly rates until your payments have reached $10,000.00.\n2. If further work needs to be done (which it will), you will have no further obligation to pay our monthly bills for legal time. ***\n3. Any recovery in the case will be allocated between us as follows:\nFirst, to repay you your $10,000 and any out of pocket expenses you incurred; and then\nSecond, the balance as follows:\nJack Vasey 66.67%\nKeck & Associates, EC. 33.33%.\u201d\nVasey signed the letter, indicating his acceptance of the terms.\nKeck filed a lawsuit against State Farm on Vasey\u2019s behalf. State Farm moved for summary judgment. The motion judge denied the motion and the court assigned the case for trial. State Farm, at the trial judge\u2019s suggestion, renewed its motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted State Farm summary judgment on the complaint on December 10, 2002.\nOn January 2, 2003, Keck sent Vasey a letter encouraging Vasey to appeal from the trial court\u2019s decision. Keck added this advice:\n\u201cUnder Illinois law, a client who abandons his case or terminates the services of his contingent fee attorneys before the case\u2019s conclu sion, is liable for the reasonable value of his attorneys\u2019 services on his case. *** The Statement of Account shows a balance due of $273,183.10 ***.\nWe do not want you to have to pay for our services. We want State Farm to pay. But if you do not appeal, State Farm will no longer represent a source of payment.\n* * *\nBy *** preventing us from filing the Notice of Appeal, you would be denying us the right to recover our contingent fee for our services. In such case, you would be assuming responsibility to pay us the reasonable value of the legal services that we have rendered to you.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nVasey replied that he did not want Keck to file a notice of appeal. On January 8, 2003, Vasey sent a fax to Keck, stating:\n\u201cI have decided to accept State Farm\u2019s offer to waive charging me their costs in return for my agreeing not to appeal the case. Please inform State Farm\u2019s attorneys of my decision.\u201d\nKeck sued Vasey for the reasonable value of the services it provided before Vasey abandoned the lawsuit. Vasey moved to dismiss on grounds that the facts stated in the complaint showed that Vasey had fulfilled his obligations to Keck. The court found:\n\u201c[T]he contract *** was never intended to extend past the trial court stage. There was no agreement between the parties *** whereby the arrangement was to continue past the trial court. Moreover, Plaintiff placed no contract language nor alleged that Defendant agreed to go forth with an appeal merely on Plaintiff[\u2019]s strong recommendations alone.\u201d\nThe trial court dismissed the complaint. Keck now appeals.\nANALYSIS\nWe review de novo the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the lawsuit on the pleadings. Doe v. Chicago Board of Education, 213 Ill. 2d 19, 23-24 (2004). \u201c[A]n attorney discharged without cause is not entitled to recover contract fees from his former client but is limited to reasonable fees for services rendered.\u201d Rhoades v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 229 (1979). Vasey here discharged Keck after the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of State Farm. Keck argues that Vasey discharged it without cause, in violation of the contract, when he refused to appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nKeck agreed to \u201chandle the *** case\u201d against State Farm for a fee largely contingent upon Vasey\u2019s recovery. The contract makes no mention of an appeal. Keck points out that if Vasey chose to appeal from the decision, or if Vasey won a judgment and State Farm chose to appeal, the contract would obligate Keck to represent Vasey on appeal, with no addition to the contingent fee established in the contract. See Pocius v. Halvorsen, 30 Ill. 2d 73, 80 (1963).\nIn Pocius the plaintiff hired the defendant to represent her in litigation. The plaintiff signed an agreement that stated:\n\u201c \u2018[U]pon the signing of the decree in the Superior Court of Cook County *** said legal services are completed and I hereby agree to pay a sum equal to one-third of the reasonable value of the property or money contained in said Decree.\u2019 \u201d Pocius, 30 Ill. 2d at 75.\nThe circuit court signed a decree in favor of the plaintiff, but our supreme court reversed the judgment, and the plaintiff took nothing from her lawsuit. She sued the defendant for return of the amounts she had paid the defendant as his fee. Our supreme court refused to \u201cenforce the original contract literally.\u201d Pocius, 30 Ill. 2d at 84. The court noted that it had an obligation to scrutinize the contingent fee contract: \u201c \u2018A contingent fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the courts as to its reasonableness.\u2019 \u201d Pocius, 30 Ill. 2d at 83, quoting Tonn v. Reuter, 6 Wis. 2d 498, 504, 95 N.W.2d 261, 265 (1959). Because enforcement of the contract as written would be \u201cunfair to the plaintiff and *** absolutely contrary to public policy\u201d (Pocius, 30 Ill. 2d at 84), the court construed the contract instead as one contingent on a recovery following all necessary appeals. The court found that the agreement, literally interpreted, unambiguously entitled the defendant to keep the fee, but the court closely scrutinized the contract to reach a result that protected the defendant\u2019s client.\nThe reasoning of Pocius accords with Rhoades, where the court similarly explained the need to protect clients from unreasonable fee demands from attorneys following discharge:\n\u201cTo require the client to pay the discharged attorney the full contract fees would make the right to discharge even without cause largely meaningless since the client\u2019s contractual financial responsibility to the discharged attorney would be unchanged.\u201d Rhoades, 78 Ill. 2d at 229.\nThus, the court held in Rhoades that a discharged attorney could not seek contractual fees, and the attorney could recover in quantum meruit only on a showing that the client discharged him without cause.\nHere, the agreement unambiguously provides that Keck would handle the case to its completion, but the agreement says nothing about an appeal. The case concluded when the trial court entered a final judgment and Vasey chose not to appeal. The client, and not his attorney, must decide whether to appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment. See People v. Griffith, 158 Ill. 2d 476, 493 (1994); Herbster v. North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance, 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 29 (1986). Nowhere in the contract did Vasey surrender his right to decide whether to appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment. Requiring Vasey to pay Keck hourly fees, far in excess of the contractual contingent fee, would make the right to decide whether to appeal largely meaningless.\nVasey kept Keck as his counsel through the completion of the case. The final judgment entered against Vasey gave him cause to discharge his attorney. Vasey did not discharge Keck without cause, and therefore Vasey does not lose the protection of his contingent fee contract. Keck\u2019s failure to win a judgment from the trial court leaves Keck with no right to recover further fees from Vasey.\nKeck contends that Much Shelist Freed Denenberg & Ament, P.C. v. Lison, 297 Ill. App. 3d 375 (1998), requires a different result. In that case the plaintiff agreed to represent the defendant for a contingent fee in a lawsuit against the defendant\u2019s landlord. After the trial court dismissed the initial complaint without prejudice, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on the defendant\u2019s behalf. The defendant settled its claim and the court dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff then sued for the reasonable value of its services. The appellate court found that the defendant became liable in quantum meruit when it discharged the plaintiff. Much Shelist, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 380.\nWe have some doubt that the result in Much Shelist comports with the reasoning of Rhoades, because the court imposes a severe burden, far in excess of fees provided in the contingent fee contract, on the litigant\u2019s right to settle his claim. See Herman v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co., 41 Ill. 2d 468, 476 (1969); Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 28-29. Nonetheless, Much Shelist involves circumstances distinguishable from those involved in this case. In the underlying litigation in Much Shelist, the trial court had not entered a final judgment before the defendant settled the case and discharged the plaintiff. An amended complaint remained pending at the time of the termination of the plaintiffs representation. The appellate court implicitly found that the defendant discharged the plaintiff without cause prior to the completion of the contract period of representation. Here, the trial court had entered a final judgment against Vasey before Vasey discharged Keck. Because the contract provided for termination at the conclusion of the case, and the contract did not purport to deprive Vasey of the right to decide whether to appeal from an adverse decision, Vasey did not discharge Keck without cause and Vasey did not violate the terms of the contingent fee contract. Even if Much Shelist accurately reflects the law, it does not require reversal here.\nVasey had cause to discharge Keck, without violating the contract, when the trial court entered a final judgment against Vasey. Because Keck has not shown discharge without cause, it is entitled to only its contingent fee as of the termination of the litigation. Vasey already paid all fees required by the contract. Therefore we affirm the trial court\u2019s dismissal of Keck\u2019s claim for recovery in quantum meruit.\nAffirmed.\nFITZGERALD-SMITH, EJ., and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert C. Keck, Jr., of Keck & Associates, EC., of Chicago, for appellants.", "Warren Lupel and Jonathan L. Loew, both of Weinberg Richmond, L.L.E, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KECK AND ASSOCIATES, P.C., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JOHN J. VASEY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20141717\nOpinion filed August 5, 2005.\nRobert C. Keck, Jr., of Keck & Associates, EC., of Chicago, for appellants.\nWarren Lupel and Jonathan L. Loew, both of Weinberg Richmond, L.L.E, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0566-01", "first_page_order": 584, "last_page_order": 589 }